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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
This study explores the development of the Maltese public service 
during a period that stretches from the beginning of the nineteenth century 
to the outbreak of World War Two, and its role, during that period, in the 
administrative politics of the islands. The phrase 'administrative 
politics' has been borrowed from Peter Self and refers to the relationship 
between administration and its political environment.[1] However, the term 
'political environment' is used here in a much wider sense than that 
intended by Professor Self for it also refers to the Physical and 
socio-economic as well as the purely political environment. The aim of this 
Chapter is to map the territory that this study will be concerned with, to 
outline the specific aims of the research and to discuss the conceptual 
framework from which they have been derived. It will also examine the 
research methods that were available to the author.
WHY A STODY OF THE MALTESE PUBLIC SERVICE?
Harrison Smith has argued that there is a 'seemingly exaggerated focus 
created around Maltese constitutional history.'[2] One reason for this, 
according to Smith, may be found in the stormy events that gave rise to the 
tide of constitutional ebb and flow that has characterised Maltese 
constitutional development.[3] As the Report of the Commission sent out to 
investigate Maltese political affairs in 1931 stressed, it was possible for 
one to plot a graph that shows the rise and fall of constitutions in 
Malta.[4] This process, this constitutional see-saw, even without the 
kaleidoscope of detail that accompanied it, may also have had a fascination 
for students of Maltese and colonial constitutional history. As Dennis 
Austin has observed, 'the single case of Malta fits uneasily' within a 
conceptual framework that views history as a consistently linear process,
i.e. a view that argues
'that this particular set of events marked the decisive watershed of change 
from which there was no going back...on the transfer of power to colonial
leaders.'[5]
Another reason, perhaps, for this overwhelming concern with Maltese 
constitutional development may have been the domination of this process by 
powerful Maltese leaders. Several historians, both local and foreign, have 
been entranced by these colourful, if sometimes, pugnacious personalities 
and their inpact on the constitutional ups and down of this micro-state. 
Austin's anticipation of 'a marvellous portrait gallery' that might be 
presented in the future, is indicative of this fascination.[6]
This excessive fascination with constitutional history has, however, 
had its drawbacks. Many areas of modern Maltese history and politics, with 
the exception of the history of the Malta siege during World War Two, and 
that of the relations between Church and State in Malta,[7] have remained 
virtually unexplored. There exists as yet no studies of Maltese political 
thought or of the system of Maltese public administration or of the Maltese 
public service. Studies of legal aspects of public administration do exist 
but these are the works of legal minds and are strictly concerned with 
legal issues. A leading example of such studies is 'Governmental Liability 
in Malta', by W.P. Gulia, once senior Crown Counsel and Lecturer in 
Administrative Law at the University of Malta but presently a High court 
Judge.[8]
There are good reasons which explain this lack of concern with Maltese 
government and politics. Apart from the over concern with constitutional 
history noted above, there has been, traditionally, a shunning away from 
the 'political' by Maltese academics. This tradition began under the 
autocratic rule of the Order of St John which governed Malta from 1530 to 
1798. The publication of any article or treatise on political matters was 
forbidden, as was the private ownership of printing presses.[9] This policy 
was continued by Britain until 1838, when the Earl of Glenelg, who at the 
time was Colonial secretary, approved the introduction of press 
freedom. [10] Until about the same time the teaching of politics as an
academic discipline had not found its place in the curriculum of the local 
university. A Chair of Political Economy was created in 1839, but was 
abolished in 1844. Its incumbent, Dr Sciortino, was dismissed shortly 
before the chair was suppressed because the newspaper of which he was also 
editor, 'il Portafoglio Maltese', was outspoken in its criticism of the 
local government.[11] The local university was at the time, (and still 
practically is), administered like any other government department and as 
the Governor of the time remarked, it was 'hard that the Government should 
be slandered and villified by one who obtains his principal means of living 
from the Government.'[12] One result of this development was that the study 
of politics and public administration remained, until fairly recently, 
excluded as an academic discipline within the University of Malta.[13]
This study of the Maltese public service cannot by itself fill the 
enormous gaps that exist in our knowledge of Maltese political affairs or 
indeed of its public administration. What it seeks to do is to demonstrate 
in a conclusive manner the richness of available material and to lay firm 
foundations for other students to build upon. In its writing, no less than 
one hundred and forty years of original documents have been examined 
comprising over 800 volumes. Several issues are examined in detail while 
others are touched upon in sufficient detail in the hope that other related 
research in this area is encouraged.
HISTORICAL BOUNDARIES OF STUDY
The theme of this study is predominantly historical. It is a study 
that seeks to trace the historical development of the Maltese public 
service in the years 1800-1940. The year 1800 has served as a convenient 
departure point for quite a few historical studies about Malta.[14] This is 
understandable when one considers that the dawn of the nineteenth century 
could not have been less eventful for Malta than it was. Within the space 
of two years the islands had exchanged the centuries old rule of the 
Knights of the Order of St John, first in 1798 for that of France, and in
1800 for that of Britain. [15] The sequence of events that led to this 
development was both abrupt and stormy. The rule of the Order of St John 
which had lasted since 1530 was toppled by Napoleon within forty-eight 
hours and without any notable resistance.[16] That of the French lasted 
only two years. Indeed, French rule was only effective for a few months for 
the Maltese had risen in revolt against them and were, until their 
capitulation to the British who had come to assist the Maltese, blockaded 
in the city-fortress of Valletta.[17] This extraordinary train of events 
which culminated in 164 years of direct British rule has been viewed by 
some historians as the watershed which propelled Malta into the modern 
era.[18] It is beyond the scope of this study to explore the correctness of 
the latter assertion, but for other reasons, more directly related to a 
study of the Maltese public service, I shall also argue that the year 1800 
provides a convenient departure point for this study too.
The Maltese public service was not, strictly speaking, a creation of 
British rule after 1800. Indeed, Chapter Two will demonstrate that there 
existed in Malta, prior to this period, a vast and complex administration 
and that the roots of some of its structures were centuries old.[19] 
However, when Britian took control of Malta in 1800 this administration was 
in ruins. The profits and revenues from Europe that had sustained this 
complex activity had been confiscated by France, while French invasion and 
Maltese insurrection had completely disrupted government activity in the 
islands.[20] The responsibility for reconstructing the administration of 
the islands and of finding new sources of revenue to sustain its activities 
devolved on Britain. The fact that British notions of administration were 
not paternalistic,[21] as had been the case with the Order, suggests that a 
reconstructed administration may, while retaining old structures, exhibit 
new directions. These issues provide a first justification.
The second justification derives from the change of status that Malta 
experienced after 1800. Under the Government of the Order of St John, Malta
was a de facto sovereign state.[22] The Grandmaster was vested with all the 
powers of government and no other sovereign had any jurisdiction over the 
islands. Valletta was the capital of this island-state and from it the 
Order administered the islands and its estates in Europe. After 1800 the 
status of the island changed dramatically. Under British rule Malta became 
no more than a dependency of Britain, part of its world-wide Enpire, 
another extension of British sovereignty. Control and scrutiny of its 
administration and finances passed from Valletta to London, where they 
became the responsibility of a Secretary of State at Westminster.[23] On 
the spot, the conduct of that administration was not the responsibility of 
the sovereign, but of his representative. This system of administration by 
proxy, as it were, contrasts with the previously more direct rule of the 
Order, and suggests new patterns of authority structures between government 
and governed.
Deciding the cut-off point for this study proved, however, to be less 
straightforward because more than one date suggested itself. Maltese 
political history, after 1800, has been generally characterised by three 
related features. The military role played by Malta as a British fortress, 
was the most consistent of these features. Most British Governors tended to 
be military officers and the island continued to serve as a British 
military base, even after its independence.[24] A second feature, was the 
variety of Crown Colony constitutions that the island had.[25] Throughout 
the period 1800-1921 the status of the island remained that of a Crown 
Colony, some constitutions allowing for limited electoral representation. 
After 1921 and until independence in 1964, self-governing constitutions 
became an inportant feature of Maltese politics, but even so, Crown Colony 
government accounted for eighteen out of the forty three years.[26]
A third feature of Maltese political history is to be found in the
island's struggle for self-government. This struggle was itself an almost
constant feature of the period 1800-1921. Independence did not become an
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important issue until the late 1950's, although the idea was first floated 
in the beginning of that decade.[27] The 1921 Constitution gave the island 
a watered down version of responsible government. It allowed for party 
competition, an elected assembly and ministerial government, but many 
important areas of government remained in British hands.[28] After 1880, 
the movement for self-government became centered on what became known as 
the 'language issue', i.e. Britain's attempt to replace Italian, at the 
time the language of education and administration, with English, and the 
resistance of some of the leading sectors of Maltese society to such 
attempts.[29]
Because of the continuity that can be discerned in the 1800-1921 
period most studies of Maltese political history stop at 1921.[30] The year 
1921 provided these studies with a convenient cut-off point for a study of 
the struggle for self-government and the intervening constitutions until 
this was tenporarily achieved. In this case, however, using 1921 as the 
cut-off point for this study of the Maltese public service was inadequate 
since the initial intention had been to produce a historical study of the 
public service and Maltese public administrationwhich will provide a basis 
for further research. That is, a study that examines the public service 
within a changing political environment, i.e. during a period of strict 
colonial military rule characterised by a struggle for self-government 
(1800-1921), during periods of self-government characterised, as they tend 
to be, by party competition and cabinet government (1921-33) and (1947-59), 
and during the transitional period to independence (1959-1964). For this 
reason, 1964, the year of independence appeared to be the best cut-off date 
that would serve such research objectives. However, given the detailed 
analyses required, this time period would have proved overwhelming. To do 
justice to detail and to capture the pattern of change and transition the 
period up to 1940 was used as the delineator.
Using 1940 as the cut-off point has several advantages. It allows an
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examination of the public service during a period that involved two
successive forms of government, Crown Colony government and
self-government. The impact on the public service of the struggle for
self-government and of the introduction of party competition can also be
examined. An examination of the issues that were carried forward from Crown
Colony Government and how these were tackled under self-government, may
also provide interesting insights. For example, it would be possible to
examine the impact that the language question (1880-1940) had over many
aspects of the public service. This controversy was the most disrupting
issue of the pre-second World War period. It created divisions in Maltese
society, disrupted education and was responsible for the withdrawal of a
number of 'liberal' Crown Colony constitutions between 1800-1921 and of
self-government in 1933. The whole issue, however, was abruptly resolved in
1940, when the Italian airforce bombed Malta.[31] Each of these reasons
provide enough justification for making 1940 the cut-off point of this
research. In any case, the issues that influenced the development of the
public service in the post-war period would appear to be of a different
character. Rather than self-government and language they had to do with
class politics, welfare and development policies, independence and the
closing down of the British fortress.[32]
THE MAIN THEMES OF THE RESEARCH
A study that attempts to chronicle the institutional or structural
development of a public service may be considered useful when, as in the
case of the Maltese public service, little is known or has been written
about it. The story of 'creation' and of later 'evolution' of government
departments, of expanding structures, of new tasks replacing old, and of
salaries and pensions, will always have to be told in any first study. But
these on their own tell us very little about a public service unless they
are examined and discussed within what Professor Self calls, the
"administrative politics" of the system. [33] They tell us little or
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nothing, for example, about the position of the administration within the 
overall system of government, the behaviour of public servants, or the 
impact of outside forces on its composition, structures and tasks. This 
study aims to avoid these pitfalls by relating, as observed earlier, the 
historical development of the Maltese public service between 1800 and 1940, 
to its social, economic and political environment.
As will be seen below, the themes or propositions of this research are 
rooted in this approach. These propositions are:
1. That for a good part of the nineteenth century, the tasks and 
practices of the Maltese public service remained essentially similar to 
those that had characterised it under the "ancien regime", and that it was 
in the second half of that century that the drift away from traditional 
structures and tasks began to make itself, however slowly, evident.
2. It will be argued that three main factors were largely responsible 
for this pattern of continuity and resistance to change, namely, Malta's 
strategic location and military role, the island's weak and dependent 
economy, and the small geographic size of the islands.
3. That as a result of the combination of all these aspects, the role 
played by the Maltese public service during the period under review in this 
study was of a "dirigiste" or "political-managerial" character.
PROPOSITION ONE
Proposition One assumes continuity. It was observed a little earlier
that it will be argued in this study that the Maltese public service was
not a creature of British colonial rule, but that the roots of seme of its
structures were centuries old. This proposition assumes that unlike the
case of some other British colonies at the time of their founding, notably
in North America, Africa and Australasia, the government of this
archipelago was endowed with an administrative structure of a type
generally found in Europe. The notion that the Maltese public service
preceded the introduction of British rule in Malta inevitably raises the
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question of continuity. An investigation of what structures existed and 
what tasks were preformed becomes crucial to an understanding of 
developments as they occurred in the following decades. That this is so can 
be seen from examples furnished by other studies of both government and of 
administration in other countries.
Professor Birch notes, for example, that 'the development of liberal 
institutions changed the British political system without completely 
transforming it. The "chain-of-command" concept of government was 
superimposed on the older system of balance but the old institutions were 
not abolished. It is, he writes,
'not part of the British political tradition to do away with established 
institutions and the modern constitution abounds with practices and offices 
which have survived from medieval times.'[34]
Steel makes a similar point arguing that in Britain
'the system of government has developed gradually with only a few sharp 
breaks in its evolution. Many of the important institutions and processes 
have their origins in the nineteenth century and earlier.'[35]
Continuity, however, was not confined to British political and 
administrative institutions. Ernest Barker wrote of France that it might 
have been expected that the doctrines of the Revolution would 'obliterate 
the past...', but the past could not be shed as easily as the 
revolutionaries had hoped. The revolution, he argued, 'retained the 
administrative machine of the past, but gave it a new motive power.'[36] In 
a similar manner, Woodrow Wilson had argued that the French revolution had 
'removed all the foundations of French politics, but scarcely any of the 
foundations of French administration.'[37] Support for this view comes also 
from Howard Machin who notes that the evolution of the French 
administrative system appears to have been 'a slow stable process.'[38]
In the case of the Maltese public service too, therefore, the
assumption of continuity appears to be reasonable. According to Professor
Vella, under the government of the Order of St John, 'the bureaucratic
machinery of government became more complex and far reaching.'[39] This
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'bureaucratic machine' derived its rationale from the dual role that the 
Order enjoyed, that is, that of Government of Malta and that of an 
international Order of Knights Templars. In response to the first, the 
Order was responsible for minting currency, financing the defence of the 
islands, and for the administration of the courts, the police, public 
works, hospitals, charitable institutions, the water supply, and the 
provision of grain imports.[40] As an international Order, the 
administration of the Order was responsible for vast estates and revenues 
in Europe. The profits from these estates and the revenues came into the 
island in different monetary form and the Order's Treasury was obliged to 
act as a general bank.[41] Although the events in revolutionary Europe, the 
expulsion of the Order from Malta, and the introduction of British colonial 
rule may have deprived the local administration of some of its tasks, 
especially those of a trans-national character, some functions would have 
remained unchanged.
But apart from continuity, proposition one involves a second
assumption, namely, that in the latter part of the nineteenth century
changes occurred which were of such a nature that the service began to shed
some of its old structures and tasks. This too appears to be a reasonable
assumption. As changes occurred in Britain and in the British Empire it
would be fair to assume that some of these changes filtered down to the
Maltese public service and that the latter too began to assume a more
modern appearance. At this stage the choice of the latter part of the
nineteenth century as the marker for these changes, must be seen as quite
arbitrary. Its sole justification, however, rests on the fact that it was
at about this time that important changes took place within the Indian and
British civil service, the two bodies which may be considered as the two
most important institutions in British and colonial administration. Two
examples may be cited at the present juncture, i.e., the introduction of
competitive examination for recruitment to the Indian Civil Service [42]
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and the division in Britain (after 1870) of the general civil service into 
grades or classes.[43]
PROPOSITION TWO
Proposition two is derived from and remains concerned with the issues 
raised in proposition one. It sets out to identify the main factors or 
ingredients which constituted the environment and which, it is assumed, 
were responsible for such continuity within the Maltese public service. 
Three main factors are identified as being largely responsible. The first 
of these was Malta's strategic location and military role. Lying as they do 
at the very heart of the Mediterranean, between mainland Christian Europe 
and Islamic North Africa, the Maltese islands had long been considered of 
strategic value.[44] The arrival of the Knights of the Order of St John 
served to increase this strategic value. From the security of Malta's 
harbours, the Order's navy sallied forth to harass and attack Ottoman 
shipping and that of its vassals, the Barbary States.[45] The island's 
harbours were secured by an imposing chain of fortifications and these 
fortifications were to prove their worth in the great Turkish siege of 
1565.[46] Recognition of Malta's strategic importance was now inpressed 
upon many European States and some of them invested funds in its defences 
in order that the island may continue to carry out its fortress role in the 
interests of Christendom.[47]
Historical studies of nineteenth and twentieth century Malta also tend
to emphasise the island's strategic importance and its role as a fortress.
Koster, in his study of church and state in Malta describes British
administration as fortress administration, noting that 'Wellington's
assertion that Malta should be ruled as the "foredeck of an admiral's
flagship" may be an extreme assertion of this policy', but the fact of the
fortress conditioned much of Maltese politics.[48] This very same point is
stressed by three other historians, viz Frendo, Smith, and Dobie.[49]
Zammit, a sociologist, also points to the fortress as a crucial influence
11
in his study of power, work and class structure in Malta. He argues that
Britain 'retained a narrowly defined aim towards Malta, namely, that of 
exploiting its strategic value.'[50] He too argues that in this respect, 
British policy in Malta was no more than that which had been pursued by the 
Order of St John. '...In important respects,' he writes, 'the British took 
on the role which had been left vacant by the Knights.'[51] An 
investigation of the influence of the fortress on the development of the 
Maltese public service, the pivot upon which colonial administration in 
Malta rested throughout the whole of British rule seems, at this stage,
therefore, to be both relevant and crucial.
The second ingredient which it is said may have exercised particular 
influence on Maltese public administration was the island's weak and 
dependent economy. W.A. Charlton in his study of the Maltese economy and 
its effects on the demography of the island concludes that the Maltese 
economy had progressed from a situation of considerable dependence on 
outside sources of wealth in the eighteenth century to one of complete
dependence by this century.[52] Charlton demonstrates that, by and large, 
as the nineteenth century progressed, economic activity in the islands
became centred upon the fortress and other imperial interests, such as the 
coal bunkering trade which serviced the route to India.[53]
The fact that economic activity was so constrained might have resulted 
in the public service becoming a focus of attention, in different ways, to 
different sectors of society for work, education and other services. There 
is evidence to suggest, as will be developed in this study, that this is a 
very valid assumption. It is in this sense that the issue of the island's 
economy may be relevant to this study of the Maltese public service.
Finally, a third factor which is assumed to have influenced the
development of the Maltese public service was the small geographic size of
the islands. Smallness is a feature that has gained' academic prominence
over the past three decades and it can be said that the attempt to define
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"smallness" is fairly recent.[54] Interest in the study of small polities 
has been greatly inspired by the emergence, since World War Two, of several 
such polities as independent states on the international stage. As a 
consequence, the literature on small states has been mainly concerned
either with the question of viability of small states or with prescribing
options by which that viability, economic and/or political, could be 
achieved.[55] Two general points may be made about the literature.
First, that various conferences and studies on small states have 
failed to decide with any degree of precision what "smallness" means. There 
has been a tendency, as a result, to adopt arbitrary definitions of 
smallness.[56] One of the most recent studies on small states, for example, 
has adopted a population of one million or less as the essence of a small
state.[57] It may be said that Malta would fit a definition of a small
state both in terms of population and area size. In the period covered by 
this study the Maltese population ranged from about 100,000 persons in 1800 
to about 250,000 in 1940.[58] In terms of area size the Maltese islands 
cover only an area of 120 square miles.
Second, most of the literature on small states deals with polities in
a post colonial stage of development. In this sense many of the conclusions
arrived at in these studies are not always supported by historical
evidence. Lowenthal observes, for example, that the governments of small
states are both large and interventionist, 'in general', he writes,
'a government's share of total enterprise varies inversely with state size. 
Any state requires an irreducible minimum of infrastructure, and the 
smaller the state the larger its government looms in its economy and 
society.'[59]
However, an IMF study published in 1983 seems to point to British 
colonialism rather than to size as the main cause for this.[60] It 
concludes that
'those countries that have been most influenced by the British Commonwealth 
system of government appear to employ larger numbers of government civil 
servants in administration than do other countries.'[61]
In the circumstances, there seems to be a general consensus that many of
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the conclusions reached are speculative in nature rather than empirically 
based and that more research is needed.[62] This study by positing size as 
one of the factors that influenced the development of the Maltese public 
service seeks to make a contribution to the study of small states. This 
study, however, because it is spread over a substantially large period of 
history, has the added advantage of allowing for a better identification of 
those features related or associated with size, and it is, perhaps, better 
placed to test whether it is size or colonial heritage that is responsible 
for the large bureaucracies to be found in small states.
PROPOSITION THREE
Proposition three is derived and remains concerned with the issues 
raised in the other two propositions. It assumes that these three main 
factors together determined, more than others, not only the way the Maltese 
public service developed but the kind of role it played. It argues that as 
a consequence of strategic interests, a weak and dependent economy and the 
pressures of geographic size, the Maltese public service had to perform a 
"dirigiste" or political management role. In a position of scarce resources 
and the restrictions imposed by smallness it was also responsible for 
reconciling British strategic needs with those of the population, zammit 
has observed that 'military efficiency partly depends upon civilian 
cooperation',[63] but, in the absence of local popular institutions, it was 
the public service which provided the means by which this could be done.
The vast literature on colonial government also seems to make this 
assumption worth pursuing. Sir Anthony Bertram, a colonial civil servant, 
describes crown colonies as 'bureaucratically governed countries.'[64] 
Lennox. Mills, in his study of Ceylon, notes that 'the Civil Government was 
carried on by members of the...civil service',[65] while Hall refers to 
senior civil servants as "ministers".[66] Sir Edward Blunt, once a leading 
member of the Indian Civil Service, lamenting the demise of crown colony 
government in that part of the empire wrote that
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'many regretted that reduction of their official authority...the sacrifice 
of efficiency to political expediency...[and] that the position of the 
civilian of the future will differ considerably from that of his 
predecessor of twenty years ago. Where his predecessor took action, he must 
ask for orders; where his predecessor gave orders, he must advise. The 
civilian who used to serve by ruling must learn to rule by serving.. .He has 
ceased to be the kindly despot of former days; he has become the trusty 
servant.'[67]
In Africa the situation was quite similar for as Adu points out 'the civil 
Service...was the effective government,' right up to independence.[68] 
Finally, the description of colonial officials by Fieldhouse as 'grand 
functionaries in the tradition of European bureaucracy under the ancien 
regime',[69] seems to drive the point home. The impression conveyed by 
these expressions is that colonial civil servants rather than being neutral 
or subordinate participants in the policy making process were actually the 
responsible party. It was they who governed.
In the case of the Maltese public service, however, proposition three 
argues that a combination of factors conspired to give civil servants a 
role that went beyond mere government. On its activity depended the 
economic and social welfare of the vast majority of the people, zammit
wrote that
'The ability of the government to provide direct and indirect employment
became the determining factor in the living standard of the population as a 
whole.'[70]
In other words, the impression is that, apart from the responsibility for 
government, for much of the period under review in this study, public
servants were also responsible for the management of the economy. Their
role was, therefore, also managerial.
Thus, on the one hand, because they were the government, the role of
public servants was political. On the other hand, it was managerial, not
only because of the interests that the colonial government owned or
controlled in Malta,[71] but because it was also the only economic force
capable of dealing with the economic and social problems endemic to the
colony. [72] It is because of this combination of political and managerial
functions that it was decided to describe the role of the Maltese public
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service as "dirigiste". This notion is not intended to convey the idea of a 
public service imbued with modern political roles or techniques of business 
management. Those are issues which have made themselves specially felt in 
the second part of this century. This study is concerned with a nineteenth, 
early twentieth century, public service. The concept is used as a tool by 
which the role of the Maltese public service and the direction of its 
development may be explained and as a label by which to categorise it in 
the process.
The three propositions outlined above describe clearly what is meant 
by relating the public service to its environment. The notion that public 
bodies are somehow involved in some kind of relationship with the wider 
environment, tends to underline most contemporary studies of 
administration. Greenwood and Wilson have argued, for example, that 'public 
bodies do not exist in a vacuum but are closely related to the broader 
environment which they inhabit.'[73] Ridley makes a similar point but
stresses this relationship further.
'Administrative systems cannot be understood except by reference to their
political environment...[and] the point here for the political 
scientist...is that political systems cannot be understood without study of 
the administration.'[74]
The idea, expressed by Smith and Stanyer, that the structure of a system is
'a pattern of interactions and relationships between separate
elements',[75] seems to be more to the point. It not only points towards an
interdependence between the various parts of the system through actions and
structures, but the notion of a 'pattern' tends to suggest that this
interdependence has a certain coherence which cannot be fully grasped if
any one part of the system is studied in isolation from the rest of the
system and the elements that constitute it. They further stress 'the
importance of not drawing too rigid a distinction between society and
government',[76] pointing to the case of Northern Ireland as one example of
how variant forms of culture may influence the governmental system. They
conclude that as a result of these cultural inputs into the system, public
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service patterns of behaviour in Northern Ireland tend to be 'quite 
distinct from those found on the mainland even though political 
institutions were formally very similar.'[77]
Studies of developing societies provide further examples of the 
interrelationship between administration and the rest of the environment. 
Katz and Eisenstadt, for example, examined, by reference to developing 
societies, the Weberian notions of inpersonality and universality of rules, 
both of which remain largely the attributes of developed and Western
societies.[78] In the latter, they argue, the application of rules is not 
seen as dependent on individual discretion or partiality. Formal rules are 
impersonal and universal and any deviation in applying these rules can only 
be sanctioned by appeal tribunals or by the courts. In contrast, according 
to the authors, in a society which operates according to traditional norms, 
rules - and therefore all decisions reached on the basis of those rules - 
are assumed to be subject to influence through personal bargaining and 
negotiation. Thus, in such societies, formal rules constitute, in the view 
of individuals, merely a place to begin the bargaining.
In his discussion of the use of public service methods in 
underdeveloped countries, Riggs provides a further example, introducing the 
'sala' model of administration as a tool by which to examine the public
service of these countries.[79] The sala model of administration has the
form of a Western bureaucracy but is actually filled with individuals
operating according to more traditional norms of family and communal 
loyalty. Under such conditions, the structure of the administrative system 
may appear to be similar to that of the country which has imposed it, but
the attitudes of those entrusted with its running and the conditions that
they have to conduct the administration in, are so different, that in
practice the two systems bear no comparison.
Each of the above examples serve to stress the view that, in a study
of the administration, the wider environment to which the administration
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has to relate must be given full consideration. They also stress that, 
where actual differences exist between different societies, in one or more 
elements of their political environment, one may reasonably expect to 
encounter crucial differences of one sort or another in their 
administration. Thus, identifying what constitutes the environment of the 
particular administration under examination becomes crucial to its 
understanding. This study seeks to follow in this pattern.
RESEARCH STRATEGIES
A study which is bound by historical perimeters of the sort that this 
is, i.e. 1800 to 1940, allows for only one type of research methodology. 
This is one based on historical records. The strength of this study lies in 
the richness of the primary source material upon which it is based. No less 
than 800 volumes of correspondence and documents, official and private, 
handwritten or printed, published and unpublished have been examined for 
this study. Because the Maltese public service has been so overwhelmingly 
neglected as a field of study, a great many of the documents utilised in 
this study were being made available for the first time. Some other 
material which has also been utilised, although available in a published 
form, has not before now received the attention it deserved. However, the 
vast proportion of the material can be described as official in character. 
Unfortunately, for reasons which are not altogether clear, their exists in 
Malta a scarcity of private papers.
Of the unpublished source material the most important and the richest 
source of primary material is that gathered under colonial Office at the 
Public Records Office, near Kew Gardens, in London. Material relating to 
Malta is generally grouped in the Colonial Office records under items 
C.0.158 to C.0.163. Other material concerning Malta can be found under 
C.0.323, C.0.324, C.0.879 Africa, volumes 2, 11 to 13, and 17, and C.0.883 
Mediterranean Volumes 1 to 7.[80]
The papers gathered under C.0.158 which consist of no less than 543
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volumes and cover the period 1801-1943, provide the basis for this study.
They are officially classified as 'Original Correspondence' and within them
can be found all the official letters, despatches and enclosures forwarded
by Governors of Malta or local officials to the Secretary of state for the
Colonies. The Governors' despatches provide the official view of matters
while many of the enclosures allow, in many cases, for the examination of
the very same issues raised in the despatches from different view points.
Such enclosures tended either to be formal reports commissioned or
requested by the governor, or memorials and petitions submitted by
individuals or groups for presentation to the Secretary of State. In an
effort to ensure good government the Colonial Office took upon itself the
role of arbiter, obliging governors to remit to its attention the views,
grievances or demands from the colonies for which they were responsible. In
later years photographs and reports from local newspapers were forwarded
with despatches. It must also be understood by the reader that, certainly
in the case of Malta and other crown colonies, almost every new
appointment, promotion, public project or policy had to be submitted for
the approval of the Secretary of State. Consequently, these documents are
in themselves rich in information and fascinating in detail. However, their
importance is greatly enriched by the generally detailed Colonial Office
minutes that accompany them. These minutes, as the reader will have anple
opportunity to discover in this study, will serve to demonstrate how the
development of the Maltese public service was, or indeed, was not,
influenced by this office in London. They will help to demonstrate the
contribution made by various individual officials, ranging from Secretaries
of State to Clerks. These minutes will also serve to show how changes in
attitudes over the period of study were reflected in the different policy
approaches adopted. Without some of these minutes this research would have
lost a good deal of appeal. These minutes, as Hall has shown, acquired
greater significance in the 1870s when junior clerks were allowed greater
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responsibility and freedom to engage in discussion with their 
superiors.[81]
C.0.159/ officially designated as "Entry Books", serve to corrplement 
the above volumes, containing letters and instructions from Secretaries of 
State for the Colonies to Governors in Malta. This section is made up of 32 
volumes covering the period 1799 to 1872. Until the latter date, the actual 
replies or despatches from the Secretary of State to the Governor were 
recorded and filed under this heading, although some draft replies prepared 
by officials for the Secretary of State could also be found under C.0.158. 
However, after 1872 only the draft replies were preserved, the flimsies 
being gradually destroyed.[82] These draft replies however tended to 
reflect accurately the official despatches bearing also the final 
corrections made to them by Colonial Secretaries.
The documents listed under C.0.160, 161, 162, and 163 may be
considered of secondary importance. They serve, by and large to provide
supporting material for the issues raised in the above two volumes.
C.O.160,(ll volumes) brings together all the Acts and Ordinances passed by
the Government of Malta between 1839 and 1939. C.0.161 contains the minutes
and proceedings of the Legislative and Executive Council of the colony.
These papers, perhaps not so much of secondary importance as the former,
provide interesting insights regarding the role of the public service as
the government and of senior public servants as its "ministers". They also
serve to throw more light on such general issues as the decision making
process in the colony and on specific issues such as the introduction of
competitive examinations for entry into the Maltese public service.
Editions of the Malta Government Gazette, from 1818 to 1940, are to be
found under C.0.162. These volumes, numbering 82 in all, carry every
appointment to the Maltese civil service, every proclamation relating to
entry into the service, reports or extracts from reports of local
commissions appointed to investigate every kind of administrative act or to
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promote reform, and an additional wealth of statistics. Finally, C.0.163 is 
merely a collection of what became generally known as the Blue Books. These 
Blue Books represent the annual details about civil and military offices in 
the colony, the names of their holders and their emoluments, and 
statistical information relating to income and expenditure, exports and 
imports, and population.
A second group of documents, which are not solely concerned with 
Malta, are those grouped under C.0.323 and 324, and under Colonial Office 
Confidential Print. The former, apart from containing the minutes of 
Colonial Office meetings, also contain the private correspondence conducted 
by Robert Hay with the Governor and with the Chief Secretary in Malta
between 1826 and 1830. As Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, 
Hay had been in the habit of conducting this correspondence on behalf of 
the Secretary of State without the latter's knowledge. This practice,
however, was not approved by Goderich, Bathurst's successor as Colonial 
secretary of State, and he was eventually ousted from his office. 
Instructions were given that the correspondence be transcribed and copies 
kept at the Colonial Office.[83] Because of their semi-official character, 
for instructions were also conveyed by Hay through these letters, one 
obtains a wider picture of the personalities of some of the actors involved
and the dominant issues at the time.
Colonial Office Confidential Print consist of printed selected 
correspondence, memoranda and other documents copied for internal use 
within the Colonial Office, or in some cases, for circulation to the 
Cabinet. Their contents range from single page copies of reports and 
memoranda to large compilations of the more inportant correspondence on 
particular subjects which extend to several hundred pages. The latter were 
of considerable administrative value in providing a compact and convenient 
way of pinpointing main papers in the Colonial Office without the need to 
refer to the whole gamut of original correspondence.
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An important admission has to be made at this point. There is no 
Public Records Office in Malta and the various records, documents and 
private papers, (the few that are known to exist), are scattered among 
several institutions and departments. None of the papers of the departments 
are indexed, bound or necessarily collated. It is indeed, a researchers 
nightmare, and all researchers have experienced serious difficulties when 
conducting research in Malta. To rectify this, during the past four years a 
working committee has been appointed with the task of establishing a Public 
Records Office in Malta.
Finally, where comparisons were deemed necessary, especially with 
events or developments in other colonies, these were mainly carried out 
with the aid of published secondary sources.
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The aim of this Chapter is to provide a background to Malta, its 
geography, its people, its economic and political institutions, and the 
developments which culminated in British rule. Two points should be noted, 
however. First, that the material presented below provides only a sketch 
which makes more succinct and concise published accounts. Second, since 
very little has been written about the Maltese public service before or 
during the time of the Order of St John, what follows below is an outline 
which suffices for the purposes of this study and which the author has 
synthesised from various sources.
GENERAL FEATURES
The history, politics, social life and economic activity of the 
Maltese Islands and their people, have been conditioned by four main
considerations: geographical location, size, religion and foreign
domination. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to talk of a Maltese history 
that is divorced from the overall history of the Mediterranean littoral or 
of the nations that dominated its politics down the centuries.
Lying almost equidistant between Gibraltar and Lebanon, and sixty 
miles south of Sicily and about one hundred and fifty miles north of Libya, 
(see Map 2:1), the Maltese Islands, consisting chiefly of Malta and Gozo, 
(see Map 2:2) have been aptly described by an Italian commentator as the 
'crossroads of the Mediterranean' (la crocevia del Mediterraneo),[1] where 
the cultures of this inlet sea meet and where its trade routes cross.
Others have expressed a similar opinion.
'...For over 3,000 years, all the forces and currents which make up
Mediterranean history have at least inpinged on Malta. Each has left
something in the landscape and it is tempting to believe, in the 
traditional experience of the people.'[2].
At some stage or another every civilization or power that dominated 








Malta or actually controlled the islands.[3] The name Malta, or Melita, as 
the islands were called in ancient times, is said by Biblical scholars to 
be Phoenician in origin meaning "refuge".[4] It appears that it is their 
location at the heart of the Mediterranean, coupled with the existence of 
magnificant harbours, that has brought these otherwise insignificant 
islands into prominence as early as the Phoenician period.
The Maltese islands are very small, their whole area being 
approximately one hundred and twenty square miles - very much the size of 
the Isle of Wight - but with a population, according to the last 
comprehensive census of 1985, of 345,705 persons.[5] The population of 
these islands has been on the increase since the seventeenth century. Until 
that time the population of Malta rose and fell according to the degree of 
stability that existed in the Mediterranean. The defences of the islands 
were wholly inadequate to protect the islanders and many would flee to 
neighbouring countries in time of crisis.[6] The network of fortifications 
built by the Order of St John rectified this matter somewhat and the 
population graph began to show an upward trend which has not yet been 
reversed.[7] However, it was in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
that the expansion in the population became really significant. Prom a 
population of around 100,000 persons in 1814, the population of the Maltese 
Islands had more than doubled by 1914, reaching the 220,000 mark. By 
independence in 1964, the population had increased by another fifty per 
cent, notwithstanding the fact that several thousands of Maltese had 
migrated since the end of World War One.[8] Thus, although much of the 
growth in population has been at its most rapid in this and the last 
century, it may be safely said that the Maltese Islands have always tended 
to be rather densely populated in relation to their size.
Malta has never possessed any mineral resources and much of its
agriculture, with the exception of cotton, has been of the subsistence
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report on the suitability of the islands as their new headquarters, 
reported that Malta was little more than a rock inadequately covered with 
soil, its main products being cotton, honey and cumin, which were exchanged 
for corn. Water was scarce and droughts not uncommon. [10] The need to 
import large quantities of grain, until recently the staple food of the 
Maltese, has therefore, been one of the constant features of Maltese 
commerce.[11]
The Maltese people received their language from the South and their 
religion from the North. The former has its roots in Arabic, being nearest 
to the Arabic dialects of North Africa. However, the Maltese language has 
also been influenced by the island's long association with Southern Italy, 
drawing its syntax, idiom and a fair portion of its vocabulary from the 
Sicilian language.[12] Furthermore, for many centuries Italian was the 
language of administration, the courts and education, with the result that 
maltese did not acquire a settled alphabet until well into this century, 
and this notwithstanding the fact that Maltese was and remained the only 
language of the overwhelming majority of the people.[13]
From the North, the Maltese acquired their religion - the Roman 
Catholic faith. It became permanently established after the expulsion of 
the Arabs in the twelfth century by Count Roger I, the Norman.[14] Since 
that time, Malta has been ruled by European powers whose deference to the 
Church made it one of the most powerful institutions of the islands. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, Church-State relations tended to have a tremendous 
inpact on the politics of the islands. At various points in Malta's history 
Rome too became inextricably involved in the island's politics.[15]
Until Malta was ceded to the Order of St John by Charles V of Spain in 
1530 it enjoyed little inportance in European or Mediterranean 
politics.[16] Throughout this time, the Maltese and their masters, noble 
families whose roots were to be found in Spain, Italy and Normandy, but who 
had settled in the islands, were outside the mainstream of European
politics of the time.[17] Their main connection was with Sicily and 
mainland Italy. From Sicily they obtained grain and fodder, while the 
cities and universities of the mainland provided culture and education.[18] 
This connexion with Sicily and Italy was also occasioned by the fact that 
Malta came under the jurisdiction of the Viceroy of Sicily.[19] For these 
reasons, Italian became the cultural and administrative language of the 
islands. Italian jurisprudence was adopted for legal purposes.[20] 
Although the Italian language acquired such a defined status in Malta its 
use remained restricted to the upper classes, perhaps an indication of the 
divisions that existed between them and the Maltese. This division may 
perhaps be best demonstrated by one particular example. Before the arrival 
of the Knights of St John, the capital of Malta was a fortified town, on a 
hill, at the heart of the island. To the European nobility, the town was 
referred to by the name of citta Notabile, while to the Maltese the name of 
the town was, and remains to this day, Mdina. How truly foreign was the 
former name can be evidenced by the way it was completely swept out of
usage by the upsurge of Maltese nationalism during and after World War Two. 
It was a case of the foreign giving way to the purely local name.[21]
THE ADMINISTRATION BEFORE 1530
John Austin and George C. Lewis, two Royal Commissioners sent out to
investigate into the affairs of Malta in 1836, wrote that in Malta,
'they have...a set of ancient complicated institutions founded upon a 
totally different set of legal and political principles from those of 
England.'[22]
Law and order was the principal concern of many of these institutions 
but there were others, such as the Universita' or grain monopoly, which 
were considered to be vital for the safety of the Island and the very
survival of its people. Not much is known about these institutions and what
is known is not beyond dispute. According to Vella, it appears that the
government of the island of Malta, was in the hands of a Governor 
officially described as the 'capitano della Verga'. The Maltese called him
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'Hakem' (in Arabic) or ruler. As representative of the Spanish monarchy he 
enjoyed both civil and judicial powers.[23] To carry out his duties he was 
assisted by several officials and a number of elected 'Giurati' [i.e. 
sworn-in administrators]. These officials together formed a council known 
as the Universita' or "Comune di Malta". The most senior official after the 
Hakem was the chief Justice who was also the deputy Hakem. Then came the 
judges and the elected officials. Two officials, 'il Portulano' and 'il 
Massaro' were responsible for the collection of all customs dues while the 
Head of the 'Sekrezija' was charged with the duty of collecting those taxes 
or dues belonging to the sovereign. Another four or five officials were 
responsible for carrying out the remaining duties of the Universita'. The 
Universita' was a municipal body charged with the superintendency of the 
markets, weights and measures, the maintenance of roads and public 
edifices, the running of a school, quarantine, and the administration of 
the hospital of Santo Spirito at Mdina. However, its most inportant 
function was to furnish Malta with sufficient grain and other essential 
foodstuffs which the Islands lacked. The Kastellan, or keeper of the castle 
at Birgu and the 'capitano dell Porto' were responsible for the security of 
the harbours.
The 'consiglio popolare', an elected body said to representing the 
nobility, the clergy, the professional bodies, the merchants, the guilds 
and the heads of families from every town or village, was responsible for 
electing the 'Giurati' and for ensuring good government on the part of the 
administration.[24] Its membership was increased during periods of crisis 
or danger.[25] Whether the Consiglio Popolare had deliberative or 
legislative powers remains unclear. In the nineteenth century Maltese 
leaders, in their bid to secure self-government, were to claim that this 
assembly did enjoy such powers. The British authorities on their part were 
to strenuously deny such claims.[26] Certainly, as was the case with other 
similar assemblies at the time, the consiglio popolare was an assembly that
was convened from time to time 'to give solemnity to certain events' and to 
elect municipal officials to administer the commune of Malta. It did not, 
as was also the case with other medieval assemblies, enjoy deliberative 
powers.[27] However, there could have been moments in its history when 
grave internal crisis or threats of foreign invasion, or during times when 
wars of succession left the throne to which the Maltese owed allegiance 
vacant, that the Consiglio popolare temporarily acquired such powers.[28] 
The population of the Maltese islands was mainly agrarian clustering 
around Mdina. Activity around the harbours was minimal and as yet there was 
little settlement around the coast lines and Malta's magnificent 
harbours.[29] The most powerful men in the island, such as the bishops, had 
their palaces in Mdina and all national activities were attended by them 
and presided over by the Governor and the Giurati.[30] The fortifications 
around Mdina served to protect the inhabitants in time of danger, 
especially from the frequent ravages of pirates and corsairs. In the sister 
island of Gozo, the pattern was similar, with the hilltop citadel at Rabat 
serving as the capital of that island.[31]
THE ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE KNIGHTS OF ST JOHN
In 1523 Charles V of Spain, against the wishes of the Maltese, ceded 
Malta to the Order of the Knights of St John, a military and religious 
order. The Knights were in desperate need of a new headquarters after 
having been expelled from their former stronghold of Rhodes, by the forces 
of the emergent Ottoman Empire. Without a new base from which the Order 
could continue to offer some form of resistance to Ottoman expansion in the 
Mediterranean, its very existence would no longer prove justified. Malta 
was thus ceded to provide the Order with its new headquarters and sovereign 
state.[32]
Price has observed that the government of the Order in Malta was
deeply influenced by Spanish and French ideals of absolutism and as a
consequence it came to embrace whole sectors of political and social
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life. [33] Autocracy was the dominant form of government to be found 
throughout Europe at the time, while the religious character of the Order 
may partly explain its readiness to extend the paternalistic structures it 
found in Malta.[34] However, as a consequence of the Order's unending feud 
with muslim princes, within the administrative system adopted in Malta by 
the Knights, autocracy and paternalism overlapped significantly with the 
requirements of military security, indeed, the Knights of St John never 
once lost sight of the fact that Malta was a fortress-state.
From the time of their arrival in Malta in 1530 until their expulsion 
from the Islands by Napoleon in 1798, the administration of the Order was 
directed towards securing the island from external attack; maintaining 
internal stability and security; the carrying out of its charitable 
obligations and of its military mission; and the efficient administration 
of its vast European estates. None of these activities were, however, 
independent of the others. Thus, for example, the revenue earned by the 
Order from its European estates helped to financially sustain each of the 
other activities.[35] In a similar way its military mission, albeit carried 
out on behalf of Christendom, not only prevented rapacious European 
monarchs from expropriating the Order's estates within their territories, 
but forced them, from time to time, to add to them. [36]
Soon after their arrival in Malta the Knights moved quickly to
strenghten the defences of the islands and to extend their authority over
the whole archipelago. Old fortifications were strenghtened and new ones
built. Much of this work was carried out in the Grand Harbour area where
the fleet of the Order was anchored and where the Order settled its
administrative offices. By the time of the Turkish Great Siege in 1565,
several forts had been constructed in this vicinity.[37] The ending of the
siege was followed by the building of the fortress-city of Valletta which
further helped to strengthen the defence of the two adjacent harbours and



































around the fortress towns of Birgu, Burmula and Isla, commonly known as the 
Three Cities or Cottonera. The litograph reproduced overleaf shows the 
fortifications and fortress towns constructed by the Order around the two 
main harbours from the time of their arrival until their expulsion from 
Malta in 1798. Several other forts and defences were constructed throughout 
the rest of Malta and Gozo.[38] When to all this activity are added the 
upkeep of the Order's navy, regiments, and arsenals it would soon become 
clear that defence expenditure proved to be considerable.[39]
Administratively, it was politically inconceivable for the Order to 
allow a rival administration to exist side by side with its own. The 
Knights, therefore, quickly suppressed the 'consiglio Popolare' but 
retained with modified functions the Universita', its administrative 
Council. Those local institutions which were allowed to continue to exist 
were brought, in some way or another, within the administrative machinery 
of the government of the Order by the time the French captured the 
islands.[40]
Under the government of the Order, all power and authority were vested 
in the Grandmaster. (See Diagram 2:1)
'He has no minister, but manages everything himself, and has immediate 
information of the most minute occurrences...and, as Grandmaster of Malta, 
he is more absolute, and possesses more power than most sovereign 
princes...he has the disposal of all the lucrative offices, he makes of his 
councils what he pleases;...in all councils that compose the jurisdiction 
of this little nation he himself presides...'[41]
The most important of these Councils was the Grandmaster's 'Grand 
Council' which was composed solely of members of the Order but which 
enjoyed only consultative powers. In time of crisis, however, the Council 
met for long sessions since Grandmasters generally realised that a serious 
crisis could result in the dissolution of their very Order.[42] But during 
periods of tranquility the administration was conducted on the instructions 
and at the discretion of the Grandmaster. A Second Council was the 
Segnatura which existed in order to ensure that the interests of the people 
were not completely overlooked or abused by members of the administration
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or individual knights, the courts having no jurisdiction over them. 
Presided over by the Grandmaster the Segnatura thus constituted the 
ultimate appeal court from the proceedings of the judicial courts and the 
administration. The Grandmaster could, if he so wished, overturn every 
judicial and administrative decision and without being required to give any 
explanation or reason for doing so. The segnatura was also the means 
through which petitions of every sort could be brought to the personal 
attention of the Grandmaster. These appeals and petitions were normally 
presented during an 'udienza', as its weekly meetings were called. At these 
hearings, the Grandmaster was assisted by four 'uditori', normally members 
of the legal profession. These Uditori were generally Maltese lawyers who 
owed their appointment to the Grandmaster of the time.[43]
The Knights imposed their own judicial system on the Maltese. The 
court presided over by the Hakem or 'capitano della Verga' at Mdina, once 
the highest court in the islands, was now relegated to hearing petty cases 
in the rural areas and became styled the 'corte Governatoriale', with the 
Hakem as Chief Magistrate and Governor of Mdina.[44] The most important 
court in Malta was at this time 'il Tribunale della Gran Corte', the 
superior court charged with hearing all important civil, criminal and 
political cases and which was composed of a President and four other 
judges.[45] Another court, a lower court, 'il Corte Capitaniale', was 
empowered to hear less serious cases including those relating to law and 
order.[46] Both of the latter tribunals were to be found in Valletta. 
Finally, there was the 'luogotenenti' or district courts, one of which was 
to be found in every town and village. Presided by a magistrate they were 
empowered to hear cases involving insignificant amounts. One cannot be sure 
whether these latter courts were truly needed considering the size of 
Malta, and one cannot help suspecting that their existence was influenced 
by considerations of patronage.[47]
The Grandmaster exercised ultimate authority over the courts through
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the dual powers which he possessed of appointing and removing judges and
through the Segnatura. All the judges of the courts were appointed by him
from one year to the next and they were confirmed or removed from office at
the annual "scrutiny" held at the palace. The Head of Government was not
obliged to give any reason for the transfer or removal of a judge. It
appears, however, that judges were seldom removed but regularly transferred
from one court to another.[48] In all cases, court judges were paid by
fixed fees while district magistrates received, annually, £10 in fees and
£20 salary from the government.[49]
Even before setting foot in Malta the Order had expressed its
preoccupation with the fact that Maltese agriculture provided only
one-fourth or one-third of the grain consumed by the population the rest
needing to be imported.[50] A fortress-state needed to be not just
self-sufficient but capable of providing surpluses which would be readily
available in the event of a siege. Furthermore, excessive dependence on
foreign sources of grain may, in time of international scarcity and
therefore, high prices, result in severe hardship among the population and
may lead to serious political instability. They, therefore, took the
Universita', which enjoyed a monopoly over the bulk procurement, storing
and distribution of grain and other essential foodstuffs, under their
strict control transforming it into a veritable "massa frumenteria".[51] As
a result of these activities grain continued to be available to the people
at low and consistently stable prices. Some have argued that for almost the
whole of this period grain could always be bought by the people at cheaper
prices than those obtaining in surrounding countries, even during times of
great scarcity.[52] A second function of the Universita' was to tap what
capital existed in the island carrying out its operations on monies
invested with it by locals and by raising loans for defence and public
works. The Universita' began, in this sense, to serve as a form of public
bank receiving private capital to finance its operations and paying
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interest.[53] For both of these reasons the activities of the Universita' 
became of crucial importance for on them depended the social and economic 
prosperity of the people. By the time the Knights were expelled from Malta 
in 1798, this massa frumenteria held deposits to the value of about 
£300,000, out of which about £100,000 came frcm private individuals.[54]
Although those responsible for the daily operations of the Universita' 
continued to be Maltese officials who retained the title of Giurati or 
Jurats, (as the British came to call them), these officials were, however, 
no longer elected administrators but appointees of the Grandmaster.
Furthermore, they had to carry out their duties under the supervision of 
two leading members of the Order, similarly appointed.[55] Indeed, reasons 
of internal security dictated that full control over this monopoly should 
be concentrated in the hands of members of the government. Two main reasons 
for this can be cited. First, were the Maltese to rise in revolt the Order 
held within its own hands the very means by which to crush the revolt. It 
not only controlled all the grain supplies but had the naval muscle to stop 
aid reaching the people. It was highly unlikely that any European state 
would come to the aid of the Maltese and in time they would be forced
either to give up or face starvation. As we shall see this aspect was
perfectly understood by the British in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century.[56] Second, that as long as the bulk of the labouring population 
was reasonably well fed, food being both cheap and abundant, they would 
remain immune to anti-government agitation provoked by the displaced local 
nobility. This aspect too was not lost on Britain.[57] Although the Order 
virtually took over the activities of the Universita', suppressing some and 
adding new ones, the institution never assumed the role of a full
government establishment such as the customs or Holy Infirmary but retained 
a semi-autonomus identity. Its finance, for example, although supervised by 
the Treasury remained separate and formed no part of the Tesoro Comune 
(Public Treasury).[58]
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Public health and welfare were also leading preoccupations of the 
Order. The Order of St John was a charitable Order of hospitallers in 
addition to a military order. In the Holy Land and at Rhodes, where they 
had their headquarters before they were expelled by the Turks in 1520, the 
knights established and administered hospitals for needy pilgrims.[59] Soon 
after their arrival in Malta, the Order established its hospital, the Holy 
Infirmary, at Birgu. After the building of Valletta the hospital was moved 
to a new and much larger purpose-built infirmary.[60] The Order also 
supported other hospitals, such as that of Santo Spirito in Mdina and that 
of Santa Maria della Scala, when their finances and their incomes became 
insufficient to maintain them.[61] Furthermore, those who were needy or 
destitute could always depend on alms provided by the government to sustain 
them.[62] In later years this extensive system of paternalism led one 
British Governor to complain that
'the habits of dependency on the government for everything, engendered by 
the system established by the Knights of St John, has had a most 
pre-judicial effect on the industry and self-reliance of the people.'[63]
The Holy Infirmary was administered by the Grand Hospitaller, an 
extremely high-ranking knight. As it was the case with every other member 
of the Order, he received neither fees nor salary. Only the physicians and 
the hospital staff received remuneration for their services, and were all 
strictly forbidden from accepting or requesting payments from their 
patients.[64] It must be remembered that those who were admitted into 
hospitals at the time were either workers engaged by the Order or the urban 
poor who could not afford private care in their homes. But from various 
reports it seems that many who were destitute, rather than sick, found 
support within this institution.[65] As a consequence the Order spent about 
£10,000 of its annual budget on charities in the Holy Infirmary.[66]
Public health was also the concern of the Quarantine establishment. A 
small establishment, the responsibility of the Universita' of Mdina, had 
been in existence before the arrival of the Order in Malta.[67] The
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government of the Order evolved the system further, however, building a
lazaretto to accommodate passengers and goods arriving in the island.[68]
This building, situated on what is commonly known as Manoel island, in
Marsamcetto Harbour, served also as an isolation hospital in times of
plague or other epidemics (See Map 2:1).[69] It appears that the quarantine
regulations were strictly observed, with armed guards posted on land and
sea.[70] Experience had taught the government of the Order that in small
enclosed towns of the type found in Malta, it was difficult, once an
epidemic had taken hold, to control it or eradicate it. Each town was a
fortress in which the country population sought refuge in time of war and
hence public health was of fundamental concern.[71]
In the eighteen century the Order established a pawnbrokerage, the
Monte di Pieta, with a view to helping those who for some reason or other
needed funds urgently but did not wish to part permanently with their
valuables or could not pay the exorbitant, if illegal, interest rates
charged by private individuals. A fixed interest was paid on loans and all
classes of people resorted to its services over the years.[72] Like the
Universita' the funds of the Monte di Pieta were kept separate from the
finances of the government and as in the case of other institutions, it was
administered by officers appointed by the Order.[73]
The second half of the eighteen century saw the creation of the
University by Grandmaster Pinto. In truth, this measure does not appear to
have resulted from the desire of the Grandmaster to further the education
of the people, but rather from a desire to take over the funds with which
the college of the Jesuits had been endowed.[74] This college conferred
degrees in theology and related subjects.[75] Following the example set by
other European rulers Pinto expelled the Jesuit Order from Malta and in
order to escape the censure of the Pope, he created the University with
some of the funds sequestrated from the Jesuits.[76] Full authority in all
matters, including the teaching curriculum was vested in the Chancellor or
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Protector who was a senior member of the Order, a Knight Grand cross. [77] 
The University had three faculties, that of Theology, Law and Medicine.[78] 
Graduates of the faculty of medicine filled, in later years, many of the 
positions in the hospitals.[79]
The Treasury of the Order was responsible for supervising the finances 
of every establishment even of those of a semi-autonomous character. But 
the Order sustained its military and administrative commitments in Malta in 
three ways. First, the Order minted its own currency and from time to time 
levied taxes.[80] Second, the Order derived the best part of its revenues 
from its estates - farmlands, castles and town dues - scattered throughout 
Europe.[81] Its estates in Europe were organized in 'commanderies' but 
their heads and their administration were appointed and supervised from 
Malta.[82] The revenues from the estates came into the island in different 
monetary form and the Order's Treasury exercised the function of a general 
bank whose relations extended from one end of Europe to the other.[83] 
According to Price, the Order spent about £180,000 annually from these 
revenues on schemes in Malta.[84]
Finally, there was the contribution made by Malta to the finances of 
the government. This came, principally, from privateering, customs, local 
taxes and income derived from property. The government received a 
percentage from the proceeds accurring from the activities of licensed 
Maltese privateers.[85] Custom duties provided another source of revenue 
and a Customs establishment existed for the purpose. An important source of 
local revenue, perhaps at the time the most important, was derived from the 
extensive property which the Order came to possess in Malta. Apart from 
substantial rural and urban properties, the Order owned all the windmills, 
granaries, and saltworks to be found in the islands.[86] How important this 
revenue was, can be seen from the fact that this property was administered 
by a magistrate, called Segret, 'who had the power to hold a court of 
justice to examine all cases relative to his administration.'[87]
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It seems to be the case that public expenditure in Malta was 
relatively high, given the necessity of maintaining extensive defences, a 
strong navy and numerous institutions. By contrast the cost of the public 
service itself, in terms of emoluments, appears to have been relatively 
low.[88] Three reasons may be offered. First, a number of charitable 
institutions, such as the Ospizio, relied on private donations and bequests 
for their funding receiving little or no assistance from the Treasury.[89] 
Second, all heads of institutions were members of the Order and therefore 
received no salary for their services. No doubt many delegated their duties 
to subordinates for no other reason than the fact that in the tradition of 
the European nobility, most Grand Crosses were illiterate. Members of the 
conventual congregation of the Order, its purely religious (and literate) 
wing also performed many duties connected with the administration.[90] 
Third, all others employed within the administration, with the exception of 
employees of the health department, who apparently were paid fixed 
salaries, received either fixed fees or a fixed percentage of the revenue 
collected,[91] a practice very much in line with the system to be found in 
other continental bureaucracies.[92]
By the time Malta became part of the British Empire many of these 
institutions had a history that stretched over centuries. It was within 
this administrative structure that the machinery which coordinated Maltese 
social, economic and political management was to be found as late as the 
end of the eighteenth century. It was also to determine their future course 
for most of the nineteenth century.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE RULE OF THE ORDER IN MALTA
The Order of St John remained in Malta for two-and-half centuries and
their administration had several consequences for Malta, some of which are
relevant to this study. Some of these were economic in character. Although
the vast majority of the people were to remain employed in agriculture,
under the government of the Order there was a consistent and gradual
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increase of other occupations. Public works, involving the building and 
repair of fortifications, and of various buildings and palaces throughout 
the islands provided the Maltese population with constant employment.[93] 
The building of the fortress-city of Valletta provided work not only for 
thousands of Maltese, but enabled various Maltese architects to gain 
prominence.[94] Vella observed that
'it is remarkable that so small an island...and that a race so small, under 
constant foreign domination, should have been able to use its native 
architects almost without exception...[for] except for Bonamici and Stefano 
Ittar, no foreign architect erected important buildings in Malta during the 
period of the Knights.'[95]
Other Maltese served in the islands' garrison or navy.[96] The Order
was at one time a powerful naval force in the Mediterranean, attacking
moslem shipping, raiding their coasts and participating in various joint
expeditions with other European powers.[97] Some of those who were not
employed on the galleys or in the armed forces, found employment in the
dockyard and the arsenals.[98]
Under the Order, however, agriculture remained the dominant occupation
of the Maltese. According to a contemporary visitor to the island,
'the industry of the Maltese in cultivating their little island is 
inconceivable. There is not an inch of ground lost in any part of it; and 
where there was not soil enough, they have brought over ships and boats 
loaded with it from Sicily.'[99]
The cultivation and manufacture of cotton for export became widespread. The 
same visitor had noted that
'the Maltese manufacture their cotton into a great variety of stuffs. 
Their stockings are exceedingly fine...their coverlids and their blankets 
are esteemed all over Europe.'[100]
Thousands of Maltese, either as farm labourers or spinners and weavers 
enjoyed a decent standard of living through this economic activity, the 
export of manufactured cotton realising between £400,000 and £500,000 every 
year.[101]
A third factor which had important economic consequences for Malta
arose from the source of the Order's finances. It has already been observed
in Chapter One that the bulk of the foreign revenue earned was expended in
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Malta where the Order maintained a complex administration which affected 
all classes of Maltese society. As a result, the island and its population 
became predominantly dependent, for their social and economic welfare, on 
income derived from abroad.[102]
There were social consequences too. The Order of St John, on its 
arrival in Malta, rather than establishing its headquarters at Mdina, the 
land-locked capital of the island, organized itself around the Grand 
Harbour where its fleet was stationed.[103] This, as was seen earlier, 
influenced new demographic patterns which resulted in the establishment of 
the Three Cities, (Cospicua, Senglea and Vittoriosa) and Valletta.[104] The 
fortress-city of Valletta became the capital and centre of power, all 
departments of government having their seat there.[105] These developments 
created an urban Malta around Valletta and a rural Malta around Mdina, the 
latter, however, enjoying no political status. The island of Gozo formed, 
and indeed still does, part of rural Malta. This division was also 
reflected in social differences. The urban population, still small at this 
time, was made up of professional people, those involved in commerce, 
household servants and labourers of every sort and members of the garrison. 
Valletta was a cosmopolitan city with cultural and social activities, and 
as such, its residents were more or less secularly minded.[106] Rural 
Malta, by contrast, had a population that spent most of its day at work and 
church, entertainments being few and far between, and mostly centering on 
the village church. Their contact with the people of the towns was 
irregular and generally occurred during national festivities or special 
occasions and on market days.[107] Under the Government of the Knights of 
St John,
'began a state of affairs which continues to the present day in which Malta 
is inhabited by divided societies, farmers and town dwellers, a garrison 
and the indigenes, where parochial affairs are faced by cosmopolitan 
ideas.'[108]
But there were other divisions too. The knights of the Order, from
their arrival in the island, kept themselves apart from the Maltese. The
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latter were, in the eyes of the knights, 'vassalli e sudditi di questo
Dominio', [vassals and subjects of this dominion], and consequently barred
from government or membership of the Order.[109] Those appointed to offices
depended on the patronage of powerful members of the Order and not least
the Grandmaster himself. The Knights were not adverse to rewarding those
who served them well with honours and monetary rewards. For example, titles
of nobility were bestowed, from time to time, by the Order on some of those
Maltese who had served them loyally, even though the Order did not fully
recognize the claims of the local nobility to its past status.[110] Others
were compensated by the Order in other ways. For example, a number of beds
at the general hospital, usually not more than fifty, were reserved for
sailors and soldiers invalidated out of the navy and army, for shipyard
workers and others who needed support.[Ill]
Another consequence which arose from the rule of the Order was
military and strategic. As I have already indicated in Chapter One the
arrival of the Order embroiled the Maltese islands in the struggles of East
against West.[112] In 1565, the Turks attempted to conquer the islands, in
a bid to deliver a final blow to the Order and to secure control of the
eastern half of the Mediterranean. The success of the Order and the Maltese
in the face of such overwhelming odds in protecting the island from Turkish
rule, helped to stall Ottoman expansion.[113] It was from this period
onwards that Malta's reputation as a fortress island began to emerge and
several European Christian powers sought to strengthen the defence of the
islands by supporting the building of the fortress-city of Valletta and the
repair of the other fortifications. In their eyes Malta became a defensive
outpost of Europe against Ottoman designs.[114]
PRELUDE TO BRITISH RULE
The French Revolution changed this position of the Order in Malta and
Europe dramatically. It was also soon to accentuate the strategic
iirportance of Malta. Within a short time after the French revolution the
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Order's estates in France were confiscated and as the French armies 
advanced in Europe, the Order lost its remaining possessions.[115] The 
majority of the Maltese, who had put up with the government of the Order 
because of its paternalism, became increasingly disenchanted with it now 
that the revolution had impoverished it and could no longer benefit them. 
The Massa Frumenteria too was in difficulties, having a deficit amounting 
to about £100,000.[116] Conspiracies against the Order became common place. 
The local elite did not wish to overthrow or replace the Order with a new 
power. They preferred to gain a share in the government of their island, a 
measure which the Order was not prepared to countenance.[117] But the Order 
had too many enemies within its own ranks. Many French knights were in 
secret communication with the Directory in Paris, passing to them inportant 
information regarding the defences and fortifications of the island.[118] 
Napoleon saw Malta as the key to the Mediterranean and the stepping-stone 
to Egypt and British India and was, therefore, determined to acquire the 
islands.[119] In 1798, the French fleet enroute to capture Egypt appeared 
off Valletta with Napoleon on board. The Order, assailed from within and 
from outside, surrendered the islands without a struggle.[120] Napoleon 
lost no time in expelling the knights from Malta.
But French possession of Malta was to be short-lived. In his short 
stay in Malta Napoleon had set about dismantling Malta's system of paternal 
administration, suppressing or taking over, for the exclusive use of the 
French troops, several public institutions. Maltese attachment to the old 
established system of administration was coirpletely ignored. In September 
1878, three months after the French had taken Malta, disenchanted with 
French rule the Maltese rose in revolt.[121] A Maltese provisional 
government was established at Mdina, for within 48 hours most of the 
countryside had fallen under Maltese control. The French, however, 
continued to hold Valletta and the Three Cities. Naples provided the 
initial support for the rebels but within a short period of time British
warships had arrived to blockade the French by sea. The stalemate continued 
for another two years before the French finally surrendered to the British 
in September 1800.[122]
The Maltese revolt against the French left the islands exhausted, 
socially and economically. Thousands of Maltese had lost their lives, some 
as a direct consequence of the fighting, but mainly through malnutrition or 
disease. The cultivation and manufacture of cotton was seriously disrupted 
with the consequence that its traditional Spanish markets were lost.[123] 
The predicament in which the Maltese found themselves was made worse by the 
fact that their paternalistic institutions, upon which their survival 
depended in times of such severe crisis, had been disrupted and plundered 
of their funds by the French. For the Maltese the dawn of the nineteenth 
century certainly looked bleak and for a time, as we shall see in the 
following Chapter, economic uncertainty was compounded by political 
uncertainity over the future of the islands. But the Maltese, as will also 
be demonstrated, enjoyed one advantage. Nearly all the Great Powers desired 
possession of their strategic Islands and this, for a time at least, proved 
to be a very important bargaining asset for them.
NOTES and REFERENCES
1. Giorgio Mattei, 'Malta, La Crocevia del Mediterraneo', RAI, Roma, 14
Apr. 1981. See also Harrison Smith, (1953), Britain in Malta, Progress
Press, Valletta, Vol.II, p.ix.
2. H. Bowen-Jones, J.C. Dewdny, and W.B. Fisher, (1961), Malta: 
Background for Development, Univ. of Durham, p.108.
3. Ibid., p.108.
4. F.F. Bruce, (1982), Acts, Scripture Union, London, p.117.
5. Demographic Review of the Maltese Islands, (1985), Central Office of 
Statistics, Valletta, p.2.
6. A. Vella, (1974), records at least two instances of population decline 
in Malta in his two volume history of Malta. In Vol.I he writes that in 
1457 the population had fallen to such an extent that it lacked the 
manpower to defend itself from frequent piratical attacks by corsairs from 
the Barbary States. Storja ta' Malta, Vol.I, Klabb Kotba Maltin, Valletta, 
p.154. In Vol.II he observes that following the Great Siege of 1565 by the 
Turks, a large number of Maltese crossed over to Sicily. They feared that 
having failed in their first bid to capture the island the Turks would now
50
launch an even bigger attack. Following the siege the defences of the 
island were not in a condition to withstand another attack. The Order was 
forced to apply to the Viceroy of Sicily to force Maltese migrants to 
return to Malta and help in the reconstruction of the fortifications and 
the island's defence. Ibid., Vol.II, (1979), p.7.
7. For a detailed study of Maltese population trends, see J. Richardson,
Ch.VI, in Bowen-Jones et al.; see also C. Price, (1954), Malta and the 
Maltese: A study in Nineteenth Century Migration, Melbourne.
8. W.A. Charlton, 'Trends in the Economic Geography of Malta since 1800',
unpublished PhD thesis, Durham University, 1961. On page 97 he notes that 
'as many Maltese left the islands during the decade 1911-21, as had left 
during the whole period 1842-1891'.
9. See Price, op.cit., p.2. With regard to the cotton industry he says:
'in this industry a large part of the community shared, from the farmer who 
"abandoned almost every species of culture" for it, to the numerous persons 
in every town and village engaged in its spinning and weaving.' See also 
Brydone, p.44.
10. Bowen-Jones, et al., p.108.
11. Ibid., p.110.
12. J. Aquilina, (1961), Papers in Maltese Linguistics, Univ. of Malta,
Valletta, p.180.
13. See Introductory Note in J. Boissevain, (1965), Saints and Fireworks:
Rural Politics in Malta, Athlone Press, Univ. of London, London.
14. J. Laspina, (1946), Outline of Maltese History, Progress Press,
Valletta, p.249.
15. See A. Koster, (1981), Prelates and Politicisns: Changing 
Power-balances between Church and State in a Mediterranean Island Fortress, 
(1530-1976), PhD thesis, Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, Holland, 
pp.20-25.
16. Laspina, op.cit., pp.249-50; Bowen-Jones, op.cit., p.107; Harrison
Smith, op.cit., Vol.I, p.xiv.
17. Ibid., p.107; and D. Austin, op.cit., p.5.
18. The Maltese islands connection with Sicily was of long standing. The 
Normans had certainly attached Malta to this kingdom and this policy was 
continued by the Aragonese who placed Malta under the control of the 
Viceroy of Sicily. See Vella, Storja..., op.cit., Vol.I, pp.126-8.
19. Bowen-Jones, op.cit., p.107.
20. See Note 21.
21. Bowen-Jones, op.cit., p.111. Mdina is said to be a derivative of the
Arab name Medina. The city was certainly given its name by the Arabs. The
Maltese continued to call the town Mdina. After the building of Valletta 
the 'italianate' upper classes began to refer to Mdina as 'citta Vecchia' 
(the Old City), but its original name persisted among the Maltese. 
Furthermore, towns in Malta have always had two names, one local the other 
foreign. Valletta is commonly referred to by all Maltese as Il-Belt, 'the
51
city', while Vittoriosa, Senglea and Cospicua, i.e. the Three Cities, are 
referred to as Il-Birgu, L-Isla, and Burmola, respectively, villages, by 
contrast have always had one name, that given to them by the Maltese. This 
provides yet another demonstration of the divisions that existed between 
those in the country districts and those in the towns, the latter in the 
grip of foreign control and influence.
22. J. Austin and G.C. Lewis, Commissioners, to Glenelg, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, in 'Report Relative to the Employment of Maltese in 
Executive Offices', 19 Feb. 1838, C.0.158/115, PRO, Kew, London.
23. Vella, Vol.I, op.cit,, pp.138-9,
24. Report of the Commissioners of 1812, C.O.158/19, PRO, Kew, London. 
Laspina, p.252. According to Laspina the Consiglio Popolare had these 
functions. 1. To elect the Guirati, that corrposed the Universita' and other 
officials of the Government. 2. To submit to the King all the needs of the 
people. 3. To report the abuses of the King's Representatives. 4. To 
provide the Island with enough corn and foodstuffs. 5. With the authority 
of the King, to make taxes and loans if necessary.
25. Vella, Vol.I., op.cit., pp.138-9.
26. Report of the Commissioners of 1812, C.O.158/19, PRO, Kew, London.
27. Laspina, as we have seen in note 25 did not ascribe any deliberative 
or legislative powers to the Consiglio Popolare. Others, however, did. 
Eton, for example, in his 'Authentic Materials for a History of the People 
of Malta', claimed that the Consiglio had such powers. The argument, 
however, was to be central to the conflict between Malta and Britain for 
almost eighty years of the nineteenth century. Antonio Marongiu, Medieval 
Parliaments, p.47, in A.H. Birch, (1971), Representation, Macmillan, 
London, p.25.
28. D. Austin, op.cit., pp.4-5; H. Smith, op.cit., Vol.I, p.xiv.
29. A.P. Vella, (1971), Storja ta' Malta, Klabb Kotba Maltin, Valletta, 
Vol.II, p.264; also Bowen-Jones, et al., op.cit., p.107.
30. E.C. Vassallo, (1915), 'The Constitution of Malta', in A. Macmillan 
(edit), Malta and Gibraltar, Historical and Descriptive, Commercial and 
Industrial Facts, Figures, and Resources, W.H. & L. Collingridge, London, 
p.250.
31. Of the two large islands that form the archipelago, the island of Gozo 
although substantially smaller than Malta has always dominated in terms of 
agricutlural produce. The smallness of the island has meant that Rabat, its 
capital, has always dominated the social and political life of the people. 
The notion that in Gozo all roads lead to Rabat would a few years ago have 
had literal meaning for could not travel from one village to another 
without having practically to go through Rabat which is situated in the 
very centre of Gozo.
32. Vella, Vol.I., op.cit., pp.182-6
33. C. Price, (1954), Malta and the Maltese; A Study in Nineteenth Century 
Migration, Georgian House, Melbourne, pp.1-2.
34. Vella, Vol.I., op.cit., pp.182-6.
52
35. Price, op.cit., p.2.
36. Laspina, op.cit., p.120.
37. Ibid., pp.80-9.
38. Ibid., pp.116-21 and pp.161-68.
39. Laspina observes that in 1645 the Knights feared an imminent attack on
the islands by the Turks. 'As the debt,' he wrote, 'for the forthcoming war
was enormous, all the silver available in the Island was coined into
money...', op.cit., p.140.
40. Vella, Storja.Vol.I.r op.cit., p.186; W.A. Charlton, op.cit.,
p.28; Bowen-Jones, et al., op.cit., p.112.
41. Brydone, op.cit., p.47.
42. J. Holland Rose and W. Hardman, op.cit., pp.56-7.
43. E. Blaquiere, (1813), Letters from the Mediterranean Containing a 
Civil and Political Account of Sicily, Tripoly, Tunis, and Malta, Vol.II., 
H.Colbourn, London, pp.323-4; and Report of the Commission of 1812, 
C.O.158/19, PRO, Kew, London; and H.W. Harding, (1980), Maltese Legal 
History Under British Rule. 1801-1836, Univ. of Malta, Valletta, p.67.
44. Harding, op.cit., pp.5-6.
45. Report of The Commission of 1812, op.cit.
46. Ibid.
47. In these courts the sitting Magistrate had the power to treat all
cases under 20 shillings only if the parties consented. Otherwise they 
could take their case to one of the more senior courts. See Harding, 
op.cit., p.6.
48. Ball to Hobart, Sec. of State for War and the Colonies, 15 Nov. 1807, 
Library MSS.530, National Library, Valletta, Malta; Report of the 
Commission of 1812, C.O.158/19, PRO, Kew, London.
49. Ibid., p.6; and A. Ball to Hobart, 'Report on the Revenue of Malta,
with some Observations', 26 Dec. 1800, reproduced as Appx. II in Holland
Rose and Hardman, op.cit., pp.553-4.
50. See Note 10.
51. Charlton, op.cit., p.28.
52. Ibid., p.28.
53. Ibid., p.28.
54. Ball to Hobart, Holland Rose and Hardman, op.cit., pp.554.
55. Vella, Vol.II, op.cit., p.341.
56. See Chapter Three.
53
57. Ibid.
58. See Debates of the Legislative Council, Session 1888, Sitting No.3 of 
10 Apr. 1888, in Vol.X, Sittings 1 to 17, 21 Mar. 1888 - 26 Jun. 1888.
59. Vella, Vol.I, p.184.
60. P. Cassar, (1964), A Medical History of Malta, Wellcome Historical 
Medical Library, London, p.40.
61. Ibid., pp.70-1.
62. Price, op.cit., p.30.
63. More O'Ferrall to Grey 21 Feb. 1851, C.O.158/157, PRO, Kew, London.
64. Cassar, op.cit., p.41 and p.392.
65. Ibid., pp.55-6.
66. Price, op.cit., p.32.





72. Ball to Hobart, 'Report on the Revenue of Malta , with some
Observations', in Hardman and Rose, op.cit., pp.553-4.
73. Ibid., p.554.






79. Vella, Storja ta' Malta, op.cit., p.185.
80. Price, op.cit., pp.1-2.
81. Ibid., pp.5-6; and Bowen-Jones, et. al., op.cit., p.109.
82. F. Ryan, The House of the Temple, Burns and Oates, p.103
83. Ibid., p.103.
84. Price, op.cit., p.2 and p.208.
85. Vella, Vol.I, pp.155-6.
86. Ball to Hobart, 'Report on the Revenue of Malta, with some
Observations', in Hardman and Holland Rose, op.cit., pp.553-4.
87. Ibid., p.554.
88. Ball to Hobart, 'Report on the Revenue of Malta, with some
observations', Harmand & Holland Rose, op.cit., pp.553-4.
89. Vella, 'storja...', op.cit., Vol.I, pp.136-7.
90. Ibid., p.138.
91. Ball to Hobart, 'Report on the Revenue of Malta, with some
Observations', Hardman and Holland Rose, op.cit., pp.553-4.
92. J.F. Bossher, (1970), French Finances: From Business to Budgets, 
1770-95, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, pp.6-7.
93. Price, op.cit., p.6; also Vella, op.cit., p.305-313.
94. Vella, ibid., p.346.
95. Ibid., p.346.
96. Ibid., pp.291-3.
97. Ibid., pp.91-100; p.291.
98. Ibid., pp.293-5; pp.301-4.
99. Brydone, op.cit., p.45.
100. Ibid. p.44.
101. Price, op.cit., p.l; and Bowen-Jones, et al., op.cit., p.116.
102. Price, op.cit., p.2.
103. Ibid., p.19.
104. H. Smith, op.cit., pp.xiv-xv; and Bowen-Jones, et al., op.cit., 
pp.110-1.
105. Smith, ibid., pp.xiv-xv.
106. Bowen-Jones, op.cit., p.112.
107. Vella. op.cit., p.274.
108. Bowen-Jones, op.cit., p.110; Harrison Smith, p.xv; Laferla, (1946), 
British Malta, Vol.I, Progress Press, Valletta, Introductory Chapter, 
pp.II-III; Henry Seddall, Malta: Past and Present, p.160 and p.162.
109. Vella, op.cit., p.341.
110. Holland Rose and Hardman, op.cit., p.xvi; also Schemershon, p.140. 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge makes a similar comment; see B.E. Rooke, The 
Friend, The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, Princeton Univ. Press, p.536; Koster, op.cit., p.20; see Vella, 
Chapter entitled 'Malta taht il-Kavalieri', in Storja ta' Malta, Vol.II.
111. Cassar, op.cit., pp.55-6.
112. Brydone, op.cit., see footnote on p.44.
113. Bowen-Jones, et al., op.cit., p.110; see Brydone, p.45 for a 
description of the fortifications in Malta.
114. Ibid., p.45.
115. Price, op.cit., p.3
116. Holland Rose and Hardman, pp.xvii, pp.56-7 and p.554.
117. Vella, Storja ta' Malta, pp.357-59.
118. Ibid., pp.357-59, Seddall, op.cit., pp.160-163.
119. Ibid., p.163.
120. Seddall, pp.164-171; Harrison Smith, op.cit., Vol.I, p.xv.
121. Seddall, p.178; Vella, ibid., p.228; Holland Rose and Hardman, p.114.
122. For a comprehensive study of the siege of Valletta see Holland Rose 
and Hardman, op.cit.
123. Price, op.cit., p.3.
56
CHAPTER THREE 
A PUBLIC .SERVICE IN ABEYANCE: 1800-1812
When the French finally surrendered in September 1800, the Maltese 
public service was in a state of collapse. The expulsion of the Order from
Malta by the French, in 1798, had deprived it of a great number of its
heads and some of its functionaries.[1] In turn, the Maltese revolt against 
the French and their subsequent siege of Valletta dealt the administration 
a further blow. Several of its members defected to the rebel cause while 
two years of siege gradually eroded its finances and its administrative 
functions.
After the capture of Valletta from the French the Maltese public
service was to suffer further losses in its personnel. Several public
servants left Malta with the French while some of those who remained were 
dismissed from the service as a consequence of 'their attachment to the 
cause of the enemy. ' [ 2 ] In the next thirteen years, that is from September 
1800 to October 1813, the period under examination in this Chapter, saw the 
emphasis was on reverting the administration to its previous system under 
the Order than on innovative measures. None of the developments that did 
take place in this period were intended to be of a permanent character, but 
were the result of a series of responses by British officers on the spot to 
the political situation developing in Malta and Europe.[3] By 1801, 
however, these responses had been shaped by Britain into a temporary policy 
which aimed chiefly at securing Maltese popular support for British 
annexation of Malta.
It is this policy and its implications for the public service which
will provide the dominant theme of this Chapter. This Chapter aims to
demonstrate that the Maltese public service was to be one of the principal
vehicles through which this British policy was to be successfully
implemented. It was mainly through the use of both the structures and the
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offices of the Maltese public service that it became possible for Britain 
to adopt those measures which were likely to strenghten Maltese support for 
the formal incorporation of their island into the British Empire. But very 
little attention was paid at ensuring efficiency and public servants were 
left to carry out their duties without proper supervision or control. The 
result of this approach was, as we shall see, widespread negligence, 
confusion and even corruption.
Real British interest with Maltese public administration, however, 
became evident for the first time in 1812 when British annexation of Malta 
finally appeared to be certain. In that year a commission of Inquiry was 
sent out to Malta from Britain with a brief to investigate fully into every 
aspect of Maltese public administration and to make recommendations, among 
other things, as to the system of government to be adopted in Malta and to 
suggest reforms in its public service.[4] In this Chapter our concern will 
be with the findings of this Commission as they relate to the 
administration. It is here that the implications of British policy in Malta 
for the administration will become generally apparent. Its recommendations, 
however, will be examined in the following Chapter where one dominant theme 
will be that of the reform of Maltese public administration in the period 
1814-24.
EARLY BRITISH POLICY IN MALTA: ORIGINS AND FEATURES
At the turn of the nineteenth century one of the issues that divided
the great powers was that of the future sovereignty of Malta. Although in
practical terms Britain enjoyed complete mastery over the islands - its
fortifications, arsenals, ports and even the government falling under its
control - Britain was prevented from claiming exclusive sovereignty over
Malta by a rival claim from Naples and by a demand from the Knights of St
John for the restoration of the islands to their Order. The latter had the
support of Russia whose Czar had been appointed Grandmaster of the Order by
a sizeable section of its membership.[5] Although both these claims enjoyed
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considerable legitimacy, Britain was not prepared to give up the islands, 
hoping, however, not to antagonise the Russian Czar unnecessarily in the 
process. It was a difficult situation and Britain could not avoid offending 
either Naples or Russia or both.[6]
This uncertainty over which power was to possess Malta succeeded in 
bringing forward into the reckoning the Maltese themselves. In the past the 
Maltese had enjoyed no say as to who should rule over them. Historically it 
was events in Europe or the Mediterranean that determined this. But, in 
1798, this established pattern was broken by the revolt of the Maltese 
against their new French masters. Their determination in carrying out 
their revolt astounded the better trained and equipped French and won 
British admiration. The revolt, however, would not have succeeded without 
outside help, although the Maltese were apparently determined to see it 
through whatever the final outcome.[7] This by itself served to impress 
upon the powers contesting for possession of Malta that, until peace was 
restored in Europe, it would be difficult for any power to hold Malta 
without Maltese support. Sir Ralph Abercromby, British commander-in-chief 
in the Mediterranean, in fact observed that,
'if the inhabitants [of Malta]...can firmly be attached to the government 
under which they live, it will be extremely difficult to wrest Malta out of 
their possession.'[ 8]
What was required, therefore, from each individual power, was a policy that 
would attach the Maltese to itself.
Naples, the Order, Russia, and even France, which were all anxious to 
see Britain out of Malta, were forced to depend on their agents or on local 
supporters to promote their interests in Malta. Between 1800 and 1802 these 
agents were particularly active spreading rumours and agitating the 
population against Britain, while all the time painting rosy pictures of 
the economic prosperity and political liberties that the Maltese would 
enjoy were they to come under the dominion of the power each 
represented.[9]
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Being in absolute control of the islands Britain had no need to resort 
to such methods, but British officers in Malta . were aware that some 
response to this agitation was expected from them. Fortunately, a sizeable 
proportion of the Maltese population, which included the peasants, the 
labouring poor, and the rural nobility and clergy, had already decided in 
favour of British annexation of Malta. It was on the basis of this support 
that these officers aimed to build their response and thereby strenghten 
British hopes of annexing the islands. Thus the whole thrust of British 
policy in Malta in this period was to be directed towards attaching all 
classes of Maltese society to the prospect of British rule.
The architect of British policy in Malta was Captain Alexander Ball. 
Ball had been despatched to Maltese waters in 1798 to direct the naval 
blockade of the French in Valletta after news of the Maltese revolt had 
reached Nelson. But the French refused to yield and in 1799 Ball landed in 
Malta and took personal charge of the provisional government established by 
the rebels. The Maltese were so impressed by the leadership qualities of 
this naval captain that they elected him to be their "Chief" and assigned 
him the role of Governor of the Maltese islands.[10] After the capture of 
Valletta the civil administration of the island became temporarily 
entrusted in his hands.[11] It was his view that Britain could continue to 
hold Malta indefinitely only if the Maltese, whose wishes in the 
circumstances were of prime importance, were given 'a material interest in 
preserving British rule in Malta.'[12] Ball was so convinced that this was 
the correct approach to be adopted that he embarked on its implementation 
without waiting for formal instructions or approval from home. But within 
less than a year Britain had adopted this policy as its own. This will 
become evident a little later when we examine the Colonial Secretary's 
instructions to Charles Cameron who in May 1801 was appointed Civil 
Commissioner of Malta.
The main elements of this policy were mainly four. First, the British
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had to show the utmost respect to the Maltese Catholic Church, according it 
in Malta the status of established church. The Maltese clergy, like their 
counterparts in Italy and Spain, tended to exercise enormous influence over 
the population. Many priests in Malta had been leading members of the 
revolt against the French. Some, as in the case of Canon Saverio Caruana in 
Malta, and Dun Saver Cassar in Gozo, had even acted as military 
commanders.[13]
Second, it was recognised that the Maltese were as equally attached to 
the paternalistic tradition and institutions established by the government 
of the Order as they were to their religion and that somehow these had to 
be continued. In times of crisis or famine it was this tradition and these 
institutions that tended to substantially minimise the sufferings of a 
relatively vulnerable population.[14] Although the government of the Order 
was autocratic, its paternalism had secured for it, centuries of untroubled 
rule. Indeed, in the last decades of the eighteenth century Maltese 
disenchantment with the rule of the Order had come about precisely because 
the latter had been so weakened and impoverished by events in Europe that 
it was no longer able to sustain its paternalism for very much longer.[15]
In September 1800 as a consequence of the revolt against the French 
and the loss of the lucrative trade in manufactured cotton, poverty and 
unemployment were to be found everywhere in Malta. Food was scarce and 
disease arising from malnutrition, was common.[16] Ball fully understood 
that, under such conditions, the degree of British readiness and 
willingness to assume the paternal role once performed by the Order of St 
John in Malta, was certain to become the yardstick against which the 
Maltese would judge the advantages of British annexation. He was also 
certain that a half-hearted attempt on this score by Britain would be fully 
exploited by the agents of the other powers in Malta.
Third with one or two exceptions, native Maltese were allowed to hold
offices, at every level of the local administration. In the past, offices
61
in the public service were bestowed on and held by Maltese at the pleasure
of the grandmaster of the day, and very few of these offices were of an
executive nature. Even where this was so, as in the case of the 'Uditori',
ultimate authority tended to rest in the person of a high-ranking member of
the Order, notably a Grand Cross or the Grandmaster himself.[17] But
because of their participation in the expulsion of the French from Malta
the inhabitants had come to feel that, with the exception of the offices of
Governor and chief [or Public] Secretary, all offices in the administration
should be filled from amongst them.[18]
The fourth and final feature of the policy adopted by Ball was related
to the question of government. It was his view that Britain must not
surrender any portion of its political or military authority in Malta.
Keeping all authority firmly entrenched in British hands had two
advantages. First, it would prevent Maltese agents acting on behalf of one
of the other powers from gaining influence over the government. Second, it
served to delay any decision as to the future system of government to be
adopted in Malta. On the grounds that nothing could be done until a general
peace was restored in Europe, the system of government in Malta was to
continue to resemble, as far as it was possible, the autocratic structures
that had once characterised the government of the ancien regime.[19] This
was not in line with the wishes of the local nobility whose members had
come to expect an inportant role in the government of Malta. They were, as
a result, to continue for the next twelve years, to press for some degree
of authority in government affairs.[20]
For a brief period between 1802 and 1803, when the Treaty of Amiens
seemed destined to force Britain to quit Malta, it appeared, however, that
in order to ensure Maltese loyalty to Britain, the British government was
prepared to give way on this issue as well. Acting as the true champion of
Maltese interests the British government forced the other powers to agree
that, in any future restoration of the government of the Order, the Maltese
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were to enjoy an equal share of authority, power and influence as that of 
members of the Order.[21] But the provisions of the Treaty were never 
implemented and after 1803 the challenge to British annexation of Malta 
began to recede rapidly. In consequence Britain was no longer prepared to 
countenance Maltese participation in government beyond what it had been 
under the "ancien" regime.
Of the above four features, two have a special relevance for this 
study. The first is that relating to the issue of paternal government. We 
have seen in the previous Chapter that during the time of the government of 
the Order one result of the government's involvement in nearly every aspect 
of Maltese social and political life was the growth of a relatively large 
bureaucracy. After 1800 the policy of rapidly re-establishing the old 
paternal structures and institutions of the island, combined with pressures 
to accommodate as many Maltese as possible, resulted in an even larger 
bureaucracy.
The second feature concerns the role and position that Maltese 
office-holders were to occupy in the new administration. As will be 
developed further in this Chapter, on this subject as well Britain was to 
defer to Maltese wishes, to the extent, that under early British rule 
nearly every administrative office in the local public service was occupied 
by a Maltese.
A third element, that concerned with the issue of government, is 
relevant only in that it was the cause of Anglo-Maltese conflict for more 
than a century and, because of the form of colonial government adopted in 
Malta after 1813, (see Chapters 4 and 5), this issue could not avoid 
intruding into many aspects of Maltese administration.
PATERNAL GOVERNMENT RESTORED
The restoration of paternalism by which Ball hoped to strengthen 
Maltese attachment to Britain, thereby nullifying the efforts of the other 
powers to gain influence in Malta, involved the re-establishment of the
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several departments and semi-autonomous bodies that once constituted the 
complex administration of the Order (see Diagram 2:1). As a strategy it had 
the advantage of placing in British hands the extensive powers once 
exercised by the Grandmasters and of ensuring, as in the past, the 
dependency of almost every section of Maltese society on the 
government.[22]
One of Ball's first measures was the reconstitution of the Segnatura. 
Under the ancien regime this council, consisting of the Grandmaster and 
four Maltese assistants known as 'uditori', represented the highest formal 
expression of paternalism and absolutism. At its sessions, as previously 
discussed, the sovereign's subjects were permitted to present their 
petitions, however trivial their nature, directly to him and he dispensed 
patronage, clemency or justice according to each case. It was because the 
Segnatura allowed the Sovereign to take personal cognizance of the claims 
of the most humble of his subjects without allowing any appeal from his 
decision but to himself which made it an expression of paternalism and 
absolutism. Between September 1800 and February 1801 it was Ball who 
presided over the sessions of this Council.[23]
The loyalty and support of the literate and professional classes Ball 
sought to secure by the rapid re-establishment of the University of 
Studies. Within a month of the surrender of Valletta he appointed its 
rector and staff and held the inaugural ceremony.[24] The monopoly once 
exercised by state and church over the university was re-instituted, a 
cleric being appointed as rector and 'protector', while the government 
continued to exercise control over appointments and the administration of 
its finances.[25]
The attachment of the peasants and of the labouring poor Ball sought
to secure in three principal ways. First, by the provision of enployment;
second, by the provision of grain, the staple food of the population, at a
particularly moderate price; third, by a readiness to champion Maltese
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interests against those of other nationalities.
As has already been observed in the previous Chapter, the livelihood 
of a vast proportion of the Maltese lower classes depended almost entirely 
on the island's cotton industry which had been severely disrupted by events 
in Malta and Europe.[26] To counter some of the effects of this slump Ball 
initiated various schemes of public works and public support. Among these 
were schemes involving roadworks and the maintenance of public buildings in 
several towns and villages.[27] Attempts were also made to encourage 
horticulture and fishery. In the first case, gardens were provided at 
government expense for the chiefs of the villages. The latter were mainly 
ex-deputies of the dissolved provisional Congresso whom Ball had appointed 
to act as sitting magistrates in their village with responsibility for law 
and order.[28] In the second case, ' a species of fishery...' was created 
'on the southern coast of Sicily'.[29] The boats for the purpose were also 
provided by the government. Ball defended his schemes with the Secretary of 
State on the ground that the people, in the absence of other employment, 
depended on such schemes and expected, as in the past, the government to 
provide them.[30]
In September 1800 problems of unemployment were compounded by the 
imminent threat of famine. Malta had never been capable of producing more 
than a third of the grain required by its population, the rest having to be 
imported, notably from Sicily. For centuries the latter had been one of the 
principal responsibilities of the Universita'. When the British entered 
Valletta there were only eight days' supply of grain in the island, the 
Universita' was thoroughly bankrupt, and the export of grain prohibited in 
Sicily and extremely scarce in the rest of Italy.[31] To stave off hunger 
from the population Ball, with credit from the home government, undertook 
responsibility for furnishing the island with abundant supplies of grain 
from Asia Minor, where he had appointed agents for the purpose.
The grain, as used to happen in the past, was sold to the inhabitants
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at a lower price since 'the very high price at which it was bought exceeded 
the ability of the inhabitants to purchase at that rate...'[32] This
measure, as Ball pointed out, apart from demonstrating the readiness of
Britain to act in the same paternal manner as the Order used to do, thereby 
impressing the Maltese with the advantages that would accrue from British 
rule, served to reinforce the lesson which the Maltese had learnt at the 
time of the siege. That is, that it was to Maltese advantage to prefer 
British rule
'knowing we have always the means of punishing them, and they are now more
sensible of it than ever, from their having experienced what they would not
believe before, that a British squadron can block them up and starve them 
in the winter months.'[33]
The responsibility for distributing the grain and other imports, and 
for supervising the markets was vested in a reconstituted 'massa 
frumenteria' or Universita' as it was called by the Maltese. By the 
re-establishment of this institution Ball hoped to gain other advantages. 
On the one hand he hoped to humour the nationalist sentiments and 
aspirations of the Maltese upper classes, especially the local nobility, 
for whom the Universita' represented a symbol of ancient local 
autonomy,[34] but without sacrificing any portion of British authority. The 
Universita' did not regain any of its ancient powers but retained only 
those which the knights of St John had allowed it to exercise.[35] On the 
other hand it served to reconcile to British rule those who in the past had 
invested their savings in the Universita' and had neither received any 
interest nor did they entertain any hope of recovering their savings from a 
bankrupt Universita'.[36] Ball, rather than declaring it to be so, 
unconditionally assumed responsibility for its debts on behalf of the 
government. By a tax on imported wines and spirits he managed to pay 
depositors the interests on their investments and to secure for them those 
investments.[37] The Monte di Pieta, an institution which had been 
similarly bankrupted by the French, he also reconstituted to the 
satisfaction of those who held deposits with it.[38]
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A final example can be found in Ball's determination to defend Maltese
interests against those of foreign allies. One example would suffice to
demonstrate this argument and to further reinforce the importance that Ball
attached to the necessity of restoring paternal government as a way of
attaching the people to Britain. The French, following the capture of Malta
from the Order of St John, had turned the Holy Infirmary (the civil
hospital) into a military hospital. The civil hospital was transferred to
the convent of St Magdalene, also in Valletta.[39] On the departure of the
French the British retained the Holy Infirmary as a military hospital for
the exclusive use of British troops. The civil hospital they assigned for
the use of Neapolitan troops. Ball, although fully aware that in the past
the expenditure on the civil hospital represented the most expensive item
on the government's budget, strongly opposed the move. He insisted and
secured after two months of haggling, the return of the hospital for the
use of poor Maltese civilians, despite the objections of the Neapolitan
commander who deplored the fact that Ball 'had preferred the Maltese to the
troops of His Majesty.'[40]
Within a mere six months Ball had succeeded in setting the old
administration of the Knights of St John going again. The Segnatura, the
Universita', the Monte di Pieta, the Segreto, now called the Establishment
for the Administration of Public Property, the University of Studies, the
hospitals, the health and quarantine establishments, the customs, the post
office and the law courts were all functioning. All these, and others,
constituted a large number of public offices. Ball resisted pressures on
him to appoint British officers to many of these situations. According to
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who for a time served in Malta as Ball's private
secretary and as Chief secretary, it was Ball's view that
'with the exception of the [office of] Governor, and [that] of the Public 
secretary...there was no civil office which ought to be given to any but 
the Maltese.'[41]
He strongly believed that a different policy would
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'affront the higher classes and alienate the affections of all, not only 
without any imaginable advantage but with the certainty of great 
loss...,[for] to deprive...the middle and lower classes of such places as 
they had been accustomed to hold, would be cruel.'
Ball inplemented his policy without any reservation. To every headship 
or public office, except that of Public secretary, he appointed only from 
amongst the Maltese. Many offices were distributed as rewards 'for services 
rendered'[42] to those who had been leading members of the revolt against 
the French. Canon Francesco Saverio Caruana, at the time of the revolt 
commander of the Maltese country battalions, was appointed rector of the 
University of studies.[43] Similarly, Vincenzo Borg, commander of the 
B'kara battalions was appointed to be one of the four administrators 
responsible for the management of the public property.[44] Felice Cutajar, 
another Maltese nationalist, became Pro-Secretary or second secretary to 
the Government.[45]
Ball's first administration came to an end in February 1801. The 
developments that occurred after this time were to prove how correct Ball 
had been in his assessment of the situation in Malta and in the way it 
should be handled. The first of these developments arose as a consequence 
of the rivalry existing between Ball and Major Pigot, the British officer 
in command of the British garrison.[46] Sir Ralph Abercromby, British 
military commander in the Mediterranean, had vested Pigot with full 
authority over the Maltese islands but directed him to employ Ball in the 
direction of the civil administration.[47] Ball and Pigot had never got on 
well together and in February 1801 the latter determined to remove Ball and 
to undertake, in addition to his military duties, full responsibility for 
civil affairs himself.[48]
This relatively sudden change provoked rumblings of discontent among
many sections of Maltese society. It also gave agents of foreign powers in
Malta a chance to give their faltering canpaign against British rule a new
impetus.[49] The Maltese were totally opposed to a system of government
that combined civil and military matters under the authority of the officer
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in charge of the garrison. According to Ball the Maltese were apprehensive 
that under a system of garrison or military government they would 
experience similar
'oppressions to what they suffered under the government of the Order of St 
John, as they are now placed in the second order of the state, the military 
being the first.'[50]
Reports of growing agitation and discontent from Malta impressed Lord 
Hobart, the Colonial Secretary, with the need to act. Heeding Ball's 
advice, in May 1801 he appointed Charles Cameron to be Civil commissioner 
in Malta thereby divesting Pigot of responsibility for civil affairs.[51] 
However, Cameron was instructed to consult with Pigot regularly and was not 
to undertake any measure until he had obtained the approval of the military 
authorities in Malta.[52] The rest of Lord Hobart's instructions to Cameron 
may be considered, because of the approximation they bore to the policy 
adopted by Ball in Malta, as the point at which the policy of an individual 
British officer on the spot was translated into formal British government 
policy.[53]
Cameron's task in Malta was threefold. First, in every sphere of life 
he was to maintain the system established by Ball. Indeed, he was not to 
allow any departure from it unless dictated by questions of defence or by 
measures the necessity of which was
'so evidently beneficial and desirable, as to leave no doubt of its 
expediency, or of its being generally acceptable to the wishes, the 
feelings, and even the prejudices of the inhabitants.'[54]
For this reason, the administration of justice, of the police, of public
property and of every other institution was to 'continue to be exercised in
conformity to the laws and institutions of the ancient government of the
Order.' Those institutions which in the past had their funds entrusted to
the local Treasury and/or which received support from this source, such as
the University of Studies, the hospitals, the foundling hospital and that
of Santo Spirito in Mdina, and the Ospizio, were to continue receiving
them.
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Cameron was to keep under his 'immediate superintendence and 
inspection' the Universita' and the Monte di Pieta. With respect to the 
Universita', Hobart wrote that,
'however much at variance with general principles it may appear for a 
government to retain in its own hands the exclusive privilege of buying and 
selling corn, I have no hesitation to give my opinion that in Malta...the 
system which has been so long established in this respect should not be 
altered for the present.'
Ball had argued that
'the safety of the Island in time of war and the maintenance of the 
labouring poor in time of peace are inseparably connected'[55]
with the government grain monopoly. The Colonial Secretary signified his
agreement with this view in words almost identical to those of Ball, adding
that the Universita' provided
'a constant and useful check over the people in the hands of the government 
[and] ought to be adhered to as an arrangement no less politic on our part 
than provident towards the Maltese themselves.'[56]
Cameron's second task was to endeavour to inpress upon the Maltese the
readiness of the British government to protect their interests and to give
full consideration to their views. To this extent, Cameron was instructed
that respecting the manufacture and export of cotton thread, the chief
article of the Maltese export and industry, that
'it becomes necessary in order to tranquilise the minds of the people, 
which appear to have been artfully alarmed upon the subject, to assure them 
that every necessary protection and encouragement will continue to be given 
to this important object
In his relations with the Maltese, Cameron was to use every endeavour
'...to meet their wishes, to show yourself indulgent even to their 
prejudices and to omit no fair opportunity of conciliating their affection 
and ensuring their fidelity to the government...'
Finally, Cameron was to acquire for Britain an extensive knowledge of
the true extent, powers and functioning of the administration of Malta
under the government of the Order of St John. He was instructed to forward
to London several reports regarding the actual revenue and its mode of
collection, the management of public property, the quarantine
establishment, the hospitals, and
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'a return of the civil Establishment of Malta, specifying the name of each 
person holding an eirployment therein, the nature of that employment, and 
the salary derived from it.'
On his arrival in Malta, Cameron, who it was said was received as some 
sort of Messiah,[57] issued a proclamation that may be considered as almost 
unique in the history of the early 19th century British Empire both in its 
language and in the message of paternalism which it conveyed. In it the 
British monarch was described by Cameron as
'a King who is the father of his subjects, who protects the weak against
the strong, the poor against the rich.'[58]
The Maltese were to be assured of his affection towards them and of his 
paternal care, the latter extending
'to the hospitals, and other charitable establishments, to the education of 
youth, to orphans, to the poor, and to all those who recur to his 
beneficence.'
Cameron promised the Maltese that his administration would aim to reflect
and implement His Majesty's wishes. 'My door', he told them,
'shall be open to all; I will hear everyone's pleas...and above all, I 
shall devote myself to the means of promoting the cultivation of cotton, 
the manufacture of yarn, and of importing and maintaining an abundance of 
food in these Islands, and of making Malta the Enporium of the 
Mediterranean and the seat of content.'
However, the international situation soon reasserted its influence 
over affairs in Malta and Cameron's rule came to an abrupt end before 
anything could be achieved. In October 1801 France advanced proposals for 
peace with Britain, but one of the French conditions involved the 
restoration of Malta to the Order of St John and the evacuation of all 
British troops from the island.[59] In March 1802, at Amiens, Britain 
reluctantly agreed to French terms, nonetheless, making every effort to 
protect British strategic interests in Malta by the inclusion of certain 
clauses within the final treaty. Article X of the Treaty of Amiens by and
large incorporated most of the British demands.[60] Malta was to be
declared neutral, its neutrality to be guaranteed by France, Britain, and 
the other powers. A Maltese branch of the Order was to be established 
before the Order was to be allowed to return to Malta, and that the members
of the Maltese branch were to 'be competent to hold every office and to 
enjoy every privilege...as the other knights.' Furthermore, it was 
stipulated that
'the municipal, revenue, civil, judicial, and other offices under the 
Government of the island shall be filled at least in the proportion of 
one-half by native inhabitants of Malta, Gozo and Comino.'
Similarly, the garrison was at all times to be composed of one-half Maltese
under the command of Maltese officers.[61] It was the first time, since the
expulsion of the French, that Britain gave recognition to a Maltese
political role in the government of Malta.
But the Maltese, despite its favourable provisions, rejected the 
Treaty. Indeed, their leaders openly declared their intention to resist the 
return of an impoversihed Order to Malta and asserted that since they had 
been the principal actors in the liberation of their country they alone 
possessed the right to decide on its government. To prove their point they 
assembled in Congress and proceeded to elect His Brittanic Majesty as their 
lawful sovereign.[62] Once again agitation in Malta reached a new peak, for 
many public servants who had openly supported the movement for British
annexation of Malta were openly abused by the agents of the Order and of 
France. Alexander Macaulay, the Public Secretary, in a letter to London 
observed that he was endeavouring to reconcile those around him 'to their 
fate' after the British withdrawal.[63] Because the situation in Malta was
threatening to become highly unstable, in 1802, the Colonial Office
replaced Cameron with Alexander Ball as Civil Commissioner in the islands. 
He alone was considered capable of handling the political situation in 
Malta since he alone had gained the confidence of many of the Maltese
leaders and of the population at large.[64]
The Treaty, however, provided only a brief respite from hostilities 
since neither Britain nor the other powers were prepared to carry out its 
provisions.[65] The decision by Britain in February 1803 'to suspend all 
measures for evacuating the island' infuriated France and by May of that
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year the two nations were once again at war.[66] At this point in progress 
British ministers became less reluctant to declare their intention to 
annexe Malta. In both Houses of Parliament the general conclusion was the
same. Malta, it was decided, 'was to be considered as of infinite
importance to the strengthening and security of our Empire in India.'[67] 
This new openess with regard to British intentions in Malta was also
reflected in developments in Malta itself. Soon Britain began to expand her
military and naval presence in Malta. Already, Malta was beginning to serve 
as the main naval servicing base for the squadrons of the British navy in 
the Mediterranean Sea.[68]
After 1803 a new development began to make itself apparent. This 
development was occasioned, as we shall see below, both by the 
circumstances of the war and by the gradual realization on Britain's part 
that as the war dragged on the challenge to its position in Malta began to 
recede rapidly. It was the increase in the number of British office-holders 
within the Maltese public service. As already observed, Ball was set 
against the idea of giving offices to persons other than Maltese. Apart 
from the notion of fairness implied in such a policy, Ball held that 'the 
number of...employments to be conferred would give considerable influence 
to His Majesty's civil representative' in Malta.[69] During his first 
administration Ball had appointed only one British officer, namely 
Alexander Macaulay, who was to assume the duties of Public [Chief] 
Secretary and Treasurer.[70] Lord Hobart, the Colonial Secretary, in his 
instructions to Cameron did not pronounce himself on the issue. But neither 
did he go against the practice adopted by Ball. Indeed, apart from 
sanctioning Macaulay's appointment, he made only one other appointment, 
that of William Eton as Superintendent of Quarantine.[71]
The motives for Eton's appointment, however, appeared to be well 
based. In the first instance, Eton was considered to be an expert on 
quarantine establishments and was known to have some knowledge of that in
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Malta. He was, therefore, expected to furnish the British government with a 
report on the establishment there.[72] Second, and perhaps more to the 
point, his appointment was intended to secure for Britain control over a 
vital source of information. The property, including private letters and 
documents, of persons subjected to quarantine were opened and examined by 
the authorities during the process of disinfection.[73] As a result 
information crucial to British interests in Malta and to the security of 
the island became readily available to the British authorities.
The situation in terms of British officers serving in the Maltese 
public service remained basically unchanged until, ironically, Cameron was 
replaced by Ball in 1802. In the next decade the number of British public 
servants holding full-time situations in the Maltese public service was to 
rise from two to fourteen.
One reason was language. The number of Maltese capable of speaking or 
writing English was almost negligible. Thus in 1802, because of the hectic 
diplomatic activity caused by the Treaty of Amiens, the Rev Laing, vicar 
and private secretary to Ball, was added to the civil establishments. Laing 
eventually stayed on to become Chief Secretary.[74] In 1807 Ball made a 
specific request for permission to 'eirploy additional assistance' of public 
officers familiar with English to help in the preparation of the local 
public accounts for inspection by HM's Commissioners at the Treasury in 
London.[75] Until then government accounts were kept in Italian (the 
official language of the ancien regime), and later transmitted to London 
with a report by Ball. Both the Treasury and the Commissioners for Auditing 
Public Accounts in London, were unhappy with the way the accounts were kept 
in Malta and did not hesitate to say so.[76] There is, however, no 
indication whether British officers were appointed, but in that year Ball 
transferred Vincent Casolani, a Maltese who had undergone part of his 
education in England, to the office of paymaster to the Government.[77]
The increase in British commerce to Malta may also have accounted for
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the appointment of sane British office-holders, especially as a result of 
Napoleon's 'continental system'. The number of British ships calling at 
Malta increased beyond all expectations and with it perhaps the need for 
English-speaking officers.[78] This might explain the appointment of 
William England as Head of Customs, of Dr Franklin as President of the 
Board of Health, a body charged with monitoring the application of the 
quarantine regulations, of Henry Fletcher as Head of the shipping Licencing 
Office, and of Charles Livingstone as Head Jurat [Giurat] of the 
Universita'.[79] The latter two officers were appointed to their situations 
by General Hildebrand Oakes who had succeeded to the office of civil 
Commissioner in Malta after Ball's death in 1809.[80] Oakes was also 
responsible for the appointment of William Tyers as Treasurer in 1811. 
Until then, the duties of Public Secretary and of Pulbic Treasurer were 
combined in one office. With the appointment of Tyers the duties of these 
two offices were permanently separated to the benefit, as we shall see, of 
the revenue.[81] Finally, other British office-holders occupied various 
offices ranging from the headship of the Registry and Printing Office to 
Clerkships.[82]
Despite this increase in the number of British office-holders the 
overwhelming majority of administrative offices continued to be held by 
Maltese, and of the former only two, Livingstone and England, held offices 
which the Maltese may have considered as traditionally theirs. Livingstone 
held the office of Head Jurat [Giurat] of the Universita', a prestigious 
office traditionally held by a member of the local aristocracy. William 
England as Head of Customs held an office that under the administration of 
the Order was farmed out to Maltese individuals.[83]
There is no evidence, however, to suggest that at this time this
increase of British office-holders produced an unfavourable reaction among
the Maltese. What it did, however, was to encourage the growth of a British
enclave within the Maltese public service thereby accentuating the process
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of division that had already began to make itself apparent at many levels
of contact between the Maltese and the British in Malta.
Coleridge observed, for example, that during his stay in Malta
'that weakness so frequent in Englishmen, and so injurious to our interest
abroad, of despising the inhabitants of other countries'
was already in evidence.[84] According to the account of another British
resident, by 1812 the division between the two sides had grown wider. He
wrote:
'it would be natural to imagine that after our being so long in possession 
of this island, a greater disposition to mix with each other would have, 
ere this, manifested itself between the natives and English 
residents...however...there is a marked and mutual coldness observed to 
exist...'[85]
This division had become the more obvious after 1806, by which time the 
British civil community in Malta had expanded rapidly, especially in the 
field of conuierce. The main reason for this expansion was the imposition in 
that year, by Napoleon, of a continental blockade against British goods. 
British merchants, eager to penetrate this blockade, found that Malta, 
because of its strategic position, provided them with an ideal base from 
which British commodities could be smuggled into the continent.[86] In 1808 
Malta's position as an important trading base was further enhanced by the 
American Embargo Act which considerably raised the demand for Levantine 
produce in London.[87] Harlow calculates that around this time the value of 
goods transhipped from Malta to other destinations was about £800,000 
annually.[88]
This was indeed an important turnaround in the economic fortunes of 
the Malta. In September 1800 the labouring poor, as we have seen earlier, 
depended almost entirely for their livelihood on schemes provided by the 
government. Many members of the literate and middle classes, and some 
members of the aristocracy had become similarly dependent on situations in 
the public service for a secure if, however, moderate income. But between 
1805 and 1812, commercial activity around Malta's harbours replaced 
government schemes as the main enployment, the cotton industry still being
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in a state of slunp. Maltese from every strata of society found employment 
within this commercial activity and such was the demand for labour that 
wages increased beyond all expectations.[89]
As a consequence the cost of living rose too, with the price of many 
commodities and of house rents setting the pace. The latter was especially 
marked in Valletta and the towns bordering the main harbours and the 
Government 'found it necessary to make extra allowances to many persons 
employed in the public service.'[90] House rents in fact had risen in 
response to the demands for housing occasioned by an influx of foreigners 
seeking to set up in commerce, and of Maltese attracted to the harbour 
areas by the prevailing employment opportunities there.[91]
Needless to say some were adversely affected by the rise in prices and 
the number of unhoused poor, especially in Valletta, rose dramatically.[92] 
But all considered the impact of the cost of living was somewhat reduced by 
the Government. First, through its monopoly position with regard to the 
importation and sale of grain, the government ensured stability in the 
price of this staple commodity. Second by maintaining its own rents - 
government owned about one-third of all commercial, domestic and arable 
property in Malta - at their old levels, the government managed to some 
extent to counteract the rise that was constantly taking place in the 
private sector.[93] Finally, several of the charitable institutions managed 
by the Government served to bring some relief to those who were destitute. 
As a result, therefore, of this unprecedented expansion in commerce, and 
the ability of the Government to partially temper the rise in the cost of 
living, poverty in the towns and villages declined rapidly. The greater 
part of the population, especially the working classes, credited this 
prosperous state of their island solely to Malta's connection with 
Britain.[94]
The local aristocracy, whose attachment to Britain was not less than 
that of other classes, was not, however, to be satisfied merely by economic
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progress. Its members desired a share in the government of Malta preferably 
in the shape of a re-constituted Consiglio Popolare. Their hopes had been 
boosted by British provisions in the Treaty of Amiens which guaranteed the 
Maltese an equal share in the government, administration and defence of 
their island. But after the collapse of the Treaty in 1803, these hopes 
were somewhat dented for Britain failed to implement these provisions. By 
1809 the Maltese aristocracy had become painfully aware that their hopes 
for representative government were fading rapidly. In that year, shortly 
before his death they pleaded with Ball to allow them to reconvene their 
Congresso, for they feared that if the matter was postponed any longer 
their claim for some form of representative government would be dismissed 
completely once peace was concluded.[95] Ball did not accede to their 
wishes and matters came to a head soon after his death with the appointment 
of General Hildebrand Oakes, the commander of the garrison, as Civil 
Commissioner.[96]
In 1811, a petition demanding the revival of the Consiglio popolare, 
independent tribunals, the adoption of the jury system as practised in 
England, a free press, and a constitution that united their 'ancient, free, 
and only legitimate government with that of the English Constitution,' was 
drawn up for transmission to London.[97] But before this could be done 
Oakes intervened, publicly attacking its organisers and dismissing from 
their office the handful of public servants who refused to withdraw their 
names from the petition.[98] The remaining petitioners directed the matter 
straight to London, protesting at this 'terror of a power without limit', 
and challenged the British government to declare whether Malta was 
considered
'as appertaining to the United Kingdom...[or] whether it is His Royal 
pleasure that we be considered as an independent nation...'[99]
Although Oakes dismissed this challenge as the work of 'a few 
turbulent and factious individuals',[100] the Colonial Office could not 
allow it to pass without serious consideration. Britain was now determined
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to annexe Malta and was not prepared to allow any adverse development to 
obstruct its plans, especially when these appeared so close to fruition. 
The time had come for Britain to take full stock of the situation in Malta 
and to map out the formal process for the institutionalisation of British 
authority in the islands at the first available opportunity. For this 
purpose, in May 1812, Lord Liverpool appointed a Commission of Inquiry. The 
three members who formed this Commission were William Burrows, William 
a'court, and General Hildebrand Oakes, the latter already serving in Malta 
as Civil commissioner. The task of the Commission was to investigate fully 
and to make recommendations regarding the future government and judicial 
system of Malta, its public service, its finances, commerce and 
agriculture, and its ecclestiastical establishments.[101] The contents of 
the Report of the Commission of Inquiry of 1812 will be examined in this 
and the following Chapter.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF BRITISH POLICY IN MALTA
The history of the Maltese public service in the period 1800-12 has 
acquired a notoriety which has remained with it to this day. Confusion, 
arising from lack of experience, and negligence were the principal 
characteristics of the first few years of British rule. An eye-witness 
wrote,
'...when public letters were received, if no answer was required, they were 
thrown on the floor of the writing-room...If any answer was scribbled out, 
in the rough, it was merely on the back of an old letter or any piece of 
paper nearest at hand.. .Nothing had been copied into the books for 
months...The letters and corresponding documents parted company the moment 
they were read - they were all thrown into a vortex.'[102]
This report received strong support, in 1835, from William Thornton, 
the Auditor-General in Malta who, faced with a request for a comprehensive 
report on the finances of the colony since the arrival of the British, 
pleaded that he wished to 'respectfully submit, whether it can in any way 
be desirable that the preparation of the statement for those early years 
should ever be attempted', since nothing could '...be stated with any 
degree of confidence...'[103]
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The explanation for this state of affairs arose from the fact, 
mentioned earlier, that the Maltese public service had, in the two years 
from the arrival of the French in Malta until their expulsion, suffered the 
loss of many of its most experienced employees. Those whan Ball appointed 
in their place, as Ball himself was to admit, had not always been up to the 
task required of them. He lamented in one of his last despatches from Malta 
that he had had no proof either of their ability or of their 
integrity.[104]
The aim of British policy in Malta was to give the Maltese a vested 
interest in preserving British rule. This meant, as was seen earlier, 
giving a large number of Maltese offices in the public service. The 
criterion was, known loyalty to Britain or potential allegiance based on 
self-interest. Those placed at the head of establishments came principally 
from the first category.[105] Others were recruited on the basis of a 
personal petition to the Civil Commissioner or on the recommendation of 
heads. By 1802, some Maltese families, notably the Casolani's, had already 
established themselves prominently within the ranks of the public 
service.[106] By 1812 the number of Maltese employed with the local public 
service had risen to almost 600 persons - a fact which the Report of the 
Commission of 1812 unhesitatingly attributed
'to the particular line of policy at the time adopted of endeavouring to 
acquire popularity and to attach individuals to the new order of things'
by the creation of numerous offices.[107]
For Britain the Maltese public service was no more than a means 
towards an end and, as a consequence, very little attention was given to 
performance. Nothing was to be done or said which might give offence to the 
Maltese occupying its offices. Every head of establishment was left to run 
it as he pleased, with little or no supervision at all. As a consequence, 
corruption was added to the already existing confusion and negligence.
An exception to the above rule seems to have been made in the case of
the Courts. Ball had informed the Secretary of State, in 1805, that he had
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assumed the powers once vested in the Grandmaster of confirming, removing
or transferring judges from one court to another during an annual
"scrutiny".[108] The purpose for this measure, according to Ball, was not
only because the scrutiny 'was an established and popular usage of the
ancient government to remove the judges...', but also because it operated
'as an excitement to the faithful discharge of their duty and at the same 
time affords the government a powerful check over a body of men'
capable of exercising great influence over the government itself.[109] But
the Maltese petition of 1811 demanding independent tribunals and the Report
of the Commission of Inquiry of 1812 which described the Maltese judicial
system as that 'great mischief' demonstrated that the "scrutiny" had proved
to be both unpopular and ineffective.[110]
According to the Commission many of those charged with offences,
whether innocent or guilty, were left
'to languish for years in prison at the mercy of the Judges, whose conduct
may be influenced by caprice, or even by a baser motive.'
Other serious forms of corruption and negligence, according to the 
Commission could be found 'wherever the Maltese are concerned with matters 
of finance.' The failure of the hospitals, for exairple, to submit their 
accounts to the local treasury for more than four years could not , in the 
opinion of the Commission, but 'give rise to suspicions of extreme 
negligence at least.' This was especially true since the Commissioners had 
not been sufficiently convinced either of the need or the reasons put 
forward by the Board of administrators to justify the large increase in the 
expenditure of the hospital establishments.[Ill] Neither was the Commission 
satisfied that the accounts submitted by the Board of Administration 
charged with the management of public property were sufficiently 
explanatory of similarly large increases in their expenditure. They 
deplored the fact that
'the Administrators have been in the habit generally of incurring expenses 
even to a considerable amount, without no authority than their own minutes 
made from verbal communications...'[112]
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The Jurats of the Universita, an institution that had received over 
£100,000 in British subsidies to procure bulk supplies of grain, were 
similarly found guilty of mismanagement. According to the Commission it was 
impossible for its members to make any sense of the accounts of this 
establishment and they were shocked to discover that
'far from finding the finances of the Universita' in that flourishing 
state, which we were led to expect, we find them in point of fact rather 
worse than nothing.'
To all this was to be added the fact that in nearly every department the 
collection of the revenue was in arrears. Some improvement had taken place 
in this respect thanks, according to the commission, to the endeavours of 
William Tyers, an Englishmen, who had been appointed Treasurer by Oakes in 
L811. This led the Commission to conclude that
'whatsoever names, titles or offices to be given to the Maltese, the 
efficient and responsible situations, in all money transactions be 
universally confined to an Englishmen.'
British officers, the Report observed, were now no longer in the same 
position as in September 1800 when lack of knowledge of Maltese 
administrative and financial matters made them dependent on the Maltese for 
their management.
Fortunately for Britain, by 1812, the tide of international politics
vas pounding in its favour to an extent that Maltese acquiesence to British
rule, while still desirable, was no longer essential. Napoleon's invasion
cf the latter had led Russia to abandon its claim to Malta while the severe
losses incurred by the French in the canpaign had virtually eliminated the
French challenge to British mastery of the Mediterranean.[113] The majority
cf the Maltese had obtained what they wanted, the reconstitution of their
paternal establishments to shield them in times of crisis or from inflation
during times of prosperity, while the enormous expansion in commerce had
somewhat freed the population from its extreme dependence on government
sohemes for employment. The Commission of Inquiry of 1812 was thus able to
conclude that what the majority of the Maltese desired in the very near
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future, was a 'more intimate connection with Britain.'[114]
Those persons who according to the Report of the Commission were 
dissatisfied with British rule were mainly members of the local nobility 
who in its view had failed to share, as other classes had done, in the 
general prosperity of the island. The Report alleged that these tended to 
look with a somewhat jealous eye on the prosperity surrounding them and it 
was this jealousy that served to explain their agitation for representative 
institutions.
Everything considered, Britain had succeeded admirably in its 
determination to acquire and hold on to Malta. As Fay has observed 'nations 
do not stumble into Empire. It only seems so...They work for it, and when 
it is won they must hold it.'[115] Britain had used all the means at its 
disposal to achieve its purpose. It cared very little for the future 
implications of its policy for its aims were focused on more immediate 
goals. Many of these implications were to become apparent as early as 1813 
and some of them, as will be seen in subsequent Chapters, were to continue 
to influence or condition developments in the Maltese public service for 
quite some time to come.
First, there was the question of the size of the Maltese public 
service itself. The number of those employed in its ranks had been allowed 
to grow uncontrolled and by 1812 in terms of salaries alone the service 
accounted for more than a quarter of all public expenditure.[116] In the 
years to come, especially in times of severe economic crisis, several 
attenpts were to be made by the colonial Office to reduce this burden on 
the local revenue. But these were only to be partially successful for 
Governors in Malta at such times were under enormous pressure to adept 
similar measures to those adopted by Ball when faced with similar 
circumstances.[117] The Maltese at this time were certainly not opposed, or 
at least concerned with the size of their public service. They paid no 
direct taxes for its upkeep for as we shall see in the following Chapter
until 1822 the revenue of the government was acquired mainly from tariffs 
on commerce and from public property. [118]
Furthermore, every class of Maltese society looked to the government 
for the provision of a particular social service, whether this was 
education, medical care, charity, and the provision of grain or work during 
periods of severe unemployment. The tendency, therefore, was always towards 
bulky bureaucratic structures. What worried many Maltese was not the size 
of the bureaucracy but the influence that bureaucrats may enjoy over the 
decision making process. This is why, as Ball had noted, Maltese opposed 
the combination of civil and military affairs under the direction of the 
garrison commander. It was their view that military governors, burdened as 
they were with military duties, could not give proper attention to civil 
affairs with the result that they were forced to delegate too much power to 
public servants, who in turn, sought their own interests rather than those 
of the population as a whole.[119] As we shall see from chapter Five 
onwards, the dangers of bureaucratic government were to be raised by nearly 
every new generation of Maltese leaders in their struggle for 
representative government. As a consequence, the activities of public 
servants in Malta were to become permanently entangled with political 
issues.
The question of bureaucratic size was closely connected with a second
implication. British policy had led the Maltese to believe that British
rule was synonymous with paternal government. This promise had featured in
public proclamations by Civil Commissioners and had been backed in practice
by the infusion of several hundred thousand pounds of British taxpayers
money. British notions of government were, however, decidedly opposed to
such practices and British departure from its own principles was
justifiable only by the need to gain advantage in Malta. By 1812. with its
objective secured and Malta enjoying unprecedented commercial prosperity,
British enthusiasism for paternal government in Malta began to wane. The
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Maltese were no longer to look to Britain in times of crisis or for the 
prosperity of their country but to their own industry and energies. Rather, 
the Maltese were expected to shoulder not only the burden of their 
institutions but also that arising from the defence of their island.[120]
We shall see, in the next two Chapters, this new attitude being put to 
the test for, in 1813, as a result of a plague epidemic, Malta's status as 
one of the 'most flourishing of His Majesty's possessions' was wiped 
out.[121] Without commerce neither employment nor revenue were possible and 
within a few short months the island had descended into a state of near 
bankruptcy. Nonetheless, Britain was to remain steadfast in its new 
attitude towards Malta and in the next few years efforts were to be made to 
curb some of the existing paternalistic structures.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE REFORM OF MALTESE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: 1812-1824
If the year 1800 had marked the beginning of an inexorable process of 
British annexation of Malta, the year 1812 may be considered as the year in 
which that process was, for all intents and purposes, terminated. Malta, it 
is true, was not formally ceded to Britain by the other powers until the 
signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1814, but this event amounted to nothing 
more than the affixing of a formal seal of approval to a 'de facto' 
situation.[1] In fact, by the first half of 1812, the strands of a new 
process were already evident from the instructions to the Commission of 
Inquiry of 1812 which was directed to examine British proposals for a 
settled system of government in Malta and to make recommendations 
calculated to reform its administration. The intended outcome of this new 
process was the formal institutionalisation of British authority in Malta. 
A discussion of the effective iirplementation of this process will provide 
the main thrust of this Chapter.
As a process the institutionalisation of British rule in Malta may be
said to have involved three strands. The first concerned the system of
government to be adopted in Malta. Primarily, British intentions were to 
make government in Malta coincide with British strategic interests. The 
second referred to the necessity of reforming Maltese public administration 
in order to raise it from the extremely inefficient state in which it had 
fallen. The third strand involved the transfer of all administrative and 
fiscal authority from Maltese public servants to British office-holders.
None of these strands was independent of the others and their separate
treatment below has been adopted to allow for systematic analysis.
The man appointed to carry this process into effect was Thomas 
Maitland, a military officer who had distinguished himself in the war with 
France and who, as Governor of Ceylon, had acquired the reputation of a
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capable, if somewhat excessively autocratic, governor.[2] In July 1813 he 
was appointed to succeed Hildebrand Oakes in Malta but with the title of 
Governor instead of that of Civil commissioner.[3] This departure from past 
practice was a further confirmation of the new process then in progress. It 
was intended to convey to the other powers
'that Malta was a possession of His [British] Majesty, totally independent 
in all its relations of the Crown of Sicily and of every other foreign 
power.'[4]
THE MAKING OF A COLONY
In his instructions to the Commission of Inquiry of 1812, Lord 
Liverpool, the British Prime Minister, had stressed the need for the 
Commissioners to keep constantly before them that Malta was a strategic 
'military post of primary inportance'.[5] It was considered desirable, 
unless serious objections existed against it, that in Malta, 'the supreme 
power both civil and military should be vested...in the same person', i.e. 
a military officer of sufficient rank, 'in order to ensure the greatest 
unity, simplicity and efficacy...' This meant that the grant of a 
representative assembly, as demanded by the local aristocracy, was 
unacceptable to Britain. The British government was also of the view that 
the powers of the civil courts should be somehow limited 'in order to 
prevent their clashing with the military authorities in any way...' In 
Brief, the leading principles by which the views of the British government 
were guided and to which the Commission of Inquiry was expected to adhere, 
were
'to give to the Maltese, and to all residents in Malta, as large a share of 
civil liberty as is consistent with the military circumstances of the 
island.'[6]
The Commissioners needed nno further urgings on this point. They were 
agreed that the Maltese were singularly unfit to enjoy any portion of 
political power and the grant of a representative assembly would be, in 
their view, 'a measure fraught with the greatest danger and involving the 
most ruinous consequences.'[7]
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Nor did the Commission of 1812 raise any objection against a system of
government which vested civil and military authority in the hands of a
military officer and in 1813 began a process whereby those appointed as
governors were also vested, almost unexceptionably, with the office of
Commander-in-Chief of all land forces.[8] Lennox Mills has argued that
'the union of the position of Governor...with that of the immediate command 
of the troops was very unusual.'[9]
But Malta had been acquired by Britain because of its strategic military 
importance and as Fieldhouse has observed, the purposes for which a colony 
is acquired tends to determine both its functions and its character.[10] 
The Commissioners, concluded, therefore, that:
'To graduate our ideas of a perfection of Government by the approximation 
it bears towards our own is a mode of reasoning as unjust as it is 
erroneous.'[11]
This conclusion was not novel but reflected current British thinking and
practice on colonial government. In the past it had been the practice of
the British government to grant colonies some form of representative
government. But in 1774 a departure was made in the case of Quebec when it
was asserted that 'an English Constitution and English laws were unsuited
to a colony of Frenchmen'.[12] The Quebec Act of 1774, therefore,
concentrated power in the hands of the governor but withheld the grant of a
representative assembly. Instead it allowed for the creation of a nominated
advisory Council which included in its composition senior heads of
departments.[13] From this time onwards, certainly in the non-settlement
colonies, the pattern of government to be found was mainly gubernotorial in
character rather than representative.[14]
Despite some differences between one colony and another, two features
of the new system were common to all of these colonies. First, in each of
these colonies, which eventually became known collectively as the "Crown
Colonies", the Crown retained a power of legislating by
Order-in-Council.[15] This method of legislation allowed Britain to
intervene directly, whenever it was deemed necessary, in the affairs of
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these colonies.
Second, in these colonies government generally meant personal rule by 
the Governor.[16] Colonial governors in crown colonies were by their 
Commissions vested with extensive powers, even quasi-absolute powers. Very 
few governors, however, ever managed to exercise these powers to the full. 
The most important check on governors tended to come from their own 
officials in the colonies, although very often this check was not always 
for the right motives.[17] Indeed, it was not unusual to find that in some 
colonies relations between the governor and his advisers were perpetually 
strained if not outrightly hostile. Howe, in Canada, had compared the 
governor to a snared bird; he
'may flutter and struggle...[but] at last [he must] resign himself to his 
fate...and be content with the narrow limits assigned to him by his 
keepers.'[18]
By contrast, Thomas Maitland was a governor who exercised his powers 
to the full. In both Ceylon and Malta he kept a firm hold over his 
subordinates, and those who failed to carry out his instructions to the 
letter he either humiliated or removed from their office.[19] He was also 
quite prepared to resist Colonial Office instructions with which he 
personally disagreed.[20] But in crown colonies bureaucratic control over 
government policies tended to be the norm rather than the exception. 
Indeed, students of British colonial government tend to agree that the 
practical essence of crown colony government was its bureaucratic 
nature.[21] In the case of Malta its growth was to become steadily more 
pronounced after Maitland's death in 1824.
A second, theoretically more powerful check on the governor, was that
provided by Colonial Office supervision. Very often the only safeguard
enjoyed by colonial subjects against misrule lay in an appeal to London.
Although colonial officials in London generally did their best to ensure
good government in the colonies, in the first decades of the nineteenth
century very little attention was given to colonial affairs. Colonies were
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to a great extent simply a bore.[22] In this too, however, bureaucratic 
influence in the colonies tended to provide the greatest obstacle to 
Colonial Office supervision. This was largely due to the fact that London 
was, in no small measure, dependent on officers in the colonies for the
bulk of its information. There were to be occasions when, in order to get
to the bottom of things in Malta and elsewhere, London was forced to have 
recourse to special Commissions of Inquiry.
Crown colony government was introduced in Malta in 1813, but, because 
of its fortress character, Malta was not included in their list nor was it, 
until 1851, referred to by this designation. Instead, in 1813 it was placed 
under the supervision of General Bunbury at the War Office which at the 
time came under the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War and 
the Colonies.[23]
Lord Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary, in his instructions to
Maitland, laid down that the latter's authority in Malta was not to be
shackled by any person or body, but was to be limited only by orders from
London. [24] Maitland was said to be a 'rough old despot', 'an ape of
Napoleon', and someone who would have 'constituted a capital governor over
a colony of convicts.'[25] A study of his colonial administration concluded
that Maitland only 'liked subordinates who were capable of nothing but
taking orders from himself.'[26] As governor he kept the reins of
government totally in his hands and hardly anything could be done or a
shilling spent without his sanction or knowledge. Neither did he approve of
appeals to London. During his term in Malta he successfully managed to
block, as late as 1821, all Maltese efforts to present their case to the
Colonial Office. Maitland argued that to allow such appeals was neither in
the interest of the Home government nor of the local administration for
'it would place it [former] in a situation of much difficulty but it would 
effectually ruin the whole power and authority of the local 
government.'[27]
As first British governor of Malta, however, the task of reforming
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Maltese public administration devolved on him. Aware of his autocratic 
nature Lord Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, sought 
by his instructions to restrain Maitland. [28] He urged him to make only 
those changes which appeared to him best calculated to strenghten British 
authority in Malta, but which also encouraged a better administration of 
justice and the revenue, and which served to stimulate commerce. He 
reminded Maitland that 'the first introduction of British 
[non-paternalistic] principles might occasion to one or other of the
classes of [Maltese] society' quite a shock since some still hoped that
Britain would grant them a share in political power.[29] The Report of the
Commission of Inquiry of 1812 was never published and the Maltese could
only speculate as to its recommendations.[30]
Maitland arrived in Malta in October 1813 when the plague was still 
raging in the islands. The malady had virtually wiped out the commerce of 
the island and, the Maltese population, almost at a stroke, had found 
itself once again plunged into poverty. [31] But little could be done until 
the plague had been brought under control and it was not until January 1814 
that Maitland was able to turn his attention to the reform of the
administ rat ion.
THE REFORM OF MALTESE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
The Commission of Inquiry of 1812 had taken only two months to
complete its wide-ranging investigations, but its Report contained several
recommendations with regard to the Maltese public service as well as the
first nearly conplete list of its personnel. [32] Several of these
recommendations were adopted by the Colonial Office and Maitland was
instructed to carry them through. But, as so often happens at the
implementation stage of the the policy process, some of these reforms were
eventually modified by the way Maitland implemented them. To some extent
the framework in which reform was actually carried out resembled very much
that which Maitland had adopted in Ceylon. His reform there had a twofold
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character: it was intended to extend and consolidate his own personal 
authority over every act and every branch of the administration, and to 
ensure the efficient collection of the revenue.[33] In Malta Maitland added 
a third, i.e., that of making the administration, in his own words, 
"English".[34]
Maitland's reform of Maltese public administration took him almost the 
whole period of his governorship before being fully completed. In several 
letters to the Secretary of State and to General Bunbury, he often 
complained that, in the case of some public institutions, such as the 
Universita' and the hospitals, what he alleged as the 'invetrate prejudices 
of the natives' forced him to proceed slowly and with a degree of 
caution.[35] Thus, Maitland's reform of Maltese public administration may 
be said to have had two phases. The first related to what may be termed the 
"proper" establishments of government, that is those responsible for law 
and order, and the collection of the revenue. The second phase, which 
proved to be much longer than the first, was concerned with the reform of 
the Universita' and the other social institutions which Maitland designated 
as "the Charitable Establishments".[36]
As in Ceylon, one of Maitland's first measures was intended to stamp
his authority over the entire administration of the island. In a minute
dated January 1814 addressed to all public establishments, the governor
decreed that as from that date every establishment must, before undertaking
any measure, submit its intentions in writing for the approval of the head
of government.[37] 'it is to be clearly understood', stressed the minute,
that verbal acquiescence to a proposition did not in any way constitute
approval for a measure until it had been formally sanctioned in writing by
a warrant bearing the Governor's signature. Further, all correspondence by
or between government establishments was to be conducted through the Chief
Secretary's office, which was situated in the Governor's residence. Copies
of all the records of the administration were also to be housed there. The
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office of the Chief Secretary was constituted by Lord Bathurst in 1813 in 
place of that of Public Secretary occupied, at the time, by the Rev Laing 
who had succeeded to it in 1807 after having served in the civil 
Commissioner's Secretariat since at least 1801.[38] Laing was appointed to 
the new office while two new appointees, Rodwell Wright and Jarvis, were 
appointed by Bathurst to the new offices of Chief Justice and King's 
Assessor respectively.[39]
Ihe immediate effect of this minute was to bring under Maitland's own 
personal scrutiny or direction the revenue and expenditure of the colony 
and nearly every item of correspondence emanating or received by every 
public establishment. Another was to deprive public servants of virtually 
every element of administrative discretion that they had come to enjoy. 
Fully in command of the administration Maitland now turned his attention to 
its reform, the Courts providing his first target.
The Commission of 1812 had concluded that the judicial establishments 
at Malta were characterised by widespread corruption and excessive delays 
in the hearing of cases. In its view judicial procedure represented one of 
the greatest mischiefs under which Maltese society laboured.[40] These 
evils 'had arisen from the Judge's incomes depending on casual fees.' and 
their remedy, consequently, lay in the
'...necessity of placing the Judges themselves on a more respectable and 
independent footing' and 'beyond partiality.'[41]
The Commission recommended, therefore, that in future Judges should be paid
fixed salaries instead of fees. Their independence from the executive was
to be secured by the discontinuation of the "scrutiny" and by the abolition
of the Segnatura. In the first instance they recommended that the head of
government should be deprived of the ancient power of dismissing Judges and
that this power be vested in the King-in-Council. Proven misconduct was at
all times to be the basis for dismissal of Judges. In the second case the
Commission recommended that no public body was to exercise any influence or
have the power to overturn judgements of the Courts, although the Governor
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was to be vested with the right of mitigation or of pardon in criminal 
cases.
Maitland consented to the view that Judges should be paid fixed 
salaries instead of fees. Indeed, he held this to be applicable to the rest 
of the public service. [42] He also welcomed the suggestion that the 
Segnatura should be abolished. According to the Governor the great number 
of memorials and petitions presented at the weekly 'audienza' served no 
purpose other than 'to oppress and clog the wheels of government.'[43] But 
Maitland, despite declarations to the contrary, was firmly opposed to the 
idea that Judges should be independent of the executive. He feared that an 
independent judiciary would set itself up as a rival focus of power to his 
own, capable of eirbarrassing his administration by a contrasting 
interpretation of the law from that of his own. It was his view that the 
authority of the Governor should at all times be supreme. Indeed Maitland 
held that it was
'the part of the loyal judicial officer to see that the authority of the 
government is unchallenged'
so that there can be no doubt as to who was the real head of the
government.[44] This meant, in Maitland's terms, that
'no judge can ever be permitted to claim or exercise a right to give any 
opinion in his court as a Judge, of the fitness or unfitness of the law of 
the land; it is his duty merely to execute that law be it good, bad or 
indifferent...[and], if repugnant to his feelings to resign his
situation'.[45]
These maxims were conveyed to members of the Maltese judiciary by the
Governor in an address in January 1815.
Maitland was adamant on this point and, even before he had formally
taken up his appointment as Governor, he had requested and obtained
permission from the Secretary of State to establish in Malta a Supreme
Council of Justice with himself as President.[46] The other members of the
Supreme Council were to be the Chief Justice and the Chief Secretary, both
British, and two Maltese judges, thereby ensuring a British majority on the
Council. This Court was to function as an extraordinary appellate court
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reviewing, however, only those decisions of the other courts from which an
appeal to the Supreme Council had been granted "ex gratia" by the Governor
after petition. [47] This placed in the hands of the Governor a
discretionary power which he could use whenever he wished to exert his
authority over the judiciary or for his own ends. The result, as Harrison
Smith has pointed out, was that in a sense the function and concept of the
Segnatura was somewhat restored.[48] Soon after this Court began
functioning Maitland boasted to Lord Bathurst that in every case that had
been allowed to come before the Supreme Council, without exception, the
decision of the inferior court had been reversed.[49] But, as Laferla, a
Maltese anglophile historian has concluded, this situation
'left much to be desired both on account of an inexplicable partiality and 
of its being coverted into a means of revenge'.[50]
The rest of Maitland's judicial reforms were more or less inspired by 
the recommendations of the Commission of 1812. Thus, the Supreme Tribunal 
of Appeal was transformed into the High Court of Appeal with the President 
of the Courts and two other judges as members. New courts having a criminal 
and civil jurisdiction replaced the ancient courts, while the Courts at 
Mdina and in the island of Gozo were abolished. A new Commercial Court was
set up as were also two new courts of inferior jurisdiction, i.e., the
Court of Executive Police and the Court of Judicial Police.[51]
The Governor, however, despite their marginality and the saving that
might have accrued to government, retained the offices of "Luogotenenti" or
town and village magistrates, because they offered seme political
advantage. It was seen in the previous Chapter that of those groups which
were unhappy with British rule the local aristocracy was the most vocal.
Maitland was determined to put an end to their agitation and secure their
loyalty for his administration by the offer of small offices. He divided
Malta into six districts and appointed to each district a member of the
local nobility to act as Lord Lieutenant, arguing that those holding the
offices of Luogotenenti at the time were 'not of that class and order of
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society which ought to represent the Government in the various casals 
[villages].'[52] These offices were, however, nothing less than sinecures 
for the former Luogotenenti were to continue to enjoy their salaries and 
powers but with the title of Deputies to the Lord Lieutenants.[53] Thus, 
the system which had began in Ball's time of creating or giving small 
offices to Maltese for political advantage was destined to continue even at 
a time when the emphasis with regard to the Maltese public service was on 
reform.
The Commission of 1812 had also found a great deal to criticise with 
regard to the collection of the revenue and the methods of accounting used 
in the island. It condemned the fact that most financial transactions were 
carried out with little or no supervision and frequently large expenditure 
was incurred without any authority except that of public servants.[54] 
Maitland concurred fully with this view arguing that as things stood it was 
virtually impossible that
'the accounts of this island could ever be examined or looked into with the 
accuracy common to all other parts of His Majesty's Dominions.'[55]
The remedy lay in the creation of a centralised and efficient system of
public accounting, like the one he had established in Ceylon. This system,
which had 'met with the complete approbation of His Majesty's Government',
had three principal features.[56] First, the collectors of revenue were to
have absolutely no authority or control over its spending, revenue
collected by Government was to go into the public Treasury. If expenditure
was deemed necessary the written approval of the Governor had to be
secured. The procedure to be followed was that as laid down in the minute
of January 1814. Second, no money whatsoever could 'be issued from the
public Treasury except by a warrant' under Maitland's own signature, and
finally, that all accounts were to be closed and audited monthly.[57]
Maitland provided for the effective implementation of this system by
the introduction of two new measures. The first was concerned with the
auditing of government accounts. Until 1814 public accounts were audited
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annually by James Toole, a member of the Services Commissariat Auditing 
Board in Malta.[58] Maitland's system, however, requiring that all accounts 
should be audited monthly, rendered this arrangement inadequate and he 
replaced it with a new Audit Office. James Toole was appointed its first 
head, but he was soon replaced by William Thornton, a nominee of 
Maitland.[59] Although initially the effectiveness of this office was 
hampered by lack of staff, the Auditor having only two clerks to assist 
him, its contribution towards the improvement of the government revenue was 
quite marked.[60]
Maitland's second measure was directed at the existing system of 
remuneration of public enployees. He, like many of his contemporaries in 
Britain, disapproved of the existing system whereby almost all government 
employees were paid by fees. This in his view prevented proper supervision 
of the collection of the revenue and consequently allowed for abuse.[61] He 
further argued that the tendency for abuse was reinforced by the 
excessively low fees received by public servants.[62] This, partly 
explained the issue, raised by the Commission of 1812, of widespread 
corruption by public servants. Maitland stressed that prevailing conditions 
made it utterly inpossible for either the revenue or the expenditure of the 
government to be fully or fairly collected or accounted for. Therefore, 
'with a view to economy in the strictest sense of the word', the Governor 
abolished all fees and replaced them, as in the case of the Judges, with 
fixed salaries which he also raised.[63] This reform served to consolidate 
government revenue for, from this period onwards, all revenue or fees 
earned by public establishments were no longer retained by them but were 
placed directly in the account of the Government Treasury.
The revenue of the government was derived from two principal sources,
i.e. that earned from general mercantile activity and income from rents.
The mercantile revenue consisted mainly of earnings from customs, excise
duties, quarantine dues, port fees, auction fees, and from Mediterranean
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Passes and shipping licences. By 1812 mercantile revenue made up nearly 
half the total revenue of the government.[64] The plague in 1813 and 
Napoleon's defeat in 1814, however, had dealt this source of the revenue a 
severe blow. The former had resulted in an embargo against Maltese shipping 
while the latter had removed the necessity for non-British shipping to 
obtain a pass or licence from Malta in order to trade freely in the 
Mediterranean. Income from such passes and from auction fees became, 
therefore, almost negligible.[65] Even so, Maitland was still convinced in 
1814 that it was
'to this source [mercantile revenue][that] we must at all times look for 
our greatest receipt.'[66]
The bulk of the mercantile revenue of Malta came from customs and 
excise duties. To ensure that these duties were 'collected with assiduity', 
Maitland divided the Customs Department into two branches, one responsible 
for imports and an other for exports. Excise duties mainly on wine, 
equalled, and at times surpassed in amount, the income from customs. The 
main reason for this had been the large influx of British troops stationed 
in Malta.[67] The Customs Department he placed under a new officer, Francis 
Muller, who like his predecessor was British.[68] The Office of Collector 
of Excise remained, however, under Maltese management.[69] The customs 
revenue Maitland consolidated by raising the 'ad valorum' duty on imports 
by a quarter percent to one percent and, by 1814, he was able to report 
that, despite all the difficulties, customs revenue had risen above that of 
1812.[70]
The Quarantine establishment was next in importance to the Customs and
Excise Departments in the contribution it made to the revenue, contributing
nearly one-quarter of all government revenue. Maitland rightly called it
'the most important Department in this island',[71] for as the plague had
painfully demonstrated the health and economic prosperity of the population
were intimately connected. The revenue earned from quarantine, though
important, was ultimately of secondary consideration. But this
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establishment had been shamefully neglected over the years. Of the two 
British officers who had occupied the office of Quarantine Superintendent, 
none had spent more than a year of residence in Malta. William Eton, 
appointed in the middle of 1801 had left Malta by March 1802 as a 
consequence of his support and involvement with the local movement for the 
restoration of the Consiglio Popolare. He remained in London until his 
dismissal by Oakes in 1811.[72] He was replaced by William Pym whose duties 
in Gibraltar, however, prevented him from attending to those in Malta.[73] 
The result was that this office had become no more than a sinecure, its 
responsibilities
'jobbed away by the holder...to some deputy selected not for his fitness 
but for the cheapness for which he would undertake to do the duties of his 
principal.'[74]
It was held that abuses by quarantine employees were directly responsible
for the introduction of the plague into Malta.[75]
Two things were required, according to the Governor, if the
establishment was to properly carry out the purposes for which it existed.
First, that a person experienced in quarantine matters be appointed as its
head. Although Bathurst had appointed a new resident Superintendent of
Quarantine, Maitland did not approve of this appointment and admitted that
he was endeavouring to entice to Malta the Quarantine Master of the port of
Leghorn.[76] Second, that employees of this establishment be well paid, had
every reasonable opportunity for promotion from the lower to the higher
offices of the department, and ultimately have a right to a retirement
pension in their old age.[77] An increase in the salaries of employees was,
however, the only measure implemented by Maitland, although it must be said
that this increase was not exceptional and formed part of the general
increase in salary granted to other public servants.[78]
But Maitland also divested this establishment from those
responsibilities which did not properly belong to it. It was, for example,
relieved of all duties with regard to shipping activities in the Grand
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Harbour, which included the safe conduct of ships into the harbour. These 
duties he transferred to a new department, the Marine Police Department 
whose newly appointed head, Robert Corner, was also designated Captain of 
the Great Port. After 1817 Corner's responsibilities were extended to 
include those of sitting Magistrate of the Ports.[79] Matters connected 
with quarantine were placed outside his jurisdiction and from 1814 onwards 
quarantined vessels were restricted to Marsamxett harbour on the west side 
of Valletta. With a lazzaretto already operating in this harbour its 
designation as a quarantine harbour seemed a logical step. Maitland also 
laid down strict quarantine regulations.[80]
Revenue from government owned property in the form of rents formed the 
second most inportant source of revenue after that from mercantile 
activities. Ball had entrusted its collection to a Board composed of four 
Maltese administrators.[81] The Commission of 1812 had been very critical 
of the way this Board had managed the finances of this department. It had 
recommended, therefore, the abolition of this board, a suggestion which 
received the approval of Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary.[82] Maitland 
claimed to have
'found the whole system to be so radically defective, and the mode of 
administering that system so perfectly vicious'
that he was convinced that the establishment would not admit of any reform
and required to be remodelled from scratch.[83]
The Governor's minute of January 1814, had, as a start, curbed every
vestige of independence that this Board, like other establishments, had
hitherto enjoyed over the disposal of its revenue. In August 1814, however,
Maitland went a step further and suppressed the Board for the
"Administration of Public Property" completely. He gave the
'amministratori' three months in which to settle and close the accounts of
the old establishment.[84] In its place he created the Land Revenue
Department which, however, was to have exactly the same responsibilities as
its predecessor, placing at its head two British public officers, Hector
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Grieg as Collector of HM Land Revenue, and John Mackenzie as Deputy 
Collector.[85] Maitland also took care, something which even the Commission 
of 1812 had failed to do, to identify and place on the regular 
establishment those skilled and unskilled enployees who, though scattered 
throughout the islands, were employed on a fixed basis with this 
establishment.[ 86 ] Not long after the Land Revenue Department came into 
being the Governor pronounced his reform a success. 'The practical result 
has been', he informed Bathurst, 'that the whole expense upon this head' 
per month, 'does not amount to what it formerly was per week.'[87] One 
reason for this was that the rents due to government were now being 
collected efficiently and were regularly accounted for. Another was that no 
expenditure could be incurred without Maitland's approval.
Having dealt with the "proper" departments of government, in 1815
Maitland turned his attention to the remaining departments' which consisted
of the charities, the Universita' and the University of Studies. On first
taking up his appointment in Malta, Maitland had been disturbed by the
scale and tasks of the administration. He still held to the view that law
and order, the efficient collection of the revenue, and the security of the
colony were the tasks that ought to concern government. 'The best symptom
of any government when it is once regulated', he wrote, 'is when the
executive authority has least to do - and when it is perfectly
dormant.'[88] It was a view, however, which did not truly reflect the
situation in Malta. As Willis Dixon has observed, in Malta the Head of
Government 'was also a business manager'. He was, 'in fact, responsible for
every aspect of the life of his colony.'[89] It was a role that had been
performed by the Knights of St John and which British policy in Malta
between 1800 and 1812, aiming as it did at securing Maltese support for
British rule, had revived and sustained. Neither was an early departure
from this system likely. In 1813, Lord Bathurst instructed Maitland that
the necessity of 'identifying...[Maltese] affections and interest with the
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British connection' still remained.[90]
Maitland's declared policy with regard to each of these institutions 
was to 'reduce them to be less expensive', and to make them 'fufil their 
intended purposes better than they do at present'.[91] But in so doing 
Maitland changed their character completely, transforming them from 
semi-autonomous bodies into government departments. As was demonstrated in 
previous chapters, with the exception of the civil hospital, most of these 
establishments enjoyed a semi-autonomous status. Although administered by 
government appointed Boards and subject to scrutiny by the local Treasury, 
a good portion of their funds were derived from voluntary contributions and 
bequests.[92] Maitland, however, put an end to this system assuming, on 
behalf of the colonial government, full responsibility for every aspect of 
their administration. Their funds and burdens he incorporated in the local 
government budget while their property he placed in the charge of the 
Collector of Land Revenue.[93]
The "Charitable Institutions", as the charities became known from this
period onwards, consisted mainly of two hospitals in Valletta, one for
males and another for females, a hospital at Mdina and one in Gozo, the
Ospizio, the foundling hospital, the Grand Almoner, and the Monte di
Pieta'. Maitland found the hospitals in a condition which not only
'defeated the objects of the Institution, but which made even a Charitable 
Establishment degrading to the government and disgraceful to the 
people.'[94]
Apart from being filthy they served only to increase the dependence of the 
poeple on the government. Many of those who made use of the institutions 
were neither sick nor destitute and the number of those employed with them 
was
'infinitely greater than what is absolutely requisite, or what is to be 
found in any of the charities of surrounding nations.'[95]
It was his view, however, that reform would not be possible until he
had wrestled control of these institutions from Maltese hands. In 1815
Maitland suppressed these various Boards substituting them with a committee
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of the Charitable Institutions. The members of this Committee consisted of 
Maitland as Patron and President, several British heads of departments as 
Vice-presidents and the Maltese Physician-in-Chief. Their day-to-day 
management was delegated to a newly established Permanent Committee of the 
Charitable Institutions consisting of, two Englishmen; the Rev Howe le 
Mesurier and Robert Grieves, and two Maltese; Canon Saverio Caruana, rector 
of the University of Studies and a Dr Caruana.[96]
The task of the Permanent Committee was fourfold. To ensure 
cleanliness and hygiene in these institutions. To improve the diet of the 
patients while seeing that all the accounts were properly kept. To ensure 
that those admitted were truly destitute or in need of treatment, thereby 
putting an end to the system whereby 'the idle and the prolifigate were 
living at the expense of government'.[97] And finally, the Permanent
Committee was to enforce discipline among the employees, the patients and
their relatives.[98]
Maitland envisaged that a reduction in the large number of persons 
employed with these institutions would serve to further lessen the existing 
dependence of all classes of the population on the government. The
government, he wrote,
'neither can nor will grant salaries to those who may not be necessary and
who have been led to suppose from long habit, that once employed by
Government... it is the duty of Government to support them and their
children through life.'[99]
This, in his view applied equally to members of the professions. He
stressed that
'...The learned professions must learn, and must be taught to feel, that it 
is not to Government, they are ever to look for support and 
assistance...but that the true support and independence they must look for 
is in their own talents, their own character and their own industry.'[100]
But in the difficult economic condition to be found in Malta at the
time these sentiments appeared inappropriate. In the countryside the
spinners and the weavers had little work. The cotton industry had remained
in a severe state of slump and, after 1817, because of cheaper Egyptian
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cotton, the situation became even worse.[101] Work was also scarce around 
the harbours of Valletta and the island did not possess sufficient capital 
by which new commercial activities could be promoted.[102] Even the 
government, which had been forced to borrow huge sums from Britain, 
entertained little prospect of paying them back.[103] But even so, if any 
action at all was possible to relieve, even marginally, the economic plight 
of the population, then the government was best placed to carry it into 
effect and it was from this quarter that the Maltese population looked for 
relief.
In 1817, forced to retreat from his earlier position, Maitland 
established two government-financed and administered cotton factories, one 
in Valletta and the other in Gozo.[104] These factories were intended to 
provide employment for women and although they never achieved a profit they 
succeeded in their aim of reducing distress among the urban poor and of 
keeping poor women from the streets. But overall, they failed to have much 
inpact on the general condition of the people, especially in the 
countryside.[105] Yet this measure, probably unique to Malta, strongly 
emphasised how difficult it was for government to reconcile liberal 
intentions with actual practice.
This factor was equally relevant, if not more so, in the case of the
Universita' or government administered grain monopoly. Initially, Maitland,
was against the government being responsible for this establishment. 'i do
not' he wrote to Bathurst in August 1814, 'understand Government being a
merchant.' [106] But the Commission of 1812 which had been instructed to
inquire whether it was possible to dismantle this monopoly had recommended
otherwise. Grain was the staple diet of the population but the island was
almost totally dependent on outside supplies for its needs. Scarcity, or
serious fluctuations in price, tended to threaten the very livelihood of
thousands of Maltese, creating tensions and instability. This, in the view
of the Commission, ruled out competition since the principal object of the
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Universita' was 'to prevent that very fluctuation in price, which such a 
competition would evidently have produced.'[107]
There was also the danger that if the whole operation was thrown open 
to corrpetition
'it would become a mere matter of speculation, and as a speculation it 
would be abandoned for any other commerce that might offer a prospect of 
greater or more immediate advantage.'
The result, it was feared, would be famine and insurrection. The Commission 
concluded that, however,
'odious name of monopoly was,[the] public weal...is not to be entrusted to 
a few interested individuals, nor can a wise government consent that the 
very existence of a people should depend upon contingencies. It is only 
upon the providence and responsibility of Government, that the nation can 
securely rely for a constant and adequate supply...for the Government alone 
is profit but a secondary consideration.'[108]
The colonial Secretary reluctantly agreed to maintain the Universita',
noting that this had also been promised to the Maltese over the years. What
was required, however, was sound management aimed principally at reducing
or eliminating its losses. For this purpose it was essential, according to
Bathurst, that the financial administration of the Universita' should be
taken out of Maltese hands and entrusted to British officials.[109]
For Maitland the Universita' represented the worst 'dunghill of
corruption' he had ever encountered and reform was only possible if the
enterprise could be brought under his personal direction. This, Maitland
conceded, was not immediately possible since the Universita' was the only
one institution which mattered mostly to the Maltese. Yet, by the middle of
1814 Maitland had made his first move. On discovering that certain
unauthorised measures which had been adopted by Charles Livingstone, whom
Oakes had appointed as Head Jurat, had resulted in losses to the government
he dismissed him and brought the grain concern under his supervision.[110]
However, the three other Maltese Jurats were retained in office.
By the end of 1815 Maitland's strict supervision had succeeded in
making the Universita' profitable, profits which he applied to defray the
bill for the charitable establishments.[Ill] Contrary to his original
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position Maitland now became firmly convinced that government ought to keep 
this concern in its own hands. So in 1818 he proceeded to remodel the
institution. In a proclamation to the Maltese he declared the Universita'
abolished, stating that the establishment of the Jurats were both 
inadequate for the important duties confided to their charge and coirpletely 
at variance with every recognized principle of British rule.[112] In place 
of the Board of Jurats he appointed three Commissioners, only one of whom 
was Maltese, with the title of Commissioners of the Board of Supply and who 
were to conduct the work of the department under his direction. In order to 
ensure that retailers did not attempt to exploit the people by charging a 
higher price than that fixed by the authorities, he created two 
magistrates, one in Malta and another in Gozo, to supervise the
markets.[113] The finances and property of the Universita he transferred to
government with the consequence that this too, like other semi-autonomous 
establishments, became another department of Government.
A profitable grain monopoly soon attracted, however, the attention of 
the dwindling number of local merchants who increasingly saw the grain 
trade as their only hope of survival. It was, after all, the only commerce 
of consequence and which carried the least risk since the island was 
dependent for its survival, socially and military, upon grain imports. 
Maitland was adamant, however, that government surrender of the grain 
monopoly would provide no lasting solution to the problems of the island. 
Indeed, he held that the result of such a measure would be political 
instability and social distress. He contended that while he was in full 
agreement with economic doctrines which opposed every form of monopoly, 
such doctrines were not applicable to Malta. The small size of the island 
and the limited capital to be found in the island, he argued, would not 
easily allow for new departures from a system which had served its purpose 
since medieval times.[114]
But in 1822 the merchant lobby was successful and Maitland was forced
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by the Colonial Office to dissolve the monopoly. He disapproved publicly of 
this measure and implemented it 'with considerable doubt and 
difficulty...'[115] fully convinced that government would soon have to 
reassume responsibility for the provision of grain.[116] He promised not to 
interfere in the grain trade
'so long as the poorer classes of the inhabitants be supplied with bread at 
a fair and moderate rate.'[117]
However, to prevent 'any scarcity, or any sudden and excessive rise in the
price of corn', the government was to keep its own stock of wheat to use in
such an event. This was to be the responsibility of the Grain Department
which he created in place of the Board of Supply.[118]
The loss of the monopoly, however, disrupted Maitland's financial
administration for it was no longer possible to defray the expenses of the
charities from this source. To recover the loss in revenue, Maitland
inposed a fixed duty on imported grain.[119] In truth it was no less than a
tax on the staple food of the people and it hit hardest those least able to
afford it, i.e. the growing number of the unemployed poor. The duty raised
in all between one-fourth and one-third of the government revenue but,
because of its nature, controversary was to centre around this tax for more
than a century. [120] The Colonial Office was, however, glad to be rid of
the embarrassments of the Universita' but its officials, as we shall see in
the following Chapter, were to remain particularly vigilant to ensure that
the local government did not resort to its old monopoly.[121]
Educational establishments received, in contrast to others, scant
attention from Maitland. The University of Studies and the college
connected with it were dismissed as unworthy of their name and as the worst
managed institutions on the island.[122] His reforms, however, amounted to
no more that the swamping of the University Council with British heads of
departments, the taking over of their property and funds, and the
imposition of student fees for each term. [123] In January 1823 an attempt
at reform was made with the appointment of a committee 'to make a minute
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investigation into the system of education in the University../, but 
Maitland died before its recommendations could be implemented.[124] This 
attitude contrasted sharply with that of the Colonial Secretary. Lord 
Bathurst had expressed the hope, in 1813, that Maltese attachment to 
Britain could be strenghtened by a gradual and systematic diffusion of the 
English language. The establishment of government schools in the towns and 
villages where English could be taught and the gradual introduction of 
English in judicial proceedings appeared to him as the most appropriate 
measures for the puprose.[125] These hopes were, however, frustrated for no 
attempt to improve or extend education was made until 1836 and, as we shall 
see in later Chapters, Britain was to pay dearly for this ommission.
One of Maitland's declared aims in his reform of Maltese public 
administration was to make the administration "English". Whereas Alexander 
Ball had sought to appoint to every office, as near as it was practicable, 
from among the Maltese, almost without exception, under Maitland, they were 
relegated to subordinate offices.[126] In the Courts and the Charities some 
Maltese retained some nominal authority, but in every case they were either 
subordinate to a British head, such as the Chief Justice, or outnumbered by 
British members on the Board.[127] As a consequence of Maitland's policy 
the number of British office-holders in Malta rose from fourteen in 1812 to 
thirty-seven by 1825.[128]
Maitland was not satisfied with making the administration British, but
sought also to make it "his" administration by appointing officials whose
personal loyalty to the Governor was unquestionable. However, because
Maitland's notion of loyalty was based entirely on the basis of patronage,
it was a lopsided one. Patronage involves, as James Scott has observed, a
'largely instrumental friendship' in which a person of higher
socio-economic status employs his resources and influence
'to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status 
who...reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including 
personal services, to the patron.'[129]
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The end product of patronage, therefore, was client loyalty. In an age when 
patronage rather, than merit, was the chief gateway for offices of every 
kind, Maitland's concept of loyalty was very similar to that of his 
political superiors. Like them he expected loyalty, as a matter of course, 
only from those beholden to him for their appointment.[130] The case 
relating to the appointment of Zammit as Judge in the Commercial Court
provides a good example of the above.
When Maitland took up office in Malta, Giuseppe Nicola Zammit, a
lawyer, held the offices of Pro-Secretaty in the Government Secretariat and 
of Uditore in the Segnatura.[131] Although at the time Maitland claimed to 
have entertained serious doubts as to Zammit's integrity, doubts apparently 
shared by the public, he did not dismiss him.[132] Neither did he take this 
step when zammit's offices were suppressed in the course of his reforms. 
Instead, he appointed him Judge of the Commerical Court and allowed him to
continue to receive his previous emoluments in addition to his salary as
Judge.[133] In return Maitland expected zammit to support his judicial 
reforms and to help speed up judicial procedures, thereby adopting a
contrasting position to that of other Maltese judges. He did not find
Zammit wanting in loyalty for within a mere six weeks from his appointment, 
the latter had decided no less than 260 cases, some of them involving great 
amounts.[134] Loyalty was rewarded by further benefits. The Governor
frankly admitted that 'i have already found it my duty to do everthing for 
him [that] I could', i.e. honouring him with a knighthood in the newly 
established Order of St Michael and St George and making provision for one 
of his sons to study in Britain.[135]
Therefore, because of the advantages that patronage conferred,
Maitland preferred to have his own appointees and soon after his arrival in
Malta he attenpted to replace officials in the colony with some of his
friends.[136] This, however, was not always possible since some of these
offices were said to be in the gift of the Colonial Secretary and only he
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had the right to appoint to them. But Maitland did not desist and he was 
partially successful. Thus, he had the Rev Laing replaced as Chief
Secretary and Toole as Auditor-General.[137] Calvert, the head of the Grain 
Department, he had personally enticed from England, while others who had 
served with him in Ceylon were also rewarded with appointments in Malta, 
including Frederick Hankey.[138] After Maitland's death the latter was to 
become Chief Secretary, having previously served in various offices. Hankey 
was a particularly close friend of Maitland upon whom the latter coirpletely 
relied, especially during his frequent absences from Malta. Once, however, 
death removed Maitland from the scene these officials were to come to exert 
an exaggerated influence over the affairs of the colony. Military 
governors, burdoned as they were with military duties, found themselves 
unable to act in opposition to the wishes of this cohesive group of
officials. The outcome was that Maltese fears of bureaucratic government, 
raised first in 1801, were quickly revived.
CONCLUSION
By the time of Maitland's death in 1824 the process of formal
institutionalisation of British rule in Malta had been successfully 
completed. All authority was vested and exercised by British heads 
irrespective whether this was in the Courts, the Revenue establishments or 
the charities. Maitland found, as a result, that he could absent himself 
from Malta as frequently as he wished and after 1816 the duties of Lord 
High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands were added to his duties of
Governor of Malta.[139] In Malta, under the direction of Hankey, his 
subordinates carried on with the administration according to the spirit and 
letter of his instructions.[140] By contrast the Maltese had, according to 
Agostino Portelli a prominent Maltese merchant, 'lost every privilege and 
consideration' and had almost become 'strangers in their own country.'[141]
In his long despatches to Bathurst and to Bunbury, Maitland often
boasted about the success of his reforms and of his administration in
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general.[142] Some of his claims cannot, however, be fully or adequately 
substantiated. He had argued in 1814, for example, that his judicial
reforms represented a system of division of powers. [143] This was in
contradiction of reality. The Governor was both executive and legislator, 
and his active presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice placed him also 
in the situation of supreme judge. Maitland had also argued that his reform 
of Maltese public administration, once coupleted, would no longer resemble 
that of the past. This proved to be only partially true. Several of the 
ancient judicial courts did disappear and were replaced by new ones. The 
segnatura and the Audienza were discontinued and the charities had been 
placed under a unified direction. The Universita', a body dating to 
medieval times, had given way first to the Board of Supply, and later, with 
the dissolution of the Grain monopoly, to the Grain Department. Yet, 
despite their change in name most of these establishments continued to
perform identical or near-identical tasks to those performed in the past.
Thus, for example, the Supreme Council of Justice, though different in 
composition from the Segnatura, did continue, as we have seen, to serve as 
a means of executive control over the judiciary. The administration of the 
Charitable Establishments was merely consolidated and reformed but none of 
its responsibilities were shed by the government. On the contrary, it was 
argued earlier that by taking full control of their administration and 
finances Maitland had fully institutionalised these services, transforming 
semi-voluntary and semi-autonomous institutions into full government 
departments. This becomes particularly evident when diagram 4.1 is compared 
with Diagram 2.1.
Neither had the practice of government intervention been laid to rest.
The cotton factories and the Grain Department, both a creation of Maitland,
testified to government readiness to intervene whenever social conditions
demanded. One may even argue that Maitland's reforms served to reinforce
Maltese dependence on the government rather than reduce it. By turning the
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charities into government departments Maitland forfeited for the government 
the voluntary contributions which many Maltese used to make for the upkeep 
of these institutions. The Maltese from this period onwards saw their 
upkeep as the responsibility of government. Furthermore, after the 
dissolution of the grain monopoly their expenditure could no longer be 
defrayed from the profits of this activity with the consequence that they 
became an intolerable burden on the revenue. These points will be raised 
again in the following two Chapters. All in all, it may be argued, that the 
most enduring contribution by Maitland to Maltese public administration was 
the establishment of the foundations for a settled departmental system with 
a salaried public service, and a centralised system of public accounting.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ECONOMIC DEPRESSION AND 
THE PRELUDE TO REFORM: 1824-1832
In 1822, while surveying the socio-economic condition of Malta, 
Maitland observed that
'there is possibly no possession under the crown of England where the 
population has suffered so deeply and so severely owing to the course of 
events as His Majesty's subjects on this island...'[1]
It was a statement that was to be reiterated by his two successors, the 
Marquis of Hastings and Sir Frederick Ponsonby, throughout the next decade 
or so. Indeed, as we shall see below, the economic situation of Malta and 
the social condition of its people was to be the dominant issue at the 
time. It served, among other things, to expose the shallowness of many of 
Maitland's so-called reforms in the public service and to bring into 
discussion several prominent items of public expenditure. Public service 
size, salaries and pensions were in fact issues which until 1824 had failed 
to excite Colonial Office attention but which were soon to become areas of 
dispute between the latter and the administration in Malta. Furthermore, as 
we shall see towards the end of this Chapter, the crisis in Malta and the 
failure of both the local government and the Colonial Office to inplement 
effective reforms was to allow the re-emergence, under new and more 
energetic leadership, of the movement of Maltese representative government. 
The inpact made by this movement was at its greatest between 1832 and 1848 
a period which is covered in the following Chapter. However, as the title
of this Chapter indicates some of the issues raised retained their
importance over the next decades.
The events to which Mailtand had alluded to in the introductory quote,
were the plague, the subsequent decline of Malta as a commercial base, and
the loss of its principal overseas markets for cotton yarn. In the years
that followed, however, the situation was to become progresssively worse.
In 1825, a Committee appointed by Hastings, Maitland's immediate successor,
to inquire into the condition of the lower classes of Maltese society,
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reported that many were 'on the verge of extreme want' while others could 
at any moment be 'reduced altogether to a state of starvation.'[2]
By 1828 the latter stage had been reached. In Valletta
poverty-stricken Maltese from the country districts competed with the urban
poor for relief of any sort. The description by Malcolm, a British resident
of Valletta, of the rural poor is worth reproducing here for it conveys
more forcefully the actual state of affairs in Malta. It also helps to
explain subsequent Maltese pressures for political reform.
'Figure to yourself', he wrote to his friend in Glasgow, 'crowds of human 
beings, men, women, and children, some in a state of absolute nudity, with 
all the others in rags, pouring in from the country every morning to 
implore a single morsel of bread; old men scarcely able to walk; women the 
picture of famine... No picture of fictitious distress...conveys anything 
like an adequate idea of the real misery of these unfortunate 
Maltese...'[3]
The Maltese, he concluded, had no alternative left but to lie down and die. 
That his picture of affairs in Malta was not an exaggerated one is 
confirmed both by official and private sources. [4]
At the time various causes were said to be responsible for this 
situation. Some, mainly foreigners, claimed that it was the result of lack 
of initiative on the part of the Maltese. This conclusion, however, seems 
to contradict the many positive things said about Maltese enterprise and 
resourcefulness during the years of prosperity (1805-1812).[5] Others, 
including Governors, blamed Malta's large and increasing population. 'The 
population of this island', wrote Hastings, 'is beyond the scale in which 
the circumstances of the country can furnish openings for its 
industry...'[6] Frederick Fonsonby, who succeeded Hastings as Governor in 
1827, held much the same view. The prosperity engendered during the war 
years, especially between 1805 and 1813, he observed,
'created and maintained a population far beyond the internal resources of 
the island... Peace took away the external wealth, but the population 
remains.'[7]
British policy towards Malta was also said by some observers to be
responsible for the situation in Malta. James Stephen, who was at the time
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Legal Adviser to the Colonial Office, was of the opinion that Maltese 
commerce had suffered because of British reluctance to admit Maltese 
shipping to the privileges of colonial shipping, on the grounds that Malta 
was held
'by a less secure tenure and as more likely to revert to the Dominion of 
some neighbouring and rival state.'[8]
Maltese shipping had certainly suffered as a result of the narrowing, in 
1817, of the terms on which the carrying of the British flag was granted to 
Maltese vessels.[9] But Maltese commerce had suffered other blows with the 
signing of the Anglo-Sicilian treaty of 1819, and later, with the 
reciprocity agreements concluded by Britain with both Austria and 
Greece.[10] The former served to consolidate the carrying trade between 
Malta and Sicily in Sicilian hands while reciprocity agreements admitted 
Austria and Greece to the status of most favoured nations, thereby freeing 
their shipping from discriminatory charges in Maltese (and other colonial) 
harbours, but without admitting Maltese vessels to similar privileges in 
Greek or Austrian ports.[11] In addition to these difficulties there had 
also been the plague.
Each of these explanations had some basis in fact but more to the 
point was the explanation furnished by Ponsonby which, for the first time, 
placed greater emphasis on the Island's loss of foreign earnings. The loss 
of 'external wealth' tended to result, almost immediately, in widespread 
unemployment and, eventually, poverty. During the time of the Order a 
similar development tended to be partially offset by earnings from cotton 
exports, especially in the country districts where every home had a loom 
for spinning cotton.[12] The rapid decline of the Maltese cotton industry 
had, by 1828, wiped away these internal resources and served to demonstrate 
that, without a shadow of doubt, the once partially dependent Maltese 
economy had become totally so.[13]
In the circumstances, the onus for finding a solution to the crisis
came to rest, almost solely, on the local administration. Apart from the
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normal practice of giving alms or small pensions, various schemes and 
strategies were adopted.[14] In 1824, for example, in a bid to save Maltese 
shipping from extinction, the Marquis of Hastings reinstituted the Board of 
Health which Maitland had arbitrarily suppressed in 1813.[15] In the 
absence of a Board charged with supervising the strict application of the 
quarantine laws, vessels from Malta were considered, at European ports, as 
automatically carrying a foul bill of health and therefore, subjected to 
the full period of quarantine. This served only to inpose further burdens 
on Maltese shipping and to make it even less conpetitive.[16] Lord Bathurst 
had objected to Hasting's reform fearing that the surrender of the 
Governor's arbitrary authority over quarantine would lead to a less strict 
observance of the regulations with consequent danger to the health of the 
garrison.[17]
The Colonial Office, and the British Treasury, also strenuously 
opposed another of Hastings' schemes, i.e. that of the setting up of a 
House of Industry for girls.[18] The intention of the Governor was to 
provide shelter and employment to several hundred destitute girls, the 
latter being expected to defray the cost of the establishment from the 
proceeds of their labour. As the funds employed had been donated for this 
purpose several years previously Hastings was strongly of the view that 
Treasury approval of his scheme was not required. Furthermore, unlike his 
predecessor, he had no intention of taking those funds over.[19] This was a 
clear reference to those private charitable funds once administered by the 
Government and which Maitland had taken over thereby reducing several 
charitable institutions to mere government departments.[20] Unwilling to 
enter into discussions which would have probably dragged on for months, 
'especially when one considers the distress' prevailing in Malta, Hastings 
proceeded to appoint an administrative committee and to establish the 
institution at a building in Floriana, just outside the bastions of 
Valletta.[21]
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Briefly, in the second half of the 1820s, the local administration
came to entertain the hope that the silk industry would one day regain for
Malta the prosperity that cotton had once provided. The administration had
succeeded in attracting to Malta a company which had been set up to promote
the silk industry in the colonies. But despite every assistance furnished
by the government the local company folded after only a few years,
prejudice by the company's agent in Malta towards Maltese participants in
the venture being one of the principal causes.[22] British prejudice was
also the cause for the delay in approving the suggestion of the Governor in
Malta that Maltese be allowed to enlist in British vessels and regiments
serving in the Mediterranean.[23] The Governor had originally sought
permission to raise a Maltese regiment but the idea had been rejected by
the War Office.[24]
However, of all the strategies adopted by the local administration in
its bid to deal with the crisis, emigration appeared to be the one best
calculated to provide a long term solution for the problem of unemployment.
Over population, redundant population, had become the watchwords of the
time (and have remained so to this day). Various plans for the. setting up
of Maltese settlements in Corfu and Greece were attempted, as well as
government-aided migration to the West Indies.[25] None of these schemes,
however, achieved any success and by the middle of the 1830s the
socio-economic condition of the Maltese had not registered any
improvement. [26] But, as each policy failed to have any impact on the
prevailing crisis, public attention and debate began to increasingly focus
on every aspect of the administration and not just on its failings. Many
Maltese, and some British observers, came to the conclusion that British
administrators in Malta must accept some responsibility, not perhaps for
the crisis itself, (though some did feel inclined to say so), but for
adding in various ways to the burdens and hardships that the Maltese poor
had to endure.[27] The general view was that these burdens were the result
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of an needlessly wasteful and expensive administration.
By 1827, Colonial Office thinking was also moving in this direction 
for the solution it proposed was that of cutting public expenditure. In the 
first case the Governor was instructed to sell the government yacht,
purchased two years earlier, recall from their Government-sponsored studies 
in Rome the Maltese artists studying there, and to close down the House of 
Industry established in 1825 which the government refused to do.[28] In the 
second instance Colonial Officials began demanding detailed explanations 
regarding every aspect of local expenditure from the Governor and his Chief 
Secretary. The result of this was that the local administration was to be
constantly rebuked 'for an insufficiently minute statement of
expenditure'[29] or because 'the details which were given in that statement 
were not conveniently arranged.'[30]
The effect of these measures, however, was only marginal. More drastic 
measures were required if public expenditure was to be reduced
substantially, for new developments were making the already critical 
financial situation in Malta more worrying. A prolonged economic crisis was 
in itself dangerous for discontent often led to grave political 
instability. In Britain, were an economic crisis was also in evidence, the 
labouring poor had combined with the middle classes to demand political 
reform.[31] Riots and various demonstrations had taken place which had 
occasioned even loss of life.[32] in Malta disturbances of this kind seemed 
unlikely. In 1827 Governor Ponsonby had informed the Secretary of State 
that the Maltese
'have struggled with their adversity with exemplary patience and nothing 
but their great moderation...could have enabled them to exist during the 
pressure of late years.'[33]
Yet, Lord Hastings, his predecessor had advised against the removal from 
Malta of one single British regiment for he feared that political disorder 
might result as the crisis deepened.[34] Already, the evidence showed that 
as unemployment rose so did the number of burglaries and robberies.[35]
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A second worrying factor was the financial deficit of the
administration in Malta which by 1826 had already reached nearly
£18,000.[36] Recurring financial deficits in a colony, tended to create
difficulties for the Colonial Office for, eventually, the colony would have
to be aided by funds from Britian. These funds would have to be approved by
Parliament and applications of this sort tended to provoke debates from
which the Colonial Office and its head hardly ever emerged with honours.
This is not to suppose that colonial affairs enjoyed any special place in
Parliamentary business or that the welfare of the colonies was a motivating
force in these debates. Indeed, when William Huskisson was appointed
Secretary of State in place of Bathurst in 1827, he was simultaneously
informed that Commons detail business of Colonial Secretary was not very
heavy.[37] It was rather the case that these debates provided the radical
and liberal element in both Houses of Parliament with an opportunity to try
and promote political and financial reform at home.[38]
The radical and liberal argument went something like this. The main
reason for the crisis in a colony was the extensive use of patronage in
colonial appointments. At home the government sought to maintain its
position in office by the distribution of colonial offices to relatives,
friends and supporters. It was admitted that many of 'those appointed were
seldom useful, and occasionally harmless,' although some were also guilty
of mischief.[39] As pressure for favours on the government increased, more
useless offices tended to be created to satisfy these pressures. The result
was, that the finances of a colony became inadequate for defraying public
expenditure, both because of inefficient and sometimes corrupt
administration, and because colonial administrations tended to be too
large. [40] In order to bail out these administrations, the government at
home resorted to funds from Britain thereby employing taxes paid by the
British public. This in turn served to inflate public expenditure at home
which, by radical and liberal standards, was an indication of an extremely
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incompetent government. Hence, the necessity for reform in colonial 
administration.[41] In 1827 an attempt was made by some radical and liberal 
members of the House to set up a Parliamentary Finance Committee to 
investigate colonial finances.[42] They were not immediately successful but 
Parliament did manage to lay down that the grant of financial aid to any 
needy colony, such as Malta, was to be regulated 'in anticipation' and was 
only to be granted after its estimates for the relevant years had been 
approved.[43]
Colonial Office officials had every good reason to expect that a 
debate about Malta would prove highly embarrassing. Patronage in 
appointments to the Maltese public service and, the creation of small 
offices for the same purpose, had both been resorted to by Lord Bathurst, 
the Colonial Secretary and by Maitland, and to a lesser degree by their 
successors. We have seen in the previous Chapter that as a consequence of 
Maitland's obsession with making the administration "English" the number of 
British office-holders in Malta had risen to thirty-seven, a threefold 
increase on 1813. It was said of Maitland that he errployed his patronage 
like a monarch appointing many of his friends to public offices.[44] He 
also created several useless small offices, such as those of Lord 
Lieutenants, which he bestowed on Maltese individuals whose loyalty to his 
administration he deemed useful.[45]
Lord Bathurst's reputation for patronage was equally notorious. It was
reported that patronage was of more importance to him than the interests of
the colonies and the press did attribute the critical situation in some
colonies to his jobbery.[46] One newspaper declared in 1823 that it had
'never heard a syllable uttered in praise of His Lordship's colonial
administration by any individual or party'.[47] The judgement of the Times
when he was finally removed in 1827 was equally scathing, 'ihere never was
tolerated', it wrote, 'a worse colonial minister than that unrespected
Lord.'[48] In Malta, Bathurst's jobbery was somewhat obstructed by
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Maitland's but no sooner had the latter passed away than he moved to impose
his authority over appointments there. He instructed the Acting Governor in
Malta that 'immediate notice...of all vacancies occuring in the Civil
Establishment'[49] must be forwarded to London and followed up his
instruction by appointing his friends and relatives. Three appointments
stand out from amongst others, namely the appointment of Jarvis as King's
Assessor at £800 per annum, that of his son-in-law Frederick Ponsonby as
Governor, and that of his son Seymour, first as Agent for Malta and later
as Treasurer with a salary of £700 annually.[50]
Jarvis's gratitude was overwhelming, 'it is neither to the interested
solicitations of friends, nor to my own personal merit', he wrote to
Bathurst, 'but to your Lordship's generosity and sense of justice alone
that I am indebted for the enjoyment of my office.'[51] Seymour Bathurst
ought to have been similarly grateful. The office of Agent for Malta which
he held from 1817 to 1825 was, at £500 a year, a pure sinecure since Malta
had hardly any trade at all.[52] The office of Treasurer in the
administration of Malta, although requiring his presence there, he treated
equally as a sinecure, absenting himself frequently from the island and
leaving his duties to be performed by his Maltese deputies.[53] Seymour had
been appointed Treasurer in 1827 when it appeared almost certain that the
ministry of Lord Liverpool, in which his father served as Colonial
Secretary, was closely edging towards defeat.[54) Ponsonby, his
brother-in-law, acquitted himself more honourably as Governor displaying
both zeal and commitment in the execution of his duties.[55]
Of course there was a price to be paid for this policy. The annual
cost to the local government in public service emoluments had, by 1826,
passed the £40,000 mark, a figure which was almost equivalent to one-half
of total public expenditure.[56] It was a situation which had led Robert
Hay, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office to conplain that
'the Civil Establishment of the Island is upon much too expensive a
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scale.'[57] Of the total wage bill 37% or about £15,000 were received by 
the 37 British public servants employed in Malta.[58] The other 63% 
represented the salaries received by more than 580 Maltese public servants, 
each averaging around £50 annually.[59] The cost, however, of maintaining 
such an extensive public service fell generally on those least able to 
afford it, the Maltese labouring poor.
Public service size and Maltese welfare, especially that of the 
labouring poor, had become intimately connected after 1822. As was observed 
in earlier Chapters, the revenue of the government in Malta had been 
derived from property rents, mercantile duties, and from the profits of the 
Government grain monopoly. The latter profits, however, were lost to the 
government when the grain monopoly was suppressed in 1822. To make good its 
losses the government had imposed a duty on grain which on an annual basis 
accounted for about one-third of all government revenue.[60] It was a tax 
on the staple food of the people and as poverty increased the people become 
less able to afford the price of bread.
'Would you believe it?', queried Malcolm in one of his letters. 'This very 
government under which the people are perishing with hunger, derive a 
revenue...out of all the grain consumed in the island. In other words they 
exact as duty one loaf out of every three that is purchased by the 
poor...'[61]
A reduction in the number of government offices seemed indispensable if the 
people were to be relieved of the burdens imposed by the grain tax.
By 1827, with Lord Bathurst out of the way, the Colonial Office had 
become more agreeable to this view. In that year Hay told Ponsonby that he 
entertained no doubt that the Governor
'will find it expedient to reduce several unnecessary offices...either at 
once, or as vacancies may occur...'[62]
Three months later, in his despatch of July 4 Hay was more specific. The
Chief Secretary's Office, he told Ponsonby, was clearly overstaffed, as was
the case with every other office. The salary of the Governor's own private
secretary was much too high and ought to be reduced, while the Governor
should seriously consider whether the services of Jarvis, the Kings
135
Assessor, were really required.[63] The protests of the Chief Secretary 
that 'the work of reduction is so difficult', Hay dismissed as 
self-deceiving adding that it would find short shrift with a Parliamentary 
Finance Committee.[64] Hay, therefore, urged the Governor to embark on the 
work of reduction resolutely, despite
'the individual misery which may be occasioned by turning out of employment 
men who have been, for sometime, engaged in the public service.'[65]
Eventually some reductions were effected but their number was so small and
insignificant that the overall inpact was negligible.
The need for a reduction in offices and salaries was one that was
generally shared by the Maltese. They accepted that if there was to be a
reduction in the bread tax or if a case was to be made for a similar 
reduction in mercantile duties, which in their view was essential if 
commercial activity was to receive a stimulus of some sort, public
expenditure cuts on offices and salaries had to be made.[66] These views 
seem to indicate a departure from traditional Maltese views, (reiterated 
towards the end of Chapter 3), which neither opposed the existence of a 
large public service nor indeed the idea that public revenue should be
spent on schemes which provided employment to the lower classes whenever 
the necessity arose. In fact they were nothing of the sort. The public 
service with its offices and activities had, for more than a century, 
provided scope for and sustained the existence of a native class of 
professional and educated persons. The island was too small and, by and 
large, too poor to otherwise provide openings for this group . They could 
not in the 1820s and 30s envisage an end to this role of the public 
service.[67]
In the case of schemes that provided employment for the labouring poor
the emphasis was on the phrase 'whenever necessary'. Persons from the
labouring poor had always sought employment in one of the several
establishments of the public service but the vast majority of them, in
normal times, looked elsewhere for enployment.[68] Only in times of severe
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crisis did they turn "en masse" to the government for help and relief of 
every kind. But once they did, they expected help to be made available 
almost as if by right. That was their centuries-old concept of good 
government.[69] In the 1820s what the Maltese labouring poor wanted was 'to 
be permitted to work',[70] that is to earn their sustenance through 
productive work and not to have to depend on government relief and 
handouts. Indeed, Agostino Portelli, a leading Maltese merchant, maintained 
at the time that, in the absence of an alternative strategy, the government 
should of itself create the necessities of employment, levying 
'impositions', with discretion, on those best able to afford them as a way 
of support for such expenditure.[71] The Maltese were, therefore, generally 
opposed to cuts in public expenditure in this sphere.
If, however, the Colonial Office was serious in its desire to reduce 
public expenditure in Malta, the Maltese contended, it could begin by 
exempting the island from its contribution to the "military chest" and by 
getting rid of several British public officers holding office in Malta.[72] 
The first was an onerous business placing on the revenues of the island the 
burden of defraying the salaries and wages of the General Military Staff 
and of the local regiment, the provision and maintenance of rent-free 
military and naval premises, and the transfer of all annual surpluses, 
whenever these occurred, into the "Military Chest" as Malta's contribution 
towards its defence.[73] The Maltese failed to understand why they should 
be made to bear the expense of maintaining the military fortress for, as 
Hastings had observed in 1824, 'if not charged with military expenses, the 
income drawn from the Island would suffice for all its other concerns.'[74]
From a Maltese point of view the second case was equally clear cut.
British public servants, they held, were both excessively paid and
unnecessary and they regularly cited examples to prove their point.[75] The
Postmaster, for example, attended at his office only when the mail packet
arrived from Britain, whereupon he collected his personal correspondence
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and departed again.[76] At a salary of £800 per annum the Collector of Land 
Revenue, Mr Nugent, once a singing celebrity in London, spent most of his 
time organising musical productions rather than at his desk.[77] Seymour 
Bathurst, as already noted, absented himself from Malta regularly,[78] 
while Captain Symonds, Captain of the Port and Head of the Marine police 
had failed to return to Malta from his visit abroad.[79] When Symonds was 
finally replaced in 1828 the salary offered to his replacement was 
considerably reduced
'....not only with a view to effect a saving, but because Captain
Symonds having been so long away from Malta, his duties could not have been 
of a very severe nature.'[80]
Several other British officials also held, in addition to their civil
offices, military commissions to which they were required to give
attention.[81] The duties of nearly every British public servant,
therefore, for one reason or another were carried out by their deputies,
mainly Maltese, at a fraction of their salary.[82]
London, however, disagreed. Instead, colonial officials thought that
savings could be effected if the existing system of pensions was reformed.
In the early decades of the nineteenth century no formal provision for the
granting of pensions existed in Malta. British governors had, however,
continued the practice, common at the time of the Grandmasters, of granting
small pensions to Maltese public servants or their families.[83] Quite
frequently these pensions were granted by the Governor without either the
knowledge or sanction of the Colonial Office.[84] In doing so, however,
Governors tended to be motivated by two main factors. Their first
motivation arose from the poverty of many public servants, their large
families being frequently the cause. The salaries of Maltese public
servants tended to be so inadequate that after cost of living and other
expenses were deducted nothing remained which could be channelled into
personal savings. Thus, even after a service of almost sixty years many
could not afford to retire without incurring the risk of serious
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poverty.[85] The situation was such, Ponsonby observed in 1828, that
'no Maltese functionary, unless obliged to do so, would ever think of 
giving up his situation to receive a pension less than the full amount of 
pay...'[86]
Matters had been made worse by a dramatic rise in the price of foodstuffs 
and Ponsonby found himself constrained to grant "house-rent" allowances to 
public employees whose salary did not exceed £250 per annum i.e. the vast 
majority.[87]
A final consideration was efficiency. Governors could not tolerate 
indefinitely the continued enployment of persons 'who from old age and 
infirmity are unable to perform their duty,'[88] as this affected the 
efficiency of the various departments. Thus, for example, in 1826 Hastings 
granted a pension to Eduardo Montanaro, a Maltese clerk who had served for 
at least 57 years, for 'he had become unable to discharge, from the very 
infirm state of his health', his various duties.[89] Similarly, in the 
interests of efficiency, Ponsonby found himself called upon to retire on a 
pension several 'decayed servants of the government,'[90] an exanple of 
whom was Mr Muller, the Collector of Customs, who had become so nervous and 
shattered in his constitution that 'the poor old man' could hardly sign his 
name.[91] Certainly, one consequence of retaining on the civil 
establishment 'perfectly useless persons' was higher costs, for others had 
to be 'unavoidably employed at an extra expense to carry on the business of 
the government.'[92]
Whatever the motives for the granting of pensions the colonial Office, 
starting from around 1825, made several attempts to curb the "de facto" 
power assumed by Governors in Malta to grant pensions. Hastings was 
informed, for exanple, that the Secretary of State
'objected to the introduction of anything like a settled principle that His 
Majesty's Government is called on to provide for the widows and families of 
all public servants, whatever might have been the nature of their 
function.'[93]
He was, therefore, instructed to send home, for the approval of the
Secretary of State, each individual application accompanied by a report
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outlining the merits of the case.[94] Hastings, however, resisted these 
pressures and the colonial Office decided to try again in 1827 with the 
appointment of Ponsonby as his successor. In one of his first despatches to 
the new Governor, Hay urged him to
'introduce some salutory reforms in the practice of bestowing pensions 
[which had] been carried further than it ought to have been.'[95]
But the situation Ponsonby found in Malta prevented him from following this
advice and a year later was still promising to 'attend to the instruction
that no claim in future is to be admitted for a pension, by widows of civil
servants of my government.'[96]
However, in 1828, in an attempt to bypass an exisiting Colonial Office
freeze on salary increases the proposed a plan for the establishment, in
Malta, of a pension scheme for all public servants, Maltese and
British.[97] The plan recommended, among other things, that
'pensions should be granted to Maltese functionaries in actual employment 
even after the short period of five years service.'[98]
The plan was rejected by London. Ponsonby was told that the Secretary of 
State saw no reason 'why a native of Malta should be entitled to claim a 
superannuation allowance after a short service of five years.'[99] Instead 
he insisted with the Governor that the informal system of granting pensions 
existing in Malta should
'by degrees be discontinued, as there is nothing of the kind to be found in 
any other foreign possession of the crown.'[100]
Public servants who desired a pension should establish a fund for the
purpose among themselves, and that it would be more convenient if the
Governor when submitting proposals on the subject adopted as his guide the
rules laid down in the British Superannuation Act.[101]
It was, however, not until the next decade that the Colonial Office
finally succeeded in putting a stop to the practice in Malta and elsewhere.
In April 1830 Governors were informed by circular letter that they would be
held personally responsible for any increases in salaries or allowances
granted to any member of the public service without prior Treasury
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approval.[102] This circular seemed to have had the desired effect for two 
years later Ponsonby complained against
'the refusal given for the last three years to the proposals which I have 
been obliged to submit for granting some pension to individuals...'[103]
In other words, the dilemma facing the government remained.
The threat of a Parliamentary Finance Committee which had hung over 
the Colonial Office for some years finally arrived in 1830 in the form of a 
Commission to Inquire into the Receipt and Expenditure in the Colonies and 
Foreign Possessions.[104] The members of this Commission, the first of its 
kind to be appointed, were apparently unsure of their real powers for Hay 
informed Ponsonby that
'the Colonial Commission now sitting in Downing Street, has taken Malta in 
hand as the first experiment of their powers.'[105]
Malta was in fact one of four colonies investigated by the Commission none 
of which were visited by its members.[106] Despite this, some of the 
conclusions reached by the Commission with regard to Malta were 
particularly relevant to the situation of the island. Indeed, in some areas 
the Report of the Commission may be seen as a vindication of Maltese 
grievances.
An exanple of this was the issue of who should bear the expense for 
military expenditure in Malta. The Commission tended to agree with the 
Maltese view that in this sphere the responsbility belonged to the home 
government. Malta was after all an imperial naval and military station. 
Neither did the Commission consider it right that an island having no 
resources of its own and which had lost its external revenue, should be 
expected to continue to carry this burden.[107] It recommended, therefore, 
that Malta should no longer be responsible for the salaries of the General 
Staff and that future annual surpluses should not be transferred to the 
Military Chest.[108] It was also proposed that the expense of maintaining 
public buildings and facilities used entirely by the services should be 
transferred from the local government to the Ordnance Department.
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The rest of the Report concerning Malta was mainly directed at 
achieving further cuts in public service expenditure. The Report began by 
stressing the need for constant Treasury supervision over the finances of 
the island and
'that no new charge should be incurred or continued without previous 
sanction and direction of that high and responsible authority.'[109]
The aim of the commission was to stop Governors in Malta, as the Colonial
Office had often sought to do, from granting benefits of a non-monetary
kind to some members of the public service. One exanple of this was that of
rent-free accommodation. Under Maitland a practice had begun whereby every
British member of the Maltese public service was allowed the use of a
government house either rent-free or at a nominal rate.[110] In 1825
Bathurst had instructed Hastings to restrict, with immediate effect, this
concession to the six highest-ranking members of the service.[Ill] But both
Hastings and later Ponsonby, ignored this instruction.[122] Indeed, as will
be illustrated in Chapter Six, the recommendation of the Commission of 1830
that every individual member of the public service should receive a fixed
monetary payment 'to the exclusion of houses and every other emolument or
advantage...' was similarly defied.[113]
The parliamentary Commission of 1830 was also intrigued, as the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry of 1812 had been, by the whole issue of grain 
supplies and sales in Malta. It was seen in the previous Chapter that in 
1822 the government grain monopoly (or Universita') was formally abolished 
and that the task of importing grain had been taken over by private 
commercial interests under a system of open competition. To guard against 
sudden scarcity or artificially high prices the government undertook to 
keep a stock of grain of its own promising, however, not to interfere in 
the market unless forced to do so.[114] Vested interests on both sides, 
however, prevented this arrangement from working satisfactorily.
As Maitland had originally feared the island possessed only a handful
of merchants who possessed enough capital to meet the mammoth task of
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purchasing the bulk supplies of grain required to feed both population and 
garrison.[115] Soon these few merchants had organised themselves into a 
cartel and the 'government monopoly' was 'replaced by private
monopoly'.[116] The situation that arose as a consequence of this
development, which Maitland to his credit had foreseen, was not lost on the 
Colonial Office. In 1826 Hay complained that the merchants supply could not 
be depended upon and it was
'only by extreme vigilance on the part of the Government of the Island that 
the inhabitants can be preserved from all distress which arises from a 
scarcity of bread.'[117]
Neither was the situation lost on the Head and Assistant Head of the 
Grain Department who had charge of the government stock of grain and who 
received a commission from its sale. Scarcity and/or high grain prices 
tended to present them with an excuse to unload on the market some of the 
grain from the government stock.[118] It was, therefore, in their personal 
interest too that the arrangement arrived at in 1822 should be defeated and 
the old government monopoly reverted to. To this extent Hay was correct in 
his assessment of developments in Malta, first in 1826 when he observed 
'that circumstances appear to be combining to bring it [monopoly] again
into play'[119] and then in 1827 when he demanded to know whether the local
government had embarked on a 'virtual although not declared resumption of 
the Corn Monopoly.'[120]
On this issue the Commission of 1830 found itself being pulled in two 
different directions. In an island where three quarters of the dietary 
requirements of the population had to be imported, it did not judge that it 
could legitimately recommend that the government should not be allowed to 
have in its possession the means by which to protect the community in an 
emergency. But neither did it appear right in its view that government 
should continue to act as a grain merchant and for this reason it was the 
view of the Commission that the Grain Department should be abolished. In
the circumstances the conclusion adopted by the Commission was ambivalent.
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On the one hand it strongly adviced 'that Government shall, as speedily as 
may be possible, discontinue the practice of interfering as a merchant in 
the grain market,' while on the other hand it conceded that, given 'the 
particular circumstances of Malta' it was expedient that Government should 
continue to keep a stock of grain.[121]
ponsonby pronounced himself against the implementation of this reform, 
although he frankly admitted its correctness 'upon general 
principles.'[122] He pointed out that, had it not been for the Government 
the already difficult situation of the Maltese would have become infinitely 
more precarious, for the merchants had suddenly shipped off their grain to 
England where its price was much higher than in Malta.[123] Ponsonby 
concluded that
'...Every day convinces me how dangerous it would be to depart from a 
system which practically has operated most beneficially for Malta.'[124]
Ponsonby's arguments though not different from those of his predecessors
won the approval of both the Secretary of state and of the Treasury. The
former, also echoing former colonial Secretaries, decided against both the
Commission and the merchants since there was, in his view,
'no calamity which the people of Malta would view with greater dread than 
the suspension of the control of Government over that important branch of 
their internal economy.'[125]
The Treasury, on its part, promised not to press against the decision of 
the Colonial Secretary claiming that
'it would be an act of cruelty and injustice to apply general principles 
[given] peculiar nature of the Island of Malta...'[126]
The question of "general principles" came up again over the question
of public service size in Malta. Hay had informed the Governor during the
Inquiry that the Commissioners had great reductions in view, and that they
were 'much struck with the number of employees in your little island.'[127]
But even in this, however, the Commissioners found it difficult not to
accept that Malta presented a special case, 'we have to remark,' they
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'that in forming such large establishments...successive Governors of Malta 
appear to have proceeded on an admitted policy that the peculiar 
circumstances of that colony, justified the Government in affording aid to 
the native Maltese in a degree not otherwise admissable on general 
principles.'[128]
Even so the Commission considered the number of public service employees 
much to great and recommended that various offices be suppressed.[129] 
Among the offices proposed for reduction were some which the Maltese 
considered as pure sinecures, including that of Agent for Malta.[130] The 
Commission also held that the salaries of most British public servants in 
Malta were far too high and recommended substantial cuts in their levels, 
sometimes, as in the case of that of the Chief Secretary, by almost 
one-half.[131]
These recommendations, as well as others discussed earlier were, 
however, resisted either by the local government, the Colonial Office or 
the Treasury in Whitehall. Several small offices were in fact reduced but 
the brunt of these fell on the Maltese. Hankey, the Chief Secretary in 
Malta confessed to Hay that he hoped 'to God, no more reductions of Maltese 
functionaries will take place' for those already made had 'filled the 
island with discontent and the Maltese are not a people to complain being 
hurt.'[132] The Treasury, on its part, rejected the Commission's suggestion 
that Malta be exempted from payments to the "Military chest" on the ground, 
according to Hay, 'that the Mother country had a just right to expect this 
measure of assistance fran her foreign dependencies...'[133] for their 
defence. Finally, Lord Goderich as colonial Secretary failed to press for 
cuts in the salaries of some British officials as proposed by the 
Commission and even indefinitely postponed consideration of their other 
proposal for the abolition of the office of Agent for Malta.[134]
The Commission of 1830 had presented all concerned with an opportunity
for reform in Malta. It seemed, in fact, that the powers that be had come
to recognize that their so-called "general principles" of political economy
may not necessarily apply given the 'peculiar' or 'particular'
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socio-economic circumstances of Malta. But the opportunity was not taken.
One reason for this, perhaps, stemmed from the fact that since the
Commission never visited Malta it lacked first-hand knowledge of the
situation there and was, therefore, unable to press forward its
recommendations. But the consequence of British failure to implement
meaningful reform in Malta was an upsurge of political discontent. In 1832,
Maltese leaders, led by Camillo Sceberras and George Mitrovich, presented
Britain with a formal demand for Constitutional reform.[135] These leaders,
backed by several hundred prominent Maltese, had arrived at the conclusion
that no reform was possible until the Maltese had their own Council or
Congresso.[136] Representation of some sort was seen by them as the only
means by which reform of Maltese public administration and of the economy
could be achieved. The intensity with which this new movement for political
reform conducted its campaign was to influence developments in Malta for
the rest of the century and beyond. Although its aims were not conceded
until 1921 the Sceberras-Mitrovich movement was to score some inportant
gains within the next few years. It succeeded, for example, in gaining for
Malta a Council of Government similar to that existing in other Crown
Colonies and, in 1836, the institution of press freedom which had been
denied the Maltese since the time of the Order.[137] With regard to the
Maltese public service the "Comitato Popolare" (or Popular Committee), as
Sceberras and Mitrovich had christened their movement, was to push for and
gain the gradual readmission of Maltese public servants to executive
offices from which they had been ousted by Maitland. This development,
which will form one of the central themes of the following Chapter, was
assisted by the efforts of John Austin and George Cornewall Lewis, two
liberals who in 1836 received a Royal Commission to investigate into every
aspect of Maltese affairs and to make recommendations aimed at removing
discontent from the island. In this sense a coalition of Maltese liberals
was to receive support for some of their demands from British liberals who
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had themselves gained political influence as a result of the British 
movement for political reform which had culminated in the Reform Act of 
1832.[138]
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CHAPTER SIX
THE LIBERAL IMPACT: 1832-1846
The year 1832 has often been considered by historians as a watershed
in British political development. In that year the Whigs, who had only come
to power a year earlier, had managed to push through both Houses of
Parliament what has become known as the "Great Reform Bill of 1832."[1] It
was not as revolutionary an Act as its title suggests but many saw it as a
vital breach in the great wall of aristocratic privilege prevailing at the
time. The radicals, who had throughout supported liberal efforts to reform
the franchise and the distribution of electoral seats, saw the Bill as a
beginning, a stepping-stone to further reform.[2] It also seemed likely, in
1832, that this liberal victory would serve as a springboard for reform in
the colonies. Before coming to power these liberals, with radical support
had constantly campaigned against all form of abuses and mismanagement said
to exist in the colonies. They had attacked colonial sinecures, patronage
in appointments to colonial offices, and the appointment of military
officers as colonial governors. They had often argued that colonies were
expensively administered and one reason for this, apart from patronage, was
the system of autocratic government to be found there. Indeed they tended
to argue that the rule of autocracy as set up in the colonies had even had
a distinctively deteriorating effect on the constitutional government of
the metropolis itself.[3] Therefore, Colonial reform was, in their view,
therefore, both necessary and desirable. But the direction political and
administrative reform of colonial government should take was not entirely
clear to them in 1832.
Whether or not the movement for political reform in Britain had
exerted any influence on Maltese liberals has not been made adequately
clear by historians. But within a month of the new Bill being passed two
Maltese petitions were forwarded to London by Governor Ponsonby.[4] These
petitions demanded, among other things, the institution of representative
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government, the proper administration of justice, a free press, the 
appointment of a civil governor, an end to the high salaries paid to 
British public servants in Malta, and that the career prospects of
deserving local public servants should no longer be handicapped because of
their native origin, by their exclusion from executive offices. [5] The 
demands of the Maltese petitioners following so closely as they did on the 
heels of the liberal victory may be said to have constituted a challenge or 
test of the readiness of the new government in Britain to match rethoric 
with action.
The response of British liberalism to Maltese political agitation 
provides the subject matter of this Chapter. It was a response that began
hesitatingly in 1835 with the grant of a nominated advisory Council of
Government and the recognition for the first time of the principle of press 
freedom in Malta, and which reached its climax in 1838 with the readmission 
of Maltese public servants to superior offices in the Maltese public 
service from which they had been excluded by Maitland after 1813.[6] The 
latter reform was the product of a Royal Commission of Inquiry sent out to 
Malta in 1836. It was conposed of two well known liberals and was in itself 
to provide tangible proof of British liberal desire to implement radical 
reform in the administration of the island. For this reason, therefore, the 
work of this Commission will provide the focus of attention for this 
Chapter.
BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The arrival of the Maltese petitions at the colonial Office in the
summer of 1832 was not a welcome event and discussions as how best to
proceed were to take up the next three years.[7] It had always been the
view of the British government that Malta's strategic importance made it
necessary that all matters, civil and military, should be vested in one
authority.[8] Consequently, those appointed as governors had all been
persons of high military rank and in their conduct of public affairs they
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were responsible to the Secretary of State alone.[9] The colonial Office 
was evidently determined to maintain this line of policy for as long as 
possible for, in 1831, it was reported that Lord Goderich, the Colonial 
Secretary, 'was not anxious that any measure'[10] involving the creation of 
a Council should be encouraged. This policy continued undisturbed until 
1835 when a nominated advisory Council of Government, consisting of the 
Governor and seven other members, four of whan were senior public 
officials, was finally established in the island.[11] But as Hilda Lee has 
observed in her study of Maltese constitutional development, the 
institution of this Council brought little or no change to the way the 
islands were governed.[12] The unofficial members held office only "during 
pleasure" while the Governor had the power to suspend them or act contrary 
to their advice, although both of these powers were to be used only in 
extreme circumstances.[13] In brief, the Governor was allowed to retain 
nearly all of his former powers. The leaders of the Maltese lobby for 
political reform, especially Camillo Sceberras and George Mitrovich, 
rejected the new Constitution. They continued to maintain that the problems 
of Malta would never be resolved until the government was placed under the 
direction and control of an elected Council or Consiglio Popolare. 
Furthermore, because Council members were all nominees of the Crown, they 
enjoyed no popularity with the public and were seen to be worse than 
useless.[14] But representative government was not a realistic option at 
the time. The view expressed by Hay at the Colonial Office was more 
reflective of British imperial policy. Representative government in Malta, 
he wrote, was objectionable and unsafe on strategic grounds. But it was 
also unacceptable on constitutional principles for, as he observed, the 
Secretary of state had already 'expressed his sentiments in a very decided 
manner upon this subject'!15] in the case of Canada, and one could not see, 
therefore, any reason for a deviation from policy in the case of fortress 
Malta.
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In 1835, however, the Maltese case was dramatically reopened by the 
publication in London of a pamphlet by Mitrovich entitled "ihe claims of 
the Maltese founded on Principles of Justice."[16] In it Mitrovich 
reiterated the demands of the petitioners of 1832 and accused Britain of 
breaking its promises to the Maltese and of oppressing them. The fact that 
Mitrovich could freely publish his pamphlet in London but not in Malta 
seemed to lend creditability to his charge. Several British personalities, 
including William Ewart, MP for Liverpool, John Hume leader of the 
Radicals, Samuel Mills Jnr., Rintoul of the "Spectator" and others were, as 
a result of this publication, attracted to the Maltese cause.[17]
Lord Glenelg, who had just assumed the office of Colonial Secretary, 
readily admitted the justice of the Maltese claim for a free press, 
determined not
'to repress in a small European community that very freedom of publication 
which we justly value as amongst the highest distinctions of our domestic 
and colonial policy.'[18]
He also felt, however, that Maltese accusations against British rule in 
Malta had placed British honour on trial and had, therefore, to be 
investigated. He, therefore, instructed the Acting Governor - Ponsonby 
having in the meantime relinquished his post on grounds of ill-health - to 
hold an immediate inquiry into all the Maltese claims and to report 
accordingly.[19]
The inquiry was given the cold-shoulder by the Maltese and the
administration was forced, by way of report to the Secretary of State, to
reply to Mitrovich's accusations paragraph by paragraph. Its report,
entitled "A Vindication of the Past and Present Administration of this
Government" defended all the measures adopted by the administration over
the years, including Maitland's removal of Maltese officers from executive
offices and the granting of rather high salaries to British public servants
in Malta.[20] While conceding that the 'Maltese ought not to be universally
excluded' from such offices, the Report questioned 'to what extent the
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Advocates for the Maltese mean to push their pretensions on this
point.'[21] The Report argued, quite correctly at the time, that there was
'nothing in what has taken place in Malta...which is at variance with the 
long established policy and practices of the British Government in
relation'
to other colonies.
With regard to the second accusation the Report argued that the high 
salaries received by the British in Malta were,
'far from being an injury, an advantage to the Maltese people in general
for with them will always remain the chief part of the salaries'!22]
of these British servants. Furthermore, the Report concluded that as long
as
'these salaries do not exceed the produce of the territorial estates in the 
island, which belong to the Crown...no fair grounds of complaint [existed] 
on the part of any one who professes to advocate the interests of the
Maltese.'[23]
On the one hand, the Maltese boycott of the inquiry was interpreted in
London as a clear manifestation of the great lack of confidence which
British administration enjoyed in Malta. On the other hand, the arrogant
tone of the Report gained the local administration little favour with Lord
Glenelg and with James Stephen, an influential liberal, who had just
replaced the Tory Robert Hay as Permanent Under-Secretary at the colonial
Office.[24] Stephen was one of a group of liberals who held to the view
that British colonialism was justifiable, only insofar as it served to
better the condition of the people under its charge, remove all forms of
exploitation and to spread Christianity.[25] Glenelg was somewhat of the
same view and this explains why the Report prepared by the local
administration failed to satisfy the Colonial Office. It was decided,
therefore, to send to Malta a Royal Commission to carry out a thorough
examination into the affairs of the colony.
THE COMMISSION OF 1836
Those appointed by Glenelg to act as members of the Commission were
John Austin, a professor of jurisprudence and George Cornewall Lewis, a
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lawyer who had previously served on two Poor Law commissions in Ireland. 
Lewis was the son of an active liberal reformer while both he and Austin 
were close friends of James Stephen at the Colonial Office. More to the 
point they were persons who enjoyed the utmost trust among those liberals 
and radicals who were active on the side of the Maltese. Lewis was later in 
life to enjoy a distinguished career both as MP for Hereford and as a 
leading member of the British Cabinet.[26] Their brief from the Secretary 
of State was to inquire into Maltese demands for a representative assembly, 
to advise HM's Government whether Maltese 'possessed of abilities and 
probity fitting them for public office' should be employed in executive
offices, and to conduct a general review of all branches of the
administration.[27] In so doing, however, Austin and Lewis were reminded to 
keep in constant view Malta's role as an important naval and military
station and the interests of Empire associated with it. The latter 
instruction was in itself an important limitation on how far-reaching 
reform in Malta could eventually be, as a similar instruction to the 
Commission of 1812 had previously demonstrated.[28]
George Lewis and John Austin, the latter accompanied by his equally 
distinguished wife Sarah,[29] arrived in Malta in October 1836 to a
tumultous welcome from the population. It was a welcome that left a deep 
impression on the visitors. 'Till this moment', Sarah confided to friends 
in England,
'I have hardly been conscious of the awful task committed to my husband; I 
felt those cheers, eager and vehement as they were, as the voice of the 
suffering calling for help and for justice.'[30]
Lewis also gave an account of their 'sort of triumphal entry' into Valletta
in a letter to his friend Edmund Head, observing that the people had
evidently thought, or were led to believe, that the Commissioners had been
sent out to Malta with some sort of Magna Carta for the islands.[31]
The reception given to the Commissioners was apparently counter
balanced by an informal briefing from some of the leading British officials
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in Malta. Lewis seems to have been favourably impressed at this first 
meeting with Sir Frederick Hankey, the Chief Secretary, whom he described 
as a 'man of ability and of pleasant, frank manners.'[32] It appears that 
during this briefing attempts at influencing the Commissioners were 
skillfully made for, in his first letter from Malta, Lewis dismissed 
Mitrovich as a well-meaning but weak man who wished 'the Government to buy 
him.. .body and soul for £200 a-year.'[33] The petitioners of 1832 he 
referred to as 'agitators' and remarked that the remedy for the 'real
grievance of the Maltese', namely an excessive population the result of
ignorance and superstition, lay 'beyond the reach of Commissioners and 
governments.'[34]
It was a view that could have scuppered the inquiry before it had 
actually began, but neither this impression nor that of Hankey were to be 
enduring. Indeed, Hankey himself was to fall victim to the reforming zeal 
of Austin and Lewis. Hankey had first held office in Malta as Maitland's 
private secretary. He was the Governor's right hand man and Maitland had
been quite eloquent in his praise of Hankey in several of his
despatches.[35] Hankey succeeded to the office of Chief Secretary in 1824 
after Richard Plasket had resigned.[36] From this period onwards Hankey 
became the unacknowledged governor of the island. Whenever he was away from 
the island Governors tended to complain of difficulties in conducting the 
affairs of the island.[37] However, when Governors were themselves on leave 
from Malta, Hankey used to report that their absence made no difference to 
the administration.[38] Not surprisingly, the tendency in the Island was to 
attribute every ill existing in Malta to his measures and personality.[39]
The Commissioners' view of the Maltese was quite ambivalent. It was a
view worth briefly pursing here for on it was to rest the judgement of the
Commission as to whether the Maltese were fit to enjoy representative
institutuions and/or to occupy executive offices in the public service. The
Commission of 1812 had judged the Maltese as unfitted by character to enjoy
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any portion of political power and to hold offices concerned with
finance.[40] On the basis of this judgement the Maltese were denied their
'Consiglio Popolare' and Maltese public servants were removed and had
remained excluded from departmental headships. In 1836 the Maltese were
invariably described by Lewis and the Austins as sharp, acute, intelligent
and remarkable in their 'practical talent'[41] almost as the British. In
several ways they were seen as resembling the Irish although their
deportment was considered as 'irreproachable',[42] 'unobjectionable'.[43]
and 'far superior to anything to be met with in Ireland.'[44]
But the Maltese were also seen as 'exceedingly ignorant',[45] 'narrow,
uninteresting, frivolous',[46] 'docile'[47] and for the most part
illiterate.[48] Poverty was a characteristic common to all classes and what
distinguished the lower from the middle classes was education rather than
wealth.[49] 'The merchants, the advocates, the doctors, and the Government
employes' formed, according to Lewis, 'the really valuable part of the
population' and although lacking in 'facts and principles' there was among
them 'a very fair sprinkling of intelligence.'[50] As a race the Maltese
were described as 'an Arab race'[51] or as a 'half-Arab' people, their
looks bearing 'a striking resemblance to the Jewish.'[52]
This question of race was of great importance for it was a generally
accepted belief in Britain that peoples who were not Anglo-Saxon in "race",
or Protestant for that matter, were unfit by temperament for representative
institutions.[53] Non-Europeans, in addition to being unfit by temperament,
were also considered as too corrupt to be trusted to hold offices in the
civil service of their country. [54] Nothing, it was held, would go right
unless controlled by British officers.[55] Opposition to this general
outlook had, however, grown from a small, but influential, group of
liberals. Among these were members of the anti-slavery movement, James
Stephen, John Stuart Mill, some colonial civil servants, and both Austin
and Lewis. These liberals were motivated by the belief that all
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individuals, irrespective of race, were capable of improvement provided 
that they had good government and education.[56]
This point of view was remarkably expressed by Lewis in one of his 
letters to Head before his nomination as a member of the Commission for 
Malta. 'Before I went to Ireland', he wrote
'I had very strong opinions as to the influence of race on the Irish 
character. But when I came to look at things more nearly, and to see all 
the demoralizing influences to which they have been and are subjected, I 
asked myself whether a people of Germanic race would have turned out much 
better; and I really could not answer in the affirmative...Protestant 
Germans might, if properly oppressed and brutalized, be made as bad as the 
Irish...'[57]
He had learnt from others with first hand experience that the same could be 
said of the negroes. This led Lewis to conclude 'that external influences 
had been far too much disregarded' in past British estimates of the 
character of other peoples and races.[58]
Austin and Lewis were to discover in Malta that one important external 
influence was how members of the colonial power behaved towards the 
population. In Malta, according to Sarah Austin and George Lewis, in Malta, 
the British had excluded, by their insolence and prejudice, even the upper 
ranks of Maltese society from all the official and informal functions that 
took place from time to time.[59] Lewis observed that the wives of British 
naval and public officers who had found themselves
'in an unwonted position of power and importance... [thought ] it incumbent 
on them to trample on the Maltese with all the weight of their 
vulgarity.'[ 60]
The response of the Maltese was to withdraw from contact with the British 
and to display their hatred towards them 'with the greatest 
cordiality.'[61]
Furthermore, those in authority instead of giving the people feelings
of self-reliance had 'intentionally kept them in a state of pupilage',[62]
discouraged all movement, stifled all inquiry, since printed discussion of
all political matters was prohibited, perpetuated ignorance and even
'discountanced trade as being troublesome'.[63] The only difference that
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existed, in Lewis's view, between the paternal military despotism set-up in
Malta and that of Austria in Lombardy was that the former, in contrast to
the latter, had done nothing for primary education.[64]
Was representative government, as the Maltese leaders were claiming,
the solution to this state of affairs in Malta? The commissioners did not
think so. Indeed, they were of the view that the very notion of a
self-governing dependency was in itself a contradiction in terms.[65] In
addition there was the security of the fortress to be considered. Although
military rule was obnoxious to them, given the situation of Malta and
affairs generally in Europe, it was difficult to see how it could be
jettisoned overboard so easily. But this difficulty did not, however, in
their opinion justify the War Office policy of keeping Malta 'in a
perpetual state of siege.'[66] Neither did the Commissioners wish to leave
the Maltese under this military despotism with its consequent
'neglect of the affairs and interests of the dependency, and...the danger 
of a disturbance of its tranquility.'[67]
It was a difficult issue to resolve and by the time the Commissioners had 
left Malta in 1838 they had not reached any conclusion with regard to this 
question. When they did, some years later, their recommendation for a 
partially elected assembly, the Crown retaining powers of disallowance and 
legislation by Order-in-Council was, purely on military grounds, rejected 
by the Colonial Office.[68]
The Maltese demand for readmission to superior offices in the public 
service offered the Commissioners an opportunity to subvert the hitherto 
existing official oligarchy of British officers which, as their private 
writings demonstrated, was
'imperfectly checked either by the direct interference of the supreme 
government or by the indirect influence of the opinion of the dependency or 
the dominant country...'[69]
that Maltese clerks ought to replace British Heads of Departments had to be
justified on grounds of economy, efficiency, ability, probity, incentive
for development, as well as political advantage, rather than their own
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personal assessment of individual British public officers. In fact, as will
be demonstrated below, in their 'Report Relative to the Employment of
Maltese in Executive Offices' Austin and Lewis defended their
recommendation that Maltese should henceforth be allowed to hold superior
offices on these several criteria.[70]
The Commissioners argued, for example, that the Maltese were better
acquainted than Englishmen with the circumstances, laws, institutions and
traditions of the island, as well as having a perfect knowledge of the
local language and of Italian, the official language of Malta.[71] It was a
reasonable argument for as Lewis had observed, Malta had
'a set of ancient complicated institutions, founded upon a totally
different set of legal and political principles from those of England'
and consequently every subject required special study before one could feel
reasonably certain that one was not committing any mistakes.[72] This
sentiment was echoed by another Commissioner forty years later[73] and
found confirmation in the fact that Austin and Lewis had failed to bring to
a successful close their own inquiry even after eighteen months of
continuous residence in Malta.[74] They were led to conclude, therefore,
that even an English official of first rate ability 'would not be able to
acquire an extensive and accurate knowledge of its system.'[75]
Furthermore, since salary levels in Malta were too low, especially when
compared to those of other colonies, those attracted to the service from
Britain were,
'for the most part...persons who, for various reasons, have been unable to 
succeed in their respective professions, or have otherwise failed to 
advance their fortunes in England.'[76]
Consequently, it was their view that 'the government would be better served
by the ablest among the natives than by the ablest Englishman'.[77]
There was political advantage to be gained too. Systematic exclusion
of Maltese from superior offices after 1813, especially from those which
they had regularly occupied under the Order of St John, was said by Austin
and Lewis to be one of the main reasons for discontent among upper and
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middle class Maltese.[78] They agreed with Agostino Portelli, a Maltese 
merchant and, since 1835, member of the Council of Government, that this 
exclusion had
'made them a degraded class in their own country...[and] lowered them in 
the estimation of Englishmen and foreigners, and even in their own 
estimation.'[79]
Lewis also wrote privately
'of the intense hatred with which they regard the English, who fill all the 
well-paid offices; and of the eagerness with which they look forward to the 
time when the places will be given to Maltese.'[80]
The local authorities were fully aware of the situation but rather 
than redressing matters they had sought to gain popularity by a resort to 
the practice of 'giving numerous small places to inefficient persons.'[81] 
It was a practice which according to the Commissioners had proved equally 
unpopular for it merely created a class of disappointed candidates for 
places and disgusted the mass of the public who saw in such a system 'its 
tendency to produce a costly and inefficient administration'.[82] In
addition it had 'the bad moral effect of inclining young men' from the
upper classes to look to the Government for their provision.[83]
The question of cost immediately gave rise to questions of economy and
taxation and we saw in the previous chapter that these had become
inextricably connected after 1822. In their petition of 1832 the Maltese
had sought an end to the high salaries paid to British public servants both
as a measure of economy and as a way of reducing taxation. They had further
argued that, were these offices to be given to Maltese officers, a
considerable saving would be effected since the salaries granted to Maltese
officers would be much lower. Austin and Lewis agreed with the Maltese
petitioners on every count. The salaries of 28 British public servants
amounted, in 1838, to no less than thirty-five per cent of all annual
salaries and wages paid by the Government, and to fifteen percent of all
revenue. [84] The removal of British heads of departments and their
replacement by their Maltese deputies was, therefore, bound to produce a
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substantial saving. The commissioners also felt that the savings which this
measure would produce would be of a long term character for they saw no
reason why the salary of a Maltese head should go above the annual income
of a principal Maltese landowner, merchant, advocate or physician which
they estimated at £400 per annum.[85] They were certain, moreover, that at
'this salary a competent Maltese might always be found to fill the office, 
though a conpetent Englishman could hardly be found to fill it for the same 
remunerat ion.'[86]
They similarly agreed that this measure would make it possible for the 
government to reduce taxation, especially the duties on grain, thereby 
making it popular among the lower classes, in an earlier letter to Glenelg, 
the Colonial Secretary, Austin and Lewis had expressed their difficulty in 
adequately conveying to him a true
'sense of the vehement and universal dislike of taxation which exists in 
this island, and of the vigilance with which every increase of the public 
burdens is watched...The amount of public money received by each person, 
the duties which he performs, or has performed for it, are known with a 
precision and canvassed with an interest which are only possible in a small 
community. The salaries and pensions of the present and former servants of 
Government are known with far greater accuracy, and are much more generally 
discussed in Malta then in England, notwithstanding the attempted secrecy 
of the Government in the one country, and the unbounded publicity of 
Government in the other.'[87]
Replacing British heads with Maltese officers was considered by the 
two Commissioners to be a less painful method of effecting economies in 
Government expenditure and reducing taxation in Malta. Another was that of 
reducing the tasks of government and consequently the size and number of 
government departments. We shall return to the latter a little later when 
we shall examine Austin and Lewis's proposed reorganisation of the several 
branches of Maltese administration.
The Commissioners held that the opening up of all levels of the civil
service to Maltese would serve as an inducement to the people to qualify
themselves for the public service.[88] They observed that many of those in
authority were quick to complain of the difficulty of finding competent
Maltese to fill the higher offices of the service. If this had been truly
the case, remarked Austin and Lewis, then the fault should not be
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attributed, to the Maltese. Higher offices had
'been almost invariably filled with strangers from England, and no 
encouragement has been held out to the Maltese subordinates to qualify 
themselves for the chief offices in their departments.'[89]
Nevertheless, despite the length of time during which 'this spirit-breaking
system'[90] had been practised, the Commissioners entertained 'no doubt
that the island would soon produce its fair proportion of competent
candidates for office'[91] provided that the criteria for appointment to
these offices was based on merit.
Merit, of course, had become the watchword of the liberals in Britain 
and the policy Austin and Lewis recommended in Malta was intended also as 
an attack on patronage. Because of this latter system, in Malta, the Report 
states, 'inefficient Englishmen have, in many cases, been placed at the 
head of departments'[92]. Indeed, inefficiency was seen by them as 'almost 
inseparable from the system of appointing Englishmen to these 
departments.'[93] Efficiency could be restored if Maltese possessing 
general ability and appropriate knowledge were appointed heads of 
departments instead of these inefficient British officers. This aim would 
be best achieved, according to Austin and Lewis, if the principle of 
departmental promotion was introduced. This meant in practice that an 
officer to be considered for promotion to a vacancy in a department must, 
in addition to having general ability (merit), be a serving member 
(appropriate knowledge) of that department. [94] Was the practice of 
departmental promotion as suggested by the Commissioners to be accepted, 
colonial patronage in Malta would have been automatically eliminated.
Austin and Lewis sought to carry their argument with the Secretary of 
State by suggesting that
'the appointment of any Englishmen to the headship of any department in 
which he had never served in a subordinate capacity, is impolitic and 
unjust'.[95]
Sir Henry Bouverie, who had only just replaced Ponsonby as military
Governor of Malta, objected. If adopted, he observed, a system of
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departmental promotion 'would at once fetter the Government in providing 
the most efficient servants as heads of the different departments' 
depriving it of
'the power to select generally from the civil service those officers 
considered most fitting for, and most deserving of promotion to the heads 
of the respective departments.'[96]
Lord Glenelg, the Colonial Secretary, agreed but saw other difficulties. He 
pointed out that an occasion may arise when 'the public interest may 
require a departure from a system of departmental promotion' and he was 
therefore unwilling to enter into any pledge to the Maltese which might in 
future prove embarrassing to HM's Government.[97] All that he was prepared 
to concede was that the claims of the subordinate officers of every public 
department in Malta would be carefully weighed 'before any stranger to 
their particular branch of the public service is placed over them.'[98] For 
this reason the Secretary of State instructed Bouverie to furnish the 
Colonial Office with periodic reports, but
'before vacancies actually occur...in favour of the advancement...of any 
meritorious officer serving in a subordinate rank.'[99]
He would not promise, however, that such recommendations would be
invariably followed but that they shall not be 'passed over on any light or
ordinary grounds.'[100]
The tendency of British heads of department to absent themselves
frequently from Malta was seen, by the Comnissioners, as further reason for
them to recommend promoting Maltese to these offices. The latter were
unlikely to be called away from their official duties by private affairs
abroad. The case of Mr Nugent provides a good example of this tendency.
Nugent who had replaced Seymour Bathurst as Treasurer in 1827 and who was
highly thought of by the commissioners to the extent that they wished to
see him promoted to Chief Secretary, received a salary of £900 a year, the
equivalent of half the total expense on salaries in his department.[101]
Yet within a ten year period Nugent had spent almost two and half years
away from the island, leaving his duties to the care of his Maltese deputy,
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Vincent Casolani.[102] In contrast Maltese public servants being at hone 
had few inducements to absent themselves from their official duties and 
'rarely received leave of absence.'[103] Employing Maltese in these offices 
would, therefore, ensure efficiency and promote economy.
While arguments of economy and efficiency, such as those expressed 
above, appealed to all sides of the House of Commons as well as to the 
Colonial Office, the Commissioners were aware that none of these really 
answered the questions that were bound to be raised, regarding Maltese
fitness to fill the superior offices of the administration and whether it 
was safe to entrust the administration of a fortress colony in the hands of 
a local bureaucracy? In the past the appointment of Maltese to offices of 
trust had been objected to, according to the Commissioners, 'on the ground 
of their alleged want of pecuniary honesty,' but they observed that none 
had so far openly advanced or offered to prove the truth of this
allegation.[104] Austin and Lewis, therefore, rejected this allegation 
pointing out that several Maltese were, and had been for sometime, 
entrusted with the immediate custody of the Government money and that their 
superiors had generally acquired the habit of delegating their duties to 
their Maltese deputies.[105]
Furthermore, the Commissioners could see no justification to withhold 
from the Maltese what, in theory, had already been granted by Parliament to 
British subjects in India. Indeed, as early as 1833, the India Charter Act 
had affirmed that race, colour, religion, and place of birth should not bar 
Indians from office in the government.[106] Although this part of the Act
remained a dead letter for almost the whole of the century, it was clear
that the Commissioners were aware of it when they recommended that Maltese 
should be appointed to the executive offices of the civil administration. 
They reported that
'The Maltese are an European and Christian community, and far superior in 
institutions, manners, science and arts to the most advanced of the Asiatic 
nations,'
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and though they might not have been as advanced as the Commissioners had 
hoped, 'their moral and intellectual condition was not as low as that of 
the Hindoos.'[107] In other words, what Parliament had affirmed in the case 
of Indians ought now to be affirmed and promulgated in the case of Maltese 
whose European and Christian culture made them as much, if not more, worthy 
of such a concession. In any case, their view of Maltese fitness to occupy 
executive offices was identical to that expressed earlier by Ponsonby when 
he noted that the Maltese were 'in every respect qualified to perform the 
duties of most of the principal offices under Government.'[108] Austin and 
Lewis recommended, therefore, that as far as it was possible, and with the 
exception of the offices of Chief Secretary, Assistant Secretary and 
Auditor-General, all offices in the Maltese public service should in future 
be filled by Maltese.[109]
The Secretary of State concurred that 'in the distribution of offices
in Malta' the claims of the Maltese should be given the utmost
consideration but he declined to subscribe to their view that British
subjects who were neither natives nor persons domiciled in Malta should be
permanently excluded from offices in Malta. It was a view that required to
be suppressed rather than encouraged. Its natural tendency was
'to prevent the native Maltese from regarding themselves, and from being 
regarded by their fellow-subjects as members of the British Empire 
collectively; but rather as an isolated class attached to a small and 
remote possession of the Crown, to which alone their prospects of 
advancement in life must be confined.'[110]
But fitness and trust were two separate issues where the
administration of a fortress was concerned. Some commentators had
disseminated rumours that Maltese loyalty to Britain was suspect and that
the Maltese would at the first opportunity exchange British rule for that
of the Russians.[Ill] Lewis, however, dismissed such commentators quite
strongly, totally convinced of Maltese loyalty to the Crown. What the
Maltese desired was reform not Tsarist rule.[112] General Bouverie,
Governor and Coirmander-in-Chief of the island did not fully agree. He
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informed the Secretary of State that
'he was not prepared to follow the Commissioners, into their analysis of 
the character of the Maltese, as compared with other people living under 
the British Crown...[and]that so long as Malta is considered as a fortress 
and a British naval station, the entire setting aside of Englishmen...for 
the purpose of bringing forward Maltese for offices, will be fraught with 
inconvenience and difficulty, and not impossibly with danger.'[113]
There is no doubt that Bouverie was partly right. How was a Colonial
Governor expected to safeguard imperial interests in a military colony if
he was to be dependent for advice and support on officers recruited almost
exclusively from a subject population? It was not inconceivable that such
officers would, in the long term, be more prepared to extend their
influence and power to other than the interests of Empire. Civil servants
in Crown Colonies, as has been seen in this and previous chapters,
exercised great authority. Indeed, Austin and Lewis had attributed most of
the responsibility for the state of affairs they found in Malta directly to
British heads, even accusing them of collecting a revenue to divide it
among themselves.[114]
But such strong opposition from the "man on the spot" would have
normally received the support of the Secretary of State for the colonies.
It was perhaps a sign of the times that on this occasion the governor's
advice was rejected and, instead, Lord Glenelg proceeded to confirm the
appointment of three Maltese officers, Sir Vincent Casolani, Louis Casolani
and Mr Bonavia, as heads of Government departments in place of
Englishmen.[115] This was done, as the Commissioners had urged
'to prove practically, and to the conviction of the [Maltese] public, that 
the principal places under the Government of the island will be open in 
future to its meritorious subordinate officers.'[116]
There was other opposition, however, and this, not surprisingly, came
from those British officers who were to be replaced by Maltese civil
servants. Captain Hunn, for example, realizing that he was to be removed
from his office as Harbour Master of Malta, accused Louis Casolani, the
officer selected to replace him, of peculation.[117] Casolani demanded a
public inquiry which, at the request of the Governor, was conducted by the
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Commissioners.[118] The charges against Casolani were totally disproved and 
Captain Hunn was retired from the service within a month of the 
investigation being concluded.[119]
REORGANISATION OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
It may be said that Austin and Lewis conducted their inquiry into the 
several branches of government in the true spirit of British liberalism. 
Their aim was to reduce public expenditure, minimise the role of government 
and lessen in a more definite manner Maltese dependence on the government. 
As with other Commissioners before them, however, these two liberal 
gentlemen were to discover that Malta had some unique features which did 
not always easily allow for the application of liberal principles. This was 
true, for example, in the case of the Commission of 1812 which had readily 
accepted, given Malta's economy and strategic importance, that the 
government grain monopoly should be continued and that the government 
should itself act to solve the acute housing shortage existing in 
Malta.[120] Of course, in 1812 protectionism and mercantilism still held 
sway in Britain but by 1837 the dominant values of British political 
economy had become increasingly influenced by free trade principles and the 
new Commissioners were less likely to be so indulging.
In reporting on the revenue of the island Austin and Lewis had
remarked that they found the expenditure of the government objectionable,
'not so much from its amount, as from the nature of many of the expenses. 
While many civil establishments are maintained on a scale of needless 
expense, some of the most urgent wants of the Government remain unsatisfied 
and some of its most important functions remain unperformed.'[121]
In other words, it was not the expense to which they were objecting to but
the purposes for which this expenditure was being utilised. Had the
government used the revenue to extend education and encourage local private
enterprise there would have been no complaint.
Needless expense was, in their opinion, occasioned by the existence of
unnecessary departments and offices. Of the existing departments Austin and
Lewis held that the Department of Marine Police should be merged with the
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Department of Quarantine and the Department of Government Works with the
Department of Land Revenue. The Commissioners viewed the existing division
between the Department of Quarantine and the Department of Marine Police as
both inconvenient and susceptible to serious mistakes which might even
endanger the health of the population.[122] Their fears were not unfounded
for seven days after they had raised the matter the island became the
victim of a particularly serious outbreak of cholera.[123] Moreover, the
Commissioners held that the policing of the two Valletta harbours could be
'performed, most effectually and most economically, by a single authority, 
inasmuch as the whole force can then be brought to bear on a single point, 
in case of any extraordinary need.'[124]
With respect to the other two departments namely those of Government Works 
and Land Revenue it was the Commissioner's view that the existing division 
was artificial and that they should be consolidated into one department. 
This was how things had stood until 1825 when, in order to accommodate 
William Mackenzie, at the time deputy Head of Land Revenue and Works, Lord 
Hastings divided the latter in two departments appointing the former as 
Head of Government Works.[125] Austin and Lewis also put a final stop to 
the practice by the local government of granting public-owned houses 
rent-free to public servants and to others.[126] Successive governors had 
been strictly ordered not to continue with this practice but the 
instructions of the Secretary of state were, until 1837, flagrantly 
ignored.[127]
Two government departments which the Commissioners believed would no
longer be needed as a consequence of new developments were the Government
Printing Press and the Monti di pieta', the national pawnbrokerage. Austin
and Lewis had concluded that, with the introduction of press freedom, the
amount of work entrusted to the government press, until then the only one
in Malta, would decline rapidly. They envisaged that, on their own,
government printing needs would not be enough to make the enterprise
profitable and that the government would be better and more cheaply served
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by putting its work out to private tender.[128] Similarly, the 
Commissioners believed that if licences were granted to private individuals 
of character which would allow them to act as pawnbrokers, the Monti di 
Pieta', the only legal pawnbrokerage in the island, could be dispensed 
with. They felt sure that with government vigilance over the new 
establishments, the public would soon learn to trust these private 
ventures.[129] In both cases the Commissioners were mistaken. The Governor 
was not prepared to suppress the government printing office on the ground 
that, should the new press prove unjustifiably hostile to the Government, 
it would have no independent means of putting its case to the public but 
would have to depend on the indulgence of its very opponents.[130] Neither 
was the Maltese public ready to substitute the centuries old security 
afforded it by the Monti di Pieta' for that of private individuals.[131] As 
a consequence both departments were retained and still, to this day, form 
an integral part of the Maltese public service.
One department which Austin and Lewis did succeed in seeing abolished
was the Grain Department. Since the arrival of the British in Malta,
British and Maltese merchants had conducted a campaign to wrest from the
government control over this item of commerce. Until 1822, however, the
government had successfully retained its hold - dating from the Middle Ages
- over the corn trade. But its monopoly was finally breached in that year
and from then onwards the energies of the merchants had been directed at
dissuading the authorities from interfering in the market.[132] In this,
however, they had failed. Austin and Lewis, opposed as they were in
principle to government intervention in industry or commerce were
determined to abolish this department. They were, however, preempted in
this by the local administration which, by a minute of the 10th January
1837, had declared its intention to sell-off its stock of grain and to
proceed, having done so, to abolish the Grain Department.[133] In the
circumstances the two Commissioners were left with the agreeable task of
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ensuring that this measure was effectively implemented, securing in the 
process the retirement on pension of the Head of the Grain Department, that 
of his deputy and of the Government broker.[134] Thus, in 1837, the 
government of Malta was finally divested of its responsibility, of over 
five centuries, of ensuring, directly or indirectly, that the population of 
Malta was adequately and cheaply fed.[135] There was no immediate public 
outrage at this measure [136] but the issue of grain provision was to raise 
its head within the next few years and was to continue to do so until World 
War Two.
One reason for this was the grain tax which, until the introduction of
income tax in 1948, was to remain the principal tax of the island. To
Austin and Lewis the levying of a tax on the staple food of the population
on the verge of starvation was totally objectionable.[137] But, on
inquiring deeper into the matter they were forced to conclude that it was
virtually impossible to abolish it. The grain tax provided the government
with about £35,000 annually or about one-third of its annual revenue.[138]
Even with the strictest of economies the expenditure of the government
could not be slashed by the equivalent of this sum. Indeed, while
advocating cuts and other forms of retrenchment, the Commissioners hoped
that a good portion of the savings made would be channelled into extending
education, especially at primary level.[139] Furthermore, given the poverty
of the Maltese, direct taxation on income or land seemed to rule itself
out. The number of persons who would qualify as taxpayers under such a
scheme would be necessarily small and the amount raised in revenue would be
greatly below that required.[140] Despite their long-standing opposition to
this tax both the British and Maltese merchants admitted of the existing
difficulties, adding that the introduction of hitherto untried methods of
taxation may also prove particularly unpopular.[141] The best that could be
done in the circumstances was that the higher rate of duty levied on grain
imported in foreign vessels be repealed and that the lower rate of duty
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charged on grain imported in British vessels be made to apply in all
cases.[142]
Austin and Lewis managed to affect some savings by the reduction of 
various offices and of course more savings were expected in the future when 
eventually most headships were occupied by Maltese officers. Some of the 
offices reduced included the offices of Chief Justice and Attorney-General, 
those of Magistrates for the markets, the establishments of the Lord 
Lieutenants (but not of their deputies), the office of Intendent of Marine 
Police, and the office of Treasurer, which was replaced with that of
cashier.[143] The Commissioners also secured a reduction in the salary of 
the Chief Secretary. Of Sir Fredrick Hankey, the holder of this office, 
little needs to be said further. His unpopularity in Malta was almost 
general.[144] The Commissioners too, despite their earlier favourable view, 
came to consider him as the chief obstacle to reform in Malta. They, 
therefore, strongly recommended that he be retired on a pension as soon as 
possible.[145] Ironically, Hankey had some years earlier sought to retire 
because of his wife's ill-health but his request was turned down on the
grounds that the Maltese government could not afford to pay him a pension
and that his service in Ceylon could not be added to that of Malta.[146]
The approach adopted by the Commissioners to the Charitable
Establishments of the Maltese government mirrored in many ways that which
had been adeptd in Britain with respect to poor relief. It was an approach
that had its roots in Bentham's utilitarian doctrine and Malthusian and
Richardian economics, and which had been given practical expression in the
1830s by Nicholls, Senior, Chadwick and Frankland Lewis (the father of
George Cornewall Lewis), through the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834.[147]
The arguments which held currency in Britain at the time may be briefly
stated thus. First, that the whole system of out-door relief of the poor
had become an intolerable financial burden on the resources of the country.
Second, that the existing system of out-door relief did not distinguish
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between those actually destitute, because of age or infirmity, and those 
who were poor, i.e. those forced to work for their own subsistence, and had 
served only to augment the number of wilful paupers. It was said that 
out-door relief had taken from able-bodied persons the fear of hunger which 
normally acted as a stimulus and which kept them industrious, with the 
consequence, that many found it preferable to be maintained by the labour 
of other than their own.[148]
Both of these evils Austin and Lewis claimed to have also found
present in Malta. As evidence, the Commissioners quoted from the Report of
Mr Thornton, the Auditor-General in Malta, which showed that between 1830
and 1836 the expenditure of the Government Charitable Establishments had
increased by about 26 per cent to just under £18,000 or about one-sixth of
all government expenditure.[149] He pointed out that 'this increase of
charge...has impaired the resources of the local treasury for the general
service of the Government' and that urgent action was needed
'to prevent the necessity of recourse being had to His Majesty's Treasury, 
in order to make good any deficiency in those means which may result from 
such cause.'[150]
Similarly, according to Austin and Lewis, 'the distribution of Government
alms' in Malta was 'liable to the principal objections which have been
justly made to out-door relief of the poor in England' and the
'discipline of the [local] Ospizio is not sufficient to deter all but the 
most necessitous, and it cannot be considered that able-bodied girls, [i.e. 
those of the House of Industry]...rank high among the objects of a limited 
public provision for the destitute.'[151]
The remedies proposed by the Commissioners were identical to those
which had been proposed by the Poor Law Commission in Britain, namely less
eligibility, the institutional test, and the centralisation and uniformity
in the administration of poor relief. First, since in Malta, more so than
in Britain, the government was not in a position to relieve all indigent
poor, it was 'manifestly desirable that the government should relieve those
who are most indigent.'[152] Second, they proposed that all out-door relief
should be stopped and that all the physical needs of the destitute be
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provided for in asylums extended for the purpose. However, it was necessary
'to remove from their [asylums] condition all those indulgencies which may 
be attractive to persons not in a state of destitution, and which would 
have the invidious effect of securing to paupers maintained by the state on 
the plea of destitution, a larger share of comforts than is enjoyed by many 
of those who contribute to their maintenance.'[153]
Hence, those attracted to these institutions were to be persons who would 
otherwise starve if they stayed away. Finally, Lewis and Austin recommended 
that all government charities in Malta should be placed under the 
management of one board. This was, to a point, the system which Maitland 
had adopted in 1816.[154] But Lord Hastings had departed from this system, 
unnecessarily in the view of the Commissioners, when he placed the 
Foundling Hospital and the House of Industry, which he had set up in 1824, 
under a separate committee from that responsible for the Charitable 
Establishments.[155]
Lord Glenelg expressed his entire satisfaction with the report of the 
Commissioners on the Malta Government Charities, both for its 'brevity and 
clearness' and on its 'foresight and perspicuity.'[156] Governor Bouverie 
was instructed to act on their recommendations provided that he did this 
with caution in order to avoid giving 'a reasonable cause of complaint' and 
because of 'some conclusive objection which has escaped the research of the 
Commissioners' but which might occur to him in the process of inplementing 
them.[157] Once again, as in the case of grain provision, the Maltese were 
being forced to come to terms with another diminution in the 
responsibilities of government. Indeed, as Price observed, the Maltese were 
being told that from now on they must work their own salvation without 
depending, as past government policy had accustomed them to do, on state 
intervention.[158]
But if the intent of the Commissioners was to restrict state
intervention in several areas of Maltese life, in the area of education the
go'/ernment was chastised for having done so little. This was not as
contradictory as it may appear. Their intention was to do away with popular
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dependence on the state and to infuse self-help, the concept on which all 
liberal aspirations were based. But self-help could not be attained without 
education. Austin and Lewis believed that a wider diffusion of education in 
Malta would serve to inculcate this virtue in a people who demonstrated 
that they possessed potential and talent. [159] It was a belief that was 
shared by Lord Glenelg who, in his instructions to Austin and Lewis, had 
expressed the view that 'the diffusion of sound knowledge amongst the
people of Malta would tend to improve their condition', and eventually 'to 
strengthen their attachment to the British Crown.'[160] The Commissioners 
were to inquire, therefore,
'whether the object in question could possibly be promoted by any, and 
what, interference on the part of His Majesty's Government.'[161]
The plan for the reform of education submitted by the Commissioners, 
which was approved by the Secretary of State in its entirety, was
remarkable in two ways. First, it went against current British practice in 
education which encouraged voluntary provision of education. They
recommended, in contrast, that government should shoulder all 
administrative and financial responsibility for education in Malta. Second, 
by recommending that the direction of state education should be entrusted 
to the Rector of the University of Studies, and as a result an embryonic 
Department of Education was therefore conceived.
State education in the Maltese islands consisted, in 1838, of the 
University of Studies, the Lyceum, (a higher school attached to the 
University), and three elementary schools. The latter had been, until then, 
attached to the Charitable Establishments.[162] Private education consisted 
of the Bishop's seminary and a small school in one of the outlaying
villages.[163] The University granted degrees in theology, law and medicine 
and apart from a small income from property endownments and student fees 
its finances came directly from the Government.[164]
According to Austin and Lewis the courses at the University left much
to be desired while elementary education was 'small in quantity and bad in
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quality'.[165] The main problem with the University was that the salaries 
paid by the government to university professors were so low that most found 
it virtually impossible to make their academic situation a primary object 
of their attention.[166] The existing number of elementary schools, 
confined as they were to the towns, were ineffective in reducing the level 
of illiteracy which the Commissioners estimated at around 80%.[167] 
Furthermore, at every level, the quality of education was handicapped by 
the difficulty of finding properly qualified teachers.[168]
The Commissioners firmly believed, as has already been observed, that 
the future well-being of the Maltese, be it social, economic or political 
depended entirely on a wider and more popular diffusion of education. For 
example, they wished to see the creation of a chair in Political Economy, 
with lectures in the subject being held in the evening so that interested 
members of the public may be able to attend. They hoped that the teaching 
of this discipline would in time help to dispel many of the prejudices 
existing among the population, especially those relating to the proper role 
of government in the economy, and to create 'a barrier of enlightened 
opinion, hard or impossible to surmount'[169] by a future government intent 
to commit the same 'gross errors in its financial, commercial, or other 
economical policy,'[170] as past governments had done. These 'gross 
errors', according to Austin and Lewis, included placing needless obstacles 
to general commerce; indiscriminate public charity to paupers of the lower 
classes; and the conversion of public offices into receptacles for paupers 
of the higher orders.
Because of the latter danger, the Commissioners did not wish to see
an expansion in the number of students attending the University. The number
of professional graduates already exceeded the demand for them and their
difficulty in gaining a living had induced the government, in a vain effort
to prevent them from joining the ranks of its critics, 'to introduce the
pernicious system of creating useless offices.'[171] What the Commissioners
179
did wish to see, however, was the extension of elementary education to
every town and village in the Maltese islands. But this required resources
which only the government was in a position to provide. Indeed, although
the Commissioners declared their opposition to gratuitous instruction,
supporting a small increase in the fees charged by the university, the
general poverty of the Maltese led them to propose that all elementary
education in Malta should be free, all expenses being borne by the
government. Similarly, the Commissioners felt that the government should
remedy the problem of a lack of properly qualified teachers by the grant of
periodic overseas scholarships to students who had graduated with
distinction from the university.[172]
Finally, the Commissioners recommended that control over these as
well as over every other establishment directly or indirectly connected
with education, such as the Public Library and the Government Botanical
Garden should be vested in the Rector of the University. He was to be
responsible for their direction and for setting down the curriculum to be
followed in each of these institutions. This, however, did not imply that
the university or schools were to enjoy administrative autonomy. Before any
rule or change in curriculum could cone into effect it had to be approved
by the Governor himself. But despite this limitation the recommendation of
the Commissioners served to break the old pattern whereby elementary
schooling was considered as a charitable undertaking and although the idea
of creating a Department of Education had not as yet emerged it was to
prove but a small step to its creation in the 1850s.[173]
The Commission, however, was brought to a sudden end in July 1838 by
Lord Russell who had replaced Glenelg at the Colonial Office.[174] Glenelg
was ousted from office mainly because of the crisis in Canada but the long
duration of the Commission and his readiness to make concession to the
Maltese, especially those which undermined British patronage, had added to
his difficulties.[175] Sarah Austin wrote, soon after her return to
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England, that 'Lord Glenelg's virtue' was that he was prepared to disoblige 
and offend
'at least a dozen old friends, powerful supporters or colleagues, merely to 
do an act of justice to Malta, which nobody will appreciate.'[176]
Glenelg himself remained convinced that what had been conceded to the
Maltese was fully justified by the case of Malta. He declared in the Lords
that if the whole of the Commissioners work had centred solely on the issue
of putting Maltese in executive positions, then 'quite sufficient would be
proved to justify the appointment of this Commission.'[177] It was indeed a
remarkable development when compared to the state of things in the rest of
the Empire for during this period similar developments were mainly confined
to the Canadian Civil Service.[178] While in Canada the filling of
executive offices by Canadians was taking place as a result of the greater
autonomy being conceded to that country, in Malta such a policy was being
adopted in spite of the fact that the island's government was to remain
autocratic.[179]
Lewis and the Austins were also satisfied with their contribution to
x
reform in Malta. Before his departure from Malta, Lewis wrote that,
'on the whole the British Government [had] behaved very well with respect 
to Malta. There were two great obstacles to overcome, viz indifference 
about so small an object, and interest in maintaining numerous jobs, and 
abuses, and blunders.'[180]
It was his view that the Inquiry did not simply 'concern the government of 
120,000 people' but also 'the moral influence of England...and...her 
character for good faith,' throughout the Mediterranean.[181] John Austin 
was satisfied that the vast majority of their recommendations had been 
adopted, as well as with his connection with Glenelg and James Stephen, for 
both of whom he entertained sincere respect.[182] His wife Sarah was 
equally pleased with the fact that by the time of their abrupt departure 
from Malta she had assisted in the setting up of ten new government village 
schools on the island.[183]
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AFTER THE COMMISSION
The success or failure of the Commission could only be properly gauged 
with the passage of time. (See Diagram 6:1).Undoubtedly, the most important 
reform to emerge from the commission of 1836 was the opening of executive 
offices to Maltese merit. But this policy was severely tested in 1841 when 
the office of Superintendent of Public Works became vacant. In line with 
previous instructions from the colonial Office during Lord Glenelg's 
tenure, Bouverie appointed Mr Xerri, a Maltese and submitted his name for 
confirmation.[184] However, on learning of the vacancy, Lord Russell 
appointed to the post Mr Arrowsmith, who resided in Britain.[185] Bouverie 
informed the Secretary of State of the dismay that the news of the 
appointment had caused in Malta, and reminded him of the recommendations of 
the Commissioners and the declarations of his predecessor that, before a 
stranger was appointed to an office in Malta, the claims of Maltese 
subordinates will be attentively considered. Stephen at the colonial Office 
minuted that the appointment was
'...regarded, not only by the Maltese but by Sir H. Bouverie himself as a 
breach of faith, (however unintentional) to the people of the island.'[186]
It was an embarrassing situation. If the Secretary of State retracted 
from his appointment of Arrowsmith, his action was bound to be interpreted 
in Malta as a statement of official policy, permanently restricting offices 
in Malta to Maltese. Not even Glenelg had been prepared to go that far. In 
a fortress of importance, as in the case of Malta, it was considered unwise 
that HM's Government should give such a pledge, for future circumstances 
may demand departure from it.[187]
Lord Russell felt that it was important that this principle should be 
reaffirmed, but he wished to do this without embarrassing the governor. A 
way out was to make the whole matter appear a misunderstanding, 'state to 
Sir H. Bouverie', Russell minuted to Stephen,
'that I made the appointment in the belief that he had not found any person 
either English or Maltese qualified for the situation. That the
recommendation of the Commissioners cannot be presumed to bind the Crown to
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appoint persons to situations for which they are not qualified because they 
are Maltese...[and] that I cannot cancel an appointment already made of a 
person whose qualifications have been favourably reported on...'[188]
On this, Russell enjoyed the support of his subordinates who were also
opposed to a policy which restricted civil offices in a colony to persons
native or resident in that colony. They firmly held that in small societies
'some of the offices of most importance should be filled up by persons from 
a distance, not connected with any of the small knots and cliques into 
which such societies usually become divided,'
for this tended 'to mitigate the bitterness of that party spirit which is 
so often their bane...'[189]
Russell's readiness to resort to patronage was quickly complemented by 
Bouverie who proposed to put asunder what the commissioners only recently 
had brought together. He proposed that the Department of Land Revenue be 
once again divided into two departments, i.e. that of Land Revenue and that 
of Public Works. This measure would have had the effect of elevating 
Arrowsmith to the Headship of a Department instead of that of a branch and 
would have almost naturally involved an increase in salary. Lord Stanley, 
who in the meantime had replaced Russell as Colonial Secretary, was 
reluctant to sanction this measure and did so only as an experiment, 'for a 
limited time' and on condition that a full report was made to him regarding 
its outcome.[190] He would not, however, grant Arrowsmith an increase in 
salary until a decision - not favourable as it turned out - had been taken 
regarding the success of the experiment.[191]
After this case, however, the appointment of non-resident British 
officials to the Maltese public service declined, although the offices of 
Chief Secretary, of Auditor-General, of Assistant Secretary and 
intermittently that of Head of Police continued to be held by British 
nationals.[192] In time, as we shall see in the following chapters, the 
recommendation of the Commissioners was to provide the basis on which a 
proper Maltese civil service could be established.
The Commissioners had hoped that the Maltese economy would show a
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marked improvement because of the adoption of their new system of tariffs 
and duties. Although in the 1840s Malta did succeed in attracting a larger 
share of the transit trade of the Mediterranean, its inpact remained 
marginal, indeed, the Maltese economy or what was left of it remained in 
its old depressed state[193].
Some inprovement in the social condition of the Maltese did take 
place, mainly in the harbour areas, but this improvement was the result of 
a marked increase in naval activity and the building of the first naval 
dockyard in Malta rather than because of an increase in trade or 
industry.[194] The Admiralty's conversion to steam powered vessels in the 
1830s and improved communication with India through the Mediterranean was, 
for a time, to transform the island into an important coal bunkering 
station, while the commissioning of the dockyard in the early 1840s was to 
provide new openings for Maltese skilled labour.[195] It was from this time 
onwards that the fortress was to gradually become a principal contributor 
to employment in Malta and the principal mainstay of the Maltese economy. 
In time it was to rival and outstrip the Maltese public service as the 
major employer in Malta.[196]
The Commissioners had also hoped that the principle had been firmly
asserted in Malta that it was not the business of government to take a lead
in civil affairs or make themselves responsible for solving redundancy and
distress.[197] Events, especially two severe droughts in less than six
years, however, soon proved otherwise. The suffering of the country people,
who had not benefitted greatly from the increase of activity taking place
in the harbour areas, was soon made worse by a great scarcity of grain
throughout the Mediterranean which pushed the price of bread beyond their
means. First Bouverie, and later Patrick Stuart, his successor as Governor,
were constrained to intervene. Bouverie, despite Treasury objections,
embarked on a scheme to improve the water supply of Valletta and of the
Three Cities.[198] Under Stuart there was a return to out-door relief and
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in 1844, to mitigate some of the hardship existing in the countryside, the 
Governor granted
'an immediate abatement on the rent of the Government Farms (the government 
being the largest landowner),...for the last year, to the amount of 25 per 
cent in some cases and of 30 per cent in others.'[199]
Three years later 'owing to the continued high price of bread' and in an 
effort to stem the rising discontent against his administration, because of 
his refusal to intervene in the grain market, Stuart instituted a programme 
of public works as a way of affording the people relief.[200] Thus, by
1847, dependence on the government, especially among the inhabitants of the 
countryside, had reasserted itself while in the towns and harbour areas 
this dependence had been somewhat mitigated by imperial defence
expenditure.
Maltese political leaders had remained steadfast in their belief that 
the remedy for Malta's social and economic problems lay in the institution 
of representative government. Some of the hostile attacks on Britain and 
the local government, in some of the newly established local newspapers, 
already demonstrated this.[201] Ironically, British reaction to these 
attacks served only to demonstrate the extent of the dependence of the 
local political leadership on the government. Three of the editors of these 
newspapers were university professors and as such employees of the
government, and included amongst them Dr Sciortino who held the Chair of
Political Economy. In 1841 Bouverie adopted the position that these editors 
'ought to qualify themselves to abuse the Government by resigning their
employment.'[202] The Colonial Secretary, the Tory Lord Stanley agreed,
instructing Bouverie
'to intimate to these Editors...the consequence which may follow a
continuance of the inflamatory language of the papers which they avowedly 
conduct.'[203]
Things finally came to a head under Stuart, first with the expulsion of
Sciortino from his post of university professor and later with the
suppression of the Chair of Political Economy.[204] Austin and Lewis had
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considered Sciortino as the ablest lawyer in Malta while they had vested 
great hopes on the benefits for Malta of the teaching of political economy 
at the University of Malta.[205]
Finally, the Maltese leaders had been disappointed too that their 
demand for the appointment of a civil governor had also been rejected. The 
Maltese had consistently maintained since 1800 that military governors were 
unable, because of their military duties, to give sufficient attention to 
civil matters, with the consequence that too much discretion was allowed to 
public servants who, imbued with power, sought their own interest instead 
of that of the people.[206] This issue was raised again in 1843 by Camillo 
Sceberras who alleged that Governor Bouverie was totally impotent to carry 
out his policies because of the existence of a 'camarilla' in the higher 
offices of the service. Sceberras alleged that this clique had its base in 
the Chief Secretary's Office and that of the Crown Advocate and that its 
aim was
'in so surrounding the Governor that he may invariably be led to sanction 
such measures as are agreeable to them, and such as may preserve the 
influence of their power...'[207]
Bouverie denied this arguing, that while Sceberras was an honest person and 
a patriot he suffered from too vivid an imagination.[208]
But whether the latter was the case or not at the time, this issue was 
to receive sane support in the next decade when Earl Grey, Lord Stanley's 
successor at the Colonial Office, felt that the time had come to concede 
Maltese demands for the appointment of a civil governor and for a reform of 
the existing constitution. We shall see in the following Chapter that as a 
consequence of these political reforms the period 1849-1858 was to be one 
in which the public service was to experience some of its most positive 
reforms, including the introduction of competitive examinations for entry 
to the Maltese Civil Service.
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THE IMPACT OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: 1846-1858
It has been argued, notably by Cohen and by Parris, that the main 
motivating influences behind important civil service reforms in nineteenth 
century Britain were political and constitutional. Cohen notes, for 
exaiTple, that the process by which public officers were transformed into 
civil servants was a political process, initiated around 1780 by Parliament 
and concluded, again by Parliament, in 1816 by virtue of a Bill which 
transferred to the latter responsibility for voting the salaries of those 
employed in public offices. Henceforth, those employed in the various 
departments were no longer to be considered as quasi-personal servants of 
the Ministers in whose offices they served, but servants of the Crown.[1] 
Parris argues that, in 19th century Britain, political officials became 
more distinguishable from non-political officials, chiefly because 
political officials were becoming more accountable or responsible and, 
therefore, more liable to removal, while non-political officials were 
becoming more permanent.[2] In the period examined in this Chapter Two 
rather important political and constitutional reforms, i.e. the appointment 
of a civil governor (1847) and the grant of a new Council of Government 
with an elected minority (1849), were also to exert influence on future 
developments in the Maltese public service. Indeed, two developments, which 
may be said to be the result of these reforms, were the introduction of 
competitive entry examinations for clerks and the formal recognition of 
bureaucratic influence in the political process. These two aspects provide, 
in fact, the two principal themes of this Chapter.
POLITICAL REFORM
In Malta, as already observed, the fortress presented the most serious
obstacle to political reform. Indeed, until, 1847, it was still argued that
'the maintenance of the power and influence of His Majesty's Government 
throughout the Mediterranean depends upon the security of the Fortress of
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Malta. The government of the fortress should therefore be essentially 
military.'[3]
But Earl Grey, who in 1846 assumed the office of Colonial Secretary, no 
longer considered this arrangement satisfactory, especially when he took 
into account 'the uneasiness and dissatisfaction, if not positive 
discontent'!4] that existed in Malta. In June 1847 the resignation of the 
unpopular Patrick Stuart as governor of Malta gave Grey the opportunity of 
pressing the matter upon Russell, his Prime Minister. 'The management of 
the garrison', he told him
'is quite business enough for the General Officer in Command of the Troops, 
and besides I do not know where to find a General Officer possessing that 
knowledge of the principles of legislation and of government which I 
consider to be indispensable in the person who is to administer the civil 
affairs'
of Malta.[5] After all, as Grey himself admitted,
'Malta, besides being a garrison and naval station, also contains a 
considerable and increasing population; its civil government is, therefore, 
a subject of importance.'[6]
He proposed, therefore, that
'in order that the Governor may be enabled to devote a larger share of time 
and attention to the civil affairs of the Island',[7]
to place civil and military matters under separate and distinct
authorities. Having late in 1847 gained his point, Grey proceeded to
appoint Patrick More o'Ferrall first civil governor of Malta.[8]
In 1849, less than two years after this concession Grey, urged by More
O'Ferrall, agreed to reform the existing Constitution of Malta by the
creation of a new, partially elected, Council of Government. In 1835, Malta
was granted a nominated Council of Government consisting of four official
and three unofficial members and until 1849 this seemed to be the maximum
that Britain was prepared to concede. Because of its advisory character,
however, the Council was generally regarded by the Maltese with
indifference and by some, even with contempt.[9] Consequently, agitation
for representative government remained a consistent feature of political
affairs in Malta. In 1848, constitutional reform in Sicily and other
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Italian states[10] added to this agitation and the pressures on Britain to 
concede political reform in Malta became almost irresistible. The question 
was how to preserve overall British authority in Malta while, at the same 
time, giving the Maltese a hitherto unknown degree of political 
participation in the affairs of their islands. For a time Grey toyed with 
the idea of setting-up municipal institutions in Malta and when in 1847 it 
became necessary, because of his old age, to replace the Chief Secretary in 
the island,[11] Grey instructed the new appointee, Henry Lushington, to 
proceed to Malta by way of Italy and to send home a report regarding the 
workings of municipal bodies there.[12]
Lushington's report, however, dismissed the applicability of municipal 
councils to Malta. Because of its small size, he observed, '...in Malta the 
tendency of everything, morally and materially, is towards the 
government.'[13] Municipal bodies would, if established, transform 'natural 
unity into artificial division.'[14] O'Ferrall, the new civil governor 
agreed, arguing further that, unless the elective principle was conceded, 
these institutions will be treated with the same indifference and contenpt 
with which the Council of Government had been treated from its 
inception.[15] In 1849 Grey finally agreed to the establishment in Malta of 
a new Council of Government. It was to consist of eighteen members, of whom 
ten were to be government officials, and were to include the Governor as 
President, and eight unofficial members, who were to be elected on the 
basis of a franchise limited by literacy and property qualifications.[16] 
It is interesting to note, as Wight has done, that of the colonies which in 
1849 had not yet attained representative government and in which the Crown 
still held the power to legislate directly, it was in Malta that the 
principle of elective representation first appeared.[17] It was Grey who 
insisted on the need for an official majority on the Council. It was 
necessary in his view, and given Malta's strategic importance, that the 
executive authority of the Governor should be preserved 'by every fair and
honest means'[18] and that the Governor in the new council should, at all 
times, be able to rely on the support of a majority of officials. In 
practice, what the Maltese were being offered was participatory 
representation rather than control over domestic affairs. With a majority 
of officials to support them, Governors could always carry their measures 
or defeat those of the elected minority. Use, by Governors, of the 
"official majority" was, as we shall see in the following Chapters, to 
become one of the main stumbling blocks in the relationship between 
government and elected members. Power, hence, remained vested with the 
Government. Neither O'Ferrall nor Reid, his successor, made use of their 
official majority for such purposes. Even so, the Constitution of 1849 was 
to enhance bureaucratic influence over the decision making process in 
Malta. It is a theme which will be examined in greater detail later. It is 
sufficient to note at this stage that it was this fact which, more than any 
other, impressed on More O'Ferrall, and later on Reid, his successor, the 
necessity of limiting, as much as possible, the hold of bureaucrats over 
government policy and of attracting to the service the best available 
candidates.
The question of recruitment first began to acquire inportance after
the adoption, in 1838, of the recommendation by Austin and Lewis that,
henceforth, and with very few exceptions, offices in the Maltese public
service were to be occupied mainly by Maltese. This measure had the effect
of placing the local civil service almost on a par with that of Canada and
of other colonies which enjoyed representative government, in the sense
that, in practice, patronage over most appointments was transferred from
the Secretary of State in London to the Governor in Malta.[19] Although
most appointments had to be confirmed by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies,[20] the latter knew very little about the qualities of those
nominated and had to trust the jugdement of the Governor. But the
appointment of a civil governor and the grant of the 1849 Constitution were
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to make the issue of recruitment more urgent and we shall see below that 
Malta was, by 1857, to follow India and Britain in adopting a system of 
examinations as the principal method for entry into the local civil 
service.
CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND RECRUITMENT
On his arrival in Malta Patrick More O'Ferrall was given a rousing
welcome by the inhabitants. The new Governor - a civilian - apart from
being an experienced politician and administrator,[21] had the distinction
of being Irish and Catholic. By means of his appointment Grey wished to
'afford to the Maltese people a practical proof that religious opinions are 
no disqualification from offices of great trust and importance.'[22]
However, his term as Governor was to fall quite short of the six years
which governors were expected to serve for he resigned his office in
1851.[23] Nevertheless, he displayed enormous foresight in tackling the
social, economic and political-administrative problems of Malta.
More o'Ferrall was of the view that the main problem which had to be
addressed in Malta was that of Maltese dependence for everything on the
government, a problem which in his view had its roots at the time of the
Order of St John. [24] Yet, the Governor was perceptive enough to recognise,
that the roots of Maltese dependence on the government were not sinply
historical, but mainly economic in character. It was, therefore, at this
level that the problem had to be addressed. But as the liberal economist,
William Nassau Senior observed while on a visit to Malta, private exertion
on its own was not enough. In Malta the role of the government was
imperative.[25] Senior stated his case thus:
'it may be said...that the Government is the great landed proprietor: that
its territorial revenue is equal to that of twenty-eight families of £1,000 
a year each, that therefore it ought not to act like a government supported 
only by taxes, and confine itself to its strict duties of protecting its 
subjects from violence and fraud, but also to perform some of the services 
of imperfect obligation which are expected from a landed aristocracy.'[26]
It would seem that the Governor was well aware of this fact for the
improvement of the infrastructure of the country was his first priority.
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Excellent harbours and strategic location at the centre of the 
Mediterranean were the only assets which Malta possessed and it was around 
these two that the Governor's economic plans revolved. o'Ferrail's 
intention was to make Malta a centre for transhipment activities and for 
this reason his first measures involved the improvement of the commercial 
port, a reduction in the period of quarantine for vessels coming from the 
Levant, and an extension to the existing facilities for shipbuilding and 
repair.[27] He constructed buildings to serve as warehouses and as bonded 
stores, and greatly extended the facilities for grain storage, seeking to 
have Malta replace the ports of Leghorn and Genoa as the centre for the 
corn trade of the Mediterranean. In this he was particularly successful for 
within a year of taking office the value of grain re-exported from Malta 
had risen from £180,000 in 1847 to £450,000 in 1848.[28] He hoped too, by 
this measure, to ensure that in the event of a sudden war Malta would be 
fully provisioned, thereby removing
'the apprehension caused by the measures of the Commissioners of Inquiry, 
who put an end to the old system of monopoly of grain in the hands of the 
Government...'[29]
With a view to encouraging the formation of a stronger and more cohesive 
commercial community, More o'Ferrall also managed to bring together, in one 
officially recognised Chamber of Commerce, the two separate organisations 
of Maltese and British merchants.[30] The Governor also saw to the
improvement of the roads leading to the country and he could report that
after two years 'every village of the Island' had been opened 'to
wheel-carriage t ransport.'[31]
More o'Ferrall's next target was the administration, and important 
reforms were carried out in the administration of Crown property, the 
Charitable Institutions, and education. He found that, notwithstanding
repeated instructions from London,
'the house property of the Crown in Valletta was jobbed to a degree rarely 
witnessed under any Government.'[32]
He directed that a new revaluation should be made and although he claimed
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that the new valuation was 30% below the real value, he estimated that it 
will add £4,000 annually to the revenue.[33] However, this measure proved 
extremely unpopular and it was not implemented until two years later, in 
1851.[34] The Governor's conception of public charity was similar to that 
of the Commissioners of 1836, that is, that government charities should be 
strictly limited to those most in need and that those housed in charitable 
institutions must, if capable of so doing, contribute through their labour 
towards the expense of their upkeep.[35] It was his view that the House of 
Industry for girls, at Floriana, did not fullfil these criteria but he 
found that he could not abolish it for its original funds had been 
privately donated for this purpose.[36] His proposal that all girls who 
were
'above the age of sixteen should be sent out to earn their bread...excited 
such an outcry',[37]
however, that the Governor was forced to adopt a different strategy. He 
offered those who chose to leave the asylum the
'same sum they cost in the house; placing those who refused in a separate 
building, obliging them to wash and work for all the public establishments 
without pay.'[38]
The building to which the latter were transferred was also to house an
industrial school 'to which the children of the poor' were 'to be admitted
as day scholars', the governor hoping in the process to destroy 'the
seclusion which was the principal evil of the establishment.'[39]
The building which had housed the House of Industry at Floriana became
the new civil hospital.[40] On a visit to the old hospital O'Ferrall had
come away convinced that abuses existed in its administration. To rectify
matters he appointed Dr Collings, an English doctor who had received his
education at the University of Malta and who could also speak Maltese and
Italian fluently,[41] as Inspector of Hospitals.[42] The medical service
was sensibly improved. The hospitals of Floriana, Mdina and Gozo were
enlarged while twenty-one dispensaries, established throughout Malta and
Gozo, extended medical relief and vaccination to the poor in the country
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districts.[43] In 1851 the Governor reported that over 68,000 persons had
received medical relief in the two years ending in December 1850 as
compared with 22,780 in the two years preceding January 1849.[44]
According to More O'Ferrall the education reforms of the commissioners
had failed and he suggested two reasons for this. First, despite the fact
that the number of elementary schools had risen to eighteen, the labouring
poor, for whom the schools were intended, had failed to send their children
in sufficient numbers.[45] Second, some of the measures adopted by former
Governors, including their support of an infant school which conducted its
prayers in English and in the Protestant form, made the Maltese suspect of
British plans to protestantize them.[46] But the desire for education
existed and although the governor preferred 'that the Government should be
looked on as protector rather than promoter',[47] to conciliate the church
in Malta he sent a young priest, Canon Pullicino, to study at Dublin the
Irish system of instruction hoping, on the latter's return, to entrust to
his charge control over public education. [48]
While carrying out these reforms More o'Ferrall grew in the conviction
that greater supervision was required over the administration, that the
morale of the service had to be improved, and that those desiring to enter
the service be of proven ability. To satisfy the first requirement
O'Ferrall undertook two measures. In the first instance he put an end to
the system whereby each department was permitted to make its own contracts,
a system which in his view encouraged peculation. Instead, in December 1848
he established the Office of Comptroller of Civil Contracts and all
government contracts had to be concluded through this office.[49] Secondly,
he concentrated all government offices in one large building. In the heart
of the building he created a record-room where all the records of the
administration, past and current, were to be held under the care of a
notary. These arrangements were intended to make control and supervision of
the administration by the Chief Secretary and the Auditor-General more
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effective.[50]
The morale of the service, especially of the lower ranks, was being
undermined, according to the Governor, by the practice whereby
'persons advanced in life, and who had failed in other pursuits, have been 
placed above those who had long and efficiently laboured in the public 
service'[51]
blunting their chances of promotion in the process. But this was not taking 
place in defiance of some rule or instruction from the Secretary of State. 
With few exceptions, such as those of Chief Secretary and Auditor-General, 
Governors were free to appoint to the service any person whom they thought 
would best carry out the duties of the office. Thus, when a vacancy arose 
the Governor could fill that vacancy either by promotion from within the 
service itself or by appointment from outside. In both cases the Governor 
was responsible for the selection of the candidates and their age was not a 
restriction. In Malta, however, the number of claimants for offices ran 
into thousands every year and many may have been appointed even when
vacancies did not exist.[52] To minimise the risk of abuse, as already 
observed, most appointments had to be confirmed by the Secretary of State. 
In 1846, for example, Grey had reproached Patrick Stuart for making 
appointments without any reference to the Colonial Office and refused to 
sanction them until he had been furnished with a full explanation.[53] A 
second check against abuse was the requirement that Governors should in
their annual reports inform the Colonial Office of persons who in their 
opinion were suited by character and ability for future enployment in the 
civil service of the colony. It was hoped by this rule to make sure that 
when vacancies arose the Colonial Office already possessed some information 
on would-be candidates for the vacancy and no candidate for appointment was 
sprung on them by surprise.
More O'Ferrall held that these safeguards were not enough. He
proposed, therefore, that the ages of those entering the service should be
fixed and that promotion should be made on the basis of seniority, provided
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the person was qualified. Until then, entry to the service was wholly
unregulated. The Governor felt that the entrants to the service should be
between twenty and thirty years old.[54] Merivale, who had replaced James
Stephens as permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, thought the
matter should be left to the discretion of the Governor but added that
'probably he [Governor] wishes himself to have that discretion finished, as 
a means of lessening the numerous claims that must be made on him.'[55]
Grey thought that limiting the ages of candidates to the public service
was, however, 'necessary to keep down the charge for superannuation.'[56]
The Governor also wished to see his own discretion, and probably that 
of his successors, restricted by a rule which made seniority the general 
criteria for promotion, although the Governor wished to retain the power to 
dispense with this rule reporting his reasons for doing so to the Secretary 
of State for his sanction. Furthermore, he proposed that the governor was 
to be allowed to appoint any member of the public service as Head of 
Department but, 'if the necessity of the case shall require such a 
departure from the general rule', to recommend to the secretary of state 'a 
person not hitherto in the public service.'[57] Seniority was meant to be a 
safeguard and, seen in the context of small island politics, an iirportant 
one for it sought to ensure that public servants who performed their duties 
efficiently and diligently were not, for improper reasons, passed over when 
their turn for promotion came round. In theory, promotions were granted on 
department by department basis up to the level of Chief Clerk and on the 
recommendation of the Governor, subject to the approval of the Secretary of 
State, for offices above that level.
Abuses did exist. An excellent example was the appointment of Sedley,
the son of a former Chief Secretary, first as a clerk and later as Head of
Police. Sedley was fitted neither by nature nor character to hold these
offices. He suffered from a speech impediment and had the habit of running
up debts with almost every commerical establishment in Valletta.[58] Yet,
he was promoted over the head of another officer who, for seventeen years,
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had served as deputy head of Police.[59] More O'Ferrall's desire to
establish rules for the purpose may be indicative of other equally serious
cases to which he was privy. Making promotion by seniority the norm would
have eventually ensured that any public servant, provided he was efficient
and deserving, was duly promoted when his turn came round. Was he to be
passed over in defiance of the rule he would then be free to appeal to the
Secretary of State to have his case reviewed. In this way the Governor
probably hoped that, as all members of the service came to feel that they
would be dealt with fairly, morale in the public service, and eventually
efficiency, would greatly iirprove. Grey was not, however, so understanding
on this occasion and did not approve that seniority should be established
as the main criteria for promotion. 'Promotion should' he minuted,
'as in the best managed of the public departments at home, be by selection 
from one class to another, the service being divided into classes and no 
person being allowed to make two steps at once unless under very special 
circumstances.'[60]
Classes, however, did not as yet exist in the Maltese public service.
Finally, the Governor proposed
'that all young persons claiming to enter the principal 
departments...should be subject to an examination.'[61]
It was a novel suggestion since the notion of recruitment by means of
examinations had hardly made much impact at this time and, being made in
1848, it came a full six years before the same proposal was made in the
Northcote-Trevelyan Report.[62] But an attempt to introduce examinations as
a method of entry into the Civil Service of the East India Conpany had
alreay been made in 1833. Macaulay had suggested that four candidates were
to be nominated for every vacancy and a competitive examination was to be
held to decide which of the candidates was best suited for appointment.
This scheme, however, lasted only one year and competition did not become
established until 1853.[63] There was, in Britain, great resistance to the
suggestion made by Northcote and Trevelyan in 1854, that entry into the
Civil Service should be by open conpetitive examination. Indeed, although
207
limited competition, that is, nomination followed by competitive 
examination, was introduced by some departments in 1855 it was not until 
1870 that open conpetition became established as the principal means of 
entry into the service.[64]
It is interesting to observe, however, that neither Merivale, the 
Under-Secretary, nor Grey the Colonial Secretary, ventured an opinion or 
comment on O'Ferrall's proposal to introduce a system of competitive 
examinations. According to Merivale all the rules submitted by the Governor 
were of a reasonable character except that of limiting the ages of 
entrants. Grey in contrast wished that 'the rules he [Governor] suggests 
may in future be observed by the Government'[65] with the exception of that 
on seniority. It would seem that these two officials had as yet, in 1848, 
no opinion whatsoever on this issue. Neither did o'Ferrall ever press it 
forward again during his tenure nor did he try to carry it into effect 
although the reasons for this remain obscure.
It was William Reid, O'Ferrall's successor as civil governor, who in 
1857, (almost a decade later), introduced competition as the principal 
method of entry into the Maltese civil service. The reasons for his action 
were not dissimilar from those which pronpted his predecessor to propose 
the measure. First, Reid was concerned with the kind of recruits attracted 
to the service. 'One of our great misfortunes' Reid was recorded to have 
said,
'...is the number of young men who have received what they suppose to be a 
learned education, who are without fortune, and for whcxn there is no room 
in professions.'[66]
Their time was spent in
'coffee-houses, talking local politics, and planning liberal constitutions 
for the independent republic of Malta...'[67]
One claimant for office was said to have replied, when asked by Reid what
his profession was, that he was a politician.[68] Furthermore, there was no
reason for the Governor to believe that they were sufficiently qualified
for the public service. Reid stated that, when confronted with the
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examination papers of the East India Company, claimants for office had 
retorted in horror that 'no Maltese could answer such questions.'[69] 
These, lamented the Governor, 'are the candidates for our public 
service.'[70] But to refuse employment to these young Maltese tended also 
to have negative consequences. They tended, on the one hand, to make good 
material through whom all forms of political agitation could be conducted. 
On the other hand, rejection also had the effect of depressing education 
for it prevented the general public from seeing in education an important 
avenue to secure employment.
Second, the Governor was constantly being flooded with petitions from 
parents of young men, or from the latter themselves, for offices of every 
kind in the public service.[71] Reid reported that, in the first ten months 
of 1857, he had received 1,163 of such petitions despite the fact that 
entrance to the service had, since February of that year, become dependent 
on conpetitive examinations.[72]
Reid himself pointed to a third and particularly more important reason 
why he felt it necessary to adept a system of competition. It arose 
directly from the grant, under the Constitution of 1849, of a Council of 
Government conposed, as I have indicated earlier, partly of official 
members, mainly Heads of Departments, and partly of elected members. The 
Governor had arrived at the view that
'since Elective Members have been admitted to seats in the Council...it has 
become necessary that official members should be men of ability, able to 
discuss questions brought before the Council as a Legislative Body...'[73]
It was indeed a very important point, for, as we shall see in this and
other Chapters, by virtue of their majority on the Council public servants
possessed the power, if they wished to exercise it, to pass every measure
they desired and to defeat those, however sensible or reasonable, proposed
by the elected members.
The first examination for clerkships in the public service was
announced in the Government Gazette of February 1857[74] and held in March
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of the same year. Two more were later held, one in May and one in November
1857. The examinations were held under the control of a Board appointed by
the Governor which included the Rector of the University as President, the
Inspector of charitable Institutions, the Public Librarian, the Director of
Primary Schools, and the Assistant Superintendent of the Ports.[75] The
subjects examined ranged between eight and ten, a sound knowledge of
Arithmetic, English and Italian being considered as indispensable. In the
first two examinations, all candidates sat for a test in English, Italian
and Arithmetic, while some did not sit the latter in the third examination
held that year. Other subjects offered in that year included Chemistry,
Drawing, Modern Languages (French and German), Modern and Ancient History,
Geology and handwriting.[76]
The system adopted by the Governor was one of open competition. All
that was required from candidates who wished to compete for clerkships, was
to submit their names in full with a certificate of their ages to the Chief
Secretary's Office and to be of unexceptionable good conduct. The only
restriction imposed by the Governor was that candidates must be under
twenty-two years of age when sitting for the examination.[77] In this sense
Malta provided the first example of a Government to introduce open
competition for entry into the civil service throughout the whole of the
Empire, including Britain.[78]
Reid had neither informed nor sojught the sanction of the Secretary of
State for the introduction of this measure. It might well be that, given
the controversy in Britain over the issue, he feared opposition to his
plans and, by the time he had informed London, two conpetitive examinations
had been held.[79] But when he finally did so, his actions met entirely
with the full approval of the Secretary of State, who also expressed the
hope 'that the measure will be attended with good effects...'[80] Neither,
it seems, had he consulted, as was normally his custom, the elected members
of Council. In fact, the matter was raised for the first time in Council in
210
June 1857 by Dr Laferla, an elected member, when he asked the Chief 
Secretary whether all future situations, or only some of them were intended 
to be conferred by examination. He also asked whether the subjects in which 
the candidates were to be examined were to be always the same or not. The 
Chief Secretary replied that, as a general rule, all junior situations 
would be conferred in this way and explained that the subjects examined 
could not in all cases be exactly the same.[81]
The introduction of competitive examinations in Malta attracted the 
attention of the Civil Service Commission in London which had been 
established in 1855 to conduct examinations on behalf of individual civil 
service departments. Its members wished to receive from Malta a resume' on 
the workings of the system adopted there.[82] Reid apparently suspected 
that the Civil Service Commission would not approve of his scheme of open 
competition and this may explain his terse reply that, despite what others 
may make of his scheme, he continued
'to be of opinion that the system of giving clerkships to the young men 
under 22 years of age who pass the best examination is working 
advantageously for Malta, and the competition created is evidently having 
the effect of improving the schools.'[83]
That this statement by the Governor was no idle defence of his measures was
confirmed by a visiting Commissioner in 1879 who observed that 'the
competitive system has doubtless given to the service a better class of
clerks generally than those who are now in the front rank.'[84]
THE GROWTH OF BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE
One of the leading concepts in the study of politics is that of power
and its distribution.[85] In a colonial setting, power, for all intents and
purposes, rests with the metropolitan government. It cannot be otherwise.
For a colony or dependency to be properly so, as Gearge cornewall Lewis has
observed, the Home Government must have the capacity, even in the face of
opposition from its subjects in the colony, to enforce all the laws and
rules - social, political and economic - that it thinks fit.[86] This was
not, for example, the case with Canada which, in 1846, was rapidly
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advancing towards responsible government. 'Canada' wrote James Stephen, 
'appears...in everything but the name, a distinct State...'[87] The same, 
however, could not be said of the Crown Colonies of which Malta was one. In 
their case the Crown could pass any legislation and interfere in the most 
minute detail of their administration. On the spot in the colony the 
authority of the crown was vested in the Governor. It was delegated 
authority. 'The Gov[ernor]' minuted Stephen in 1843,
'has, properly speaking, no independent authority at all. All that he does 
he does on behalf of the Queen. Whatever powers he exercises are exercised 
on HM's account.'[88]
This was also reflected in Clause 4 of the Colonial Regulations which
stated that 'the Governor is the single and supreme authority responsible
to and responsible of His Majesty.'[89] Hence, according to Bertram 'it is
the duty of all subordinate officers to efface themselves in the execution
of his policy...'[90]
This, of course, was the theory of Crown Colony government for actual
practice showed that very few governors managed to exercise their power to
the full. Indeed, it was demonstrated in the Introduction!91] and in
Chapter Four,[92] that in most Crown Colonies bureaucratic influence over
decision-making was the dominant feature of government. In Malta, the fact
of bureaucratic influence over government had been confirmed in the early
1830s by Frederick Hankey, the Chief Secretary of Malta, when he assured
Hay at the Colonial Office, that the frequent absence of Governors from
Malta made no difference to matters there.[93] Further evidence is provided
by the behaviour of Stoddart, the Chief Justice, and of Langslow, the
Attorney-General, who until the suppression of their office by Austin and
Lewis in 1838, had sought to establish their influence over the government
of the island through concerted opposition to the Chief Secretary.[94]
Finally, we have seen in the previous Chapter that, in 1843, Camillo
Sceberras had accused Hector Grieg, who in 1838 had replaced Hankey as
Chief Secretary, and the Crown Advocate, of organising a "camarilla" with
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the sole aim of preserving their influence and power.[95] Two points must 
be stressed here. First, that what Sceberras was saying implied that the 
Chief Secretary and the Crown Advocate already possessed enormous influence 
and power over the process of government. Their whole effort was directed 
at maintaining their position of power not at acquiring it. Second, 
Sceberras was writing at a time when Bouverie's term as governor was 
drawing to a close and the appointment of a successor was expected. It is 
possible that Sceberras was taking the opportunity to remind the Secretary 
of State that as long as governors remained burdened with military - in 
addition to civil - duties, the power of officials would remain untouched. 
His accusations were, perhaps, another form of appeal for the appointment 
of a civil governor.
It must be said that a good portion of the influence and power of
bureaucrats, especially of the Chief Secretary and of the Crown Advocate,
arose mainly from the role which their offices gave them. The Chief
Secretary, for example, wasthe main channel of communication between the
governor and the governed; between the Head of Government and every other
branch of the public service. All acts of Government were transmitted
through his office and none of the other departments could proceed with any
measure which had not been submitted for approval through his office. It
was also the Chief Secretary who normally provided the initial briefing to
a governor on his arrival in a colony, as well as a great measure of the
advice during his tenure. According to Bertram the Chief Secretary was 'the
Governor's chief lieutenant and Prime Minister',[96] and the head of the
Civil Service. Taking all this into consideration, therefore, it would be
absurd to speak of the influence and/or power of the Chief Secretary as
being somehow illegitimate. It would have certainly made more sense,
however, had Sceberras demonstrated the dangers inherent in the existing
political order which vested too much power in the person of the Chief
Secretary without, at the same time, providing adequate accountability
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procedures to ensure that those powers were not being in any way abused. A 
Governor's term was too short to allow him to acquire an extensive 
knowledge of particulars and by the time he had done so, it was very often 
time for him to leave the colony.[97]
The office of Crown Advocate, which was established in Malta after the 
suppression of that of Attorney General, although inferior in rank to those 
of Chief Secretary, President of the Courts and of the Judges, was equally 
of great importance. The Crown Advocate was the Governor's legal adviser 
and it was his task to explain to the latter which of his proposed measures 
were allowed by law and which were not. The attack some years later by 
Bayley Potter in the House of Commons on the influence and power of the 
Crown Advocate in Malta are worth reproducing here, 'if there is an appeal 
to the Governor,' he said,
'he refers it to the Crown Advocate. If there is an appeal to the Chief 
Secretary, he also refers it to the Crown Advocate. If the appeal be to the 
Secretary of State at home, the Crown Advocate writes the despatch that 
accompanies the appeal; and if the appeal be to the Law Courts, again the 
Crown Advocate appears and defends the Government - that is, himself - 
before Judges who have been appointed by himself.'[98]
This statement was intended as a personal attack on Adrian Dingli (whom we 
shall meet again later), who was appointed Crown Advocate in 1854 and who 
served in this office for several decades. But it also serves to 
demonstrate how influential the office of Crown Advocate was in practice. 
If its occupant happened to be a lawyer of ability and stature, as Dingli 
undoubtedly was,[99] than its influence over the policy process was bound 
to be great.
Maltese political leaders had always based their demand for the
appointment of a civil governor unshackled by military duties, on the
assumption that he would be in a better position to personally manage the
civil affairs of the colony thereby curbing bureaucratic influence over
policy-making.[100] Certain incidents which occurred during the
administration of More O'Ferrall and later of William Reid - both civil
governors - showed that it did not freely reflect reality. There was the
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clash after 1848, for example, between More O'Ferrall and his Chief
Secretary, Henry Lushington, over the question of Italian exiles from
revolution torn Italy. Lushington was a liberal in the widest sense of the
word. He was an enthusiastic supporter of catholic and negro emancipation,
the Reform Bill, the French revolution of 1830, and having made several
visits to Italy, of the Italian movement for unification.[101] As events
unfolded in Italy, Britain became apprehensive of the political influence
that Italian exiles in Malta might come to exercise over the minds of
Maltese liberals and of the diplomatic difficulties that their attacks in
the Maltese press against the existing governments in Italy would create
for Britain. It sought, therefore, to curb both the influx of political
refugees and their political activity in Malta.[102] O'Ferrall's
determination to carry out his instructions were violently and publicly
opposed by Lushington, and the Governor, himself a liberal, was soon being
vilified by the press in Malta and Britain, and in the House of
Commons.[103] It is argued, by scsne authors, that the Italian refugees
question was the principal cause behind O'Ferrall's early retirement from
his office in Malta.[104]
Reid too had his problems with his Chief Secretary although in his
case his clash was with Victor Houlton who had succeeded to the office
after Lushington's death in 1854.[105] In 1856, in a letter to the colonial
Office Houlton had challenged Reid's authority to transfer, against his
wishes, a clerk from the Chief Secretary's own department to another
department.[106] The Chief Secretary was, as might be expected, severely
reproached by the Secretary of State for his audacity but how deep the
conflict between successive Governors and Chief Secretaries had been in the
past was revealed, in 1858, by Reid's successor when he wrote that
'a retrospect of the past will clearly show, that the Chief Secretary's 
Office, instead of being channel of communications between the Head and the 
several official Departments of the Government, had gradually assumed to 
itself a position and authority not subordinate to, but almost co-equal 
with the Governor himself; and it is well known, that in more than one 
instance, the Head of that Department has assumed in public affairs a tone
215
of independence, not only antagonistic to the prerogatives of Her Majesty's 
Representative, but most injurious in its consequences...revealing before 
the public, the picture of a Government divided against itself.'[107]
By contrast, Dingli's particularly long term as Crown Advocate was not 
marred at any time by conflict with his superiors. Indeed, in 1857 Reid 
expressed his relief to the Secretary of State that on the retirement from 
office of one of the Judges Dingli did not, as was his right, seek to be 
promoted in his place even though the office of Judge carried a higher 
salary.[108] Even so, Reid was obviously not quite happy with his extensive 
dependence on the Crown Advocate for advice for in 1855 he was recorded by 
Nassau Senior to be quite anxious to receive a detail account of the 
latter's private conversation with Dingli.[109] Interestingly enough, the 
picture painted by Dingli serves to emphasize the prominent role played by 
a civil governor in the day to day administration of the colony, 'ihe 
principal error in our system' he told Senior,
'is that the Governor does too much...over-interference...1 wish to see 
heads of departments forced to exercise their own judgement and discretion. 
I wish that the Governor was absent for three or four months every 
summer... Our people would be trained to go a little alone.'[110]
Although Dingli's criticism would have horrified Maltese political leaders,
opposed as they were to any discretion being allowed to senior public
servants, Reid was of the opinion that the criticism was justified.[Ill]
Perhaps Dingli had abandoned a promising private career in exchange for
public office for the same reason that Lushington had decided to accept the
offer of office in Malta. Lushington was of the view that, although Malta
was rather small in size, its public affairs strongly resembled those of
larger communities, with senior civil servants having to deal with the
police, finance, law, reform, education and even party conflicts.[112]
Furthermore, Dingli's expression 'our people' was evidence of how faithful
the Colonial Office had been to its promise to appoint Maltese to executive
offices in the public service. By the late 1840s five of the eight most
important departments of government, namely those of Land Revenue, Crown
Advocate, Quarantine, purveyor of Charities, and of the Treasury, were
216
under Maltese headship.[113]
A final example of informal bureaucratic influence can be found at the 
time when discussions were being held between More o'Ferrall and Earl Grey 
as to what changes should be introduced in the system of government in 
Malta. After intense discussions, as has already been indicated, it was 
decided, in 1849, to establish in Malta a partially elected Council of 
Government, the elected members forming a minority. It is clear that, until 
it had been established that the unofficial elected portion of the Council 
was to be in a minority, several senior members of the administration were 
opposed to any change whatsoever, 'it would appear' wrote Camillo Sceberras 
in a clear reference to the latter,
'that some of those whose fortune it is to be most frequently consulted, 
aim at keeping the country stationary and to estrange it from any possible 
progress in the spirit of English Institutions...'[114]
This attitude is confirmed by the correspondence of More o'Ferrall with 
some of his most senior subordinates. For example, it was not until July 
1848 that Sim, Assistant Chief Secretary, and Thornton, Auditor-General, 
signalled their readiness to support the Governor's plan to admit elected 
representatives to the Council.[115] This in itself was not only evidence 
of the influence of civil servants in colonial government but also of the 
fact that few political reforms had any chance of success unless supported 
by them.
The introduction in 1849 of a mixed Council of Government composed of
an official majority and an elected minority served to give formal
expression and to enhance, rather than decrease, the potenial for
bureaucratic influence. It was a system of government which was eventually
extended to nearly every crown colony in the British Empire and, as Bertram
observed, government by official majority eventually became 'the very
kernel and essence of Crown Colony Government.'[116] The rationale of this
system was very simple. The mixed Council system allowed, on one hand, for
'all public questions...[to] be freely and openly ventilated...the 
Government [to] be publicly and directly criticised and attacked
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and... .required to give an account of its policy and to defend 
itself.'[117]
On the other hand 'the Government retains at its disposal on all questions 
a majority of votes...' and through this majority it
'maintains control of the finances, the processes of legislation and the 
general administration, or in other words, it is by this means that the 
Government is able to govern...'[118]
This, of course, debars unofficial members from making their votes 
effective. Bertram concluded that, in effect, the existence of a permanent 
majority of government officials on the Council tended to render the 
Council merely consultative or advisory. This raised, in Malta, the
question of what role elected representatives were expected to play in the
new Council as for all practical reasons the powers of the latter did not 
appear to be greatly different from those of the Council of Government 
which had been established in 1835.[119] Indeed, from a constitutional 
point of view, the main difference between the two Councils was in their 
composition and in the method of appointing its membership.[120] Grey had 
even insisted that the new Council should be known by its old title of 
Council of Government in order to avoid the political images that calling 
it a "legislature" might have conjured in the minds of local
politicians.[121]
o'Ferrall was not entirely happy with this approach. Public officials,
he opined, even without the advantage of a seat on the Council and a
majority to back them, already enjoyed tremendous influence and
authority.[122] It was an influence which arose from the necessarily
centralised and non-representative nature of colonial government. What was
being proposed under the Constitution of 1849 was the formal sanctioning of
the role of senior civil servants as political administrators. This logic
was not lost on More O'Ferrall. What was the point, he wished to know, of
admitting elected representatives to the Council if these representatives
were not to enjoy any authority or power? 'it is impossible' O'Ferrall told
Grey 'to inspire the Maltese with confidence in such a Council...'[123]
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Furthermore, his own experience of civil servants in Malta, and perhaps 
elsewhere, had made him wary of entrusting in their hands, as the 
Constitution proposed, the government of the island. Civil servants, he 
wrote,
'...As the sole legislators unaided by those in whcm the people place 
confidence, they are called on to perform a duty for which they are 
unqualified and unfit.'[124]
It was necessary, therefore, that a scheme be devised which would allow 
elected representatives to exercise some degree of influence on decisions 
involving several aspects of Maltese life.
The solution proposed by the Governor involved the creation of three 
subcommittees of the Council; one for the University and Public 
Instruction, one for the Government Charities, and one for Public Works, 
all three covering spheres which accounted for a substantially high 
proportion of government expenditure. Elected members of Council were to 
hold a majority on these committees which were to consist of three elected 
and two official members of Council.[125] The duties of these committees 
were to investigate government accounts, enforce the rules of public 
departments, report abuses, and draw up annual reports on the efficiency 
and organisation of the departments under their supervision and if 
necessary, to make recommendations for their improvement. Recommendations, 
however, had to be approved by Council before they could be 
implemented.[126] The extensive powers of scrutiny, investigation, and 
recommendation that More O'Ferrall intended to give to these committees was 
a clear indication of the Governor's determination to give the elected 
members a positive role to play in the domestic affairs of the colony.
The Governor submitted that his plan, apart from having the support of 
his senior subordinates, had the advantage of bringing the government in 
closer touch with the people, 'no part of the Maltese community' o'Ferrall 
told Grey,
'is more interested in the favourable decision of this question than the 
servants of the Crown charged with the administration of the Government.
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They labour under great disadvantages from not having the opportunity of 
making known through Representatives possessing the confidence of the 
Maltese, the reasons that guide them in public measures. Many measures are 
deprived of half their benefit, others are misunderstood and misrepresented 
from not being explained. A government that has nothing to conceal must 
gain the public confidence by having its acts fairly canvassed and examined 
by the Representatives of the people.'[127]
Grey thought the Governor's plan 'ingenious'[128] but nonetheless excluded 
all reference to the committees proposed by o'Ferrall from the Letters 
Patent that promulgated the Constitution in May 1849. He preferred, in a 
military station such as Malta, not to fetter the authority of the 
government with constitutionally sanctioned structures which might handicap 
that authority at some future stage. Creation of the committees was to be 
left entirely in the hands of the Governor.
What took place immediately after May 11th 1849, when the Letters
Patent proclaiming the new Constitution were published in Malta,
demonstrated that the Governor was not quite right in his assessment of the
desire or willingess of Heads of Departments to have their administration
thrown open to public scrutiny. The new Constitution did not bar public
servants of whatever rank from standing in their own individual capacity
for election to the Council of Government and, if elected, to take their
seat in Council without the need to resign their office. This was in spite
of the fact that eight out of the ten official seats on the Council had
been reserved for Heads of Departments. As a result no less than five Heads
and two Judges contested the elections held in August 1849, while another
five candidates for election were either close relatives or friends of
senior public servants.[129] There can be little doubt that the aim of
these public servants was to so swamp the new Council and its committees
that, in the process, the principle of public service accountability, so
dear to the Governor, would be automatically defeated. Their campaign
methods were also eventually denounced by their opponents, who accused them
of conducting their canvassing among the lower ranks of the public service
in an unacceptable and unethical manner.[130] No public servant was elected
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in the 1849 poll, but two of those elected, Bishop Casolani and Adrian 
Dingli, were close relatives of senior public servants. It is interesting 
to observe also, that none of the Maltese leaders of the 1830s were elected 
during this election. Camillo Sceberras polled only 34 votes, while his 
partner of old, George Mitrovich fared even worse polling 26 votes. 
Mitrovich was, however, elected in the 1855 elections. Agostino Portelli 
who had sat on the former Council as a nominated member and who had been 
elected as the first President of the newly instituted Chamber of Commerce 
polled a total of 279 votes but this was about 150 votes less than the 
amount required for him to be elected.[131] Of those elected three were 
clerics and three lawyers.
There is little doubt, if the minutes of the Council are to be
considered as providing a reliable picture of proceedings in the new
Council of Government, that both More O'Ferrall and later, William Reid, 
managed both sides of the Council admirably. There is no evidence that 
either Governor employed the official majority on any issue and it appears 
that they both preferred to consult the elected members rather than attempt 
to pass any measure against their opposition. The only time that More 
O'Ferrall was to employ his casting vote in one of the sessions of the 
Council, he did so on behalf of a motion put forward by an elected
member.[132] Reid, in his first statement to the Council, expressed the
wish that those sitting on the Council should act as a united legistature 
and he promised to treat elected and official members equally. He stressed 
the need for consultation over all matters before they were introduced in 
Council, the importance of calmness in debate, and for reasonable demands. 
These, he told Council members, were the two qualities by which elected 
bodies successfully managed their duties.[133] Throughout his term Reid 
remained faithful to his promise. Apart from continuing with the system of 
committees instituted by More O'Ferrall, all important legislative matters 
were first subnit ted for the consideration of elected members in an
informal and private manner before being introduced in Council.[134] 
Furthermore, in matters which were mainly of a municipal character, such as 
the management of public lands, roadworks, and public works the elected 
members were allowed an informal veto, and nothing which they opposed was 
done.[135] This approach led Lushington, the Chief Secretary, to lament 
that Reid was too prone to give in to the wishes of the elected 
members.[136]
Ironically, during the period 1849-1858 if problems cropped up in the
Council those responsible were, almost invariably, public servants. The
case of Judge Bruno was the most important and led to the first of a series
of amendments to the Constitution of 1849. From the time of his election in
1854, Bruno, a former Crown Advocate, actively opposed most of the measures
of the local government. Reid held that the behaviour of the judge was
unacceptable and objectionable and he requested the Colonial Office to
advice him whether it was proper for a public servant to continue to hold
his seat in Council and his office simultaneously.[137] Although it was a
fairly new issue, since this type of mixed Council was of recent origin,
the Colonial Office had already dealt with the matter in the case of the
New South Wales Council in 1845. In that year Lord Stanley, who at the time
was Secretary of State, had laid down that if a public servant was elected,
thereby assuming responsibilities which prevented him from supporting the
government in the legislature, he could not retain his office.[138] In the
case of Judge Bruno the Colonial Office concluded that since he held his
office 'on good behaviour', he could not be dismissed and as an elected
member of Council he must be allowed to act and vote freely.[139] The
Secretary of State decided, therefore, that the best course would be to
exclude Judges altogether from sitting on the Council of Government, and a
measure to this effect was passed by Letters Patent dated 30 July 1857.
Judge Bruno and Judge Micallef, the President of the Courts who held his
seat on the Council by virtue of his office, rather than election, resigned
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their seats.
Viewed in its totality civil government had proved successful, even
though it cannot be said, as was seen in this Chapter, that it had
succeeded in banishing the spectre of bureaucratic influence. Indeed, the
Constitution of 1849 had increased the potential for the exercise of
bureaucratic power since, in practice, it had vested ultimate authority in
an official majority which consisted mainly of Heads of Departments sitting
in the Council of Government. That these Heads had not been able to exert
this power was due, in no small measure, to More O'Ferrall who discovered
in the creation of three sub-committees of Council the required
counterbalance. Reid too had been successful in containing the drift
towards bureaucratic influence over government, even though in the view of
some of his subordinates this appeared to indicate weakness in the face of
the elected minority. It is not, however, to be supposed that More
O'Ferrall or Reid had managed to reform the attitude of Heads of
Departments. Two examples may suffice to show that they had not managed to
do so. First, there is the conversation of Sciortino, ex-professor of
Political Economy with Nassau Senior. In surveying Maltese society
Sciortino stated that the tendency of public servants was to hold together,
aloof from other groups in Maltese society.[140] This observation is of
special interest for, as we have seen in Chapter Six, a similar complaint
used to be made about British Heads of Departments in Malta. By the middle
of the 1850s these offices had been taken over by Maltese officials who it
seems had adopted the habits of those whom they had replaced and against
whom they too had complained. In this sense, it appears that indigenization
of the service not only failed to rectify old problems, but was apparently
giving rise to new divisions and conflicts, this time between the Maltese
themselves. Second, there is the case of Mitrovich, who in 1858 resigned
his seat on the Council arguing that as long as the Council remained under
the control of the official majority he could not be of any use to his
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country. He decided, therefore, to retire and wait 'for some improvement in 
the constitution of the Council.'[141]
Civil government had also laid the foundations for the emergence of a 
modern civil service. The introduction of competitive examinations for the 
filling of vacant clerkships served to distinguish, for the first time, 
clerical offices from other offices in the public service. It may be said 
that the Maltese civil service, as distinct from the Maltese public 
service, the latter including in its ranks University professors to 
unskilled labours, was created in 1857. In some of the following Chapters 
this separation will be shown to become more accentuated with the division 
of the civil service into classes or grades.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE LIBERAL TWILIGHT AND CREEPING IMPERIALISM: 1858-1878 
The departure, in 1858, of Reid from Malta at the end of his six-year 
term as Governor marks the beginning of the end of the post-1832 period of 
"liberal" colonial development for Malta. During this period the longed for 
separation between civil and military government had been conceded and a 
new, partly elected, Council of Government was also created. Press freedom, 
once unknown in Malta, had become firmly established. Changes had also 
taken place in the sphere of public administration. The readmission of 
Maltese public servants to executive offices in the Island's administration 
had practically ensured the rapid indigenization of the Maltese public 
service, while as a result of the introduction of civil government and of 
limited electoral representation some improvement had taken place in public 
administration. The first ensured greater personal supervision of the 
administration by the Governor while the second brought, for the first 
time, the management of public departments and of public finances under the 
scrutiny of elected representatives. Finally, in 1857, the principle of 
open competition - a highlight of the British Northcote and Trevelyan 
Report - as the basis for entry into the civil service of the Island, was 
also adopted.
Nonetheless, over this same period the Maltese public service had lost
little of its traditional functions. The only significant exception was the
suppression, in 1837, of the Grain Department. Indeed, until 1858, London
had enjoyed greater success in resisting an expansion in public service
responsibilities then in trimming them, although some colonial officials
nevertheless, wished to see greater commitment from the local government in
the field of education. Neither were the political developments of the
period enough to satisfy Maltese aspirations as these fell short of
representative government. But, overall, each reform did tend to strengthen
the belief that, in time, other reforms would eventually be conceded by
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Britain. This view was also entertained by Earl Grey who, in granting to 
Malta the Constitution of 1849, expressed his belief 'as to the advantages 
to be attained by the gradual introduction' of electoral representation and 
noted that he looked 'forward to the experiment.. .about to be tried with 
hopeful ant icipat ion'.[1]
Events after 1858 were, however, to prove otherwise. By the middle of 
the 1870s a shift of policy by Britain towards Malta was to become clearly 
apparent. Indeed, beginning with this Chapter we shall see that political 
retrogression, instability and conflict were to become more common in 
Malta. From this time onwards was to begin an era, stretching until 1921, 
during which Anglo-Maltese relations were to deteriorate rapidly reaching a 
situation of crisis by the early 1900s. The apparent cause for this crisis 
was the "language question" which centred around British efforts, after 
1880, to replace Italian with English as the language of education, 
administration and the law courts, and the resistance by the Maltese upper 
and middle class to this policyi
The real cause of the crisis was much broader, however, and can be 
attributed, courtesy of hindsight, to Britain's changing status as a world 
power. In the forties and fifties Britain was still the acknowledged naval 
and economic power of the period. Such was Britain's international standing 
that many in Britain confidently declared that it was the world that needed 
Britain and not the other way round. [2] Some would have done away with 
colonies and Empire for Britain, they claimed, required neither. Although 
no government minister subscribed to this view, it was this frame of mind 
which had made concessions to "fortress" Malta possible. As threats to 
British supremacy appeared remote, Britain could afford to be generous to 
the Maltese.
In the 1860s, however, British naval and economic supremacy was
beginning to feel the challenge of other powers, but notably from France
and Prussia.[3] Gradually, as Britain's sense of security began to
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evaporate so did it gradually seek to reassert its military interests in 
Malta over those of the population. Until 1880, it had hoped to do this 
without antagonizing Malta's middle and upper classes and would have 
probably succeeded but for the behaviour of some of its Governors, who not 
only occasioned the withdrawal of civil government, but tended to make 
frequent use of the official majority in matters which involved no inperial 
interest. In the period 1858-1878, the period examined in this Chapter, no 
less than four Governors ruled over Malta, namely Gaspard le Marchant 
(1858-64), Henry Storks (1864-67), Patrick Grant (1867-72) and Charles van 
Straubenzee (1872-78).[4] Of the four, only Storks refrained from the use 
of the official majority preferring, instead, to follow in the tradition of 
More O'Ferrall and William Reid of either postponing or shelving those 
measures where consensus was lacking. Government use of the official 
majority did not by itself violate the letter of the Constitution which 
allowed for it; but it undermined its spirit for it was expected that, in 
all matters of a local nature, the government would give greater weight to 
the views of the elected members.[5]
Initially, the Colonial Office squared itself on the side of the 
Maltese. Governors were warned by the Colonial Office not to abuse of their 
powers and in 1864, in an attempt to stanp out this practice, Secretary of 
State Cardwell laid down the rule that no money vote was to be pressed 
against the opposition of a majority of the elected members, other than in 
exceptional cases.[6] Some years later another Secretary of State had no 
hesitation in publicly censuring Governor Straubenzee for departing from 
this rule.[7] Even with respect to the reintroduction of military 
government the Colonial Office was not entirely satisfied that it had 
adopted the right measure and, until the early 1870s, had left the option 
of returning Malta to a civilian system of government under active 
consideration.
All this seemed to make the prospect of a future crisis quite
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inprobable. But with every political retrogression or defeat within the
Council, the resolve of the Maltese political elite to work for a new
Constitution which would give them greater control over local affairs
became more determined. As the international challenge to British
domination increased, however, British determination to resist Maltese
pressures for reform became equally determined. This resolve was further
strengthened by developments in the Mediterranean which appeared destined
to influence Britain's standing in Malta. On the one hand it was feared
that French expansion in North Africa and a large annual seasonal Maltese
migration to this region would result eventually, in an extension of French
influence over Malta's labouring poor.[8] On the other hand, Britain feared
that the success of Italian nationalism to forge a unified Italian state
would serve to inspire a spirit of irredentism among Malta's italianate
middle and upper classes.[9]
It was these fears which, in the 1870s, eventually led Britain to
reconsider its policy in Malta. The limited autonomy until then enjoyed by
the islanders was to be curtailed; Cardwell's Rule was to be
"re-interpreted" and the authority of governors was to be publicly upheld
at all times; civil government no longer featured as an option; and efforts
were to be made to integrate Malta more fully into the British Empire and
to make Maltese interests coincide more intimately with those of Britain.
This meant in practice that every stratum of Maltese society socially,
culturally and ecomically was to become dependent on Britain and its
empire. It was envisaged to effect this by a determined policy of
anglicization. A wider diffusion of English among all classes of Maltese
society, Britain hoped, would result in new opportunities for Maltese
migration to English-speaking portions of the Empire and would also help to
consolidate the loyalty of future generations of Maltese for whom English,
rather than Italian, would be the language of education, commerce and
government. But the "language question", to which this policy gave rise,
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did not become a prominent issue until the 1880s and as such is not of 
major concern in this Chapter. Nonetheless, we shall see in the following 
Chapter that, by 1878, pressures on Britain to adopt some form of language 
policy for Malta were already growing.
The question which is of most concern to us here, however, is how the 
various issues of the period 1858-1878 influenced developments in the 
Maltese public service. In 1858, as we have seen in the previous Chapter, 
the Maltese public service seemed poised to enter the modern era at the 
same time as the British and Indian services. It was, by any standard for 
this tiny military outpost, an encouraging achievement. Furthermore, the 
Maltese public service, more than ever before, had come to occupy a unique 
position in the colony and had become the focal point of nearly the entire 
society. Its senior members (who were nearly all Maltese), formed, for all 
practical purposes, with the Governor, the government. It was also the 
major civil enployer in the island, the number of its employees - clerical, 
professional or otherwise - touching the thousand mark. Its clerical and 
professional offices provided almost the only stable encouragement to 
educational merit and achievement in Malta. On many of the services it 
provided, such as hospitals, the asylums, the village schools, and outdoor 
relief, depended large sections of the population. As an institution, 
therefore, the Maltese public service was prized and valued by all classes 
of Maltese society while, in influence and prestige, it ranked second only 
to the Catholic Church.
But there was another side too. The fact that the civil service was
the goverment meant that, in times of political conflict, it was not only
exposed to the attacks of those who opposed the government and/or British
policy, but there also existed a danger of serious divisions within its
ranks. This latter danger, as we shall see, had become more real with
indigenization. Heads of Departments were, at the same time, distinguished
members of the local community and agents of a foreign power. As long as
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government measures coincided with popular expectations their position in 
the community was not threatened. But whenever these measures, whether 
originating with them or from London, were opposed by the elected leaders 
of the community, these same Heads, not infrequently, became the focus of 
bitter attacks in the Council, in the press, and in public. Thus, because 
of their dual role as administrators and legislators senior civil servants 
tended, almost inevitably, to find themselves at the centre of every 
political row and conflict. Unlike their counterparts in Britain, Maltese 
civil servants could neither plead nor claim neutrality. Finally, because 
of the existing income and literacy qualifications for voters, public 
servants tended to form a substantial proportion of the Maltese electorate. 
This not only added to their political muscle but also made them the focus 
of a good deal of vote canvassing and electoral politics. In the process, 
existing divisions within the public service, notably in relation to 
salaries, were exacerbated and new ones created. Consequently, it will be 
seen that, as Maltese society became more politicized and fragmented, the 
Maltese civil service similarly became more politicized and fragmented.
In the period 1858-1878, the period examined in this Chapter, things
did not yet reach this stage but, as we shall see, the indicators were all
pointing in that direction. Indeed, internal divisions, conflict between
government and governed, concern over foreign influences, and developments
in Europe and the Mediterranean, tend to dominate this period with the
public service receiving only sporadic attention. It was, as at the turn of
the century, a watershed period in international affairs and since Malta's
destiny was bound up with that of British interests in Europe and the
Mediterranean, it was also to herald a new political era for Malta and,
consequently, for its public service.
THE ADMINISTRATION UNDER LE MERCHANT
Sir Gaspard le Marchant took over from Reid as civil governor of Malta
at the very end of April 1858. His previous appointments had been as
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governor of Newfoundland and, later, of Nova Scotia.[10] In Newfoundland, 
his success in steering the colony out of its social and economic 
difficulties by a show of firmness and energy had won him the praise of 
Earl Grey, at the time British Secretary of State for the Colonies.[11] In 
Nova Scotia, by contrast, the colony's progress towards 'the full adoption 
of "responsible government"'[12] - the first to do so - served to temper 
and constrain Le Marchant's tendency to "rule". He soon forgot, however, 
the lessons he had learnt under this system of government for, in the next 
six years, he was to rule Malta autocratically.[13] He proved, in fact to 
be a governor in the Maitland mould, outspoken and determined to carry his 
view even in opposition to that of the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies.[14] Like Maitland, he held to the view that the Governor should 
be the sole authority in the colony and the source of all honours, rewards 
and offices in the public service. This was exemplified by his distaste for 
the system of open competitive examinations which Reid had established in
1857 for clerkships in the civil service of the island.[15] 'The successful
candidates' of open competiton, Le Marchant complained,
'do not feel to be under any obligation towards the government for the 
attainment of places which they owe exclusively to their own 
abilities.'[16]
Thus one of his first measures as Governor of Malta was to restrict 
competition for offices in the public service to candidates who had been 
specially nominated by his office.[17]
Le Marchant's initial attention in Malta was directed towards the 
public service. His judgement, expressed in his despatch of 10 September
1858 to the Secretary of State for the Colonies was, that the Maltese
public service was both overcrowded with offices and inefficient.[18]
According to the Governor, the existing number of offices was 'utterly out
of all proportion to the work required',[19] and duties which in North
America were performed by two or three clerks, in Malta required the
employment of between eight to ten clerks. Some departments, such as the
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Public Works Department, which employed over 500 persons, mainly labourers, 
he considered to be extraneous to the proper tasks of government and in the 
'first principle opposed to free-trade' and 'injurious to Government and 
oppressive in its result to the people...'[20] This state of affairs Le 
Marchant attributed - as Austin and Lewis had done in 1838[21] - to the
policy adopted by his predecessors in office who, seeking popularity, 
tended to crowd public offices with clerks and other employees.[22]
Although we have seen, on different occasions, examples of the above 
policy and of the pressures to which Governors were subjected, in 1858, it 
was not an entirely correct assessment. Political discontent, reinforced as 
it normally was in the case of Malta by the poor social condition of the 
people, had been immeasurably reduced by the political reforms of the 
1840s.[23] Furthermore, a constant attention to civil affairs, especially 
commerce, by both More O'Ferrall and William Reid, had led to an 
improvement in the economic, and hence, social condition of the people.[24] 
This improvement was further enhanced in the period 1854-57 by the rapid 
expansion of British military activity in Malta as a result of the Crimean 
War and the Indian mutiny. Price has estimated that in 1856 alone, naval 
and military expenditure in Malta amounted to nearly £800,000, or about 
four times the amount for 1851 (See Figure 8:1). consequently, 
opportunities for employment were also abundant and although the 
cost-of-living had registered a sharp rise, wages outstripped prices to the 
extent that the majority of Maltese lived remarkably well.[25] Indeed, at 
one stage the local press took it on itself to exhort the people against 
the folly of spending their "balaclava profits" in imitation of some of the 
rich foreigners visiting the island.[26] As a consequence of the combined 
effect of this prosperity and of the political reforms conceded earlier, 
the government of the colony was not by any means unpopular and did not 
need to resort to patronage to acquire popularity. Reid, in fact, had 
voluntarily renounced his patronage and had proceeded to regulate entry
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into the civil service by means of a system of open competitive 
examinat ions. [ 2 1 ]
Nearer to the point, perhaps, the excess in the number of clerks had 
more to do with the existing 'superfluity of young educated men',[28] the 
direct product of government efforts to encourage education, and with the 
absence of an established system of retirement pensions than with any other 
motive. In Malta the civil service was the only institution that offered 
many university graduates, members of the professions, and others with a 
secondary level of education the opportunity for a generally secure 
lifetime career.[29] The professions in Malta were so overstocked that many 
of their members prefered the security of a government clerkship to the 
uncertainities of private practice.[30] Not infrequently, individuals with 
an established or potentially rewarding practice, demonstrated little 
hesitation in exchanging it for a government appointment.[31] commercial 
activity, with its long periods of troughs and short bursts of prosperity, 
did not provide similar security and was, as a consequence, less attractive 
to educated young men. Hence, government offices seem to have provided the 
main motivation for attendance at educational establishments. Consequently, 
if their number was to be strictly restricted to what was absolutely 
necessary, local government efforts to encourage education would have been 
defeated as there would have been little incentive for young persons to 
seek education.[32] This was forcefully demonstrated after 1857, by the 
great boost given to education by the introduction of competitive 
examinations for civil service clerkships which, for the first time, made 
merit instead of patronage, the key to government employment. This latter 
point will be raised again in Chapter Ten.[33]
On their own these considerations tended to encourage the maintenance
of a large bureaucracy but they were particularly strengthened by the
absence of an established scheme of retirement pensions. We have seen
earlier that, despite old age or infirmity, Maltese civil servants tended
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to cling to office for as long as possible as no superannuation scheme 
existed in Malta.[34] All that they were entitled to was a small monthly 
allowance which, in most cases, was not enough to guarantee their existing 
standard of living.[35] Hence, pressures to provide offices for graduates 
and school leavers were not balanced by the creation of a number of 
vacancies, the result of retirement at a fixed age, or after a fixed number 
of years of service, from among senior members. This is borne out by Le 
Marchant who complained that Heads of departments were
'chiefly men of very advanced [ages]...wholly incompetent and unfit for the 
performance of their respective duties...and that for years past, whenever 
incapacity, unfitness, and other disqualification was brought home to any 
officer, he was merely transferred from one department to another.'[36]
This, the Governor alleged, was one of the chief reasons for the 
inefficient state in which the Maltese public service found itself. The 
administration of the Courts, he wrote, for exanple, was in a discreditable 
state with 'every one who from mental and physical defect was disqualified 
for other departments'[37] being transferred there. As a consequence the 
work of every branch of the judiciary had fallen seriously behind, creating 
'the greatest inconvenience'!38] and considerably shaking public confidence 
in the administration of justice. Arrears were also to be found in the 
Customs, while the educational establishments, 'these valuable 
institutions', as the Governor called them, had been reduced 'to the lowest 
state of inefficiency.'[39] But, according to the Governor, the problems of 
these departments paled in significance when compared to the disgraceful 
state of the police Department. The Head of Police, Mr sedley, 'was 
hopelessly in debt with almost every merchant and shopkeeper in the Town' 
and was 'altogether at the mercy of parties, whan it is his first duty to 
watch over and control.' His subordinates, ill-paid and under no effective 
leadership levied, according to Le Marchant,
'a sort of "black-mail" upon the public, who are so entirely in their 
hands, that they dare not complain, and yet are sensibly alive to these 
abuses.'[40]
The very low salaries with which most public servants were rewarded,
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the result of the overcrowding of offices, created in the opinion of the
Governor more difficulties and dangers. First, they excited divisions and
jealousies within the service itself. Many clerks were vociferous in their
claim that, while the salaries of Heads of Departments allowed the latter
to enjoy a lavish standard of living, their own salaries were so low
'as literally to deprive their families of the comforts, if not the 
necessaries of life, that they had previously considered their government 
salaries would confer.'[41]
This point had been raised only a few months earlier before the Governor's
own despatch by George Mitrovich, an elected member of Council who, in his
letter of resignation to the Secretary of state, wrote that the
'Civil List is very disproportionate - profusion on one side and misery and 
starvation on the other',[42]
adding however, that the efforts of the elected members to secure a more 
equitable scale of salaries had been defeated by Heads of Departments and 
other officials sitting on the Council of Government. These divisions 
became more pronounced at the time of the Crimean War and shortly after 
when the cost of living 'had almost doubled.'[43] Most civil servants found 
that their salaries were no longer adequate and, as their position 
worsened, appeals were made by the Governor for permission to pay civil 
servants a special subsidy for the duration of the emergency.[44]
Second, low salaries tended to undermine the attachment to the 
government of its own servants. On this point Le Marchant was adamant: 
'...There can be nothing', he wrote,
'more weakening, more pernicious, or more obstructive to the best interests 
of government than thus creating a class of public servants, whom it is 
impossible properly to remunerate, and who gradually cease to be loyally 
disposed, because in their opinion change is the only chance left, likely 
to bring forward their advancement.'[45]
The kind of "change" to which the Governor alluded to meant, certainly, a
transition to representative government at least, if not responsible
government, both of which were still held to be incompatible with Malta's
status of a fortress. It was, therefore, worrying for a Governor to
discover that a great proportion of the public servants under his charge
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held views strongly divergent from those of HM's Government but, in 
conformity with those of persons agitating for political reform.
Le Marchant's alarm on this point was further strengthened by a 
private memorandum from the Crown Advocate, Sir Adrian Dingli, which 
demonstrated conclusively
'the influence, as electors, that can be exercised [because of their 
electoral strength] by the enployees under Government, in voting in favour 
of the Elective Members of this Island.'[46]
This point was not lost on political activists in Malta who made civil 
servants an important objective for their propoganda and agitation. Indeed, 
the promise to strive for a more equitable salary structure for civil 
servants tended to be one of the permanent planks in the electoral platform 
of every candidate seeking election to Council.[47] Neither was the issue 
allowed to lose any of its vote winning appeal in-between election times 
for, as the minutes of the Council of Government show, elected members 
tended to take every opportunity that came their way to raise it.[48] But, 
because of their minority position in Council, it was not possible for 
elected representatives to carry their point.[49]
The conclusion reached by Le Marchant on reflecting over these various
issues was, 'that a crisis had come', that the whole administrative system
of government was 'utterly exhausted' and that it was rapidly grinding to a
'conplete stand-still.'[50] He proposed, in the face of this alleged
crisis, several solutions some of which were only partially successful. He
proposed, first, to raise the salaries of a large category of civil
servants. Second, that 'the old should be pensioned, [and] the young
brought forward.'[51] Le Marchant contended that no improvement in the
administration was possible until several Heads of Departments, whose ages
ranged from 64 to 75 years, were retired from the service.[52] Some of the
older heads were indeed retired from the service on the basis of their
age[53] but, from the Governor's own admission, some five years later, it
is clear that those whom he appointed in their place were not very much
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their junior in age. Le Marchant wrote, in fact, in 1863, that
'A greater part even of those officers thus selected are now becoming 
entitled by long service to their retirement and if they accept it the 
government will be placed in some embarassment.'[54]
Third, the Governor proposed that several offices be consolidated and 
others, including the entire Public Works Department (PWD), be suppressed. 
For this reason, the Office of Inspector of Prisons was to be consolidated 
with that of Head of Police, while the Offices of Comptroller of Contracts 
and of Inspector of Charitable Institutions were to be consolidated under 
the title of Comptroller of Charitable Institutions.[55] Le Marchant 
claimed that his decision to suppress the entire Public Works Department 
was motivated by a desire to reduce government expenditure and to break the 
age-old Maltese habit of dependence on the government. The Governor had 
found on his arrival in Malta that local government spending on poor relief 
averaged about £24,000 annually, a sum in his opinion both 'extravagant and 
wasteful'.[56] It was a situation similar to that which he had found in 
Newfoundland but which, during his six years as governor, he had reduced to 
£3,500. His efforts had earned him 'the thanks of the whole community'[57] 
and the praise of Lord Grey at the Colonial Office.[58] He hoped to do the 
same in Malta and actually said so.
Public works, whether of a necessary character or merely to soak up
unemployment during periods of severe depression, had always been one of
the government's chief concerns. Furthermore, the government owned large
properties which required maintenance. What the Governor now proposed was
to suppress the entire PWD and to put all public works schemes out to
competition by tender.[59] Le Marchant hoped by this move to stimulate
private endeavour, infuse a measure of competition into Malta's domestic
economy, and increase employment opportunities in the private sector. The
Governor fully expected that his view that 'the very existence of the Works
Department was...opposed to free-trade'[60] would coincide with that of
Colonial officials in London and in this he was not disappointed. But,
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while this scheme was approved, the Secretary of state could not disguise 
his alarm at Le Marchant's declared intention of interfering with Malta's 
"Poor Law System".[61] Of course, local government efforts to 'check any 
extravagant or wasteful expenditure for the support of the poor'[62] were 
always to be encouraged, but the Secretary of State wished to impress upon 
the Governor 'the prudence of caution'[63] when it came to dealing with 
Malta's long established system of poor relief. Lytton feared that the 
Governor's measures would serve merely to create apprehension among the 
population for
'what might be safe [in Newfoundland].. .might be very dangerous in an old 
state like that of Malta, in which scarcity is always to be 
apprehended.'[64]
This statement is in itself evidence of how well some colonial officials in 
London had come to understand the peculiar condition of dependence on 
external factors that characterized Malta's economy since the incepton of 
British rule, price has written that
'the years 1842-1865 were years of great economic fluctuation. In a matter 
sometimes of months the islands might be flung from one extreme to another, 
from the depths of poverty to the peak of prosperity.'[65]
The reasons he cites for this state of affairs are rarely of local origin.
An upturn or downturn in imperial spending in Malta, depending on the
likelihood or unlikelihood of war in the region; the long presence or
absence of the fleet from Malta; an increase or fall in entreport trade,
determined mainly by an upswing or downswing in the demand for cereals in
neighbouring countries; or periods of relatively high or low prices for
imports. This connection the Colonial Office appeared at last to be making.
Thus, Le Marchant was strictly instructed not to proceed with any "poor
law" reform until this had been laid before the Secretary of State for
approval.[66]
The soundness of this advice was forcefully demonstrated to Le
Marchant less than fifteen months later when, 'at a moment of great
scarcity',[67] his government found itself coirpelled to purchase, from
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overseas, stocks of grain for the use of the civilian population. The
Maltese interpreted this action as proof of 'the vigilance and paternal
care' of the Governor towards their interests and an example of 'a
provident administration wholly directed to their welfare.'[68] It was, in
fact, a measure and a language more suited to the first decades of British
rule than to the decades of free trade, especially when it is recalled that
any attempt by Governors, after 1838, to intervene in the grain market
would have earned them the severe disapprobation of the colonial Office. By
contrast, in 1861, the Colonial Office tacitly recognized the inevitability
of the measure.[69]
Within a short period of time the peculiar economic circumstances of
Malta were also to defeat Le Marchant's reforms in the sphere of public
works. The whole purpose behind the closure of the PWD had been to
encourage groups of workers to combine together and compete for government
contracts. But, apart from minor works of repair to government-owned
properties, the type of works mostly required by government after 1859 were
projects of a large scale character, such as the construction of a
deep-water commercial harbour, the building of a new and larger dock, and
the construction of a majestic Opera House. There was in Malta, however,
very few contractors who possessed either the capital or the resources to
undertake these projects. The result was that private monopoly, rather than
competition, soon threatened Le Marchant's reforms. Thus, in 1861
'in order to prevent the various contracts for public works from falling 
into the hands of one or two contractors only',[70]
the Governor sought Treasury approval for dispensing with Colonial
Regulations to be able to make advance payments to the 'non-capitalist
contractors'. [71] He pleaded that his whole reform depended on this and
that if his appeal was not approved, then the government would have to
revert to the earlier system rather than allow itelf to become hostage to a
few private contractors. His plea failed to move the Treasury, not only
because their Lordships were reluctant to sanction what in their view was
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a dangerous precedent, but also because it was Le Marchant himself who,
only months earlier, had decried the applicability of private enterprise
concepts to Malta. At the time, the Governor had rejected Treasury
criticism that the building and administration of an Opera House was a
matter for private speculation with the argument that, 'out of England',
governments are often faced with exceptional responsibilities and
legislation. [72] The Opera House project was, he argued, exceptional for it
was meant to provide a cultural alternative to 'dissipation and
gambling'[73] and which only the government could provide. Treasury refusal
spelled the end for his scheme and in the latter half of 1861 the Public
Works Department was reconstituted.[74]
Finally, the Governor proposed, that all surplus clerks in a
department should be gradually transferred, as opportunities arose, to
other departments. Of the several offices earmarked by Le Marchant for
reduction, those involving offices in the chief Secretary's Department, but
especially that of Assistant Secretary, deserves further comment. In his
despatch of September 1858 the Governor had proposed the abolition of the
office of Assistent Secretary to the Government and the merging of its
duties with those of the Governor's own Private Secretary.[75] He justified
this measure on two counts. First, 'a close study of the duties'[76] of the
Chief Secretary's Department had revealed that the number of clerks in this
office was too large. Second, that public opinion increasingly demanded the
suppression of this surplus office and he himself could not 'offer one
single excuse for its continuance.'[77] The most important duty performed
by the Assistant Secretary was that of keeper of the official
correspondence between the Governor and the Secretary of State for the
Colonies and other Colonial Office officials. It was, consequently, an
office of great trust and this officer was expected to assume, when the
absence of his direct superior required it, the duties of Chief Secretary.
But Le Marchant claimed that Mr Legh, the Assistant Secretary, had
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delegated all responsibility over these important duties to junior clerks 
with the result that all 'correspondence of however confidential a nature 
with HM's Government, were accessible to all',[78] even to the public. 
This, he said, had served to undermine the authority and prestige of the 
local government in the eyes of the Maltese.
The evidence suggests, however, hidden motives on the part of the
Governor. Indeed, it seems likely that Le Marchant intended these
reductions both as a blow to the authority and public prestige of victor
Houlton, the Chief Secretary, and as a demonstration of his ultimate
authority. The Governor's own comments point towards this conclusion. Le
Marchant claimed, for example, that his predecessors had continued to allow
the presence of a surplus number of clerks in the Chief Secretary's office
'under the false notion that any reduction...might lessen before the public 
the position of the Chief Secretary.'[79]
This was precisely the position that Houlton had adopted when, some years 
earlier, Governor Reid had decided to transfer one of these surplus clerks 
to another department.[80] In the dispute that followed, Houlton not only 
resisted Reid's decision, but was said to have assumed 'a position and 
authority not subordinate to, but almost co-equal with the Governor 
himself'.[81] Hence, the reduction and transfer of several clerks from the 
Chief Secretary's Department was probably intended as a show of authority 
by the Governor and of his readiness to wield that authority without 
hindrance. The Governor, apparently, expected his Chief Secretary to oppose 
his authority and was, therefore, determined to ostracize him from any 
share in the management of the colony by denying him access to any 
information which might make him privy to his plans. It was for this reason 
that he appealed to the Secretary of State to allow him to transfer 
responsibility for all official communications between himself and London 
to his own Private Secretary and to abolish the office of Assistant 
Secretary.
Lord Lytton, the Secretary of state, at first refused to approve this
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arrangement. He pointed out to the Governor that the Office of Private 
Secretary, unlike that of Assistant Secretary, was a tenporary appointment 
and that the officer holding it would be obliged to resign his post at the 
end of a governor's term of office. He also stressed, that entrusting these 
duties to the governor's Private Secretary, would give rise to the danger 
of official despatches being lost or mislaid, in itself a serious matter 
since despatches tended to serve as 'important...guides to the future 
policy of successive Governors.'[82] Furthermore, Lytton pointed to the 
obvious difficulties that defining the limits between public and private 
duties would entail and to the confusion and dispute that this may give 
rise to amongst the officers of government.[83]
The Governor stuck to his position but suggested that, in the event 
the Secretary of State continued to view the Office of Assistent Secretary 
as 'necessary and advisable for the interests of the Crown',[84] then 'the 
only arrangement' that would be acceptable to Maltese public opinion would 
be to appoint Wilford Brett, his Private Secretary, to that office. Lytton 
refused to sanction this proposal but accepted, by way of compromise, the 
Governor's earlier suggestion to abolish Legh's office and to transfer its 
duties to Brett. Le Marchant had won his point, but some time later his 
real intentions were exposed in a newspaper article and in a letter from 
four of the elected members to the Secretary of State.[85] Both statements 
made the point that the Chief Secretary had been pushed aside by the 
Governor and that it was the Private Secretary, who was 'without 
responsibility'[86] and the Crown Advocate who held the reins of 
government. As for Legh, for bearing the Governor's accusation of 
inefficiency without protest, his reward was promotion to the responsible 
situation of Auditor-General in place of William Thornton, one of the 
officers retired from the service on account of his old age.
Le Marchant distrusted the Maltese as much as he distrusted his Chief
Secretary. It was a distrust born out of the 'strong line of demarcation
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existing between the Maltese and the English'[87] which he witnessed in 
Malta. He observed that, despite almost sixty years of British rule, the 
habits of both communities remained so dissimilar 'that whether of the 
highest or the lower classes, not the slightest affinity of feeling exists
between them.'[88] There was, he concluded, 'something very wrong' and
feared that this situation would ultimately be exploited by other powers 
who had every interest to see Britain ousted from Malta. According to the
Governor, this called for the reorganization of the existing, ill-paid and
badly led, police force into an intelligence force, fully alert to the 
alleged dangers that seemed to threaten the fortress.
His plan was to retire Sedley, its Head, on a pension and to replace
him with Hector Zimelli, a Maltese who was fluent in both English and 
Italian.[89] This was a controversial proposal for it was still felt in 
London that, for security purposes, the Head of police should be a British 
officer. Le Marchant maintained that a British officer was of no use since 
what was required was an officer capable of personally watching over the 
various groups of European refugees living in Malta and over the comings 
and goings of Maltese migrants to North Africa. It was important, in his 
view, that the new officer should have his roots in the community, be 
conversant with their language and habits, and be socially acceptable to 
them. [90] Finally, he proposed to raise the salaries of all members of the 
police force and to subject them to a new code of regulations based on the 
British model.[91] Despite some misgivings, the Governor's proposals were 
ultimately approved by the Colonial Office, although in effect the new code 
was never implemented.
The elected members of Council, having as yet had no reason to suspect
that the new Governor would not continue with William Reid's policy of
deferring to their wishes in matters of domestic policy, cooperated freely 
with him. Thus, in January 1859, the Governor was able to report that his 
reforms in the public service of the island
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'had been received with the most unanimous expression of gratification by 
the public and by all parties...and at the Council of Government...the Hon 
Dr Naudi, on behalf of the whole body of elected members.. .publicly gave 
expression to their thanks and concurrence',[92]
declaring at the same time 'their readiness to support the government in 
completing them' by voting the necessary funds. Later in the year support 
was also forthcoming from the elected members of council for a number of 
costly public works some of which, the Governor admitted, many thought 
'should be borne by the Imperial Government alone, and not drawn from the 
resources of the colony'.[93] Neither did the elected members attribute to 
the Governor any sinister motives for his appointment of zimelli as Head of 
Police. Rather, they saw this measure as 'expressive of the confidence by 
which the Government at the present time meets and responds'[94] to their 
loyalty and as culmination of the long-awaited removal of all handicaps to 
promotion on Maltese public officers.
But the Governor 'was impatient of co-operative consultation in 
Council',[95] this being evident from his early despatches to the Secretary 
of State. Here he refers to the elected representatives on the council, 
without reason or justification, as 'the members of the Opposition.'[96] 
Nor did he reappoint the three special committees of scrutiny on which the 
elected members held a majority and which had existed since the inception 
of the new Constitution of 1849.[97] Le Marchant was not prepared to share 
his authority with the elected members, a policy which he justified on the 
grounds that the Maltese represented 'more an Asiatic, than essentially a 
European people...in habit, feeling, as in character,'[98] thereby 
belonging to that category of peoples who 'require to be governed much more 
than they require to be represented.'[99]
A definite break between Governor and governed occurred in the autumn
of 1859 when, following a series of bitter exchanges and confrontations
between Le Marchant and Lt Gen Pennefeather, the Commander of the garrison,
it was decided in London to vest, once again, all civil and military
authority in the person of the Governor. This political retrogression
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generated a great deal of ill-feeling towards the Governor among Malta's 
middle classes who, for almost fifty years, had campaigned for the
separation of these two authorities and the appointment of a civil
governor. In no time at all, the old arguments about bureaucratic influence 
over government, the threat to civil liberties, and how the Maltese 
educated classes resented being ranked below military officers, began to 
make their rounds again. But others saw in the restoration of military
government - and rightly so - a serious obstacle to further constitutional 
advance and an informal movement was quickly set up to have this decision 
reversed.
In the Council elections of January 1860, despite alleged
irregularities on the part of government, four members of this movement, 
Ruggero Sciortino, Fillippo Pullicino, Pasquale Mifsud and Francesco 
Torreggiani, captured four out of the eight seats reserved for elected 
representatives on the Council of Government.[100] The election of the 
"Four Lawyers" - as Le Marchant styled them[101] - meant that the Governor 
could no longer count on the support of all the elected members of Council. 
The four formed, in fact, for the first time in the history of the Council, 
an organized opposition to the Government. Le Marchant was not unduly 
perturbed since official members, as his subordinates, were obliged to vote 
according to his directions 'whatever their private opinions may happen to 
be.'[102] They were servants of the Crown and since the governor was its 
representative they were bound to uphold his authority.[103] Henceforth, Le 
Marchant made it a rule that, no matter how trivial the matter, official 
members of Council were to vote 'en bloc' according to his direction.[104] 
In all, in the period 1860-64, twenty one divisions were called for in the 
Council Chamber by the "opposition" and on eight separate occasions the 
measures proposed by the Governor were carried by the vote of the official 
majority alone, but with one or more of the elected members voting with the 
government in the other thirteen divisions.[105]
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Matters came to a head in 1863 when the Governor employed the official 
vote to obtain formal approval from the Council for a further sum of 
£10,800 in excess of that already voted for the harbour works.[106] A 
petition, organized by the four lawyers and signed by Maltese from all 
sections of the population, was transmitted to London.[107] In it the 
petitioners, citing the grossly inaccurate estimates for the building of 
the Opera House and an Ospizio which had been presented in Council, 
complained that the existing Council provided no safeguard against 
financial mismanagement by the government and that the passing of money 
votes by the use of the official majority served merely to give the acts of 
government the semblance of legitimacy. Adrian Dingli, the Crown Advocate, 
who had piloted the original estimates through Council on behalf of the 
Governor, was accused of making a false statement in Council and of 
seeking, in collusion with Le Marchant, to deceive its members.[108] The 
government was further accused of having neglected the needs of the poor by 
proceeding with the building of an Opera House which was of interest only 
to the more prosperous inhabitants of Valletta. The petitioners demanded, 
therefore, that the Council be entrusted with
'the real and effective power of controlling, without detriment to the 
interests of the Imperial Government, and under suitable provisions, the 
expenditure of the public money and the administration of the public landed 
property.'[109]
They also demanded the appointment of a civil governor and 'the proper 
development of liberal institutions.'
The Governor's abusive use of the official majority was not what the
Colonial Office wanted or had hoped for. The presence on the Council of
Government of a majority composed of government officers was intended to
protect imperial interests in Malta if ever they needed protection. But
ultimately, the Crown could always legislate for Malta by means of an
Order-in-Council. These powers, however, were seen in London as powers of
last resort. In every other aspect the local government was to conduct its
administration, as far as possible, according to the wishes 'of the
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intelligent and educated'[110] section of the inhabitants as represented in
Council by their elected representatives. This was the official view, the
Colonial Office view, and it was on this basis that in September 1864
Secretary of State Cardwell laid down the rule that it was
'the desire of HM's Government that the principle should never be lost 
sight of by those who administer the Government of Malta, that great 
consideration should be shown to the opinions of the Elected members of 
Council in matters of local and domestic interest, and that above all no 
vote of money should be pressed against the majority of the Elected members 
except under very special circumstances in which the public interest or 
credit were seriously at stake and never without an immediate report to the 
Secretary of State.'[Ill]
The elected members had won an important concession if not victory. 
The Governor's behaviour had been publicy repudiated by London while near 
total control over public expenditure had been extended to a majority, 
(i.e. five out of eight), of the elected members. To some extent this 
readiness on the part of Britain to allow Maltese elected representatives 
such wide influence and control over the government - influence and control 
to be found only in the self-governing dominions or colonies with 
representative government - made Malta somewhat unique among Crown 
Colonies. In the years to come Cardwell's rule was to result in the public 
censure of other governors but it was also to become the basis of much 
difficulty for the colonial Office itself.
None arose, however, in the next three years during Sir Henry Storks',
Le Marchant's successor, short administration of Malta. Storks, also a
military officer, was appointed Governor and Commander of Chief of Malta in
October 1864 at a time when great changes were taking place in the
Mediterranean and in Europe. Italian unification was edging closer while,
in the eastern Mediterranean, the Suez Canal Project was at an advanced
stage and its construction promised to make the Mediterranean an inportant
commercial route to the Far East.[112] Britain had just ceded the Ionian
Islands to Greece and Malta was Britain's sole remaining possession in the
Mediterranean.[113] The island had become the navy's Mediterranean home,
supply depot and repair base. The Admiralty's presence in the Grand Harbour
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was expanding rapidly with new property being taken over for naval purposes 
every year. A new and larger dock was being built and other facilities 
extended. British inperial spending in Malta, though below that of 1856, 
had once again risen to approximately £500,000 per annum (see Diagram 8:1). 
The number of Maltese employed with the services in the harbour areas was 
increasing daily with the population becoming more concentrated around 
Valletta and the Three Cities[114](see Map 8:2). Others, in the farming 
community, were encouraged to return to the cultivation of cotton, their 
ancient staple, as a result of the cotton famine produced by the American 
Civil War. According to Price, by 1863
'the acreage under cotton had more than doubled and that for five happy 
years the farming community enjoyed conditions unheard of since the 18th 
century.'[115] (see Map 8:3).
Each of these developments appeared to enhance Malta's position and role 
for British interests in the Mediterranean and beyond. It was, therefore, 
of some importance that the administration of Malta should be conducted 
smoothly and with as little irritation to Maltese interests as possible.
Although the elections of January 1865 had returned, with one 
exception, candidates who had supported the petition of 1864 and who were 
said to 'belong to what is called the opposition,'[116] the Governor was 
determined to work closely with them. He wrote Cardwell, in June 1865, that 
he
'thought it right to associate the Elected Members of Council in all the 
proposals of the Government, both as regards legislation and works.'[117]
This he did by reverting to the old system of creating "Select Committees"
to consider measures proposed by the government, and 'generally, if not
always, by giving them [elected members] a majority of the votes.'[118] The
elected members responded positively to his approach and he was able to
report that
'the best understanding exists amongst all the Members of the Legislative 
Body...[and]between the Governing and the Governed.'[119]
As a result 'much useful legislation [had] been accomplished' while
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'liberal provision'[120] - around £65,000 in salaries and £75,000 in voted
services [121] - had 'been made for the public service.'[122] Furthermore,
'the proceedings of the Council and all its discussions [had] been marked 
by great good feeling, by a sincere desire to act for the benefit and 
interests of the public welfare and by a conciliatory spirit of 
concession...the mainspring of all Constitutional Institutions.'[123]
Permanent officials at the Colonial Office, who some months earlier had
dismissed the elected members as 'place-hunters'[124] and as unfit even for
limited electoral representation, were now delighted and realised that
admitting the elected representatives as partners in government tended to
have a salutory effect on the administration and was much more advantageous
than treating them as an unnecessary nuisance. 'Certainly it is very
satisfactory', was the comment of Secretary of State Cardwell who had
exhibited greater faith in the elected members than most of his officials.
'Sir Storks has shown confidence in the Elected Members, which was not the
case under the former regime.'[125]
By his policy Storks managed to somewhat "rehabilitate" the civil
service in the eyes of the general public. Under Le Marchant, Heads of
Departments, especially Adrian Dingli, the Crown Advocate, and those
holding a seat on the Council had become the frequent target of attacks
from the elected members and from the press, which was generally hostile to
the government. Many of the government measures were attributed to them
personally, rather than to the Governor.[126] In contrast, the method
adopted by Storks made of the elected members, not an opposition, but
active participants in the decision-making process. This was acknowledged
by the elected members themselves who, in a letter to the Secretary of
State, spoke of 'the cordial and conciliatory spirit'[127] with which he
[Storks] conducted the affairs of government. They also stressed that
'under his administration each functionary discharged exclusively the 
duties attached to his office...and no person interfered in the business 
dependent on other departments...'[128]
Finally 'matters requiring close enquiry or that might have given rise to
serious conflicts were coirmitted' to select committees to resolve.[129] The
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outcome was, that as responsibility for policy was shared with the elected 
members, Heads of Departments automatically became less identifiable with 
the policies of the government and thus, also less of a target for 
newspaper attacks.
Storks also restored confidence in the examination system for entry 
into the Civil Service. Le Marchant had replaced, as we have seen earlier, 
open competition with nomination and competition.[130] It was an act which 
had ingrained in the minds of a generally mistrustful population the belief 
that patronage over government offices had been informally 
reinstituted. [131] Storks, on his part, did not formally abandon the 
principle of nomination before competition, this being the system preferred 
by the Colonial Office,[132] but he never actually followed it. A 
government notice published in January 1865, soon after Storks arrival in 
Malta, in announcing the government's intention to hold Civil Service 
examinations, merely stated that 'candidates wishing to compete' were 
'required to send their names with certificates of their age to the chief 
Secretary's Office.'[133] The phrase 'must seek nomination' was left out. 
The only condition that candidates had to fulfil was that they should be 25 
years of age or under.[134]
The Governor also rationalized the whole examination system. He
reduced from fifteen to ten the number of subjects which formed the basis
of the examination syllabus and divided the examination in two parts. Part
One was to consist of four obligatory subjects and part Two of the
remaining six subjects which were, however, voluntary. Candidates who
failed in any of the subjects set for Part One, namely English, Italian,
Arithmetic and Handwriting, were to be considered as having failed the
examination.[135] In that same year efforts were made to raise the standard
of candidates who sat for civil service examinations. In May, a notice
which appeared in the Government Gazette, announced that 'to afford
[candidates] sufficient time for preparation',[136] as henceforth 'better
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standards were expected' from applicants, 'two competitive examinations' 
were to be held annually, one in May and one in November. At every session 
the first four candidates, according to their order of merit, were to be 
appointed to the public service as vacancies occurred. In October, a second 
notice announced that, in order to remove any indifference on the part of 
candidates with respect to the voluntary subjects, it was decided that, 
starting from the November session, a minimum passmark of sixty marks was 
being set for each voluntary subject taken. Marks below this minimum were 
to be excluded from a candidate's final total which determined his overall 
placing.[137]
Finally, public confidence in the whole examination system was further 
enchanced by a public show of impartiality. In the May 1865 session the 
results of the examination for clerkships were published along with a 
report from the Commission of Examinations, which also presented to the 
Chief Secretary the original examination scripts for the purpose of 
scrutiny should the need arise.[138] In the autumn session, examiners went 
one step further by returning, to the Commission of Examinations, the 
unopened and sealed evelope which contained the original index numbers of 
the candidates, as well as the corrected original examination scripts of 
candidates.[139]
Towards the end of March 1867, Storks was recalled to London to assist
with the army reforms then in progress.[140] His parting observations from
Malta, especially with regard to public expenditure, are worth recording
here for they were to have a prophetic ring about them some years later
when high rates of expenditure, over a period of successive years, were to
bring the island to the brink of bankruptcy. Storks began by noting that
the revenue of Malta averaged about £160,000 per annum, out of which,
around £140,000 were spent on salaries and public services.[141] Yet, in
just over six years the local government had spent several hundred thousand
pounds on public utilities. On their own 'the Great Harbour works and the
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New Theatre' or Opera House, had already cost 'in round numbers'[142] 
£140,000, and greater sums were still required for the former. 'Both 
undertakings' were, according to Storks, 'of questionable utility and 
neither of absolute necessity.' He felt it incumbent on himself, therefore, 
to place on record his opinion
'that works of magnitude should be undertaken unless of the most urgent 
necessity and they should be paid for by moderate annual charges on the 
revenue of each year. Any other system is inconsistent with the limited 
revenue of Malta and would lead if persisted in to great financial 
embarrassment.'[143]
CREEPING IMPERIALISM
The Maltese were sorry to see the Governor go. In a letter to the Duke
of Buckingham, the newly appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies, the
elected representatives declared that, under Storks, the population had
'for a moment...forgotten the necessity of having the administration of the 
country directed by a Civil Governor',[144]
but the reattainment of which, they were still committed to pursue. For his 
part Storks saw no reason 'why the same good feeling' that had 
characterized his administration
'should not be maintained provided that consideration for the wishes of the 
elected members in all matters of expenditure, combined with judicious 
firmness be shown in the management of the Council...'[145]
Storks was fortunate, however, that his term of office was short - three
years - and that almost one-third of it had been taken up by the affairs of
Jamaica.[146] Even so, during his administration serious problems of a
social and economic nature arose, including a cholera epidemic which
brought to attention the gravely insanitary condition of Valletta and the
Three Cities, and a three year drought which, coinciding as it did with the
collapse of the cotton boom, reduced the population in the agricultural
districts of Malta and Gozo to destitution. Storks bequeathed to his
successor, Patrick Grant, who arrived in Malta in the summer of 1867, the
task of finding solutions to these grave problems.
But some of Grant's early political difficulties arose from another
problem which he inherited from Storks, i.e. from the latter's decision to
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grant the Auditor-General an annual increase of salary of £100, without 
first bringing the proposal before Council. The Secretary of State had 
approved the measure and Grant, who in the meantime had replaced Storks, 
was instructed to proceed accordingly.[147]
The elected members, however, challenged the Governor's right to alter 
salaries without the approval of Council and demanded that the decision be 
reversed.[148] They acknowledged that Governor Grant was not responsible 
for the measure but were adamant that 'its effects will be to weaken again 
that reliance on the efficiency of the Council of Government which', owing 
to their exertions, 'it had on the part of the people obtained since Mr 
Cardwell's ruling'.[149] The Civil list of Malta was first established in 
1848 and formed an integral part of the Constitution granted to the island 
in that year. According to the Letters Patent, no variations or 
modifications of the Civil List could be effected without a legal enactment 
in Council and without the assent of the Crown.
The Maltese were conceded their point, but the new Secretary of State 
was not prepared to withdraw the sanction of his predecessor and directed 
that a resolution should be presented in Council which would properly 
regulate the increase of salary granted to Legh. For the future, 'all 
alterations of or additions to the salaries and allowances or modification 
of the services enumerated in the Civil List' were to be brought before 
Council for approval or rejection.[150] Three of the elected members felt 
satisfied that the essential principle had been conceded.[151] Not so with 
the remaining five who, in protest, resigned their seats on the Council, 
stood for re-election and were returned. Agitation, fomented by some of the 
newspapers, continued and by July 1869 another petition was on its way to 
London.[152]
The three members who had retained their seats also came in for severe
criticism and at the next elections they were defeated and replaced by more
radical candidates.[153] Rogers, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the
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Colonial Officer, concerned with developments at Malta, advised his 
superiors not to allow further "deterioration" with the full authority of 
the Governor. But neither Monsell, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, nor 
Earl Granville who in December 1868 had stepped into the role of Secretary 
of State, were prepared to go back on Cardwell's instruction. The former 
formally affirmed, in the House of Commons, that in local affairs the will 
of elected members in Malta 'should be in almost everything supreme'.[154] 
Granville for his part promised to take 'the desire of the Maltese 
community' into consideration as to whether a civilian or military officer 
should be appointed Governor.[155]
From this distance it may seem that this issue had attracted needless 
importance when, in fact, it serves to demonstrate how fearful the elected 
members were of any attempt by the local administration to usurp their 
political powers. The distrust which existed between the two sides was
apparently such, that nothing but the withdrawal of the measure was
acceptable to the elected members and their electors. This is an important 
point which helps to explain the intensity which characterized later
conflicts between the political and the administrative elites. Nonetheless,
it was a point which Grant appears to have missed, for in the first two 
years of his administration, he employed the official majority in Council 
on no less than nine occasions.[156] In January 1869 the elected members 
responded by calling, in Council, for a general increase in the salaries of 
public servants,[157] seeking thereby, to embarrass the government with its 
own employees and to create divisions between Heads of Departments, who 
were Council members, and their subordinates. It was a strategy which, as 
we shall see in other Chapters, the elected members were to repeat in later 
contests.
The government, which was already paying out over £65,000 annually, or
nearly one-half of its revenue, in salaries!158] was not in a position to
meet their demand. The projects which Governor Grant had inherited from his
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predecessors had continued to absorb large portions of government
funds.[159] Another £20,000 had been spent in 1867 on poor relief and works 
aimed at improving the water supply in an attempt to meet the emergency 
caused by the droughts of 1865-7.[160] To make matters worse, after 1868 
the government experienced a sharp drop in its revenues. In the first 
instance, to alleviate the plight of the farmers, the government had been 
constrained to forfeit the rents due to it from its own tenants. But 
drought was succeeded by bunper crops and this too had an adverse effect on 
the government revenue. At least three-fifths of the public revenue was 
derived from import duties of which the duties on grain formed the bulk. 
Between 1868 and 1871, as a result of the 'dimunition of demand for
inported cereals',[161] this revenue fell by an average of £10,000 a year.
Consequently, by May 1871, the government of Malta had a deficit of 
£30,000.[162] Thus, while the Governor was prepared to acknowledge that 
many of the salaries of public servants were on the low side and that, in 
principle, there was some justice for a demand for an increase in 
salaries,[163] he also thought
'that it would be inprudent to add to the already high fixed expenditure of 
the local establishments of this Government,'[164]
and had no choice but to veto the motion.
In London, apparently, colonial officials had forgotten about the
intimate connection between the revenue of the island and the tax on grain,
the staple food of the bulk of the population.[165] Secretary of State
Granville found it 'strange that good harvests in Malta should have
continuously reduced the receipts.'[166] Others were sinply horrified, as
Austin and Lewis had been in the 1830s, to discover that by and large the
salaries of public servants in Malta were financed from a tax charged on
the food of the labouring poor.[167] Monsell advised his superior not 'to
consent to the proposal for raising salaries'.[168] He proposed instead
that the Governor should be instructed to draw up a statement which would
show 'the undue proportion of the revenue which is absorbed by salaries',
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and to place it before the elected members of Council. The Governor should 
also be asked to
'suggest the abolition of many uselss offices and the raising of the 
salaries , which are generally low, of the offices that would remain, [but] 
only when the process has been carried out.'[169]
The Governor agreed that there were 'several offices which as
vacancies occur might be suppressed.' He also intimated that
'several of the older employees, whose conduct is exemplary and who are 
still qualified for the discharge of their duties, might elect to 
retire'[170]
provided that the Treasury in London was prepared, 'on the plea that their 
tenure of office was terminated on grounds of public policy', to award them 
a pension rather higher than they would normally receive. Others, the 
Governor continued, who were not on the fixed establishment, but who had 
served in their respective offices for a substantial number of years and 
whose services were no longer required, might also be induced to retire if 
they were granted an allowance for each year they had served. Without any 
of these concessions, Grant wrote to Granville,
'I doubt whether I should succeed in obtaining the consent of the Council 
to any scheme that I might otherwise propose.'[171]
Treasury officials, however, as on other occasions, refused to allow any
departure from normal practice and once again the opportunity for reform in
Malta was lost.[172] Indeed, until 1878, six years after Grant had retired
from Malta, matters remained virtually the same.
Patrick Grant's administration of Malta had not been an easy one. The
affair over Legh's salary increase, though not of his doing, had soured
relations with the elected members and, in time, had resulted in a Council
dominated by radicals. These radicals were determined to oppose the
government and Cardwell's instruction provided them with the means for
obstructing its programmes. In July 1870, for example, the necessity of
completing the new commercial harbour compelled the Governor to pass, with
the aid of the official majority in Council, a money vote amounting to just
over £12,000. On this occasion, however, Lord Kimberley who had replaced
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Granville as Secretary of state for the colonies in that very same month, 
supported the Governor, arguing that the conpletion of the harbour works 
was one of those special and exceptional cases contemplated in Cardwell's 
instruction.[173] The sanitary condition of the towns had also decidedly 
worsened, the Governor's own son falling victim to cholera.[174] As early 
as 1867 the Governor had reported that, 'exclusive...of the number of 
troops',[175] the population of Valletta and the Three Cities amounted to 
just under 60,000 souls or nearly half the total population of Malta. A 
report prepared for the government had estimated that a scheme to introduce 
a proper system of drainage in these towns ' would involve an outlay of 
fully one million sterling,'[176] a sum beyond the meagre resources of the 
islands.
When, in June 1872, Sir Charles Van Straubenzee took over from Grant 
as Governor of Malta, most of these problems were still seen by colonial 
officials as Maltese problems, having little or no connection with imperial 
interests in the colony. Pleas from successive Governors to be allowed to 
organize schemes for Maltese emigration or to purchase and store stocks of 
grain for use during an emergency because
'of the danger to a first class Fortress from an exuberant and increasing 
population...mainly if not entirely dependent on importation for its supply 
of food',[177]
were not approved. To be fair, colonial officials did show some interest in
the proposal to establish a government grain reserve at Malta but, when the
motion was rejected by the elected members on the ground that it was an
imperial matter to be realized with imperial funds, some of this interest
waned.[178] Similarly, while a wider diffusion of English among the Maltese
would have been considered both welcome and gratifying, colonial officials
found Grant's determination to save a private school, founded by two
English sisters for the purpose of spreading knowledge of English among
Malta's middle classes, vexing. Grant had argued that the school should be
'maintained in the interests, both of the local and Imperial
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Government',[179] but the Secretary of State was of the view that the best
thing that could have happened was 'that this school should have died a
natural death'.[180]
Despite Malta's strategic importance and advice to the contrary from
his Permanent Secretary, Lord Kimberley was set to continue with the policy
of his predecessors of allowing Malta to manage its affairs 'very much as
they would be if Malta had real representative institutions'.[181] The full
import of this policy was brought home to Straubenzee, the new Governor, in
no uncertain manner in May 1873. The issue concerned the passing, against
the opposition of five (a majority) elected members, a resolution in favour
of accepting a particular tender for the organization of a postal service
between Malta and Sicily.[182] Kimberley held that the question involved no
imperial interests and that the vote, therefore, came clearly within the
terms of Cardwell's instruction. He had, in the circumstances, no
alternative but to disapprove the Governor's action and to direct him to
inform the Council accordingly.[183] Straubenzee invited the Secretary of
State to reflect on the consequences of his decision once the latter's
despatch became public. It would, he said, 'place the whole of the
Government in the hands'[184] of any five members of Council who were
intent in opposing any measure involving public expenditure.
'it would...damp the zeal of the official members, on whose integrity and 
devoted attention to duties of their respective Departments, the good 
management of public affairs...solely-depends.'[185]
He concluded that,
'it must in the end, bring most of the Heads...to look - as I believe, many 
of the subordinate officers already do - to the elected leader of any five 
of the eight elected members of Council, as the person whom they have to 
please'.[186]
Despite such strong arguments, however, Kimberley refused to be moved and 
his reply to Straubenzee is worth reproducing here because it was to be the 
last occasion, until 1921, on which the Colonial Office was to show a 
liberal attitude to Malta, 'i am' wrote Kimberley,
'sorry indeed that the Government should be weakened but I think it will be
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far more weakened by not adhering to a promise made as that made by Mr 
Cardwell, than by our telling the Government publicly that they have 
erred...[for] the unofficial members...have a right to expect that as long 
as Mr Carwell's instructions remain in force, the Secretary of State will 
attend to their remonstrances against any departure from them.'[187]
After 1874 this policy was to begin to change dramatically. The
distinction between what in Malta constituted local or imperial matters
narrowed rapidly. By contrast to earlier years, emigration, wheat reserves,
sanitation, education and language were all soon to become imperial
matters. In this context Cardwell's rule became an anachronism and although
in theory it remained in force for a few more years, the time of its
rescission was very close. The reasons for this are to be mainly found in
the events of the time. In the 1870s, as already observed, the political
and economic development of European nations was at a stage where they
could begin to challenge Britain's supremacy and seriously threaten her
interests throughout the world. Bernard porter has written that the
'portents...of that atmosphere of jealous international rivalry which 
surrounded the later, more competitive period of colonial expansion'[188]
were already there at this time. In Europe, Prussia had not only
established itself as a military power in its own right but had, in 1864,
contemptously brushed aside British warnings against Prussian annexation of
the Danish Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.[189] In the Mediterranean,
closer to Malta, British supremacy was being challenged by French expansion
in North africa and, to a lesser extent, the emergence of a unified Italy
as a new Mediterranean power. Consequently, apprehension in Britain was
growing fast. England, wrote John Ruskin in 1870, must either found more
colonies 'as fast and as far as she is able'[190] or 'perish'. For Disraeli
the stark choice that faced Britain was between decline and empire.[191] To
survive the challenge Britain had to be prepared economically and
militarily.
It was axiomatic, therefore, that British defence outposts were to play
an important role and for this strategy to be effective, in almost
everything, military and imperial considerations had to take priority over
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civil matters. This can be seen to be true not only of Malta, but in other 
fortresses as well. Thus, in his study of Aden under British rule, Garvin 
notes that, from around this period onwards, but principally after 1880, 
when applied to Aden the term "fortress" was used as something more than a 
mere descriptive term.
'it was a statement of policy. It meant that military security was given 
absolute priority over all other considerations and in this sense it did 
represent something of an innovation. When Aden had first been occupied it 
had been [like Malta] regarded as a centre of commercial influence as well 
as a military base.'[192]
Similary, as in Malta, because of this fortress policy, every additional 
inhabitant was regarded 'as a nuisance and a further mouth to feed in time 
of siege.'[193]
Although this policy became more evident when in 1874 Disraeli and 
Carnarvon became Prime Minister and Secretary of State for the Colonies 
respectively, in Malta some changes had already manifested themselves even 
under liberal administrations. The expansion of military and naval 
facilities, for example, had been proceeding steadily throughout the 60s 
and early 70s. Apart from a new and larger naval dock, opened in 1871, and 
other harbour works, defence works were going up all over the island.[194] 
(See Map 8:4) By these developments the nature of the defence of Malta, as 
well as the impact of the fortress on the civil population, had reached a 
new dimension. Now, three-quarters of the island, and almost the entire 
population, were included within the territory to be defended. The 
"fortress" no longer implied the immediate vicinity of the Grand Harbour, 
but practically the whole island.[195] Thus, as the world situation 
gradually changed so did that of Malta. It was hardly any more the era of 
Grey, Gladstone or Kimberley but of politicians with a robust sense of 
imperialism, such as Disraeli, Carnarvon and later Chamberlain and 
Churchill.
The formal reassertion of the fortress policy and the first
authoritative departure from Cardwell's rule took place within months of
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Lord Carnarvon stepping into the Colonial Office. In Malta, the Governor
and his colleagues had been stung by the rejection, in Council, of a scheme
which would have facilitated Maltese emigration to the Carribean.
Emigration was held by government officials to be imperative if
overpopulation in the towns - the cause of their insanitary condition - was
to be reduced. This, at least, had been one of the conclusions reached by a
Commission appointed by the Governor in 1874 to inquire into the causes of
distress in the island, but particularly to investigate the alarming jump
in the death rate that had taken place within the space of one year.[196]
Matters were further complicated when the elected members refused to pass
the votes for an improvement in the drainage system of Valletta and the
Three Cities. Straubenzee was not prepared to tolerate this and, with the
support of the official members, pushed the estimates through Council.[197]
The immediate reaction in London was to support the Governor. The
drainage question, wrote the Secretary of State, was one of vital
importance 'not only to the local community but to the health of the
Imperial forces.'[198] Herbert, the Permanent Under-Secretary, in his
minute to Carnarvon decried 'Mr Cardwell's unfortunate instruction' which,
in his view, divested 'the Crown of power and prestige which it is
especially necessary that it should possess in Malta.'[199] He agreed with
the Governor on the need for 'a more liberal interpretation in favour of
the Governor being given to Mr Cardwell's Despatch'!200] limiting the power
of the elected members 'to purely local matters of minor interest.'[201]
Herbert's view coincided with that of Houlton and other senior government
officials in Malta who had never been quite happy at having elected members
invited to share in the policy process. Indeed, an attempt to have
Cardwell's rule rescinded was made, at the instigation of Houlton, as early
as 1866 when Storks was away on Colonial Office business in Jamaica.[202]
But at the time the suggestion was dismissed without even a comment. This
time, however, Houlton went further arguing that 'the Maltese are
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Orientals'[203] and therefore, entirely unfit for any share in 
decision-making.[204]
The Secretary of State concurred with the view of his Permanent 
Secretary. In May 1875 he informed the Governor and the elected members 
that he considered it
'fatal to the sound administration of public affairs and to the true 
interests of the community...[that] sole responsibility of deciding 
important questions...in many cases involving much larger interests'[205]
should be left to a small number of elected members. While great
consideration was to be shown to the opinion of elected members, the
government had the duty to 'prevent an unsafe decision being arrived at by
using, in the last resort, the votes of the Official Members.' Furthermore,
the Governor was not,
'in every case which might affect the interests of the fortress or navy or 
even visitors to the island...[to] hesitate to use [the] Official 
Majority.'[206]
The result was that the ultimate responsibility for governing was now
weighted in favour of the Governor and Heads of Departments.
Free from political constraints the local government was now in a
position to direct its attention to emigration and the improvement of the
sanitary condition of the towns. But the finances of the colony were hardly
such as to allow it to do so. Neither were the alternatives for procuring
the funds encouraging. It could either raise fresh taxes or cut down, in a
large way, on the number of offices to be found in the public service.
Whichever course the government chose there was bound to be an outcry. Of
the two options, London favoured the second. Straubenzee was less certain.
He explained to the Secretary of State that although the civil
establishments of Malta were organized on a scale exceeding the real wants
of the public service, 'the want of employment for young men'[207] who had
received an education induced many to compete for clerkships in the civil
service. Indeed, such was the demand that, in May 1875, on
'the occurrence of a vacancy of one of the less valuable clerkships at only 
£50 per annum, there were 50 candidates for it.'[208]
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He also reminded Lord Carnarvon that the government had done nothing to 
carry into effect a promise it had made, following a demand for a salary 
increase 'from the whole, or nearly so, of the clerical employes under this 
government',[209] to 'adjust inequalities in the service whenever an 
opportunity offered'[210] itself. In fact, he thought that the time had 
come for the government to honour that promise and he was taking advantage 
of the death of Legh, the Auditor-General, to put before Council a scheme 
which would raise the salaries of all the lowest paid clerks. He proposed 
also to raise the salary of the Chief Secretary by £300 per annum.
Herbert advised Carnarvon to approve the scheme, intimating to the 
Governor, however, that it should not be considered as a final one, as the 
Secretary of State was considering 'so reorganizing the service as to admit 
of the employment of fewer persons.'[211] Carnarvon was not, however, 
convinced of the proposal to abolish the office of Auditor-General. He told 
the Governor that
'the office of Auditor-General appears to be one which from strong reasons 
ought not to be suppressed...as upon the Audit depends the effective 
financial administration of the Government.'[212]
Furthermore, the abolition of the office would have meant the loss of 'the 
presence of an Englishmen' on the Council at a time when it appeared to be 
'very important to maintain the number of English members.'[213] For the 
purpose of retrenchment Straubenzee was instructed to look at other 
offices.
Nonetheless, the Governor's scheme raised several questions in the 
minds of Colonial officials. Was it not time that the government looked to
other sources than the grain tax to secure its revenue, especially when it
was apparent that, those who contributed most were the least capable of
affording it? Was it not time to inquire whether it was at all possible to
change the bias of the education system in Malta in a way to better equip
Maltese young men to rely on their own efforts to advance their fortune?
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Would not a wider diffusion of the English language serve to encourage a 
great readiness for groups of Maltese to emigrate and for others to seek 
their fortune in other parts of the enpire? Would not an anglicized 
Maltese nation also offer greater security for Britain's naval base in the 
Mediterranean? Should action be taken, despite the failure of earlier 
schemes, notably those of Le Marchant, to trim government establishments in 
Malta in a comprehensive and systematic manner? To answer these questions 
in the years 1877-8 no less than three Commissioners were sent out to 
Malta. Francis Rowsell, the first to be appointed, was charged with 
investigating the system of taxation in Malta and to recommend reforms; 
Patrick Keenan to inquire into the education system and to advise how best 
to advance the study of English; and Penrose Julyan, who was charged with 
inquiring into every aspect of Maltese public administration and to suggest 
reforms. The work of these three Commissioners will form the subject of the 
following Chapter, although our main focus will be on the Julyan Report.
Having said that, however, it must be noted that the appointment of 
these Commissioners was an indication that the Colonial Office was prepared 
to assume greater responsibility for the administration of Malta. The 
policy of deferring to the wishes of the Maltese representatives, as had 
been the case under liberal ministries, was coming to its end. The new 
approach was summed by Lord Carnarvon in a speech in 1878. In 'military 
posts' such as Malta, he said, 'the whole of the Civil Government has to be 
discharged by the Colonial Office.'[214] Local autonomy under such 
conditions was both incompatible and impossible. Imperialism had to hold 
sway. This will become apparent in Chapter Ten after we have examined the 
reports of the commissioners.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE COMMISSIONS OF ROWSELL, JULYAN AND KEENAN
Although Britain had acquired Malta because of its strategic
inportance, until the 1870s, official efforts at anglicizing the Maltese
had been remarkably few and far in between. Maltese enthusiasm at the turn
of the century in favour of British annexation of their islands seemed, at
the time, to make the pursuit of such a policy redundant. In 1813, Lord
Bathurst the Secretary of State, had instructed Maitland to establish
public schools 'where the reading and writing of English may be taught'.[1]
But, as the Royal Commission of 1836-8 demonstrated, this instruction had
been disregarded by Maitland and, over the years, by his successors.[2] One
reason for this was fear for upsetting the Catholic Church which tended to
regard ignorance of the English language as an effective obstacle to
attempts by British evangelic groups to Protestanize the Maltese.[3] The
process of anglicization was, however, further retarded by the
Commissioners themselves when they concluded that Italian was 'far more
useful to a Maltese than any other language, excepting his native
tongue.'[4] They had recommended, therefore, that Italian should be the
language of instruction while English was only to be studied if the time
allotted to a pupil's schooling allowed for it. Things remained very much
in this mould until the late 1850s when the introduction of a system of
competitive examinations for clerkships made knowledge of English as well
as Italian a condition for entry into the civil service of the Island.[5]
From this time onwards knowledge of English among the population, but
especially in the towns, began to show marked progress. Among the labouring
classes too, English was becoming an inportant asset as it opened the
prospects of enployment in the dockyard and the armed services.
Nonetheless, this progress had been achieved with little or no compulsion.
There had been no formal policy of anglicization, even though some thought
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that this might have boosted emigration to other British parts of the 
Empire.[6] But, until then, Britain had not as yet perceived a challenge 
for the hearts and minds of the Maltese from any of the other powers. By 
the 1860s, however, the fear had germinated in the minds of Governors and 
some colonial officials, that Maltese loyalty to Britain may not survive 
the test given the existing choice of other powerful masters. Anglicization 
and exclusive dependence of the population on Britain seemed then, to be 
the best policy.
As we saw in the previous chapter it was Le Marchant who first raised
the issue when he denounced the real lack of progress that the English
language had made among the population and pointed to the alleged
influences being exerted on Malta by events in North Africa and in
Italy.[7] These sentiments were re-echoed by Patrick Grant, in 1869, when
he vainly sought, 'in the interests, both of the local and Imperial
government', Colonial Office permission to save a private shool which
conducted its lessons entirely in English.[8] Two years earlier Grant had
sought to impress upon London, in the wake of the decision of the p & 0
Steamship Company to cancel its once weekly stopover in Malta of its Indian
Mail Packet, the necessity of completely binding Maltese economic interests
with those of Britain.[9] Grant wrote to Buckingham, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, that, although the cancelation of Malta as a port of call
would mean a loss to the trade of the island it was 'from a political
view', that the matter had to be viewed. He explained that
'the Maltese at their present moment look to Great Britain alone as the 
source of their wealth and their trade supply...[and] they are only too 
well satisfied, should all the source of their wealth continue to emanate 
from the Mother Country'.[10]
But, he warned, 'when the interests of a people are not maintained a 
certain indifference must take its place.' He was certain that the French 
or Italians, 'at any rate foreigners', would rush to fill the void created 
by the British Company, for motives not necessarily connected with 
commerce. Grant concluded, rather emphatically, that the
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'sympathies of the people of Malta towards England should be, on grounds of 
good policy, specially fostered and maintained, and that they [Maltese] 
should be practically taught to look to Great Britain for all their
benefits..."
Admiral Yelverton concurred with the Governor. He wrote, that
'it would be much to be regretted if for any small convenience or saving of 
time we sacrifice the advantage of maintaining a feeling of cheerful
dependence on England at this important station.'[11]
These pleas, however, fell on deaf ears in London. One colonial official
even minuted that
'the saving of an entire day in our communication with India must outweigh 
any wish to favour the inhabitants of even our principal station in the 
Mediter ranean.' [ 12]
In 1873 it was Straubenzee's turn to raise the matter when he learned
of War Office plans to abolish the Royal Malta Fencible Corps. He
immediately wrote to the Secretary of State opposing the measure. 'The
Corps' he wrote,
'forms under present circumstances the special link between the English and 
Maltese: if this line is broken or if its force is diminished, the result 
will be the strengthening of the line of demarcation between the two 
peoples and that community of interests, which it is so much the policy and 
so much the desire of HM's Government to maintain in its integrity, will be 
materially weakened...'
He reminded the Secretary of State that
'the language of the Council, the language of the Courts of Justice, nay 
even the first language which the Maltese youth is taught in the schools is 
Italian. In all this, there is a tendency to italianize whilst, on the 
other hand, the social effect of this local corps tends to 
anglicize...'[13]
Lord Carnarvon, who took over the seals of the Colonial Office in
1874, fully agreed with the Governor and the Corps was spared. He also
agreed with the Governor's decision, in 1877, to raise, over those for
Italian, the maximum number of marks allowed for English at future
competitive examinations for vacancies in the public service.[14] The
Governor also laid down that, in future, all letters addressed to Her
Majesty or to the Secretary of State, if not written in English were,
except in cases of poverty, to be accompanied by an English
translation.[15] Hence, it was at this point that a conscious decision to
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anglicise the Maltese was taken. This is also clearly evident from the 
instructions to Julyan and to Keenan who, as part of their brief, were to 
investigate and advise on how to advance, at the expense of Italian, the 
use of the English language in the administration, the law courts and 
education. But, it represented too a conscious decision, on the part of the 
Colonial Office, to tighten its grip on Maltese affairs generally. This 
gave rise first to the Rowsell Commission and later to the Julyan and 
Keenan mission. This Chapter departs from a brief examination of Rowsell's 
Report on the Taxation and Expenditure of Malta in which he makes several 
observations on Maltese public service. Then follows a detailed discussion 
of Julyan's Report on the civil establishments of Malta. Finally, the 
salient points of Keenan's Report on the educational establishments of 
Malta are briefly noted.
THE ROWSELL MISSION
At the time of his appointment as Commissioner, in 1877, Francis W.
Rowsell was Director of Navy Contracts. He was about to visit Malta for
health reasons but nevertheless accepted Lord Carnarvon's invitation to 
carry out, while in the island, a thorough examination of the system of 
food taxation to be found there. In his letter of appointment it was 
pointed out to him, that
'a considerable part of the revenue of the Colony is derived from Inport
Duties upon grain, and questions as to the incidence of these taxes, and
the possibility of replacing them by others'[16]
had engaged the attention of both the Secretary of State and of some
members of the House of Commons. They were, therefore, anxious to have this
matter investigated by an independent person.[17] Rowsell was also at
liberty, if he thought it justified, to inquiry into 'taxes other than
those on grain or into the expenditure of the colony, whether as regards
the cost of establishments or other services.'[18] As it turned out,
because of the close connection that was said to exist between the level of
taxation and the cost of public establishments, a good part of the final
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report presented by Rowsell deals exclusively with these establishments.
In conducting his inquiry the Commissioner sought the views of as wide 
a spectrum of Maltese society as possible, including those of Members and 
ex-Members of council, landed proprietors, merchants and bankers, the 
nobility and the clergy, and even that of
'small tenant farmers, labourers enployed by them...large proprietors, 
workmen in handicrafts, boatmen, and others of the manual labour 
class.'[19]
What he got back contained, in his view, 'little else than an expression of 
opinion, which had direct relationship to the supposed class interest of 
the writers.'[20] This he found understandable. In a small community like 
that of Malta, he wrote,
'where wealth is concentrated in very few hands, and where the struggle 
among the generality for the existence of their class, and for individual 
existence within that class, is very keen,'
it was very difficult for people to rise above 'personal considerations and 
to look at measures in their bearing upon the common welfare.'[21] He felt, 
therefore, that the views expressed were
'entitled to attention only as representing the individual wish of persons 
or classes, and the way in which those persons would vote if the question 
of abolition or reduction of the corn duties were left to the arbitrament 
of a poll.'[22]
Few Maltese displayed a desire to break with the old system by which
one-third of government revenue was derived from the duty on corn on bread
tax. The majority, which included six of the elected members, the Chamber
of Commerce, the farmers themselves, the nobility and the Church, were
against any change. The six elected members defended the existing system -
of which only one of their colleagues had complained - pointing to the fact
that the revenue of the government had proved sufficient to pay for the
daily needs of the administration and for a series of extraordinary works
involving hundreds of thousands of pounds.[23] Indeed, Rowsell himself
admitted that between 1858 and 1876 'no less a sum than £173,939 has been
spent out of revenue in the execution of works...'[24] Each group demanded,
however, 'economy in the whole administration',[25] without, at the same
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time, indicated how this could be achieved. This seemed to justify, in 
Rowsell's view, the need for a general examination of the revenue and 
expenditure, and of the civil establishments of government.
Rowsell found, in 1876, that the revenue amounted to £176,002 of which 
£106,226 were derived exclusively from customs duties.[26] Of the latter, 
£53,253 were raised from the duty on grain imports. Government expenditure, 
for that same year, was calculated at £167,507, with £75,069 being the cost 
of salaries of employees of the public service, and £68,257 of the services 
- pensions, poor relief, education, hospitals, police, street lighting, 
repairs and so on - provided by the government,[27] a total of 
£143,000.(28] On the basis of these figures there appeared, in Rowsell's 
view, therefore, a "prima face" connection between the bread tax, or grain 
duty, and government expenditure.
'The general impression' produced upon Rowsell 'by a perusal of the 
documents furnished, by study of some test offices, and by personal 
conference with the heads of departments' was, that
'the service of administration is too costly, and that there are more 
people employed than are necessary to do the work as it is, and that the 
organisation of work itself might be simplified with great advantage.'[29]
This, of course, was hardly news to colonial officials. Commissioners,
Secretaries of State, Under-Secretaries and Governors had all pointed it
out at some time or another. Straubenzee, the Governor in office at the
time of Rowsell's inquiry, had raised it only two years earlier.[30] But
some of Rowsell's other findings, did furnish some sort of explanation for
this state of affairs. One finds from reading the report, for example, that
in Malta there were 'no copying presses in any of the offices, and all,
even the most trivial things, are copied by hand.'[31] Neither was 'there
any division of the clerks into classes', nor a 'general scale of pay' or
'any arrangement for increment, except on promotion, or after 30 years of
service'. Further, 'almost all employes, officers, clerks, and messengers,
even servants and workmen' being on the establishment had a claim to
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pension. Only in the Customs Department did he find a few people enployed 
on day pay, but even here pressure was being applied, notably by elected 
individual members of Council, to have these placed on the pensionable 
establishment. He deprecated such a system, as well as the opposition of 
most Heads of Departments to the idea of creating within the Maltese civil 
service a class of clerks, equivalent to that of civil Service writers in 
England, on day pay. Rowsell wrote that,
'viewed from the side of the employer and paymaster, this exclusive use of 
"established" clerks and employes cannot be justified, and supposing the 
organization to remain as at present',
i.e. of 262 officers and 101 clerks, he expected that 'there should be an
infusion, as vacancies occur, of at least 15 per cent of writers on day
pay, without claim to pension.' He accepted, however, that these writers
ought to 'be eligible for the establishment and constitute its main
recruiting ground.'[32]
He was also of the view that
'the diversity of salary between clerks doing the same kind of work in
different offices, to which chance rather than selection has appropriated 
them...[was] injurious to the service and to those employed in it.'
He proposed, instead, the division of the clerks, other than Chief Clerks
and writers, into two groups and a scheme of annual increments of £2 in the
lower and £3 in the higher division till the attainment of a maximum, to be
decided, was reached. He believed that the introduction of a system for
regulating salaries would put an end to the practice, by elected members of
Council, of putting pressure on the government for procuring increases of
pay to individual officers, clerks and other employees. He hoped too that
it would serve to inculcate, among members of the service, a sense of
loyalty 'to the interests of the community at large.' This he also held to
be advantaged by a general, rather than a departmental system of promotion.
In theory, promotions in Malta were granted 'according to seniority coupled
with efficiency'[33] and that on promotion, public servants were liable to
be transferred to other departments. In practice, promotions occurred at
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both the general and the departmental level. Among the lower office clerks 
promotion was by department, while at the higher level, i.e. from Chief 
Clerk upwards, promotion involved the possibility of transfer from one 
department to another.[34]
Following from his general remarks about the Maltese Civil Service, 
Rowsell turned his attention to the question of retrenchment. Within twenty 
years, as he discovered for himself, the cost of establishments had risen 
by an average of £1,000 a year, from £54,740 in 1855 to over £75,000 in 
1876, while the number of public servants had risen by only 186 to 1,157. A 
great part of this increase in cost was due mainly to periodic increases in 
salary. In 1876 alone, in order to diminish some of the graver inequalities 
which existed, the government had forked out a little above £2,000 in 
salary increases.[35] In the same year another £3,000 were added to the 
cost of establishments with the recruitment of 98 new members to the police 
force. These and other increases had taken place despite exhortations for 
economy from Secretaries of State and promises of reductions from 
Governors, although some of them had been justified by periods of high 
prices.[36] Rowsell himself, notwithstanding his view that the public 
service was overmanned, could not indicate savings beyond £3,000 and these 
spread over several departments. These he hoped to achieve by the abolition 
of the Land Revenue Department, of the Treasury and of the Printing Office, 
by a reduction of offices in the Judicial Establishments, and by a more 
efficient administration of the Charitable and Educational Institutions.
The Department of Land Revenue had been, since the time of the Order
of St John, but under a different name,[37] responsible for the
administration of Crown Property in Malta, said to be equal to about
one-third of all land in Malta and Gozo. Rowsell saw in this ownership,
however, no special advantage for the government, for although at the time
only 'one government owned house, and only one piece of rocky ground'[38]
were without tenants, most of the revenue of the government from its
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property was respent in salaries and repairs. Hence, Rowsell strongly 
favoured the sale or perpetual lease of all government property and the 
investment of the proceeds in British consols. This, he suggested, would 
lead to the 'ultimate extinction' of this department.[39] The office of 
Public Works which had been severed from and reamalgamated with the 
Department of Land Revenue on several occasions in the past, he preferred 
to place
'under the management of some professional officer, like a Captain of 
Engineers, who must obviously be more competent to discharge...[its duties] 
than a layman, however, honourable and zealous like the present Collector 
of land revenue.'[40]
Rowsell's private opinion of the personal qualities of the latter 
contrasted sharply with that expressed in his Report. Dr Trapani, the 
Collector of Land Revenue, Rowsell wrote, was 'too fixed and immobile, and 
too much lacking in energy to make a good head of department where action 
is required,' proof being 'the arrears of rent, extending over may years, 
which he allowed to grow to inconvenient'[41] amounts.
This inplied some criticism of the way appointments to higher offices
in Malta were made and Colonial officials were, therefore, quick to reply
that, when Trapani was promoted, it was usual to let Governors have 'their
own way' and that his 'recommendation was accepted without question.'[42]
This confirms, what has been said earlier, that indigenization had
transferred real control over appointments from the Colonial Office to the
colonial administration. It also indicates that London was no longer
prepared to rubber stamp recommendations coming from the Governor in Malta.
However, in recommending the extinction of the Department of Land Revenue,
Rowsell missed an important point, i.e. that Malta, being a strategic
military base, property was constantly required for building new barracks,
defence lines and other military and naval facilities. For this reason, in
the late 1860s the local government gave itself powers to expropriate
property merely on the basis of a declaration by the Governor.[43] Thus,
Crown property, in addition to any revenue it might have generated if
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properly administered, had a strategic significance. Nevertheless, Rowsell 
concluded that if his recommendations were implemented 'considerable 
economies would...show themselves in the expenditure of the 
department.'[44]
With respect to the Treasury Office and the Government Printing Press, 
Rowsell stated that the reasons which had prompted the commissioners of 
1836 to recommend their abolition as distinct offices still held force.[45] 
On the one hand he suggested that the duties of the former should be merged 
with those of clerks acting under the Chief Secretary. On the other hand, 
he felt that the existence, in Malta, of several private printing presses, 
had rendered the operation of a government owned press unwarranted. He 
wrote, that
'a good deal of unnecessary work is done now and much of what is necessary, 
[e.g. Blue Book] is done upon a scale which is quite beyond 
requirement.'[46]
He believed that the local government would save about £500 a year on 
printing alone if the printing office was suppressed.
Notwithstanding his own admission of a lack of knowledge of Maltese 
legal departments, Rowsell was 'under a strong impression that in these 
also a better organisation would lead to a saving of money'.[47] In the 
preceding year these establishments had cost the government over £13,000 
but the Commissioner was convinced that savings of about £1,000 annually 
could be achieved if the number of Court registrars was reduced, the 
registry system centralised, and if the number of judges and magistrates 
was in each case reduced by one.[48]
For Rowsell, a cobdenite, the local government's expenditure on the
charities and on education was an important issue.[49] He reported that, in
1876, the Charitable Institutions had cost the colony nearly £27,000. He
himself disagreed with many of the heads of expenditure under this item,
but was 'not prepared to go into a detailed criticism'!50] of it, mainly
perhaps, to avoid being involved in some controversy which would have
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sidetracked discussion away from his main recommendations. Nevertheless, he 
stressed the fact that, although the government spent £80 a day for 
charitable purposes, there was in Malta
'no poor-house, in the sense of a workhouse, nor any general organisation 
for the relief of the poor and the suppression of mendicity'.[51]
/
It was clear that, nearly eighty years of British rule had not proved 
sufficient to establish in Malta British concepts of charity.[52] Nor, 
Rowsell conceded, did it seem likely to happen in the future. The best one 
could hope for, he wrote, was
'a vigorous head and hand which will so organise the establishments as to 
enable the government faithfully to discharge the trust it may be said to 
have inherited from the Knights Hospitallers, at the same time that the 
money and property appropriated to this purpose are made to go as far as 
possible.'[53]
Rowsell believed that the most qualified public officer for the job was
Ferdinand Inglott, since 1870 Head of Customs. He would have prefered, had
there been a choice and 'if important changes' were to 'take place in the
Department and Administration of charities', a younger man than Inglott but
the latter was, in his opinion, 'active, clear-headed...facile', had
experience of the charities and was 'undoubtedly the best administrative
officer...in Malta.'[54]
The Commissioner's final recommendation was directed at the island's
system of education. The fees for the Lyceum and the University, he said,
were too low and ought to be raised to higher and more realistic levels.
His preference was for the abolition of 'the expensive medium of an
university' and the creation of an examining board which would be
authorised to grant degrees in the several faculties to those who, after
private study, reached an approved standard after examinations.[55] Rowsell
offered no criticism or suggestion for improving the actual system of
education, but he wrote of 'the strongest representations' made to him 'by
men of the most opposite general opinions',[56] to the effect that the most
thorough investigation was needed. He himself endorsed this call, for 'the
subject is one of great importance to the island, and the money expended
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yearly upon it is considerable.'[57] We shall see further below that 
Rowsell's proposal did not go unheeded and that the subsequent inquiry was 
to prove to be the catalyst which precipitated the language question.
It must not be forgotten, however, that the primary purpose behind 
Rowsell's Commission was to investigate Malta's tax system and the 
possibility of replacing the grain tax with other forms of taxation. The 
duty paid on wheat imported into Malta was ten shillings a quarter and six 
and four shillings a quarter respectively on Indian corn and barley,[58] 
making up nearly one-third of the government revenue. Rowsell found that, 
given the fact that the main consumers of this item were the labouring poor 
and the unemployed, members of this class tended to pay 5s more per head 
per annum in taxes than individual members of the upper and middle classes. 
And since the former was by far the most numerous class it resulted that it 
was their taxes which mainly sustained the administration and its 
programmes. Rowsell concluded that, on this evidence alone, the Colonial 
Office should totally abolish this tax and replace it with others, which 
the Commissioner himself enumerated, on items consumed mainly by the middle 
classes.
By the time the colonial Office had arrived at a decision on how to
proceed in the light of Rowsell's Report, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach had
replaced Lord Carnarvon as Secretary of State for the Colonies. In London
there had been some irritation with regard to the reluctance of the
government in Malta to adopt some of the proposals for retrenchment to be
found in the report. 'The favourite motto of the Malta Government', wrote
one official, 'seems to be "quieta non movere"'.[59] Hicks-Beach for his
part considered retrenchment as part of a long-term strategy. What he
looked for in Rowsell's Report were recommendations which could be
implemented right away and as he found none which fitted this description
he felt compelled to dismiss 'them for the moment from consideration'.[60]
His immediate focus was the question of taxation. He accepted that the
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wheat tax was of such importance to the revenue of the local government and 
the circumstances of Malta so peculiar, that it was 'impossible to accede 
to the demand'[61] for its total abolition. Even so, he considered that the 
grain tax was 'open in principle to some very grave objections'.[62] and he 
proposed to reduce it by one-half. The loss in revenue he intended to 
recoup by new taxes on beer, wine and spirits, tonnage dues, store rent on 
bonded goods, licences and education fees.
The reaction in Valletta against these proposals was indicative of how 
any attempt to tamper with existing structures and taxes immediately 
brought to the surface tensions, divisions and vested interests. In 
Valletta, a crowd of about 2,000 people gathered to demonstrate and 
'protest against an act' which was said to decide their destiny. Carrying 
placards vilifying Rowsell, they smashed the window panes of his residence 
and later entered the Council Chamber and disrupted proceedings.[63] 
Savona, the elected member of Council whose successful lobbying of House of 
Commons members had instigated the inquiry, received from the crowd similar 
treatment. In the next couple of years every attempt to push the tax reform 
through Council was blocked by the elected members.[64] Colonial officials 
contenplated using the official majority but Hicks-Beach rejected the idea 
arguing that taxation was clearly a local matter. Herbert, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary agreed remarking, however, that 'Cardwell's declaration of 
the rights of the unofficial members' had produced of much trouble and that 
in a fortress colony
'principally inhabited by foreigners who were Roman Catholics a "severe 
type" of Crown colony should have been preserved.'[65]
The affair also served, however, to expose the existing divisions in
the public service and to enphasise the ambivalent situation in which the
Constitution of 1849 had placed senior civil servants and Heads of
Departments. As it happened one group of civil servants led by Victor
Houlton, the Chief Secretary, opposed the abolition or reduction of the
grain tax. A second group, led by Adrian Dingli, the Crown Advocate,
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supported its reform. Dingli had proposed, in letters to Rowsell, a 
reduction of one half in the bread tax and the introduction of sane direct 
taxes which he saw as necessary 'for the political education of the people, 
and their preparation for self-government.'[66] The Chief Secretary, 
however, supported the status quo and even published, anonymously, a 
pamphlet on taxation in Malta to support his stand.[67] Houlton, however, 
went further and despite precise instructions from London he not only 
'failed', in Council, 'to carry into effect the intentions of Her Majesty's 
Government' but placed 'on record...a resolution entirely opposed to their 
strong opinions'.[68] This blatant sabotage from one of its servants, led 
London to postpone its taxation reforms in Malta.
Generally speaking, Dingli was not considered as a great supporter of 
reform but in defending the status quo he would never have gone so far as 
to humiliate the Colonial Office in public.[69] Indeed, we shall see in the 
following Chapter that, notwithstanding his opposition to a policy of 
forced anglicisation, Dingli did not make his views publicly known but 
supported, as was his duty, the policy of the government. Many, however, 
failed to appreciate this and almost every unpopular act or measure was 
ascribed to his influence. This was demonstrated quite forcefully by the 
controversy over the bread tax. On this question Dingli's private views 
coincided with those of London, nonetheless, he was made the target of 
attacks in Malta and London, even by those who like him supported the 
reform. One newspaper, (Public Opinion), edited by Savona, actually accused 
him of working for the retention of the bread tax as it enabled the 
government
'to lord it over the country, and to effect, with a high hand, out of the 
proceeds of the Bread Tax, all their pretty schemes for the embellishment 
of Valletta'[70]
to the detriment of the people in the districts. In April 1879 the attack
was taken up by Plimsoll who claimed, in the Commons, that Dingli was 'the
strongest opponent in Malta of its [bread tax] abolition.'[71] Soon after,
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Savona, in a letter to the Secretary of State, 'virtually impugned' 
Dingli's 'sincerity in supporting a motion for the reduction of that 
duty.'[72]
Dingli protested against these attacks and pressed for permission to 
publish his private correspondence with Rowsell. But the Colonial Office 
rejected his plea, claiming that it could not, under any circumstance, 
allow civil servants to air or divulge in public either their private views 
or their advice to Governors.[73] Following Plimsoll's attack Dingli 
appealed for 'a higher authority to make a statement clearly stating his 
position,'[74] but this appeal was also rejected. The consequence of this 
was that, while in everything Dingli was expected to act very much like a 
minister of the Crown proposing and defending the policies of his 
government, in the face of criticism and personal attacks, he was to 
maintain the anonymity reserved for public servants. •
THE JULYAN MISSION
Rowsell's observations on the public service had left Colonial
officials in doubt, after reading Rowsell's observations, that the time as
to the need for a comprehensive inquiry into 'the organisation and working
of the Civil Establishments'[75] of Malta. On the suggestion of Robert
Meade it was decided to entrust the inquiry in the hands of Penrose Julyan
who, some months earlier, had successfully carried out a similar mission in
Mauritius.[76] According to his instructions Julyan's mission was to have a
fourfold objective. First, to examine every department of government
'with a view to ascertaining whether it may be practicable...to effect any 
reduction in the numbers and cost of the employes in the public 
service'.[77]
Second, to report on the possibility of promoting 'English as the official
language of the colony.' Third, to investigate Maltese demands
'that the salary of the Governor of Malta from local sources should be 
reduced from £5,000 to £3,000, the balance, if necessary being made up from 
Imperial funds.'
Finally, Julyan was instructed to examine the subject of the drawback of
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customs' duties allowed to the 'imperial Government on account of corn and 
cattle consumed by the Garrison and Fleet'.[78]
It was nearly forty years since a thorough investigation of the civil 
establishments had been conducted[79] and on this basis alone Julyan's 
official report was eagerly awaited at the Colonial Office. It was, in fact, 
to provide the basis for public service reform and political debate for the 
best part of the 1880s. It could not be otherwise for, in Malta, as with 
other Crown Colonies, the bureaucracy was synonomous with the government 
while its membership constituted, as already observed, a substantial 
proportion of the electorate. Furthermore, some of the items for 
investigation indicated in the letter conveying Sir Hicks-Beach 
instructions to Julyan, had been placed there in response to pressures of a 
political character emanating from Malta, notably pressures for the 
re-institution of civil government and for economy in the conduct of 
government.
Julyan opened his report by a warning that, 'with reference to the
pincipal object'[80] of his mission, there appeared to be
'room for only a limited reduction in the number of Government 
employes...and none in the salaries of the subordinate classes.'
Indeed he was of the view that if his recommendations were adopted
'all, or nearly all, the saving thus effected in the number of employes may 
be judiciously applied in augmenting the stipends of those who remain.'
He also promised to address himself to the role, competence and status of
many of the professionals, both legal and medical, employed in the public
service and to the
'propriety of furnishing so small a dependency with such elaborate 
arrangements as exist for the administration of justice and the 
distribution of medical and other charities.'
It appeared to him that
'the increased prosperity of the Colony depended quite as much upon 
improvements in those respects as upon any changes that can be made in the 
condition of the Civil Service proper.'
Having thus stated his overall view even at this early stage of the report,
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Julyan then proceeded to discuss in detail the organisation and workings of 
the Maltese public service and to suggest reforms.
The first question which Julyan tackled was that concerning the 
Governor's salary. He observed that the only justification which Britain 
had for maintaining in Malta a system of military government was rooted in 
the fact that the island was considered to be a military and naval station 
of great importance. Therefore, as it was likely that military affairs were 
to continue to have precedence over civil matters and that a military 
officer was to continue to act as Governor, then it was only just that 
Britain should contribute from imperial funds £2000, (or two-fifths) 
towards the latter's salary.[81] The Commissioner also noted that it had 
been strongly urged upon him by many 'influential inhabitants',[82] that 
'the future prosperity of Malta would be greatly promoted by the 
substitution of a civil for a military Governor'. The reasons were three. 
First, the civil affairs of the island required the undivided attention of 
a compentent administrator. Second, that a military career did not afford 
the kind of training calculated to produce such an administrator. Third, 
that it was not possible for a military officer of high rank and advanced 
age, to perform efficiently the coiribined duties of Commander of the Forces, 
'in so large a garrison as Malta' and of civil administrator. Consequently, 
it was alleged that civil affairs had been allowed
'to fall under the influence and direction of an irresponsible subordinate 
[meaning Dingli] who has thus become practically the civil ruler of the 
island.'
The Maltese proposed, therefore, as a remedy the appointment of a civil 
Governor or of a Lieutenant-Governor, the latter with responsibility for 
all civil matters but, subject to the veto of a military Governor, 'who on 
ordinary occasions should devote himself almost exclusively to his duties 
as Commander of Her Majesty's Forces'.
Julyan rejected the Maltese view. He held 'the real question'!83] to
be one of individual qualification rather than of profession. He was
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certain that 'with such aid as every Governor...has a right to expect from 
his subordinates' the remainder of the time not taken up by military duties 
would prove amply sufficient for a military governor to deal 'with the 
civil administration of this small island.' Furthermore, Julyan considered 
the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor, with extensive powers over civil 
affairs, 'a dangerous innovation, involving considerable unnecessary 
expense, and not likely to result in anything but confusion.'[84] Such an 
officer, he wrote, would
'either become the de facto Governor, or be merely a Chief Secretary under 
another title. If he were the former, the nominal Governor would be an 
expensive superfluity; if he were the latter, there would practically be 
two chief Secretaries where only one is required'.
The solution suggested by Julyan was twofold. First, that in the case of 
Malta,
'past experience in civil administration, no less than in military duties, 
be made a "sine qua non" in the appointment of Governors'.
He thought this would be a decided advantage to the population. Second,
that an Executive Council should be formed to assist and advise the
Governor on all matters connected with the civil administration of the
island. He believed that such a Council would strengthen the Governor's
position in the eyes of the public, increase public confidence in the acts
of the government and lay to rest the accusation that the governor depends
upon an 'irresponsible and recognised individual for information and
guidance'. It would also make it 'next to impossible' for government
business to be controlled by one influential individual.
The question as to whether a Lieutenant-Governor should be appointed,
served to bring into sharper focus the office of Chief Secretary.
Independently of whether the government was civil or military, as Julyan
correctly pointed out, the role of Chief Secretary was of great importance.
The Governor's residence in a colony being short, the latter could not
expect to govern efficiently without the assistance of some one with a more
intimate knowledge of the inhabitants, of the exigencies of the colony and
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of the working of government departments. Julyan admitted that, in the case 
of Malta, the fact of military government tended to accentuate this 
importance, with the Chief Secretary more or less expected to act, with 
respect to civil affairs, as the Governor's responsible agent. Thus, he was 
called
'upon not only to furnish the Governor with a correct view of the actual 
circumstances of the island, but also to interpret to him all the wishes 
and complaints of more or less truly representative sections of the 
community.'[85]
These were indeed demanding tasks and in order that they may be performed 
more efficiently, Julyan recommended that some of his duties should be 
hived-off to other departments. He felt too, that the creation of an 
Executive council would also serve, as in the case of the Governor, to 
lighten the responsibilities of the Chief Secretary, even though he fully 
expected that both officers would be included in its membership. [86] The 
Commissioner envisaged, therefore, that these changes would eventually 
allow for the reduction of at least one senior clerk from the Chief 
Secretary's department and the reduction, on the appointment of a 
successor, of the Chief Secretary's salary from £1,300 to £1,000 per 
annum.[87]
Having disposed of these questions Julyan turned his attention to the
revenue departments, viz., the Treasury, the Land Revenue and Public Works
Department, the Customs Department, and the Port Department. In each of
these departments Julyan found that the clerical duties were 'efficiently
performed',[88] but with respect to the Land Revenue Department he observed
that its past management had been completely faulty and its existing
condition wholly unsatisfactory. This state of affairs, he said, had
'given rise to an exaggerated impression on the public mind that they are 
the result of favouritism and culpable neglect, if not of corruption.'
The real reason for 'this unfortunate state of things', according to
Julyan, was that 'the duties and responsibilities inposed on the Head of
the Department' were more than a person of ordinary intelligence and
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capacity might be expected to perform properly. In fact, the Head of this 
department was responsible for the collection of all land revenue and for 
the superintendence of all public works. But the latter duties - for which 
he was not professionally qualified - pressed so heavily upon him that the 
business of both branches tended to suffer. Neither had he the time to 
exercise proper supervision over his subordinates and professional officers 
appeared 'in practice to be independent of all control.'[89] Julyan's 
conclusion was that Mr Trapani, the Collector of Land Revenue, was 
entrusted with a 'greater power than he can safely exercise' and that there 
was 'little more than a theoretical control over his actions.' The result 
was that, in 1877, the overall expenditure of this department, about 
£48,000 (of which £4,000 were stipends), had exceeded its earnings by over 
£5,000.[90]
Nonetheless, Julyan dismissed as no solution Rowsell's suggestion that 
the government should sell-off or lease, on a perpetual basis, its 
property. This, he held, was not in its best interests, especially from a 
political stand-point. He emphatically stressed that,
'as the great landlord of the colony the Government secures an influence 
which is not without its advantage...and which may be far more important in 
the future.'[91]
What was required instead, was the existing rules should be strictly 
adhered to and that ultimate responsibility for expenditure and for all 
contracts should be placed beyond the control of departmental officials. To 
achieve this, the Commissioner wrote, it was necessary that the 'duties 
connected with the Land Revenue and Public Works should be entirely 
reconstructed' and that several of these duties 'should be distributed 
among separate branches of the public service.'[92] He recommended, 
therefore, the separation of the Revenue branch from the Works branch and 
the transfer from both these branches to a Contracts Committee, to be 
created, of all administrative responsibility for the sale or letting of 
property, for the procurement of supplies, and for public works.
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This Committee was to consist of the Auditor-General, who was to be 
ex-officio Director of contracts, and two other Heads of Department, 
preferably the Collector of customs, and the Collector of Land Revenue, the 
latter to be styled in future the Receiver-General. However, whenever the 
items before the committee involved matters concerning either the 
Charitable Institutions, or the ports, or public works, one of the other 
two heads was to make room for the head of one of the latter departments. 
Henceforth, instead of each department entering into its own contracts, 
under the system proposed by Julyan all contracts were to be effected by 
the new committee. Julyan expected that, as a result, the number of
contracts would be fewer, that the amount of clerical labour involved would 
be lessened, that better and more uniform quality would be ensured, and 
that a better class of contractor would be attracted. He also hoped too 
that these new arrangements would also serve to place, beyond the power of 
any one person, the ability to influence any sale, lease, or contract of
any kind. Such a system, he pointed out, had been successfully adopted in
other colonies and he could see no reason why it should not work in Malta.
The Land Revenue branch Julyan proposed to convert into a purely
financial department under the direction, not of a Collector, although the
collection of all property rents was to remain his principal
responsibility, but of a Receiver-General, whose duties were also to
include the issuing of all licences for which a fee was charged and of all
the financial business once transacted by the Treasury which was to cease
to exist. Julyan estimated that with the abolition of the Treasury
department 'an ultimate saving of from £700 to £900 per annum'[93] would
accrue. The Commissioner also stressed the need for all rents on
government-owned property to be raised to those charged by Church bodies
and private landlords. This, he contended, was 'a perfectly legitimate
proceeding',[94] especially in an island where the government already did
too much for the people. Julyan admitted that while, within certain limits,
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'it may be the duty of the Government...to act the part of a generous 
landlord',
it was equally its duty
'in the interest of the community at large, and as the steward of the 
public estate, to turn that estate to the best possible account by 
insuring the full market price.'[95]
The Works branch too, Julyan wished to see established as a separate
and independent department for its functions, when compared to those of
similar departments in other colonies, he considered as disproportionately
large and important. 'Not only', wrote Julyan,
'has the Government to perform many duties which elsewhere generally fall 
on municipal authorities, but there are also assigned to it various tasks 
and responsibilities, which, in other portions of the British Empire, it is 
found expedient to leave in private hands, or under the care of independent 
corporat ions.'[96]
Examples of these included the Opera House, the Valletta Market, the public 
cemetery, and responsibility for the Cathedral of St John and several other 
churches and chapels which the government had inherited from the Order , of 
St John. The new Public Works Department, as proposed by the Commissioner, 
was to retain many of its existing responsibilities, notably those 
concerned with the maintenance of government property, public roads, 
aquaducts and gardens, but its permanent staff was to be confined within
the narrowest possible limits. Hence, all new works and repairs of any
magnitude were to be executed by contract and, in future, labourers and 
other inferior employees were to
'cease to have a claim on the Government for life-long employment and 
superannuat ion'.
Something also had to be done, advised Julyan, about the conduct of 
professional officers - architects and surveyors - employed with this 
department who frequently absented themselves from their duties without
making any 'precise statement of the grounds of their absence.'[97] He
recommended that the
'system of allowing them to engage in private practice while they are 
permanent officials having a right to superannuation, should...be 
discont inued'
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as quickly as possible. Professional officers, he wrote, were either to be 
'salaried officers proper',[98] or like other professional men in private 
life, be paid solely by fees for the work performed by them. Finally, he 
concurred with Rowsell that the Head of this department ought to be a 
professional man, but a native of Malta, for Julyan felt that 'languages of 
the Island', i.e., Maltese and Italian, would pose serious difficulties for 
an outsider. Julyan recommended, however, that the appointee should be 
precluded from practicing privately and required to devote his whole time 
to the business of his office.
In contrast to the Land Revenue Department, Julyan found the customs 
Department, whose head was Ferdinand Inglott, in a 'highly efficient and 
admirable condition'.[99] The manner in which it is administered, he wrote, 
'the systematic organisation of all its various branches, and the energy 
and intelligence applied to the working-out of all its details',[100] were 
highly creditable. It was not isolated praise. In 1876, the local Chamber 
of Commerce had, at its annual meeting, proffered 'a word of praise'[101] 
to the Collector for many of the improvements he had introduced, while 
three years later Julyan reported that the leading merchants of Malta had 
stated to him that Inglott
'had raised the Customs Department from a sad state of choas and 
reproach...to the...condition in which I found it; and that although he was 
generally considered unnecessarily severe in exacting conformity to the 
regulations, yet his impartiality, zeal and uprightness commanded the 
respect of the whole commercial body.'[102]
Inglott, the Commissioner told the Secretary of State, was 'immeasurably 
superior to all other' heads of departments and was
'possessed of such qualifications as could hardly have failed to ensure 
distinction in any colony.'[103]
Furthermore, Julyan attributed everything that was good in the
administration of the Charitable Institutions to the time when Inglott was
its head. Ironically, at that time, the elected members of Council had
steadfastly opposed the Governor's proposal to grant Inglott an increase of
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salary and the latter, when the opportunity arose, exchanged the Headship
of the Charitable Institutions for that of Collector of Customs.[104] It
was, to some extent, fortunate that this had happened for the Customs
Department was the most important revenue department of the Island. Indeed,
about two-thirds of the entire revenue of Malta, and three times as much as
was derived from any other source, were collected by this department. But,
if Julyan found little to criticise in this department, he was opposed to
some of the commercial practices of Malta which added to the work of the
Customs. He deprecated, for example, the practice by importers of selling
grain in small quantities, imposing upon the purchaser the obligations of
passing Customs entry for his portion. This, wrote Julyan, not only led to
the loss of valuable time but in effect turned the Customs establishment
'into a sort of retail shop, with disadvantage to everyone but the 
importer.'[105]
With the elimination of such practices, the Commissioner felt that, even 
here, some savings could be achieved.
The last of the so-called revenue departments was the Port Department.
In truth, as Julyan demonstrated, this department contributed little to the
revenue of the government. No charge was made to outgoing shipping for the
issue of bills of health or for the supply of water; no licensing fees were
paid by harbour pilots, pontoon and steam-tug operators, and by boatmen who
earned their living conveying passengers about the harbours. What Julyan
perhaps failed to grasp was that the use of Valletta as a commercial
harbour, which had been greatly enhanced with the opening of the Suez
Canal, (see Figure 9:1) was of such vital importance to the Maltese economy
that the government was prepared to forego revenue in order to remain
competitive, especially at a time when the trade could have easily gone
elsewhere.[106] Hundreds of families depended for their livelihood on
employment connected with the harbour and a loss in trade would have had
serious social and political consequences. Thus, it was with great
reluctance that in 1877 the local government had agreed with Rowsell's
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suggestion that the port dues charged to shipping, especially steamers, 
should be slightly increased.[107]
Julyan was on surer ground with respect to his proposal to transfer
control over the Marine Police from the Superintendent of Police to the
Superintendent of Ports, an office which combined within it ex-officio
membership of the Board of Health and the duties of Chief Quarantine
Officer. The duties of the Marine Police were, in fact, to ensure order in
the harbours and their surrounding areas, the prompt collection of port
dues, and to give pratique or to place ships under quarantine. Julyan felt
that, placing the Marine Police under the authority of the Superintendent
of Ports, a former British naval officer with long experience of commanding
individuals under military discipline, would serve to convert this corps
'into a far more useful body of revenue protectors than they now appear to 
be.'[108]
Over the years visiting Commissioners to Malta had expressed
astonishment if not outright condemnation at the extensive, complex and
costly system of charity which they found in the Island. Julyan did not
prove to be an exception. In his report, even in those parts which dealt
with areas other than with the state of charitable provision in Malta, he
constantly complained that, in Malta, the government does too much for the
people.[109] The charities merely provided the best example of this. In
effect Julyan held public charities in Malta to be, because of their
'mischievous exuberance',[110] guilty of demoralising the people.
Translated into figures this exuberance amounted, in 1877, to £26,883. This
represented an outlay of 3s 7d per head of the population, or nearly a
twofold rise on 1836, a significant increase even when one allows for a
one-third rise in the population.[Ill] But, as Julyan observed, the above
total did not take into account the value of the buildings employed for the
purpose, many of which were of recent origin and had been constructed at
considerable expense. Neither did it take into account the cost of repairs,
of the pensions of retired employees of the department and of the pay,
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allowances and pensions of the so-called police physicians who were not 
members of those institutions but acted as agents on its behalf. If all 
these other charges were included in the general account, wrote the 
Commissioner, 'the expenditure in "charity" will be found to exceed 
one-fifth of the whole revenue of the colony.'
In all, there were eleven separate or associated charitable 
establishments under the overall supervision of a Controller, nine in Malta 
and two in Gozo (see Diagram 9:1). Most of these institutions, although 
long ago removed from their original sites, traced their origin to the time 
of the Order of St John when each disposed of its own incomes and 
benifices. This, Julyan argued, had given rise to an
'erroneous impression...that the duty of maintaining all these 
establishments is imposed on the Government by the terms on which it 
succeeded to the property held by the Knights...[which] certainly includes 
certain foundations intended to be applied in charitable ways.'[112]
Erroneous or not, a great deal of the responsibility for this impression
devolved on the British themselves, but especially on Thomas Maitland who,
as we saw in Chapter Four, had thought it fit to consolidate the proceeds
from these foundations with the general revenue of the government and to
merge the different institutions under one authority, thereby laying the
foundations for the emergence of the Department of Charitable
Institutions.[113] In other words, it was the local government itself which
had, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, freely took upon
itself full responsibility for these institutions. Unlike Julyan, members
of the public, the vast majority of whom were illiterate, had no means of
knowing that, in 1877, these various foundations barely contributed £3,000
a year to the revenue, a figure quite below that spent annually in out-door
relief alone.[114] But it was on the basis of such knowledge that Julyan
could conclude that
'whatever the justification...to be found for the elaborate system of 
so-called charity, which regards every working-man, however lucrative his 
employment, and his belongings, as fit objects for charity, it must not be 
looked for in any supposed moral or equitable obligation devolving on the 
present Government to maintain the institutions of the Knights of St
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John.'[115]
Despite these pointed comments, Julyan claimed that it was outside his 
province to call into question 'the policy that governs the treatment of 
the poor in these Islands'. It was the machinery for attaining the ends of 
that policy that he wished to focus on. This, he considered as elaborate 
enough but, as he rightly pointed out, the efficient administration of such 
organisations depended largely on those who have to work them. In this case 
the responsibility fell on the Controller as Head of Department, five 
clerks, six unpaid Commissioners of Charity and
'a very large number of professional and non-professional employees.'[116]
At the time of the inquiry the office of Controller was vacant but even so
the Commissioner found that the clerical duties of the department appeared
to be satisfactorily performed. The position and performance of
professional members was, however, a different matter. Julyan observed that
a difficulty common to hospitals of every type, was the confusion that
arose from the division of authority between lay and professional
directors. In the 1840s (Chapter Seven), this problem was minimised with
the creation of the office of Inspector of Prisons and Charities. Its
holder, Dr Collins, was a medical man who knew, according to Julyan, how to
subordinate professional interests to lay ones whenever necessity required
it.[117] But, in 1859, Le Marchant had abolished this office and
amalgamated its duties with those of Controller,[118] with the consequence
that this latter office, the duties of which had been limited to procuring
supplies for the various establishments, grew in importance until it had
become the leading office. Its lay-occupant, however, had found it
impossible to impose his authority over the professional staff or, indeed,
to influence relations between the latter and other lay employees. In his
Report Julyan stressed the importance of this authority being exercised as
well as the need to find a qualified person for the office of Controller.
Nonetheless, he did not believe that one could be found in the local
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service, nor did he wish to see the appointment entrusted to a Maltese 
professional. He thought that the best course for the local government 
would be to reinstitute the office of Inspector of Charities and to obtain 
for it the services of an experienced army medical officer who, if 
necessary, could be called upon to act as mediator in disputes between the 
Controller and the doctors.
The issue of professional employees, however, did not end there. About 
twenty-eight other doctors, all on the pensionable establishment and free 
to practice their profession privately, were at the time employed as Police 
Physicians charged with providing medical relief for the poor. Julyan 
deemed their number excessive, the result, in his view, of a system under 
which
'everybody in Malta who lives by daily labour, that is every working-man, 
as well as every beggar, is considered to have a claim to receive medical 
assistance and medicines gratuitously, when he or any member of his family 
is ill...'[119]
It was also a system which, doctors claimed, depressed their profession. On 
the one hand, some doctors felt, for example, that the title of Police 
Physicians tended to lower their standing in the eyes of the community. On 
the other hand, as the large majority of the population were reluctant to
pay for medical assistance when it could be obtained for free, Maltese
doctors also tended to find it difficult to obtain an independent living. 
They were, therefore, 'eager to be subsidised by the Government, and nearly 
all dissatisfied that the subsidy',[120] was not greater than it was. 
Moreover, they were not subject to effective control. The principal reason 
for this was that, in theory, they came under the charge of the
Superintendent of Police (hence their name), but since their work had no 
connection with his department they were practically independent of his
control.
The Commissioner preferred that the staff of Police Physicians should
be completely abolished but he accepted that the Government appeared 'to be
committed' to its system of medical charity. Furthermore, he felt that if
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this form of charity was suddenly withdrawn, a large part of the population 
would find 'itself without any medical assistance at all'. Julyan proposed, 
instead, that their number of Police Physicians should be reduced from 
twenty-eight to sixteen, their designation changed to District Medical 
Officers and that
'for all administrative purposes they should be subject to the Controller 
of Charitable Institutions'.
He also wished to see something done about the issue of private practice.
This issue had engaged the attention of the Colonial Office for the first
time in the autumn of 1872. At that time, colonial officials had initially
resisted the Governor's application for a pension on behalf of a government
enployed doctor, on the ground, that the latter had been allowed the
private practice of his profession.[121] One official wrote that
'if Malta stood alone, I should think that the Governor's views might be 
adopted without much hesitation; but...how far a new rule can be recognised 
for Malta, without its being extended to other colonies also'[122]
was questionable. The fact was that this system had always been in
operation in Malta and it was only now that the colonial Office had
discovered that it existed. Nonetheless, Herbert Taylor held to a different
view from that of his colleagues. 'I think' he minuted,
'the circumstances of Malta should make it an exception to the ordinary 
rule, and we may do well not to disturb an arrangement which is apparently 
economical and efficient.'[123]
The Secretary of State had concurred with Taylor but stressed that he would
resist its introduction in other colonies.[124] Julyan himself was inclined
towards a system whereby competent outsiders were paid fees for such work
as was actually performed by them on behalf of the department.[125]
Another government section which Julyan wished to see placed under the
charge of the Controller of Charitable Institutions, with strict
instructions to keep down by every means its expenditure, was the Sanitary
Office. This department was created in 1875 when policies which aimed to
improve the sanitary condition of Malta were introduced. Julyan considered
'some organisation of the sort...doubtlessly necessary',[126] but felt that
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many of the services it provided could be equally performed within existing 
departments. Furthermore, he saw in this office
'rather more than the germs of a very large and costly addition to the 
number of Government Departments.'[127]
Already twenty-four persons, some of them holding other offices in the 
administration, were receiving salaries from this department to the amount 
of £690 per annum. Julyan advised, therefore, that the inordinate growth of 
this 'enfant terrible among the organisations for spending money in Malta' 
should be resisted 'by all legitimate means.'
Having concluded his examination of the so-called Charitable 
Institutions Julyan turned his attention to the Police Department and the 
Judiciary. As we have seen earlier Julyan favoured the transfer of both the 
Marine Police branch and of the Police Physicians from the Police 
Department to the Port Department and the charitable Institutions 
respectively. This left him with the task of examining the Interior Police 
branch. Julyan stated that while he was unable to say whether its existing 
numerical strength was sufficient, its quality left much to be desired. The 
Commissioner found that the service was held in very low esteem by the 
public and that applicants for admission were quite often of a questionable 
character. Neither were members given any sort of training. Nor were they 
subjected to a proper discipline and they were free to relinquish their 
employment merely at a day's notice. Two-thirds of them were unable to 
write their own names and nearly all were ignorant of the English language. 
Julyan concluded that the condition of the force was
'evidently by no means such as should be expected in a body of men intended 
to protect the public against evil-doers.'[128]
The solution he proposed, apart from proper training and discipline, was to
attract recruits 'from a more respectable portion of the community' even if
this meant paying higher salaries. But of more importance was the
appointment of a suitable head. The practice of appointing one or another
of the Chief Clerks by way of promotion, Julyan considered misguided. He
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wrote, that
'the duties of a Superintendent of Police are such that, without special 
training, he can hardly be expected to interest himself in the work 
entrusted to him, or...to secure the assistance of his subordinates.'
He preferred to see at the head of this corps an officer with military
training and he believed that a suitable individual could be found in one
of the local regiments.[129]
When examining the Courts of Justice, Julyan declared that no legal
'knowledge is requisite to see that this machinery is far more elaborate 
and cumbersome than it need be, and that any improvement that can be 
effected in it must be a great advantage'[130]
to one of the poorest communities in the British Empire. He blamed for this
state of affairs both the government, for making litigation easy, and the
lawyers, for encouraging it, although he found the latter's case wholly 
understandable. He observed that,
'in an island so oversupplied with lawyers as Malta, it is hardly 
surprising that efforts of all sorts should be made to promote litigation, 
but it appears...to be the duty of the Government, in the interests of the 
unfortunate suitors themselves, most decidedly to discourage such 
practices.'
The Government could do this in his opinion, in three ways. First, by
abolishing the right of appeal against the decisions of either the City or
district Magistrates Courts when the amount was trivial. Second, by
ensuring, as was not the case, that all judicial fees be promptly paid.
Third, that as in other countries, the parties to every suit should be
required to furnish the necessary copies of all original papers.[131]
'ihe system of doing gratuitously for the public what it ought to do for
itself...should be systematically discouraged throughout this and all other 
branches of the public service'
insisted Julyan, for this was in his view 'a special affliction in 
Malta.'[132]
Altogether the judicial establishments of Malta consisted of two types
of inferior courts and five superior courts, and the Crown Advocate's
establishment, employing nearly one-hundred and thirty employees at an
annual cost, exclusive of pensions and buildings, of £15,631. The first of
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the inferior courts was that of the Syndics, or districts courts. These had 
come into existence in 1839 after Austin and Lewis had recommended the 
aboliton of the office of Lord Lieutenant. Each was presided over by an 
advocate, his duties being those of a civil magistrate, senior Police 
Officer, representative of the Land Revenue and Public Works Department, 
and of the Department of Charitable Institutions, and in 'a 
quasi-patriarchal nature'[133] of village head. Julyan thought that the 
judicial duties of these 'amiable and intelligent "heads of the villages"' 
should be enlarged and that their designation be changed from Syndic to 
District Magistrate. In fact Julyan wished to transfer to these courts some 
of the duties, such as those of deciding contraventions and minor offences, 
of the City Magistrates Courts, the second type of inferior courts in 
Malta. In compensation, he recommended that the geographic jurisdiction of 
the latter courts be extended to include some of the new suburbs of 
Valletta and the three Cities, notably Sliema, Msida, and zabbar. On the 
one hand, however, in the interests of efficiency, he proposed that 
District Magistrates should in future be eligible for promotion as City 
Magistrates and that the salaries of the latter should be augmented. On the 
other hand, in the interests of justice, he recommended the introduction of 
a rule
'prescribing a triennial interchange of districts to the District 
Magistrates in order that there may be no risk of local associations 
interfering with the impartial exercise of their powers.'[134]
The Superior Courts of Malta consisted of a Criminal Court, a Civil
Court, divided into First and Second Halls, a Commercial Court, and a Court
of Appeal. In his report Julyan gave warning that the reforms which he
intended to propose might have to be 'enforced',[135] for he expected
strong opposition to them from the legal profession, as well as the civil
service. His recommendations were indeed radical - abolition of the
Commerical Court and of the Second Hall of the Civil Court - although in
every case Julyan was supported by Sir Antonio Micallef, the President of
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the Court of Appeal and Chief Justice.[136] Apart from the fact that the 
work done in these courts could easily be accommodated in the remaining 
three courts of justice, their abolition, the Commissioner argued, tended 
to
'facilitate a complete revision of their clerical and semi-clerical 
establishments, and lead ultimately to a considerable reduction in 
staff.'[137]
Indeed, Julyan estimated that at least the services of six clerks and three 
copyists would no longer be necessary, a net saving to the government of 
around £600 a year. When to these one added the savings arising from other 
reforms, such as the requirement that Magistrates should take down the 
depositions themselves, thus removing the need for the retention of other 
clerks, and the transfer to the Public Registry of the work done in the 
Court Registries, he expected overall economies of over £1,000 within this 
branch of the public service.
The Crown Advocate's establishment attracted Julyan's attention more
as a consequence of the controversy surrounding the holder of its chief
office than for any other reason. But having no wish to add fuel to this
controversy, in his formal report, the Commissioner restricted his comments
to the duties and qualities fo the Crown Advocate. These duties were in
theory of a legal character. The Crown Advocate, wrote Julyan, was
'largely responsible for the conduct of prosecutions...as counsel for the 
Government...has charge of all its civil suits; he is, moreover, its legal 
adviser on all other affairs...prepares all its legislative regulations, 
and has a very large share in all legislative schemes presented to the 
Council of Government and submitted to Her Majesty's Secretary of 
State'.[138]
In practice, however, because the occupant of that office - Sir Adrian 
Dingli - was 'a gentleman of such rare ability and well-earned eminence', 
other duties and responsibilities had been over time added to his legal 
chores. He had become in fact
'one of the principal advisers and agents of the Governor on all matters of 
public importance.'
Julyan opined that both the local and the home governments had every
319
reason to 'congratulate themselves on commanding the services of so
talented an auxiliary', but added quickly that, when those services were no 
longer available, his successor's duties 'should be strictly restricted in 
accordance with the rank and functions assigned to him by law.' He 
expressed the hope that this occasion may yet be 'very distant.' In a
private letter to the Secretary of State, however, Julyan advised that, at
the first opportunity, 'hopefully at no distant date',[139] the government 
should promote Dingli to the position of Judge and President of the court 
of Appeal and, was Dingli to refuse promotion, then the Colonial Office
should not hesitate to force it upon him.
The reasons for this insistence were graphically stated in the rest of 
the letter. Julyan argued that Dingli's 'supposed irresistible influence 
over all Governors and his alleged Machiavelian tendencies in politics' had 
rendered him 'the most unpopular public man in the Island, and every 
distasteful measure' by the government was attributed - with much injustice 
thought the commissioner - to him. So entrenched in the public mind was 
this belief that, although Dingli was a brilliant man and an asset to any 
government, it tended to neutralize the value of his real abilities and to 
add to the political difficulties of the government. Furthermore, Julyan 
expected Dingli to be one of the leading opponents of his proposals, a view 
in which the colonial Office concurred.[140]
Having examined the revenue, charitable and legal departments, Julyan
turned his attention to the Audit Department, treating it last because, in
his own words, it had 'to do with all the others.'[141] In fact the
Commissioner found that the system practised in Malta, whereby the accounts
of departments were submitted for audit in one inclusive statement, tended
to defeat the raison d'etre for the very existence of this establishment.
It was by no means a state of affairs unbeknown to either the local or home
authorities. In 1876, Straubenzee, supported by the elected members, had
requested Colonial Office permission to altogether abolish 'the almost
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sinecure office of Auditor-General'.[142] Their request was, however,
rejected on the ground that upon the thoroughness of the Audit depended
'the effective financial administration of the Government.'[143] Julyan
fully concurred with this view, arguing that it was 'most desirable that an
independent audit should be preserved',[144] especially since there were in
Malta no professional accountants or auditors to whom the periodic
examination of public accounts could be entrusted. It was, therefore, the
only 'safe course open to the Government.' Julyan's solution was threefold.
First, he recommended that the Auditor-General should also be appointed
Director of contracts with responsibility for chairing the contract
Committee, for preparing all the details prior to the approval of tenders,
and for the formal completion of the documents. Second, that the
responsibility for preparing all papers connected with the Annual and
Supplementary Estimates should be transferred from the Chief Secretary's
Office to that of the Auditor. Once the papers had been prepared they were
to be submitted to a Finance Committee - yet to be created - composed of
the Chief Secretary as Chairman, the Auditor-General himself, the
Receiver-General and the Collector of Customs. It was to be the Auditor's
duty to tabulate the estimates, explain their details to the Finance
Committee and subsequently, as a member of the Council of Government,
expound the several items for the approval of the latter body. Finally,
Julyan recommended that the Auditor-General should be made responsible for
collecting all materials necessary for the publication of the Government
Gazette and the Annual Blue Book,[145] tasks normally carried out by the
Chief Secretary's Office. It becomes apparent from the foregoing
propositions that JuyIan's intention was to alter the role of the
Audit-Office from one of nominal financial policeman to one with extensive
opportunity for overview. He intended the Contract Committee and the
Finance Committe, in which the Audit-Office was to have the leading role,
as regulatory bodies making sure that no measure involving the expenditure
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of public funds was adopted without either the knowledge or consent of the 
Auditor-General.
Other issues, of a more general nature, but which Julyan felt required 
examination including the existing system of promotion, revision of the 
Civil List, and the amalgamation of the whole clerical staff into classes. 
In a brief note to Julyan, Victor Houlton, the Chief Secretary, had 
asserted, that the system of departmental promotion up to clerk No. 1 and 
of inter-departmental promotion, according to seniority but coupled with 
efficiency, from Chief Clerk upwards
'had always worked admirably well, both in the interest of the public and 
of the civil servants'.[146]
In contrast, the Commissioner dismissed the system as nothing more than a 
combination of 'somewhat arbitrary arrangements'[147] and felt that the 
clerks had every reason to be dissatisfied with their prospects. Like 
Rowsell, he found that, in Malta,
'chance or favour can have an important effect in determining the prospects
of different Clerks for promotion.'[148]
A clerk who happened to be in a department in which several vacancies
occurred in a relatively short period of time succeeded in attaining the
position of Clerk No. 1 in his department before other clerks who, though
senior to him in the service, remained behind owing to the fact that few
vacancies had arisin in their departments. Julyan demonstrated this
practically, by examining the progress made by clerks appointed in 1857 and
1863. In each case, he found, that the most junior of the entrants enjoyed
a position and a salary which were higher or equal to those of the most
senior entrant in his year and, at times, of those of preceding years.
Julyan argued that the merits of the advantaged individuals, though full of
promise, did not lessen 'the just grievances of the men who have been
practically...superseded'.[149] Some form of redress was obtained when a
vacancy for a Chief Clerkship occurred, for the local government had a
tendency of appointing to it the most senior clerk. But, it often happened
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that, whenever such a vacancy did arise it generally did so in some 
department in which the prospective candidate had never served and 
consequently could not 'be expected to show any particular aptitude' 
towards its duties. This, Julyan contended, was 'another evil consequence 
of the existing arrangements, affecting the Government rather than its 
employes.'
Julyan thought that, 'the only equitable and expedient arrangement', 
in such a small place like Malta where each department had only a small 
number of clerks, was to
'constitute one general establishment of Clerks, all of whom, if they 
display an average amount of intelligence and industry, shall have a right 
to advance towards the highest emoluments that the Government can afford to 
pay them, and who may look forward to ultimately earning, by special 
industry and intelligence, promotion to the superior position held by Heads 
of Departments.'
He proposed, therefore, that as a first step 'all distinctive titles such 
as Chief Clerk, Clerk No. 1, Corrputist' and so on, be abolishd and that 
other titles, such as Registrars and Assistant-Registrars be retained only 
for convenience of reference without, however, 'constituting any barrier 
between their holders and other clerks.' Second, that the whole clerical 
establishment be divided into four classes consisting of fifteen clerks 
each (see below). This meant that the existing establishment of ninety-five 
full-time clerks would have to be reduced over time to sixty clerks. Julyan 
cautioned that, in fairness to those involved, this could only be achieved 
gradually. Indeed, there was a number of 'elderly Civil Servants who, from 
their ignorance of the English language, or from other defects',[150] were 
comparatively useless and the Commissioner believed that they could be 
pensioned right away. But there were others, much younger and more capable, 
whose offices would become redundant as a result of the reforms he 










Fourth £60 £4 £80
Third £90 £5 £120
Second £130 £5 £180
First £190 £10 £250
Finally, whenever a vacancy occurred, promotion from one class to 
another was to be by seniority, provided the Governor was satisfied, by the 
Head of Department in which the officer in line for promotion was serving, 
that he was 'in all respects worthy of advancement'.[151] Julyan stressed 
that great care should be taken to see 'that none but suitable men are 
promoted', and that 'the rigour of selection should be increased for each
higher grade'. Julyan, however, wished the government to place less
emphasis on seniority when it came to selecting Heads of Departments. In a
private letter to the Secretary of State he had stated that, apart from
Dingli and Inglott,
'Heads of Departments were men of inferior intellectual capacity, 
possessing little or no power of organization, and quite unfitted to 
render...assistance and advice in matters connected with the civil 
Administration of the Island.'[152]
Neither were the Chief Clerks, from whom Heads of Departments were normally 
chosen any better, affording, in his view, 'but scant material out of which 
to form inproved successors.' Nor did he consider the few British officers 
enployed in the civil service of the island to be superior to their Maltese 
colleagues. He wrote that
'truth conpels me to add that the natives...have little or nothing to learn 
in the management of their respective Departments from the Englishmen now 
in the service.'[153]
It was among those recruited after 1857 that, Julyan believed, the
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government had to look to in the future to find suitable Heads of 
Departments. Julyan told Hicks Beach that 'the competitive system' had 
given to the service in Malta
'a better class of clerks generally than those who are now in the front
ranks and after these younger men shall have attained somewhat more
official experience',
he thought it possible to choose from among them.[154] Thus, in his Report 
he recommended that, in choosing Heads of Departments, the authorities 
should
'not only feel themselves at liberty, but should make it their duty, to 
choose for each post the fittest man that can be found, in whatever grade 
or branch of the service he may be,.'[155]
The Commissioner also hoped that the reductions he had proposed would 
make a slight and gradual increase in salaries possible. He believed that 
his scheme, by allocating salaries on the basis of classes rather than on 
the basis of seniority in a given department, was much fairer, giving to 
all a greater prospect of a higher salary after long service than they 
could expect under the prevailing system. Moreover, he thought it right 
that, clerks who had been in the service for fifteen or twenty years,
should 'secure most advantage'[156] from the proposed salary scales for 
each class. He hoped that this would somehow serve to relieve them,
burdened as many of them were with large families, from their difficult 
financial situation. Nevertheless, Julyan argued that the improvement in 
salaries could have been more marked were it not for the government's lack 
of foresight in allowing itself to be burdened with a large number of 
subordinate employees, such as storekeepers, gaugers, warders, nurses, 
boatmen and messengers, many of whom, 'being permanent servants of the 
Government',[157] were entitled to regular wages and the prospect of 
pensions. He insisted, like Rowsell, that the local government should be 
made to abandon this practice, 'in Malta' he wrote,
'even more than in many other colonies, there is a constant effort to 
fasten upon the Government the responsibility of providing for crowds of 
dependents, who are often no better than pensioners long before they are 
formally superannuated; but it is almost idle to protest against this
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communistic tendency unless the Government is itself firm and prudent 
enough to resist it.'
He proposed, therefore, that as soon as the proposed reforms were carried 
into effect, a new Civil List identifying the names and salaries of all 
civil servants and professional assistants be drawn up and that no increase 
be allowed to it without the sanction of the Secretary of State.
The final item for inquiry on Julyan's agenda and one which he treats 
in the final section of his report was that concerning the desirability of 
promoting the use of English as the official language of the colony. The 
Commissioner thought it regretable that so little had been done, in almost 
eighty years of British rule, to foster the English language among the 
Maltese. Ineffectual as it had proved to be, Maitland's minute of 1820 had 
remained virtually the only official statement of policy in support of 
English. Worse still, indeed 'a great error',[158] in the opinion of 
Julyan, was Lewis's and Austin's recommendation that Italian should be 
preferred over English on the ground of its alleged usefulness for purposes 
of trade and from the general proximity of Malta to Italy and Sicily. By 
this 'mistaken tolerance'[159] he continued,
'political agitators have been assisted in gaining a few converts to their 
theory that the Maltese...are akin to the Italians, and ought to look 
forward to a union with the Kingdom of Italy instead of that of Great 
Britain'.
Reality, he argued, demonstrated conclusively that there was no foundation 
to this theory. According to the Census of 1861, only one person in nine 
professed to speak Italian and only one in ten of the population to be able 
to write it. There was, therefore, no real justification for continuing 
with the policy of preferring Italian as the official language of the 
colony.
In addition to political dangers, ignorance of the English language
tended, according to the Commissioner, to debar the local population from
participation in the advantages that membership of the British Empire was
supposed to confer, notably in the field of emigration. Despite their known
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industry and frugality, a large proportion of the rapdily expanding 
population seemed 'condemned' to a 'painful struggle for existence'[160] as 
the resources of the Island were far from adequate for its support. Julyan 
spoke of the alarming increase of pauperism, and the yet more 'alarming 
extent of infant mortality', and concluded that emigration appeared to be 
the only corrective avenue. But this, in his opinion, was obstructed by the 
'insular prejudice which is fomented by the lack of sympathy with English 
institutions and habits.' Knowledge of the English language, Julyan 
believed, would remove this prejudice and eventually induce many young 
people to escape starvation at home by seeking better fields for enterprise 
in other British colonies. He was convinced, therefore, that the Government 
owed it to
'them as well as to itself to promote among the people, by all fair means, 
a knowledge of the only language that can really help them...'[161]
The most direct action that the local government could take to 
achieve this aim was,
'to insist on all its employes being thoroughly acquainted with English, 
and using it constantly, to the exclusion as far as possible of all other 
languages, in their relations with the public.'
The public service did appear to be the best vehicle by which the study of 
English could be promoted. First, civil service clerkships and other public 
offices were greatly sought after by young Maltese, there being, as Julyan 
found, a great number of candidates for every vacancy. Second, as a result 
of the more stringent requirements imposed upon all candidates for 
admission into the Civil Service by competitive examinations, proficiency 
in English among educated young Maltese aspirants for office had improved 
considerably. Indeed, as we shall see in the following Chapter, by 1878
pressure was mounting on the local government to persuade London to permit
Maltese wishing to compete for commissions in the Army and Navy, or for
offices in the Home or Indian Civil Service,
'to be examined in Malta under such regulations as the Civil Service
Commission may deem expedient to lay down.'[162]
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Twenty years earlier, when Governor Reid had first confronted Maltese
graduates with the examination papers for the Home and Indian Civil
Service, they had rejected the idea they could compete, claiming that their
academic level was far too inferior to that of British candidates.[163] But
Juylan also found that the practice of keeping books and preparing
documents in Italian, as well as the general habit of clerks of conversing,
while at work, in Maltese and Italian tended to encourage those proficient
in English to forget nearly all they knew. The Commissioner recommended,
therefore, that English should become the sole language of administration.
Second, that in future, no communication with the public be made in
Italian. Third, that no demand for payment or other claim upon the
Government be accepted unless prepared in English. Fourth, that the number
of marks for English language in competitive examinations be appreciably
higher than for Italian. Finally, he recommended that no clerk be eligible
for promotion from one class to another and no Head of Department or
professional officer be appointed, unless he had acquired and retained a
thorough knowledge of English. Having made his recommendations the
Commissioner, however, declared himself opposed to the idea that the use of
Italian among the educated classes should be 'in any way forcibly
restrained'!164] or that the Maltese language should be eradicated. Indeed,
he warned, that any attemmpt to interfere with the colloquial use of
Maltese 'would certainly be injudicious and productive of nothing but
dissatisfaction among the people.'[165]
In forwarding his Report to Hicks Beach, Secretary of state for the
Colonies, Julyan stressed that the success or failure of his
recommendations depended largely on the attitude adopted by Victor Houlton,
the Chief Secretary, and by Adrian Dingli, the Crown Advocate. He believed
that both these public officers, whom he considered to be 'primarily
responsible for the present state of the Civil Establishments' were
opponents of reform, and therefore, not to be depended upon. He proposed,
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consequently, that such recommendations as met with the approval of the 
Secretary of State and which did not involve amendments to existing laws, 
were not to remain 'optional with the local authorities'!166] or dealt with 
in the Council of Government, but were to be implemented through 
instructions from the Colonial Office.
THE KEENAN MISSION
Penrose Julyan had been specifically barred, by his instructions, from 
inquiring into the educational establishments of Malta, this task having 
already been assigned to Patrick Keenan, the Resident Commissioner of 
National Education in Ireland.[167] Keenan's Report, submitted in June
1879, three months after Julyan had presented his, would have had little 
direct relevance for this study were it not that its recommendations became 
the subject of serious political controversy and, eventually, of crisis. 
Indeed, it requires a cursory look here for, as we have seen on several 
earlier occasions, in a bureaucractically governed society political
conflict, whatever its causes, tends to have some impact on the public 
service of that society. For brevity's sake, Keenan's proposals may be
divided into five issues. First, that in primary schools the medium of 
education should be Maltese and that pupils were to be taught to read their 
native tongue from new Maltese lesson books. The Maltese to be taught to 
pupils, however, was to be purified in order to bring it nearer to Arabic. 
Second, that the existing system of requiring children to learn two foreign 
languages - Italian and English - was to be abolished. English only was to 
be taught, but through the medium of Maltese. Italian was to be considered 
as an extra branch of study. Third, that as from 1st January 1881 all 
primary school teachers should be qualified to teach English and that in
future all pupils at the Lyceum and the University should be taught through 
the medium of English. Fourth, that all educational fees should be 
increased and that the number of University professors be reduced from 
twelve to five. Finally, a proper department of education was to be
established.[168]
From the above recommendations it is evident that Keenan's intentions 
were both pedagogic and political. In the first instance, by proposing that 
Maltese, the only language spoken by the labouring poor and their children, 
should be the first language of education, the Commissioner hoped to make 
education truly available and effective among this class. Keenan himself 
found, that as the medium of education was Italian, a foreign language 
with which the children of the labouring poor were generally unfamiliar, 
the latter failed to benefit from schooling. In the circumstances of Malta, 
where enployment opportunities for the educated sons of the middle classes 
were few and far between, this proposal struck at their very interests. But 
by proposing that the Maltese language taught in schools should be purified 
by having all Latin words ostracized from it, he involved himself in the 
controversy than brewing as to whether the Maltese were descendants of 
Italian settlers, and hence, European in origin, or Arabs or, indeed, as 
some claimed, of Phoenician stock. Finally, by proposing that English, 
rather than Italian should be taught in schools and other institutions of 
higher learning, Keenan sought, mainly, to help secure future British 
strategic interests in Malta.
Rowsell's Report on the taxation and expenditure of the government of
Malta and Julyan's Report on the civil and clerical establishments tend to
betray a strong sense of annoyance with the state of affairs which they
found there, but particularly with its extensive system of paternalism. It
was a system which served or benefited every so-called class of Maltese
society, although, as Rowsell demonstrated, it was the labouring poor who
carried the biggest share of the burden in its upkeep. But, as every class
was, in economic terms, relatively poor, dependence on the state tended to
be widespread. Julyan, it may be said, seemed to think, although he never
expressly said so, that the whole system had given rise to a vicious circle
of vested interests from which it was difficult for Maltese society to free
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itself. This is particularly evident from the Commissioner's observations 
regarding the Police Physicians' establishment. There was, therefore, a 
large hint of reservation in the Reports of both Commissioners as to the 
chances of their proposed reforms being implemented. Strong opposition was, 
in fact, expected and, as we saw, Rowsell did personally experience a taste 
of the strong emotions that fear of retrenchment or reform could arouse 
among the population, even among those groups which, in the opinion of the 
Commissioners, had most to gain from the reform.
Keenan's Report too gave rise to staunch opposition and, eventually, 
Maltese society was to become divided into two unequal camps: that of the 
minority "Riformisti" faction led by Savona and later by Strickland, and 
that of the larger "Anti-Riformisti" party led by Fortunato Mizzi and later 
by his son Enrico. The former supported Rowsell's taxation proposals and 
Keenan's anglicization drive while the latter naturally opposed them. We 
shall trace, in the following Chapter, the direction that this conflict 
took as the British government sought to implement the recommendations made 
by Julyan and Keenan. We shall also examine the implications that this 
conflict had for the public service and how these were accentuated by 
international political developments and British strategic needs in Malta.
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CHAPTER TEN
IN THE EYE OF THE STORM: THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE*. 1879-1903
In the years 1878-1879, with the Reports of all three Commissioners in
its hands, Colonial Office attention was directed at their evaluation and
to questions connected with their implementation. This evaluation, as we
shall see in this Chapter, was somewhat conditioned by the growing
superpowers rivalry[1] and the prospect of a second Anglo-Russian war.[2]
As each Report arrived on their desks colonial officials discussed their
contents, first within the department, and later with the Governor and his
officials in Malta. Once a decision had been reached, instructions were
usually sent out to the Governor advising him on how to proceed. But as
Hyder has observed, the initial decision is merely the starting-point of
the policy process and various factors - organisational, environmental,
political and others - gain greater prominence at the implementation
stage.[3] Others have argued that successful policy implementation, or
reform, must take stock of the attitudes and vested interests of the
implementing agency's staff, of its clients, and of the general public.[4]
These actors are not, as it is sometimes supposed, neutral agents within a
rational policy.process. But, it must also be said that, independently of
existing attitudes or levels of support or opposition, not infrequently,
policy success or failure is conditioned by the abilities of those
entrusted with its implementation. These views receive strong support in
this Chapter for it will be shown that a large number of the reforms
endorsed by the Colonial Office were either never implemented[5] or, as
Julyan himself put it, were 'improved out of existence'.[6] Resistance to
change came from Governors and civil servants as well as political leaders
and, frequently, from a coalition of civil servants and politicians. Having
said that, however, it must also be said that similar patterns applied in
the case of reforms which enjoyed the support of one group or both. At this
stage two examples may suffice. First, we have already seen in the previous
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Chapter, how a coalition of civil servants and all but one of the elected 
members, had successfully defeated Colonial Office efforts to reform the 
bread tax.[7] Second, we shall see below, that, in 1880, Government and 
Opposition were to join together to press the colonial Office to advance, 
by six months, the implementation of Julyan's proposed amalgamation and 
division of the clerical establishment into classes.[8]
Colonial Office officials were not oblivious to these difficulties. 
They expected opposition from Houlton, Dingli and other civil servants in 
Malta[9] but, very often, they viewed opposition to reform not as a defence 
of vested interests, but as an intrinsic racial characteristic of the 
Maltese. Thus, Herbert advised Hicks Beach, that 'public dissemination and 
discussion' of Julyan's Report,
'would destroy its usefulness and greatly increase the difficulty of 
carrying out either the suggested reforms or those modifications of them
which in many cases may be found preferable'
on the ground that it was 'quite unsuitable for publication among an 
Oriental community.'[10] For his part, Hicks Beach expected political 
opposition to Julyan's Report and informed the Governor that, if necessary, 
he was prepared to legislate by Orders-in-Council in order to inplement the 
reforms.[11] .
There were, in fact, two sides to each of the commissioners' Reports.
One side, which formed the greater bulk of the Reports, aimed for a reform
of systems and organizations. Its second feature can best be described as a
political statement. The first is easily discernable, for the primary
concern of each Commission was with reform of one kind or another.
Rowsell's task, for example, was to propose reforms in the existing system
of taxation in Malta. He did not, as we have seen, recommend a departure
from the existing system of indirect taxation to one based on more direct
methods, such as an income tax. He found in Malta, as the Royal Commissions
of 1812 and of 1836 had found, too much opposition on this score.[12] He
proposed, instead, a shift in emphasis and in the incidence of taxation on
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the different classes of society. But Rowsell also suggested certain 
reforms in the organization of the civil service of the island, such as its 
division into classes, and made a strong appeal for a reform in the 
educational system in Malta. The bulk of Julyan's Report was concerned with 
changing practices and structures within the public service itself. It was, 
according to Herbert at the Colonial Office, a report which probed and laid 
bare 'the body politic'[13] in a useful manner. Julyan examined, as we saw, 
every department of government and recommended reforms. He also suggested 
reforms in the way promotions in the civil service were conferred and 
expanded on Rowsell's proposed division of the service into classes. 
Keenan's main concern was with systems, i.e. the reform of the system of
public education to be found in Malta at the time. To this he dedicated the
(
best part of his Report. But he too attended to questions of organization 
and, as we have seen, proposed the creation of a Department of Education. 
This meant, in practice, that public education would no longer be 
considered as a quasi-charitable undertaking but as an activity in its own 
right.
The second element of the Reports, i.e. their political statement, is
equally readily discernable. In Julyan's and Keenan's case, it concerned
language and, eventually gave rise to what has become known as the
"language question". Both men were of the view that the solution to Malta's
social and economic problems, as well as of those connected with British
strategic interests in Malta, was to be found in the adoption of a vigorous
policy of anglicization. Hence, Julyan wrote not only of the benefits that
such a policy would confer, mainly through the creation of prospects for
emigration to more prosperous portions of the Empire, but of the dangers
that it would help to combat, notably of Maltese aspiration for unification
with Italy. In his Report Rowsell never said as much but, in an article on
Malta, which he published in the August 1878 edition of 'Nineteenth
Century', he left no doubt as to his position on the subject, 'it is', he
341
wrote,
'a curious instance of English deference to established facts that 
Italian...established [in Malta] for reasons which have passed away and by 
a government [the Order of St John] which has been blotted out, is still 
the language of the Courts, is still allowed to be used in the Legislative 
Council, though not understood by the bulk of the people, nor by the 
English.'[14]
The two elements outlined above are treated, were feasible, as two 
separate themes in this Chapter, colonial Office attempts to implement the 
administrative reforms proposed by Julyan, and in sane instances, by 
Keenan, will be discussed first. We shall see that, roughly speaking, they 
occupied the period 1879 to 1883, although by 1882 colonial officials could 
already gauge the kind of results that their efforts had obtained.[15] The 
second theme covers the period from about 1883, the time when opposition to 
the Government's language policy first became truly organized, to 1903 at 
which stage the crisis over language between Malta and Britain reached its 
climax. It is a fairly long period during which several developments, 
nearly all having some bearing on the public service, took place.
In the first instance, there was the formation of the
wanti-riformistin faction which, under the leadership of lawyer Fortunato
Mizzi, provided stiff opposition to most of the reforms proposed by the
Commissioners. But theirr principal aim was to have Italian language
retained as the official language of Malta. They were not opposed to a
wider diffusion of English. Indeed, some of them had been active in
promoting the establishment of a fee-paying English school run by the
English Jesuits.[16] They also accepted that a good knowledge of English
would increase the chances of educated Maltese finding employment in Malta
and other parts of the Empire. They, in fact, strongly supported Savona's
efforts to induce the British Government to allow the holding, in Malta, of
the examinations for commissions in the British Army and Navy, and for the
Home and Indian Civil Service.[17] In other words, their opposition to
anglicization sprang from a defence of vested interests. Frendo, in his
study of Maltese political parties admits as much but he prefers to see it
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mainly as part of the struggle for greater constitutional liberties.[18]
Many civil servants because the language issue touched their interests 
too, openly sympathized with the stance of the opposition. But, this 
support could only be maintained at a price. As civil servants constituted 
a large proportion of the electorate the anti-riformisti found that on 
issues which touched directly on the private interests of public servants 
they were obliged to adopt positions - especially where salaries were 
concerned - dictated by these same public servants. We shall see, 
therefore, that as a result of these two factors, discipline in the public 
service was to become seriously affected.
A second inportant development was the introduction, in 1887, of
Representative Government. It was a measure which defied all logic. After
1883 Government and opposition became locked in a struggle over the
"language question". The British Government, although willing to make
concessions in favour of the Italian language, was not prepared to abandon
its policy of making English the official language, and eventually the
second language, after Maltese, of Malta. As one colonial official put it,
it was 'not only Imperial Interests but Inperial Duty' that called on
Britain 'to see that the language of the Empire holds its proper - that is
an advantageous - place'[19] in the educational curriculum of dependency.
But the elected members proved equally intransigent in their stand.
Gradually, but systematically, the "anti-reformisti" adopted a course of
action which aimed to undermine what vestige of confidence of the people
might have had in the existing Council and ultimately, to bring its
business to a standstill. This policy led colonial officials and Heads of
Departments to the conculsion, that the remedy for Malta's political
problems, was the withdrawal of the 1849 Constitution and the
re-institution of a nominated advisory Council.[20] Events seemed destined
to follow this direction when Sir Henry Holland, then Secretary of State
for the Colonies, was swayed by a Maltese plan for representative
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government.[21]
Representative government brought with it a short respite in the 
conflict and efforts were made, by both sides, to heal some of the damage 
inflicted on the civil service. Within less than a year a new 
reorganisation of the clerical staff, of the Police Physicians staff, of 
the Public Works Department, and of the Police had been undertaken. But, by 
1892, agitation for responsible government was already threatening the 1887 
Constitution. Worse still, by 1895, the "language question" was again to be 
found at the top of the political agenda. As the conflict mounted the 
elected members found, that the earlier Colonial Office disposition to make 
concessions to Malta, had all but dissipated. Instead, they found a 
resolute Joseph Chamberlain who, as secretary of state for the colonies 
held, as Lord Wellington had done in the 1840s, that giving a constitution 
to Malta was the same as giving a Constitution to a man-of-war.[22] He was 
determined, therefore, that either the elected members work the existing 
constitution or that he would rescind it. In 1903 he chose the latter 
course.
The conflict created many difficulties for the public service,
especially for its most senior officers. The "anti-riformisti" accusation,
for example, that Heads of Departments were nothing less than the
collaborators of a 'military despotism'[23] forced many of them to abandon
their residences in Valletta and set up house, across Marsamxett Harbour,
in Sliema. Sliema, today Malta's largest town, became the "English" town
while Valletta retained its latin-Italianate character.[24] Furthermore,
both sides in the struggle viewed the public service as some kind to a
mercenary army which could be induced, for a reward, to abandon one general
and join forces with his enemy. Thus, both sides sought to gain from the
Colonial Office as many concessions for public servants as possible.,-
Secretaries of state and Colonial Office officials repeatedly expressed
despair at events in Malta,[25] but, fears that Governors in Malta might
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lose face with the people, led them eventually to approve their demands or
schemes.[26] Finally, the public itself was no less a target than public
servants were. Schemes, such as the building of new hsopitals, most of them
involving large expenditure, were undertaken by the government in an effort
to gain popular support from among the common people. In the last decade of
the nineteenth century, for example, because of the great number of public
works being undertaken, workers had to be brought over from Sicily and
Spain as the normally over-abundant supply of Maltese labour proved
insufficient.[27] It was a policy, however, which eventually brought Malta
to the brink of bankruptcy.[28]
IMPLEMENTING JULYAN'S REPORT
A Colonial Office memorandum, written in 1882, records that Julyan's
Report on the civil establishments of Malta arrived at the office on the
7th April 1879 and that 'the Chapters relating to the several departments
were dealt with separately.'[29] Enclosed with this memo was a letter in
which Julyan acquainted Sir Michael Hicks Beach, Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 'with the impressions' that he had 'formed regarding the
personnel of the Government as represented by its more prominent
members.'[30] Its overall message was, that senior civil servants were,
either 'unequal' to the demands that the reform programme would impose upon
them, or 'unwilling' to give it loyal support.[31] It was only to Inglott,
according to Julyan, 'the only head of Department who appeared to entertain
any serious idea that reform of any kind was called for' and 'by far the
fittest man to give effect to the proposed changes',[32] that London could
look to with confidence for implementing its measures. It was not a
situation calculated to inspire great hopes for the future and Colonial
Office frustration with the prospect of reform in Malta was already clearly
evident about three months after Julyan wrote his letter.[33]
This frustration arose principally over the question of who should be
appointed to act as Director of Contracts. Julyan, as we have seen earlier,
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had proposed the creation of a Contracts Committee. This Committee was to 
be responsible for all government contracts which concerned the leasing of 
crown property and the general or individual needs of departments. He had 
proposed as its chairman, William Hoare, the Auditor-General, of whose 
abilities, however, Julyan entertained a low opinion. It was a view which 
received confirmation over the next ten years or so as one case of fraud, 
or of misappropriation of funds, followed on the heels of another.[34] 
Neither was it lost on Colonial officials. One of them observed, for 
exairple, in June 1879, that while it was a 'question of principle whether 
the duties of Director of Contracts are consistent with those of 
Auditor-General', Mr Hoare was
'so little competent that it may be a question whether he should be charged 
with the initiative in so important a department of the public 
Service.'[35]
It was decided, therefore, that Inglott, the office of Collector of
Customs, should be appointed Auditor-General and Director of Contracts with
Hoare taking over the new office of Receiver-General. This brought, 
however, a spirited reaction from Sir Arthur Borton, the Governor since 
1878, who condemned the transfer as 'objectionable and unadvisable.'[36] He 
reminded Hicks Beach that the office of Auditor 'had always been reserved 
for Englishmen' and that it would be 'as inexpedient as it would be
contrary to all precedent to place a native of Malta in that position.'[ 37]
Nor was it right, said the Governor, that a Maltese should be appointed to 
an office which, after its reorganisation, would rank 'second only to that 
of chief Secretary.'[38] For a time London held it position. Hoare, Hicks 
Beach wrote to Borton, must be held responsible for the defective working 
of the Auditor's office in Malta and, given
'the additional importance and responsibility which will be given to the 
Auditor-General by making him Director of Contracts',[39]
it was inconceivable that Mr Hoare should continue to hold that
appointment. Borton, however, remained adamant. The fault for the
accumulation of arrears in the Land Revenue and the Courts, he told Hicks
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Beach, should not be attributed to the Auditor-General but to the Heads - 
both Maltese - of those establishments. Hoare had done 'what the Government 
demanded of him' by calling attention to these arrears in his annual 
reports and if no action had been taken this was
'from motives of humanity to a very poor population,...undue deference to 
public opinion (which is greatly opposed to such severity), as well, as to 
constant appeals from members of the elected bench in favour of 
defaulters.'[40]
What in the end, however, decided the Colonial Office to retain Hoare as 
Auditor and to appoint him Director of Contracts was not Borton's claims, 
but the fact that Inglott refused the offices. He also refused the office 
of Receiver-General, as the new Head of the Land Revenue was to be styled. 
Some years later Fairfield, at the Colonial Office, minuted that Inglott 
had 'behaved badly' towards them by refusing to take 'upon himself the 
brunt of carrying out Sir P. Julyan's recommendations.'[41] But, despite 
Hicks Beach's warning that 'in the future' he expected, from Hoare, a 
higher 'degree of activity and efficiency in the discharge of his 
duties',[42] no real improvement was attained. Five years later another 
Secretary of State complained, that the 'Auditor-General does not duly 
appreciate the importance of the duties devolving upon him'[43] and was 
relieved to hear that Hoare intended 'to retire at once' thus, saving him, 
the 'unavoidable' duty of taking disciplinary action against him.
Many of the fears expressed by Julyan, however, continued to reassert
themselves over, the next decade or so. Two cases in particular gave rise to
debate and recrimination. The first concerned Mr Mamo, the Assistant
Collector of Land Revenue. The Governor, praising his 'zeal, assiduity, and
ability',[44] had recommended the latter for the office of
Receiver-General. But, before the Colonial Office had time to consider his
nomination, it was discovered that one of the senior clerks under Mamo had
voluntarily confessed, on his sick-bed, to have misappropriated
departmental funds.[45] The case roused the indignation of the Secretary of
State. He refused to consider Mamo's nomination for promotion and severely
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censured the Auditor-General who, it was discovered, that Hoare had failed
to conduct an audit on the books of the clerk concerned.[46] The Governor
continued, however, to see 'no reason to doubt' Mamo's integrity, but
admitted that the latter 'had not the moral courage to exercise proper
authority'.[47] He attributed this to the peculiar circumstances of a small
community in which, Borton said, few possessed 'a sufficiently keen sense
of public duty to override private friendships.'[48] It was decided,
therefore, to appoint to the newly created office of Receiver-General,
Sciortino, one of the senior clerks in the Chief Secretary's office whom
Julyan had singled as deserving of promotion.[49]
The matter did not end there for, when in May 1880 Lord Kimberley
replaced Hicks Beach at the Colonial Office, attempts were made by the
elected members of Council to have the issue reopened. The Governor
protested with the Secretary of State that the elected members had no
right, constitutionally, to 'express an opinion, the subject matter
belonging exclusively to the Executive,'[50] adding, however, that in a
small place like Malta public questions were generally viewed 'through the
medium of private and family interests.' Mamo had a very large family and
Borton claimed that it was this fact, rather than the merits of the case,
which had given rise to the memorial. Nonetheless, Borton said that he
shared the elected members view that Mamo had been 'a victim of
circumstances'[51] and expressed his readiness, at 'an early
opportunity.. .of giving him a fair promotion.'[52] But Lord Kimberley
remained firm. Mamo, he told the Governor, had been passed over because it
was felt that Sciortino was more fit to fill the office of Receiver-General
than the former would have been. Moreover, the elected members no right 'to
volunteer their advice in the filling of a Government appointment',
especially one which had not been 'officially made known'.[53]
The second case involved Monreal, the acting Controller of the
Charitable Institutions. Both Rowsell and Julyan in their separate reports,
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had called for a more efficient administration of this department. Rowsell 
thought that, what the department needed, was a firm hand on its management 
and had recommended that Inglott should be appointed its head. Julyan, 
because he preferred to see Inglott employed elsewhere and 'in the absence 
of a better man', recommended that Monreal, although 'not so able generally 
as one or two others',[54] but having experience of the work of the 
department, should be appointed its head. In confirming Monreal's
appointment the Secretary of State expressed his view as to the reforms 
that were required in the sphere of poqr relief. Although he envisaged 
great difficulties, he stressed that 'every endeavour'[55] was to be made 
to reduce the existing expenditure on charities. A new poor house had to be 
built, the number of Police physicians had to be reduced,[56] and a 
'provident dispensary', which would do away with 'the pauperizing system of 
gratuitious medical attendance',[57] established. The Governor promised to 
attend to these instructions but, in the end, nothing was accomplished. 
Neither the poor house nor the dispensary project were, in fact, followed 
up, while the number of police Physicians was not, because of the
opposition of the elected members and the 'representations of the 
Governor', reduced. [58] But, worst of all, no real improvement was 
registered in the administration of the Charitable Institutions.
In September 1886, Simmons, who two years earlier had succeeded Borton
as Governor, after surveying the performance of this department took the
unprecedented step of forcing the controller to retire at once from the
service. Stanhope, Kimberley's successor at the Colonial Office, thought
that 'it was a bad precedent' but, at the same time, an 'advantage to the
public service to be rid'[59] of Monreal. But not everyone agreed. The
elected members pressed the government to state whether Monreal had
requested to retire freely or whether he had been forced to do so. They
also pressed the government to place, on the Council table, the official
correspondence which had taken place on the subject, something which the
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government refused to do.[60] Others held up Monreal's forced retirement as
yet another instance 'of the oppression and injustice of the local
government'.[61] Colonial Office officials too thought that Monreal had
been harshly treated. One of them minuted that, while Monreal was 'no doubt
incompetent,...no one case against him appeared to amount to actual
delinquency or neglect of duty'.[62] However, 'the worst of it' was, the
official continued, that the Governor had failed to find this out earlier
and in 1885 had actually increased Monreal's salary from £400 to £500.
This, he concluded, had given Monreal a handle against the Governor and
made it difficult for them to support the latter. But the Secretary of
State was not prepared to weaken the authority of the Governor and although
he refuted, in a confidential despatch, what he called the latter's
exaggeration, he upheld the decision.[63]
These two cases were singular in that action was taken against
inefficient Heads of Departments. But they also represented a two-fold
pattern which was repeated in nearly every other department. First, reform
everywhere proved difficult. Second, interference from the elected bench in
questions of public service organization and discipline, once immune from
such pressures, had become an important factor. Even the reform of the Land
Revenue Department and the appointment of the Receiver-General had almost
succumbed to the manoeuvres of the elected members. When Rowsell's
suggestion that Crown property should either be sold or let on perpetual
lease was made public, the elected members sought, and obtained, the
creation of a select committee of Council to investigate the issue. It was
part of an attempt to forestall changes for, after nearly two years, the
Committee had not submitted its report.[64] London waited patiently but, in
February 1880, the Governor was instructed to proceed on the lines
indicated by Julyan - Rowsell's proposals having in the meantime been
rejected by London - by separating the Land Revenue branch from the Public
Works branch and to appoint, as we have seen, Sciortino as Receiver-General
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and Head of the revenue branch.[65] It was also decided, after a good deal 
of soul-searching, to appoint Galizia, the senior architect in the works 
branch, as Head of the newly independent Public Works Department.[66] His 
headship, as Julyan predicted,[67] was not particularly successful and in 
1888, when Galizia retired, the Governor sought to replace him by Mr 
Chadwick, an English engineer, who had been sent to Malta to assist the 
Government with the setting up of a Water Works Department. Although 
Chadwick's appointment was to be for five years only, Council members, not 
wishing to be seen preferring an outsider to a local candidate, rejected 
the proposal.[68]
In their individual reports Rowsell and Julyan had recommended the 
suppression of the Government Printing Office. Hicks Beach thoroughly 
agreed and Borton was instructed to implement the proposal. The Governor 
promised to do as instructed but, when pressed to act by the Colonial 
Office, he raised many of the objections which, forty years earlier, had 
been raised by Bouverie. The government, he argued, required a press of its 
own to print papers not intended for public circulation and for keeping the 
public informed about developments in the administration. It was unwise to 
make the government depend exclusively on printers and newspapers nearly 
all of which were hostile to it. London, however, continued to insist on 
its suppression but, as Anderson at the Colonial Office minuted in 1881, 
'eventually nothing happened.'[69] The issue re-surfaced in the autumn of 
1885 when Governor Simmons, while defending the continued existence of the 
Printing Office with the same arguments as his predecessor, sought 
permission to have the salaries of those employed in it raised.[70] At this 
stage, London simply gave in. 'I suppose' minuted Anderson, 'we must 
agree',[71] while Lord Stanley, at the time Colonial Secretary, was merely 
content to exhort the local government 'to keep the fixed establishments 
not in excess of what is actually required'.[72]
In the sphere of judicial reform, as already observed, opposition was
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expected from Adrian Dingli, the Crown Advocate. On reading Julyan's Report 
one official in London minuted that 'Dingli will not like what Sir P. 
Julyan proposes', that he was 'averse to retrenchment' and that he was 
'clever at making objections' which he 'expressed at a length which wearies 
out those who are in controversary with him.'[73] Like Julyan, this 
official thought, that reform in the legal establishments depended entirely 
on the fact that the President of the Courts, Sir Antonio Micallef, 
supported it.[74] But these hopes receded in September 1879 when Micallef, 
desirous to stand as a candidate at the next Council election, tendered his 
resignation.[75] Julyan warned that 'a grave error has been committed in 
not having had the reorganization of the Law Courts'[76] dealt with 
earlier. He wrote that,
'under the OLD President the proposed alterations would have been pretty 
sure to work well. Under the NEW ONE [namely Dingli] I would be greatly 
inspired if they be not improved out of existence.'
Julyan was in fact proved right. Minor reforms, such as those which 
extended the jurisdiction of the Syndics and City Magistrates Courts were 
implemented but other, more important reforms, notably in the Civil Courts, 
'succumbed' as Anderson minuted in 1882, 'to the hositility of Sir A. 
Dingli'.[77]
Houlton's opposition to reform in his department was as determined as
that of Dingli. Julyan had proposed that the preparation of the annual
estimates, of the Blue Book and some other minor tasks should be
transferred from the Chief Secretary's Office to those of the
Auditor-General. Julyan hoped that this would lead to a reduction in the
number of clerks serving directly under Houlton. But the latter was the
epitome of the "maximizing bureaucrat" of modern day. He believed that any
diminution of tasks and officers from his office represented a loss of
influence and prestige[78] and, in the past, had stubbornly resisted
similar measures.[79] Julyan's recommendations were, however, so trivial
that Colonial Officials did not press them when it became clear that
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Houlton was completely opposed to their implementation.[80] But, unknown to
Houlton, the conviction was taking hold, in London, that the Chief
Secretary in Malta had to be got rid of. The issue was first raised by
Herbert, the Permanent Secretary at the Colonial Office, when the Office
was discussing Julyan's views regarding Maltese demands for the appointment
of a Civil Governor or, alternatively, of a Civil Administrator (Lieutenant
Governor) to assist the Governor in civil matters. Julyan had concluded
that neither were really necessary. What Malta required, in his view, were
really competent Heads of Departments, capable of assisting and advising
the General holding the office of Governor, in questions of civil
administration. He thought that the creation of an Executive Council would
help achieve this.[81]
Herbert agreed with the Commissioner that, with an efficient civil
administrative staff to support him, 'a military Governor may conduct
public affairs sufficiently well' but stressed that, without such support,
he tended to be 'helpless to correct errors and initiate reforms.'[82] He
did not object to 'continue the military Governor' but, since Julyan had
demonstrated in his Report that Heads of Departments lacked the ability to
provide this support, he would abolish the office of Chief Secreatary and
appoint, instead, 'a Civil Lieutenant Governor'. The latter would be
required to preside at Council sittings and to conduct, under the direction
of the Governor, the civil administration of the Island. Herbert believed
that such an arrangement had four distinct advantages. On the positive
side, 'if well carried out', he thought the measure had political
advantages, for he expected that the appointment of a Lt Governor would
'be considered a substantial concession to Maltese feeling'.[83] He also
envisaged that 'it would give increased efficiency' to the public service.
On the negative side, the Permanent Secretary saw in this measure the means
for getting rid of Houlton, an ardent opponent of reform, and a man lacking
in 'administrative experience and other special qualifications', including
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a 'thorough knowledge of.. .Italian'. He also felt that the risk of
embarrassment for the Crown would be significantly reduced if the 
Governor's role of President of the Council of Government was taken over by 
the Lt Governor.
Hicks Beach concurred, but it was not until 1884 that the War Office 
consented to the appointment of Civil Lt Governor. Nevertheless, in March 
1883, the Colonial Office managed to secure Houlton's resignation as Chief 
Secretary appointing, in his place, Hely-Hutchinson, a former Chief
Secretary in the Barbados administration. The latter was appointed first as 
Chief Secretary and later, in 1884, as Lt Governor.[84] But, whereas 
Houlton had served in Malta for almost thirty years, his successors, 
including Hely-Hutchinson, were to hold their office from between six and 
fifteen years before being "promoted" elsewhere by the Colonial Office.[85]
Houlton also opposed the formal creation of an Executive Council. He
held this measure to be 'neither desirable nor expedient in a fortress like
Malta',[86] pointing out that 'a De facto Executive Council composed of the
Governor, his first civil officer, [Chief Secretary] and his legal adviser
[Crown Advocate]' had existed in Malta for nearly twenty years.[87]
According to the Chief Secretary, informal but detailed discussions,
regarding the business to be brought before the Council and the mode of
proceeding therein, were held before each Council sitting. The Secretary of
State did not agree. The institution of an Executive Council, he wrote,
would 'be an advantage.'[88] The real question, as he saw it, was not
whether this Council should be set-up, but who was to sit on it, for he
doubted 'whether 6 members could be found', from among Heads of
Departments, who were 'really qualified to serve.' One of his officials,
Edward Wingfield, suggested that 'five members...will be sufficient at
first.'[89] Borton held that five should be the maximum membership of the
new Council and as he thought it desirable that it should be dominated by
British officers, he suggested that the commander of the troops, the
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Auditor-General, the Chief Secretary and the Governor, should be included 
in it. He was, therefore, not greatly excited with the suggestion that an 
elected member should be coopted to the Executive Council.[90] Some 
officials, however, thought that the comnander of the troops should be 
excluded conpletely from this Council and his place be taken by Inglott, 
the Collector of Customs.[91] In the end it was decided to defer to the 
wishes of the Governor and fix the membership of the Executive Council at 
four with, in addition to the Governor, the commander of the troops, the 
Chief Secretary and the Crown Advocate as its members. But in 1883, two 
years after its inception, its membership was extended to seven with the 
inclusion of the Auditor-General, the Collector of Customs and the Director 
of Education.[92]
Julyan had raised, in a forceful manner, the question of private
practice to which notaries, lawyers, doctors, and architects, employed in
the public service, were entitled. These officers, the Commissioner had
argued, must either be made to devote their whole time to their duties or,
like other professionals in private life, be paid for the actual services
performed by them on behalf of the government. This question came up for
discussion in December 1880 when Governor Borton submitted, for the
approval of London, a scheme for improving the salaries of Land Surveyor's
eirployed with the P.W.D.[93] Borton proposed to raise their minimum salary
from £70 to £100 and their maximum from £120 to £250 per annum. He claimed,
however, that the proposed new rates of pay were not large enough to
compensate them for the loss of private practice. Borton recommended,
therefore, that they should be allowed to continue to enjoy this privilege
adding, that this arrangement was more economically advantageous to the
government. The Secretary of State replied that, if this was truly the
case, he would not refuse to sanction the scheme. Nonetheless, he observed
that it seemed 'probable that the Government surveyors, who had been
content to earn...fran the Government' much less than an able surveyor in
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Malta would normally do, were not of 'that description'.[94] He, therefore, 
instructed him to reduce, as vacancies occured, the number of surveyors 
employed in the public service.
There the matter rested until 1883 when sixteen notaries, with private 
practices in Valletta, presented the Governor with a draft Bill aimed at 
regulating their profession.[95] These notaries were particularly aggrieved 
by the unfair advantage which their colleagues in the profession apparently 
enjoyed by virtue of their employment in the Public Registry and the legal 
establishments of government, and their right to practice privately. They 
argued that the latter's access to privileged information was Unethical and 
Section Six of the Bill which they proposed sought to make the office of 
notary incompatible with the holding of public office. The Governor noted 
that there were seventeen public servants who held warrants allowing them 
to act as notaries, of whc*n, two were in the habit of practicing privately 
during office hours at their place of work, another two had offices of 
their own in Valletta, while the rest had small practices which they 
carried out from their homes.[96] Borton opposed the Bill but suggested 
that those notaries who were very old should be pensioned, while those with 
large practices should be advised that their income from this source will 
be taken into consideration when their pension was calculated. He further 
advised that a rule should be laid down
'that in future no salaried employee of the Government, with certain 
specified exceptions, will...be allowed to practice privately as notary.'
Paradoxically enough the new Secretary of State, the Earl of Derby,
thought the matter unimportant and advised the Governor to ignore the
matter.[87] But ten years and two Governors later, the issue resurfaced
again when the Government found it difficult to fill the vacant office of
Director of the public Registry as none of its notaries would accept the
promotion if, as they feared, it resulted in the loss of private
practice.[98] Governor Smyth held, however, that 'the exercise of private
practice by superior officers of the Government'[99] tended towards
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irregularities and deemed it 'unadvisable' that these should be allowed to 
continue with their practice without some sort of restriction. The 
Governor's view had the support of his Executive Council which ruled that 
'a professional officer, not as yet debarred' from practicing privately 
would not, on promotion, be forbidden from continuing with it, but that his 
practice should be restricted to a list of clients approved by the 
Governor.[100]
How important for the government this issue had become can be gauged 
from a list of professional officers which the Governor had forwarded it to 
London in January 1894. [101] According to this list sixty-five members of 
the various professions were in government employment, all enjoying the 
privilege of private practice of their profession and having, at the same 
time, the right to receive a pension on retirement. Thus, what successive 
Governors had defended as an economical arrangement had, by 1894, become an 
intolerable financial burden on the government, especially in the period 
after Julyan, when calls for increases in salaries could no longer be
ignored. The government thought, that one way out of its difficulty, was to 
make the public service less attractive to members of the professions by 
forbidding professional officers the privilege of private practice. This 
step was eventually taken in December 1894[102] but remained a dead letter
until almost a year later when it was established that Heads of Departments
were to request from their subordinates, every quarter, a written 
declaration 'that they have not contravened the rule forbidding private 
practice'.[103] The names of officers who were specially permitted 'to
exercise any private practice in some profession or calling out of office 
hours', were also to be listed and forwarded to the Chief Secretary.
Finally, Julyan had proposed that the clerks should be amalgamated
into one general establishment, that their number should, as vacancies
occur, be reduced from ninety-five to sixty, and that the remaining sixty
clerks be divided into four classes of fifteen each. Promotion from one
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class to another was to be by seniority but subject to proven ability.
Wingfield's judgement at the Colonial Office was that these proposals
seemed much 'fairer and more likely to produce efficiency'[104] than the
existing system. Hicks Beach agreed, writing to Borton that he was
'disposed to adopt the recommendations' although the scheme required, in
his view, 'much care and forethought in its application.'[105] In Malta
too, on this occasion, the reaction was a positive one. A united Council of
Government, in itself a rare occurrence, had concluded that, 'this altered
system should be made to come into play...on the 1st June'[106] 1880,
instead of January 1881 as proposed by London and a commission, consisting
entirely of public servants, was appointed to advise 'upon the best mode of
putting into force' the classification proposed by Julyan.[107]
The Report presented by this local Commission was short, crisp and
deliberately vague.[108] The commission adopted the classification and
salary structure which Julyan had proposed in his Report but, since the
scheme was being implemented before the number of full-time clerks had been
reduced and the extra clerks absorbed, it was necessary to make some
modifications. Thus, it was proposed, that the existing sixteen extra
clerks were to be included 'as supernumeraries in the classes to which
their seniority, coupled with efficiency, would entitle them.'[109] This
meant, in practice, that the number of clerks assigned to each class was
not to be fifteen, as the Report seemed to suggest, but higher. According
to this arrangement the First Class was to contain sixteen clerks, the
Second Class eighteen clerks, the Third Class twenty-four clerks, and the
Fourth Class eighteen clerks. Three copyists were to be placed on probation
while another eight clerks were to be retired on a pension on account of
their age. The Commission claimed that the distribution of individual
clerks within the different classes had been effected on the basis of
seniority coupled with efficiency. As evidence for its case the Commission
used the example of four clerks which, it alleged, were entitled by
358
seniority to be included in the First Class, but as they did not possess 
'the necessary qualifications', had been placed in the Second Class. The 
Commission, however, failed to specify the qualifications which these 
gentlemen lacked.
The feeling at the Colonial Office was that the Governor was right to 
bring the scheme before the Council of Government when he found that it was 
'disposed to adopt'[110] it. But, as one official remarked, it was 
'impossible to judge of the fairness of the whole scheme without a more 
exact knowledge of the individuals'[111] than the Office possessed. He 
rightly pointed out that, in his Report, Julyan had recommended seniority 
as the basis for classification not for the existing clerks, but for the 
future, when the supernumeraries had been absorbed. He advised, therefore, 
that the matter should be brought to Julyan's attention for his comments.
Julyan's reaction to the Report of the Commission was scathing. Julyan
claimed that, on the basis of his knowledge of the individuals concerned,
he did not find in the proposed classification 'that attainments and
intelligence have counted for anything.'[112] Nor did it appear to him,
from the proposed scheme, that the future prospects of the most inefficient
were in any way to be inferior from those of the most efficient. Hence, the
adoption of seniority as the basis for classification reflected, in his
view, a 'want of moral courage' which, though comfortable for the
proposers, tended to render nugatory the recomnendations contained in his
Report. He made it plain that he had never contemplated that seniority
alone was to determine the class, or the position in the class, that each
individual was to occupy. This, he argued, would only have the effect of
raising the incapable to the level of the most efficient. Julyan then went
on to demonstrate that, if one looked at the salaries of each clerk before
classification, the system as proposed would become wholly untenable since
many clerks who, on the basis of seniority would be placed in the Third
Class would, on the basis of pay, be placed much higher. Was pay, he asked,
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an indication of the relative merits of each individual? Julyan concluded 
that, either great injustice had beeen done in the past to the most senior 
of these clerks or that, in future, an injustice will be done to the public 
service by placing him in the highest position to which a clerk can attain.
Julyan proposed an alternative strategy. The first step, he wrote, was 
to retire on a pension from the service all the clerks who either from age 
or other circumstances, were unfit for their duties. Next, the government 
was to select the 63 men best calculated to render good service and to 
divide them into four classes of fifteen each, plus three probationers. The 
third step was to place those who may be left, in excess of establishments, 
on a supernumerary list, dividing them under two heads: effective and
non-effective. The latter he would get rid of as opportunities presented 
themselves while the former he would classify by seniority, transferring 
them to the Fourth Class of the fixed establishment as vacancies occurred. 
There was, at the Colonial Office, unanimous agreement with the views 
expressed by Julyan. The Secretary of State informed Borton that he was 
doubtful whether a classification made on the basis of seniority could be 
consistent with either justice to the clerks or the requirements of the 
public interest. He, therefore, instructed him to follow the procedure 
proposed by Julyan.[113] Nevertheless, despite these instructions, the 
existing body of supernumerary clerks was retained. The elected members and 
Heads of Departments, both fearing the unpopularity that reductions would 
cause, refused to give sanction to the instructions from London but 
contented themselves with adopting the classification proposed by Julyan in 
his Report.
When proposing that Julyan should conduct the inquiry into the Maltese 
public service, one colonial official had expressed the belief that the 
benefits of the mission would greatly outweigh its costs.[114] In fact, its 
achievements proved hardly spectacular although one or two of the reforms,
such as the division of civil servants in classes, were to prove enduring.
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But, despite the insistence of London, several reforms were never 
implemented, while others only partially. Opposition to the reforms 
proposed by Julyan had ccxne from nearly every sector of Maltese society, 
including the Government. This perhaps explains Borton's reticence to use 
the official majority to push through many of the measures which had been 
approved by London. 'These are matters' he wrote to the Earl of Derby in 
November 1883, 'of entirely local interest'[115] and since the elected 
members were opposed to them, the Governor hoped that the Secretary of 
State would not insist that they should be pressed through Council. Borton, 
however, was not prepared to grant the elected members similar 
consideration when it came to implementing Keenan's recommendations on 
education. 'The question of education' he had added almost immediately, 'is 
in a somewhat different position.' His view was, that 'the avowed policy' 
of opposition to anglicization by 'the "antiriformista" party', had to be 
firmly resisted and that whatever had 'been done in the direction of 
encouragement of the English language', had to be defended and maintained.
In practice little had as yet been done. In 1879 Hicks Beach had
expressed general concurrence with the several recommendations made by
Patrick Keenan with respect to educational reform in Malta. The Secretary
of State thought that the first step that had to be taken was to appoint a
Director of Education and to leave in his hands the general details of
reform.[116] Furthermore, he felt that the opportunity had arrived when
'the great abilities and experience of Mr Savona should if possible be 
enlisted in the service of the Maltese community by the offer to him of the 
post of Director of Education.'[117]
Savona was at the time an elected member of Council and had been prominent
in calling for reform of the bread tax and of the educational system of the
Island.[118] It was his qualities as a reformer, however, 'rather than his
attainments in scholarship'[119] that had led the Secretary of State to
nominate him for the new office. But, as Savona was an active supporter of
anglicization, some opposition was expected to his nomination from his
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former colleagues on the elected bench. For this reason Hicks Beach
suggested, to the Governor, that the offer to Savona should not be made
until Council had created the post and voted its salary. Events proved him
right. No sooner had Savona entered on his duties of Director of Education
than the first outbreak of hostilities between Government and opposition
over the language issue occurred. A new newspaper, "Diritto di Malta", was
launched to campaign against Keenan's proposals and against those who not
only 'forgot that they were Maltese'[120] but continually reminded them
that they should be the 'slaves of England' sacrificing their all for 'this
famous garrison and Royal Navy.' it was only a matter of time, therefore,
before the language question came to dominate every aspect of Maltese
social and political life.
THE IMPACT OF THE "LANGUAGE QUESTION"
In March 1880 Borton informed the Secretary of State that Dr Naudi,
the spokesman in Council for the elected members, had proposed a resolution
in which the latter had called upon the government to refrain 'directly or
indirectly' from implementing any of the suggestions contained in Keenan's
Report 'without the approbation of the Council.'[121] He also proposed that
'with a view to calming the apprehensions which...have been caused by the
publication of that Report' his resolution was to have precedence over all
others, 'to this Resolution' wrote Borton, 'i could not accede; its object
was to deprive the Executive of a power which it legally possesses.' He
further claimed that the "apprehensions" to which Naudi referred were
confined to a few of the teachers and professors who feared the loss of
their appointment unless they managed to learn English sufficiently well.
The Governor's stand may be explained by the fact that Dr Naudi's son was,
at the time, a pupil of the English Jesuits College at St Julians[122] and
consequently stiff opposition to the reforms was not expected from him. But
the Governor had not counted on the vigorous opposition that was to be
mounted against the government from Fortunato Mizzi, the elected member for
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Gozo and soon leader of the "antiriformisti".
Mizzi believed that the only way to defeat the government's
anglicization policy was to make it appear despotic in the eyes of the 
people by forcing it to carry its measures with the votes of the official 
members. He also planned to bring discredit on the existing Council. Mizzi 
took the first step in the latter direction in 1882, when he engineered the 
election, to the Legislative Council, of two ridiculous persons, a pauper 
with a chronic nervous disorder and an illiterate organist.[123] Although 
this, by itself, had proved enough to shake the confidence of the 
government, the discovery that some public servants had openly canvassed 
for the election of these individuals, appeared to call for strong 
measures.[124] One civil servant was, as a result, dismissed by the
Governor and others severely reprimanded.
Hemming, a junior clerk at the colonial Office, thought the action of 
the Governor 'very injudicious',[125] noting that it was 'not by any means 
uncommon', in Britain, for public servants to take an active part in 
political elections. Herbert, the Permanent Secretary, did not agree. The 
dismissed officer's defence seemed to him 'an impudent one and an
aggravation of his office',[126] and it was, in his view, 'absurd to
suppose that he did not know he was not acting properly in supporting the 
candidature of a wretched imbecile pauper.' Hence, the Governor's action 
was correct and ought to be - as it was - upheld. But, what the event had 
demonstrated, according to the Governor, was that 'the numerous body of 
those who oppose the Government' included 'a large section of public 
servants who are averse to reform.'[127] In January 1884, Borton returned 
to the same theme, complaining of the
'evil effect which is produced on the discipline and morals of the public 
service by the fact, that the bulk of the public servants are entitled to 
the franchise, and thus possess the means of putting pressure on the 
elected members to take up the cause of any public servant who may have 
incurred the censure of his superiors.'[128]
In the elections that followed the election of the two questionable
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persons, the government was left in no doubt as to the strong opposition 
that it faced over its language policy. Seven of the eight candidates 
elected to Council belonged to the "anti-riformista" group who, bouyed by 
their success, demanded that during Council sittings the official members 
should speak Italian and that all government bills should also be 
introduced in that language.[129] Borton had no doubt that, 'in the event 
of either of these demands being refused, a political crisis will
supervene.'[130] The Colonial Office, nonetheless, was determined to uphold 
the educational policy of the local government. The inhabitants of the 
fortress of Malta, minuted Herbert, on which the interests and safety of 
the Empire depended to an unusual degree, had to be educated in
English.[131] When the news of this decision reached the elected members 
the seven "anti-riformisti" resigned en masse, pledging to go on with their 
campaign, much of which was directed against Savona personally.[132]
In the meantime the local government and the Colonial Office sought to
stall the opposition's campaign by trying to get Cabinet approval for the
transfer of the Imperial Post Office branch in Malta to the local 
government, by a reduction in the contribution by Malta to the Governor's 
salary and by the appointment of a Lieut Governor.[133] It took, however, 
years of acrimonious debate between the Colonial Secretary andthe Treasury 
and the War Office before the desired results were achieved.[134] In 1883 
the unpopular Houlton was replaced by Hely-Hutchinson, first as Chief 
Secretary[135] and later, in 1884, as Lieut. Governor, responsible for 
civil matters. The of this new office was announced at the same time that 
the reduction in the contribution from Malta to the Governor's salary was 
announced.[136]
But the concession to which both Government and opposition earnestly
looked for from London, was that of making Malta a centre for examinations
for the Home and Indian Civil Service and for commissions in the Army and
Navy. The government's anglicization policy could only gain the approval of
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the middle classes if the prospect of employment within these institutions 
could be truly brought within their reach. In other words, anglicuzation 
must be seen to have tangible rewards. On this point everyone was agreed. 
It was Savona who, in 1878, as an elected member, had first raised the 
issue of making Malta an examination centre .[137] Hicks Beach had 
supported the idea and had promised to provide the necessary funds if the 
Civil Service Commission adopted the proposal. His request was, however, 
rejected.[138] In 1880, after renewed pressure from Malta, the matter was 
taken up by Lord Kimberley, who strove to impress on the Commissioners the 
'considerable importance' that he attached to this measure as it would help 
promote the study of English in Malta and to attach 'the Maltese to this 
country.'[139] This time the Civil Service Commissioners were more 
receptive but further progress over the issue was blocked by the Treasury. 
Treasury officials decided that, it was one thing to examine in Malta for a 
Maltese local service and quite another to localise examinations for the 
Home Civil Service.[140] The Governor was disappointed. He noted that, 
while the matter was still being negotiated, the elected members had given 
priority to education issues over all others and were ready to vote the 
necessary funds 'with the sole ultimate object'[141] of so raising the 
standard of education and English in particular
'as to enable them [Maltese youth] to successfully compete with others in 
competitive examinations...for services out of this Island, especially 
India...'[142]
Fairfield at the Colonial Office thought that it was highly important to 
prevent the Maltese 'from becoming sulky and throwing themselves into the 
arms of the Italia Irredenta party'.[143] But he was sure that the Treasury 
would merely 'scoff at such considerations.'
As the crisis in Malta deepened a great deal came to rest on the
resolution of this question. For the local government, and for Savona
personally, success in this venture would have served to vindicate the
policy in favour of English over Italian. For some of the elected members
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it would have made the difference between cooperation with the policy of 
the government or opposition to it. In October 1882, Cachia Zammit, one of 
the elected members intimated to the Secretary of State that 'the Imperial 
Government would gain by the adoption'[144] of this measure, for people 
liked practical benefits and 'get well affected in proportion as these 
benefits become recognised.' But the Treasury remained steadfast in its 
refusal especially as educated Indians were also clamouring to have the
examinations for the Indian Civil service conducted in India.[145] It was 
inconcievable that the Maltese would be allowed to compete in Malta for the 
Indian Service while the privilege of competing in India was denied to the 
natives of that colony.
In the June 1884 elections the seven "anti-riformisti" regained their 
Council. The methods which they employed, especially their cry that the
government intended to protestanize the Maltese,[146] were denounced by the 
Governor. He also complained bitterly 'that a considerable proportion of 
the employes of Government' had voted for Mizzi and his colleagues. This, 
he thought, might somehow surprise the Secretary of State, so he pointed 
out
'that for many years past the public service, as a body, had looked to the 
elected members of Council to obtain for them increase of salary and 
amelioration of position. The elected members, who are not responsible for 
keeping the expenditure within the revenue, make such proposals with a 
light heart. The Government',
however, compelled to oppose such proposals finds itself
'held up to the public service as the obstacle to their welfare, whilst the
elected members pose as the friends and supporters of the public servants 
against the parsimony' of the government.[147]
In that same year Borton was succeeded, as Governor, by Sir Lintorn 
Simmons who held Malta to be a fortress of vital strategic importance for 
British imperial.[148] He fully supported the language policy of his 
predecessor. 'There can be no doubt whatever', he wrote, 'that assigning to 
English the first position'[149] in schools was the best measure that the
government could adopt in the interest of the great mass of the population.
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He trusted, therefore, "that no pressure will induce H.M.'s Government to 
yield one iota to the clamours that have been raised.' The agitation in 
Malta, he claimed, was partly the result of 'a thirst for employment under 
the local Government', among educated young men, 'which...cannot possibly 
be satisfied.' The latter, being 'very clever', directed their energies at 
exciting opposition to the Government in the hope that their persistence 
might in the end be
'rewarded by some of the best appointments in the gift of the Government 
over the heads of many who had toiled assiduously in the inferior ranks of 
the public service'.
Savona, the Director of Education, he thought a good example of this
strategy. He was determined Simmons not to give in to this 'same game', nor
to allow the elected members to obstruct or even challenge the government.
His approach created some misgivings at the Colonial Office, 'i regret',
minuted Herbert, 'that Sir Lintorn Simmons should appear to have too
military a seat on this restive horse.'[150] Lord Derby, the Secretary of
State, compared the Governor's language to that of military men in the
House of Lords who seemed to hold that 'Malta should be regarded as always
in a state of siege.'[151] At one point the Secretary of State was even
constrained to 'deprecate' the high handed attitude employed by the
Governor in the Council.[152]
But the Governor was to create other difficulties for the Colonial
Office. Ignoring his own criticism of his predecessors' tendency to reward
agitators, Simmons eirbarked on a plan which was clearly aimed at attracting
to the government's side the vast army of public servants in its employ.
This he intended to do by increasing salaries throughout the public
service. The Governor took his cue from the decision of the Colonial Office
to raise Hely-Hutchinson's salary from £1,000 to £1,600 per annum, in
recognition of the increased responsibilities that his new office of Lt
Governor entailed.[153] Simmons strongly argued that the large increase
conceded to the Lt Governor had created jealousy and disappointment among
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the 'higher Maltese'.[154] He proposed, therefore, to raise the salaries of 
all Heads of Departments and of Dingli, who was now President of the 
Courts.
Colonial Officials thought that the Governor had 'a strong' case.[155] 
Derby agreed, that 'the very great preponderance of the Lt. Governor's 
salary'[156] over those of Maltese heads, was likely to create discontent 
in the Maltese conmunity. Others felt that the Governor had a point when he 
said that the higher Maltese could not, on account of their salaries, mix 
on equal terms with navy and army officers who, to a great extent dominated 
Maltese society.[157] But the Governor's attempt to compare the salaries of 
Maltese Heads of Departments with those of English officers in other 
colonies, they held to be fallacious. Anderson observed that 'Malta' was 
'unique in having an indigeneous professional class'[158] and as this class 
was 'far too numerous for the wants of the population', professional 
incomes were very low and, as every one was eager for a government place, 
public service salaries were also low. 'Malta salaries' concluded Anderson, 
'must be judged by Malta standards not by the standard of Gibraltar, 
Ceylon, or any other place.' He, therefore, advised against raising the 
salaries of these Heads further. Derby thought, however, that they 'must do 
what the Governor wants',[159] although he was not sure that the elected 
members would not block the proposal. He felt that it would 'be awkward 
for the Governor if the opposition' could 'pose as defending the taxpayer 
from the greed of the official members.'
The Governor knew that there was a real danger of this happening[160]
so, in order to aggravate 'the great difficulty' in which the elected
members would find themselves, he proposed salary increases to minor
employees in the Customs, the printing Office and other
establishments.[161] The initial reaction in London was to resist the
Governor's proposals. Wingfield warned that 'the expense of the
Establishments of Malta is growing apace'.[162] Anderson advised total
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rejection of the schemes as there was 'not a word in all these schemes of 
any reduction in the numbers of these enployees.'[163] Stanley, who in the 
meantime had succeeded Derby as Secretary of State for the Colonies, found 
himself 'reluctant to sanction any further addition to the permanent 
liabilities of the Island.'[164] But, as one scheme followed on the heels 
of another, the Colonial Office found itself unable to oppose the Governor. 
Four days after his earlier minute Anderson merely minuted that he supposed 
that they 'must agree to allow this [scheme] to stand.'[165] Stanley 
concurred but, in extending his approval, he appealed to Simmons to keep 
before him the need 'to practice economy'.[166] Nevertheless, concerned at 
the apparent spiralling cost of the civil establishments, Stanley called 
for an internal Colonial Office memorandum on the expenditure of Malta 
since the time of Julyan's Commission.
The memorandum showed that between 1879 and 1884, during Borton's 
administration, the cost of establishments had risen by a little over
£4,500 overall. Of this sum, however, £2,000 represented the addition to 
the cost of the educational establishments arising out of Keenan's
suggestions for an inproved teaching staff at the University and in the 
primary schools.[167] But the memo also demonstrated that, in the year 
since Simmons appointment as Governor, the cost of establishments had 
increased by a further £5,000. This was, in itself, a large junp and 
Anderson's earlier warning that Simmons was 'going on a great deal too 
fast',[168] was fully justified.
In 1886, however, as a result of renewed agitation in Malta such
issues seemed to lose their urgency. Mizzi and his colleagues had once
again brought ridicule on the existing Council of Government by securing
the election of "ridiculous persons", one of whom was said to be of
ill-repute. [169] In London one official saw this as 'the last nail in the
coffin' of electoral politics in Malta,[170] which he dismissed as 'a
farce'. Heads of Departments were unanimous against giving in to the
369
elected members while Savona advocated a return to gubernotorial 
government.[171] The Governor favoured neither a return to absolute 
government nor the grant of greater powers to the elected members.[172] For 
Anderson 'the only question' seemed to be how far Britain was to concede to 
the Maltese their popular demands without in any way endangering British 
interests in Malta as a fortress and coaling station.'[173] Some effort had 
to be extended in order to retain the loyalty of the Maltese, especially 
since the Franco-Russian-Turkish alignment seemed to pose an important 
threat to British strategic interests in the Mediterranean and beyond.[174]
Various schemes of reform were, therefore, considered by the Colonial 
Office. One of these schemes was the brainchild of Gerald Strickland, a 
young Cambridge graduate of Maltese and British aristocratic lineage, and 
of Fortunato Mizzi. It was moderate in tone and, while it sought to give 
elected representatives on the Council of Government a majority, it
admitted the necessity of allowing the Governor a veto and the Crown the 
prerogative of legislating by Order-in-Council. Furthermore, it precluded 
the proposed Council from legislating on matters of imperial interest.[175] 
Colonial officials found the plan very much to their liking. It provided
them with an opportunity to do away with the official majority whose
members, according to Herbert, could not learn the 'rules of this
game,'[176] i.e., that the official majority was not to be resorted to in 
matters of a secondary and local importance and lived 'under a mistaken 
fear of any defeat in Council.' At the same time the new scheme aimed to 
leave untouched all the powers which the Crown had always possessed in the 
colony.
The new Constitution was promulgated by Letters Patent dated 12
December 1887. A Council of Government consisting of six official members
and fourteen elected members was established. The grant or refusal of
public money as proposed by the Govenor was to be determined by the votes
of the elected members present. The Governor was also to select, from the
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elected bench, three members to sit as salaried unofficial members in the 
Executive Council.[177] Not everyone in Malta agreed that the new 
Constitution had satisfied their claims for autonomy but, at the first 
Council sitting held under the new Constitution, Mizzi described it as the 
'first substantial step towards that just limit of autonomy which is the 
desire of all.'[178] Three months later he was to be found once again 
defending the Constitution of 1887 against the attacks of its opponents. As 
the person who had in the past led the opposition to the government, Mizzi 
said, it was only just that he should now state that 'our demands have been 
finally heard'. Many exaggerations had been written but, he reminded 
critics, that 'perfection in human affairs can never be achieved.'[179] 
Mizzi, Strickland and Grech Mifsud had been appointed by the Governor, 
following their performance in the March 1888 elections, to the Executive 
Council and to this extent, one must accept Mizzi's view as the most 
reliable.[180] As a member of both Councils he was in a better position 
than most to comment on how the Constitution was working.
It was Mr Mizzi himself who, in 1888, in the Council of Government, 
proposed the appointment of a select committee to report on the clerical 
establishment.[181] The reason he gave for his resolution was that the time 
had arrived for an enquiry to examine whether the classification of clerks, 
adopted in 1880, and the salaries connected with it, merited some reform. 
He also wished the select committee to examine which departments required 
supernumeraries and writers; whether it was possible to place those so 
engaged on the clerical establishment? and to see whether the conditions 
under which these supernumeraries and writers had been employed could be 
inproved. Mizzi also gave notice of his intention to bring forward, at a 
later date, other resolutions for the appointment of similar committees to 
inquire into the conditions of other public employees.
The Select Committee, which included Mizzi himself, two other elected
members, and the Collector of Customs, and the Comptroller of Charitable
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Institutions,[182] presented its Report in 1890.[183] The Report claimed 
that the classification of clerks as proposed by Julyan had failed to 
effect any improvement or produce any saving to the local exchequer.[184] 
It was stated that one result of the Julyan scheme was that nine 
supernumerary clerks and twenty seven writers had been kept in the service. 
This was a twisting of the facts. At the time that Julyan reported, the 
office of writer had not been introduced in Malta. Rowsell had in fact 
deprecated this fact and had strongly urged its adoption.[185] It is clear, 
however, that the local government had adopted Rowsell's proposal because 
it suited its purposes. It allowed it to employ educated young men as 
clerks, who would otherwise have remained unemployed, without disturbing 
the classification sanctioned by the Colonial Office and without the 
necessity of seeking the approval of the Secretary of State.[186] Thus, 
whereas Julyan had, in 1879, proposed a clerical establishment of 
sixty-three full-time clerks, i.e. a reduction of 22 clerks on the existing 
establishment, since his Report the number of clerks in full-time or 
temporary full-time employment had risen from 85 to 114 clerks.[187]
The Select Committee Report also concluded that promotion from one
class to another on the basis of seniority, a system which was also
attributed to Julyan, had failed to increase efficiency. While 'Penrose
Julyan evidently aimed at preventing sorry possibility of promotion by
favouritism', the Report stated, promotion by seniority had not proved 'a
sufficient incentive to the zeal of government clerks.' The
'certainty...of not being passed over by abler men, and the impossibility
of overtaking, through personal ability those who are less efficient',
were, in the view of the Committee, 'the two most serious defects in the
existing classification.'[188] Consequently,
'the clerical establishment.. .does not open up a career likely to secure 
the services of the best intelligence in the country, much less a career in 
which promotion is made to depend on ability.'
Julyan, as we have seen earlier, did not recommend that seniority
should be the sole criteria for promotion. On the contrary the Commissioner
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had insisted that none but the most suitable should be promoted, and that 
'the rigour of selection should be increased for each higher grade.'[189] 
However, everything else being more or less equal, seniority should be the 
yardstick for promotion. Hence, if after 1880 promotion from one class to 
another had been granted entirely on the basis of seniority then the fault
rested with the local government and not with Julyan. In all probability
the government had resorted to this system because it provided some defence 
against the certainty of accusations, in Council and in the press, of
favouritism or nepotism. Malta being a very small community accusations of
this sort are employed with great effect but not easily rebutted.
Having thus stated its position the Select Committee then proceeded to 
make its case in favour of a reform in the existing classification of the 
clerical establishment and of the writers. Echoing the Northcote-Trevelyan 
Report of 1854, the Committee stated that in every department two kinds of 
work was required of clerks and writers, that is, work requiring the 
exercise of intelligence and entailing responsibility, and mere 
copying.[190] To perform the latter work the Committee recommended that a 
class of writers, distinct from clerks, was to be formally constituted. 
Recruitment to, and promotion from, this class was to be by competitive 
examination, which was to consist of a small number of subjects, while the 
maximum age for candidates was raised to 35. Of the existing number of 
writers eighteen only were to be retained in this class, the remainder to 
be promoted to the grade of clerk. The clerical establishment was no longer 
to be divided into four classes of fifteen clerks each but in three classes 









3rd 26 £60 £5 £100
2nd 52 £110 £5 £180
1st 18 £220 £10 £250
The Third Class, the lowest on the clerical establishment, was now to 
consist of 26 clerks. Recruitment to this class was to be by competition 
between candidates aged 28 or less and new entrants were to be considered 
as on probation for the next three years. While on probation they were to 
receive a salary of £60 per year but from the fourth year onwards they were 
to receive an annual increment of £5 until they reached the maximum of 
their class, i.e. £100 per annum. Promotion to the Second Class was to be 
by seniority, unless undeserving, and to take place when vacancies occurred 
but, at least, after ten years service in the Third class.
The Second Class was to consist of 52 clerks, an increase of 37 on the
previous classification. As with the Third Class promotion from the Second
to First Class was to take place when vacancies occurred, but after not
less than fourteen years service and by competitive examination. The
government, however, was not to be bound to appoint the first placed
candidate in the examination but one of the first three. The starting
salary for this class was to be £110 per annum rising by annual increments
of £5 to a maximum of £180. The Collector of customs and the comptroller of
Charitable institutions, the two official members on the Select Committee,
dissented from the idea that promotion to the First Class should be by
examination. They argued that a mark of scholarship was not in itself a
mark of efficiency and it might turn out that the most efficient and
deserving clerks might repeatedly miss promotion on this score. This
requirement, therefore, was in their view liable to defeat the Committee's
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own insistence that only the most efficient should be allowed to advance to 
the higher offices.[191]
The First Class was to consist of only 18 clerks with a minimum salary 
of £220 rising by an annual increment of £10 to £250 per annum. Registrars 
of the Courts were no longer to be on the clerical establishment but those 
appointed to these offices were to be graduates in law and were to receive 
a salary of £300. Promotion from the First Class to departmental Headships 
was not to be considered as of right. The Committee proposed that five of 
the clerks in this class should be appointed as Assistant Heads of
Department (receiving £50 more). It was stressed, however, that the
government should not bind itself to choose Heads of Departments from among 
these First Class clerks but, if necessary, from among outsiders and clerks 
of the lower classes. This notwithstanding, the Committee felt that the 
existing practice of selecting from among the clerks in the First Class was 
both 'praisworthy and commendable' and advised 'that it would be well not 
to depart from it save for exceptional reasons.'[192]
The Select Committee reserved its final comments to questions of
discipline and other general matters. No public officer was to be allowed 
to practice a profession privately, even out of office hours. Heads of
Departments were to report every irregularity committed by clerks under 
their charge and each Head was to sign a declaration, every year, stating 
that he had done so. Overtime was to be conpulsory and an attendance book 
was to be kept. In order that clerks may have a wider knowledge of the 
administration, periodical transfer of officers was recommended. With 
respect to the qualifications expected from would-be candidates for the 
civil service, knowledge of book-keeping was to be obligatory. Finally, as 
it was desirable that the number of graduates in the civil service should 
be augmented, the Report proposed that graduate examinees should be awarded 
a bonus mark.
The Select Committee Report may be said to present some interesting
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insights. It seemed, for example, that all sides were agreed, that the 
public service was and would remain, the focal point of Maltese life. 
Hence, the insistence on securing for it 'the best intelligence in the 
country.' But the Committee was divided on whether intelligence, or 
academic achievement, and efficiency presupposed each other. The view that 
they somehow did was strongly contested by the official members on the 
Committee, who happened to be in a minority. There is good reason to 
believe that public servants feared that if academic achievement was to 
become the sole yardstick for entry and promotion, then many of them would 
inevitably suffer. This, perhaps, explains why the Committee agreed, 
apparently by way of compromise, to the unusual provision, that the 
government should not be bound to appoint the first placed in the 
examination, but one of the first three. In return the professional groups, 
represented on the Committee by the elected members, who were all lawyers, 
gained control over the most important offices in the law courts, 
Registrars being required to be law graduates, while other graduates were 
to enjoy special advantages in civil service examinations.
In forwarding the Report to London, new Governor Smyth, made a strong
defence for its recommendations.[193] Governor Simmons, he said, had given
repeated assurances 'for improving the position of these Government
servants'. Rejection of the proposed scheme, he feared, would be
interpreted by everyone as a breach of faith by the government and would be
used by its opponents as another excuse to attack it. Nevertheless, Smyth
admitted, that the new classification, if adopted, would lead to a large
increase to the fixed establishment of the colony and ultimately to the
pension list. Colonial officials were not overly enthusiastic to
accommodate the Governor. They were annoyed that Simmons's "assurances" had
never been reported to the Secretary of State nor that a Select Committee
had been appointed to examine the classification of clerks. The increase in
expenditure which the Report of this Committee envisaged was also thought
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to be a "large order".[194] Wingfield argued that he found it difficult to 
believe that a reclassification was thought necessary after only ten years, 
but feared that, at the base, of it was a contest between government and 
elected members for control over 'this harmful body of voters.'[195] He 
advised, therefore, that before the Report is approved the Governor should 
be instructed to examine closely the Heads of Department and to report back 
on whether he was personally convinced by the results of his enquiry of its 
necessity. He did not expect these Heads to easily admit that the new 
classification was not particularly necessary, or to admit of reductions in 
the existing number of clerks and writers, but their statements would give 
the Governor the opportunity'to sift their reasons'. Finally, he advised 
that, even if the new scheme seemed to be justified, the Secretary of State 
should not sanction the new financial burdens which it entailed unless 
'adequate provision' had been made for increasing the revenue by a revision 
of the tariffs and duties in operation in Malta.
With respect to the recommendations proper, opinion was varied. Mr
Round thought the Report 'very sound';[196] Herbert, the Permanent
Secretary, thought it'"doctrinaire" in its views, tho' ably drawn up.'[197]
The latter also agreed 'very much' with the opposition of the official
members on the Committee to the proposed examination for promotion to the
First Class. Wingfield added that 'such a proposal is not likely to be
entertained anywhere out of China'. He advised against its approval and
suggested that promotion would be better left in the hands of the Governor.
The proposed extension of the maximum limit of age for candidates for
clerkships from 25 to 28 and in the case of writers to 35, he thought
'unwise' and 'more so' with respect to the latter. But, he did not consider
this an important point and suggested that it should be left for local
decision, the Secretary of State, however, expressing his doubts to the
Governor as to its expediency. The same, he thought, applied to the
proposal to give candidates who were University graduates a preference in
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the examinations for clerkships. The recommendation that five First class 
clerks should receive 'an additional £50 per annum a piece as assistants to 
certain Heads of Departments' he considered a reasonable proposal but he 
did not wish to see a rule laid down which would 'in anyway fetter the 
Government in the selection of Heads of Departments.' Lord Knutsford, since 
1887 Secretary of State for the Colonies, concurred with these views and 
instructed that they should be ernbodied in a despatch to Malta.
Progress on the Report was, however, stalled by events in Malta. Mizzi 
was trying to revive his flagging political fortunes by working for 
responsible government. In 1890, for example, he demanded that the three 
elected members of Council who also held seats on the Executive Council 
should be appointed political heads of departments of the local
government.[198]
But a more serious obstacle to reform arose from a different
direction. All the elected members of Council had, in their electroal
campaign promised to oppose the imposition of new taxation. Since the
Colonial Office had made final approval of the scheme dependent on a
revision of the Customs tariffs and other duties, the elected members were
bound to reject it. They accused the government, especially the new Chief
Secretary, Count Gerald Strickland,[199] that it had brought the two issues
together in order to force the members to betray their pledge to oppose all
new taxation.[200] They further claimed that this showed that the
government was not sincere when it stated that it also supported the
revision of the classification of clerks.[201] The Governor, probably on
the advice of Strickland,[202] decided to counter-act these accusations by
taking the unprecedented step of publishing, without permission, the
Secretary's of State despatch on the subject.[203] This, he argued,
forestalled elected members of Council from 'making political capital of
this question and claiming to be the sole protectors of the interests of
Government enployees.' A month later, on the 9th February 1891, he again
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defended his actions, 'it would', he warned Knutsford
'be detrimental to the discipline of the Public Service if this contention 
was not shown to be without foundation.'[204]
In April 1891, in opposition to the proposed revision of the Customs 
tariffs all the elected members of Council resigned their seat and the 
Council had to be dissolved.
But, while the matter of reclassification was waiting for a new
election and the reconstitution of the Council of Government, which alone
could vote the necessary funds, the government resolved to reintroduce the
practice of nomination before competition in the recruitment of clerks. The
Governor had first raised the matter in his letter of February 1891 when he
had expressed his desire to add a further recommendation [to those of the
Select Committee Report] to the effect that, in future, before competing
'for posts in the Civil Service, candidates should obtain a nomination to 
be given by the Governor after having ascertained that they are physically 
and otherwise fit for the service.'[205]
Putly, a junior clerk at the Colonial Office, thought that the Governor 
'merely' wanted to satisfy himself of a candidate's physical and moral 
fitness before he was allowed to compete and did not intend to 'limit the 
competition'.[206] The more experienced Wingfield, however, who still held 
that nomination before competition 'ought to be the rule',[207] expressed 
his doubts. He thought it wise to ask the Governor for an explanation. The 
Governor replied, that as education in Malta was given almost gratuitously, 
many who were not socially and morally qualified to hold responsible 
offices in the public service, obtained such offices as a result of 
unrestricted competition. On this point, the Governor said, even his senior 
advisers agreed, for they attributed the existing difficulties and 
deficiencies of the civil service to the admission, through open 
competition, of 'young men belonging to families of the lower order.'[208] 
Sir Carbone, Dingli's successor as Crown Advocate said, for example, that 
open conpetition did not attract to the service 'the services of gentlemen, 
and hence of loyal and reliable public servants.'[209]
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London did not find the explanation satisfactory. One official 
observed that while 'in principle' he believed 'in a wide and liberal 
nomination system'[210] what the governor was proposing went 'beyond 
securing merely moral and physcial fitness.' How would it be worked in 
Malta and how would it be regarded by the Maltese he asked? Wingfield felt 
certain that when it was discovered, as it must be, that the service in 
Malta was being restricted to "gentlemen" it 'could not fail to cause great 
discontent among a people' used to open and unrestricted conpetition. 
Hemming opposed open conpetition on grounds that it had 'had a very bad 
effect on the Civil Service' in Britain and was, therefore, 'likely to have 
much worse effects in a place like Malta.' Yet, both in London and in 
Malta, everyone seemed to have lost sight of the fact that anglicization, 
as a policy, had been justified on the premise that knowledge of English 
would not only lift the labouring poor from their present state of 
ignorance, but that it would open up for them new enployment opportunities 
in Malta and abroad. Nomination, therefore, as justified by the Governor, 
appeared to be a clear betrayal of the promises that had been repeatedly 
made to the ordinary Maltese.
The issue served to focus Colonial Office attention on the activities
of the Chief Secretary in Malta. Gerald Strickland was appointed chief
Secretary in March 1889 after Hely-Hutchinson, until then Lt Governor, was
appointed Governor of the Windward Islands.[211] In taking up his
appointment, like Savona and many others before him, Strickland had
departed from his publicly stated position that 'elected members should not
accept government appointment.'[212] But he desperately wanted the office
and Lord Knutsford felt that, as Strickland was half Maltese and an
aristocrat, his appointment would be seen as a concession to the loyalty of
the Maltese towards Britain.[213] Strickland, however, was proving to be
too influential and the Governor seemed to be following his lead in
everything.[214] Indeed, the Governor was also seen as being too weak with
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respect to other higher civil servants.[215] Hence, behind the Governor's 
appeal for the re-introduction of nomination before conpetition, colonial 
officials beheld the hand of Strickland. One official observed, for 
exanple, that nomination would, in theory, place the patronage in the hands 
of the Governor but that, in reality, it 'would probably rest with the 
Chief Secretary.'[216] He questioned, however, whether Strickland will 'be 
likely, with the best intentions, to exercise such patronage wisely.' 
Another minuted that in exercising the right of nomination the Governor 
must be to a great extent guided by the Chief Secretary - and as 'long as a 
Maltese [Strickland] holds that office - a belief in favouritism may be 
expected to prevail.'[217] Hence, Colonial Office officials suspected that 
nomination was intended merely as a cover, not for attracting the best 
candidates that could be got, but for employing friends of Strickland and 
of other senior officials, and for punishing opponents of the government by 
witholding from them the opportunity of competing. The Colonial Office 
decided, therefore, to hold out against the Governor's wishes for as long 
as possible but, in autumn 1891, they finally gave in. Nomination before 
competition once again became the norm in Malta and was to remain so until 
1945.[218]
The change did not escape Savona's attention who, in 1887, had 
resigned the Directorship of Education. As leader of the opposition, (Mizzi 
having retired from the Council), he was Strickland's principal opponent. 
At a public meeting in Valletta Savona, citing names, described how certain 
elected members of Council had been rewarded with offices for supporting 
the government. Then he quoted the Government Notice respecting candidates 
for the civil service. 'The scope of these new regulations', he alleged, 
was
'to bar the educated sons of the low from joining the Civil Service, and as 
Count Strickland looks with an evil eye on those who oppose the Government, 
the sons of those who side with the latter will be taken on in 
future.'[219]
After 1895, following Savona's retirement from politics and Fortunato
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Mizzi's return to the field,[220] the latter made similar accusations
against Strickland. In 1901, when proposing a resolution of Council for the
removal of Strickland from the office of Chief Secretary, Mizzi claimed
that the former had turned patronage - he called it corruption - into a
system: 'Whoever serves the Government shall be rewarded by the
Government.'[221] There was some truth in these allegations, but it is
difficult, at this distance, and without the benefit of private papers, to
judge how extensive patronage in appointments had become. In a small
community such as that of Malta with its necessarily miniscule middle class
it is not unusual for one to find that many of those involved in the
political milieu are connected by family or marriage and, despite holding
different views they tend to get along together fairly easily. This has
always been the case in Malta and remains so today.[223] There was,
however, an other factor. While it was and remains common practice for
opponents of the government to deprecate the employment of non-Maltese
citizens in the public service, it was also generally the rule that when a
Maltese acquired a position of influence in his country he, not
infrequently, became the object of some of the most vile attacks
imaginable. Hence, the campaigns against Dingli (1854-1881), Savona
(1880-1887) and Strickland (1889-1902).[224]
Whatever the reason or the cause, this pattern of conflict between the
permanent members of government and the permanent members of the opposition
continued. The question of improving the salary of the clerks through a new
classification of the clerical establishment had remained unresolved. In
July 1893 the Governor once again took up the matter with London. He
informed the Marquis of Ripon, newly installed at the Colonial Office that
'the condition of affairs bears heavily on the Civil Service...[and] there 
is a growing danger of overwhelming difficulty in maintaining the necessary 
regularity and discipline in the service, with the present grievances of 
inadequate pay.'[225]
As the elected members, however, remained opposed to a revision of the
Customs tariff it was useless to look to the Council for progress. The
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Governor therefore proposed, on the insistence of Strickland, to announce 
that the profits from the sale of electric current will be placed in a 
special fund for this purpose. But London vetoed the idea.. It was, they 
said 'eminently unsatisfactory'.[226] The increase of salary, it had been 
decided, was fair and
'this being so it should be put on exactly the same footing as the original 
salaries...and not made to depend upon a separate and purely artificial 
fund.'
The Council, it was admitted, was 'difficult to manage' but none thought 
that such a roundabout policy as the Governor proposed was either 
'necessary or desirable.'
Fortunately, in 1894, a decline in the influence of Savona made the 
other elected members more willing to cooperate with the government. Many 
measures, involving public works and the improvement of the administration, 
were passed.[227] It also became possible for the government to carry the 
changes extending the customs tariffs upon which implementation of the new 
classification had, since 1890, rested. Thus, the expenditure necessary for 
carrying out the latter was, in September 1894, submitted for the approval 
of Council along with the rest of the Estimates for 1895.[228] The scheme, 
which became operative in January of the latter year, differed only 
marginally from that devised by the Select Committee of council in their 
Report of 1889. Indeed, the only departure from the Report was that in 
future examinations, after nomination, for situations in the Civil Service 
were to be held for Writerships while vacancies in the clerical 
establishment were to be filled by competitive examination, also after 
nomination, among the writers.[229]
THE DEMISE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
As the nineteenth century and Queen Victoria's reign edged steadily
towards their close, so did the crisis in Malta gear up to its climax. The
Constitution of 1887, because it placed the two essential powers of
government - administration and financial supply - in the hands of two
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different authorities, the former in the hands of the Governor and his 
senior civil officers and the latter in the hands of the elected members of 
Council, had proved unworkable. Such a constitution presupposed that the 
two authorities had similar, if not identical, goals and that disagreements 
can always be resolved in a spirit of mutual concession. It also assumed 
that both parties accepted their constitutionally assigned roles, the 
former as policy-maker and the latter as guardians of the public purse, and 
that neither side would seek to usurp or obstruct the other side in the 
exercise of its constitutionally sanctioned powers. Hence, the Constitution 
assumed willingness on both sides to maintain the status quo.
The elected members never accepted this feature of the Constitution 
but sought a transition to responsible government and very often seemed to 
think that obstruction and intransigence would eventually lead to its 
concession. If past evidence was anything to go by, then the logic 
underpinning the elected members' strategy of opposition to the government 
could not be faulted, but, the timing was to prove these strategies wrong. 
In 1895, conpetition - economic and/or military - with Britain from 
Germany, France, the United States, Russia and Italy had grown sevenfold. 
Britain, it was said, was in "splendid isolation" which in practice, meant 
that it had few friends.[230] 'There has been for some time past,' Joseph 
Chamberlain said in that year, 'a combined assault by the nations of the 
world'[231] upon British supremacy. If not checked, he warned, this assault 
would eventually jeopardise the very existence of the British people. As 
early as 1888 he had expressed his belief that, in facing up to these 
challenges, Britain must look to its colonies.[232] But this meant, in the 
first instance, Britain maintaining initiative and authority in these 
colonies in its own hands. Thus, Chamberlain had not only opposed Home-rule 
for Ireland but had exchanged his membership of the Liberal Party, which 
had proposed it, for that of the Conservative Party, which opposed it.
In June 1895 Chamberlain was appointed Secretary of State for the
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Colonies in Salisbury's third ministry. In December of the same year he 
instructed the Governor in Malta to inform those agitating for responsible 
government that, as Britain held Malta as a fortress, and it being an 
indispensable one for the protection of imperial interests in the 
Mediterranean, agitation would force HM's Government to consider 'a 
revision of the constitution in the opposite sense.'[233] Nonetheless, 
agitation continued and after 1896 became more intense when a series of 
measures by the government, intended to advance the process of 
anglicization in education and in judicial proceedings, were 
implemented.[234] Their effect was to revive the language question and 
provoke the return of Mizzi to the Council of Government at the head of the 
"anti-riformisti" or "Partito Nazionale" as they were generally known by 
this time.[235] A new policy of obstructionism got under way and several 
legislative and financial bills were rejected by the elected majority. 
Chamberlain's response was to have these measures promulgated by 
Orders-in-Council.[236] Hence, as intransigence on one side gave rise to, 
or was met by, intransigence on the other, the crisis deepened. Neither 
Mizzi's visit to London in the suummer of 1899 nor Chamberlain's visit to 
Malta in November 1900 served in any way to bring the two sides any 
closer.[237]
While newspapers favourable to the opposition and Mizzi's own paper 
laid siege to the government outside the Council chamber, the elected 
members did much the same inside it. Some newspapers repeatedly claimed 
that
'as soon as the English language should be installed as the official 
language...all the posts, [in the civil service] big and small, shall be 
occupied by Englishmen'
for whom the climate in Malta was 'delicious'.[238] As evidence they
pointed to a number of British 'faces' in the local police force and to the
'augmenting salaries' in the public service, which they alleged was
necessary to attract candidates from Britain. The intention behind these
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attacks was clear. The "nazionalisti" hoped to undermine the loyalty of 
civil servants to the government by impressing upon them the belief that 
anglicization would undermine their future prospects of advancement. It 
does not seem to have succeeded on the same scale as before. Nomination 
appears to have given the Maltese civil service, as Strickland seems to 
have anticipated, what the creation of the closed higher division of clerks 
had given to the British civil service, i.e.
'that sort of free masonry which exists between people who have had a 
certain grade of education'
and 'whose associations and ideas'[239] belonged to that class with whom 
they will have to deal. In the case of Malta it was affinity with the 
feelings, aspirations, language and values of the colonial power, rather 
than class, which was at the heart of the nomination system. No doubt, this 
affinity would have been greatly enhanced had Maltese willingess for a 
closer association with the British been reciprocated locally. The governor 
complained, for example, that both he and the Admiral had done their 'best 
to get scxne of the leading Maltese elected' to an English Club in Valletta, 
but
'young officers in the Army and Navy invariably prevented it, which was a 
very great pity, as it was a grievance greatly felt by Maltese in high 
positions in the island.'[240]
This notwithstanding, there were, apart from appointments and promotions, 
other rewards for those who supported the government, including commissions 
in the local militia.[241] Furthermore, a secure career in the public 
service remained the most stable option for young men with an education. 
Until its abolition, in 1897, the Senate of the University, in its annual 
reports on education in Malta,frequently complained of 'the serious 
drawback' to the University,
'arising from the Civil Service Examination, which was attended by a good 
number of University students, being held at or about the same time as 
those'[242]
of the University. At the same time the Reports acknowledged that it was
nearly impossible to stop the trend and suggested that it would be in the
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interest of both the University and the Civil Service
'were the Competitive Examinations held periodically every two years, in 
September, after a two years' Course and Examinations in Arts and 
Sciences',[243]
at the University of Malta. Hence, very few outside the Faculty of 
Lawsthought it worthwhile to jeopardize the chances of a future career in
the public service by openly sticking their flag to the mast of the
"nazionalisti".
Mizzi and his colleagues vented their frustrations with attacks
against Strickland whom they held responsible for what they called this
system of 'bribery' and 'corruption'. [244] The local government was very
sensitive to the tone of these attacks and sought, by the use of all its
financial and legal powers, to crush the opposition. In April 1899, partly
in response to the case of Edward Holden who, in 1892, attempted to procure
plans of forts and gun batteries in Gibraltar and Malta,[245] and partly to
curb disclosures of information to the press, an Official Secrets Act was
promulgated in Malta. The Bill prohibited 'the communication or publication
of official documents or facts' by public servants making it an offence
punishable by imprisonment for one year or the payment of a fine. [246] In
that same year the Governor made an attempt to interfere with the freedom
of the non-English press, but was restrained by Chamberlain.[247] At the
same time he intimated to the Secretary of State that it was expedient
that, in the case of Malta, 'colonial Regulations forbidding government
officials taking an active part in editing or contributing to newspapers',
should be relaxed. He also sought permission to spend, over the next three
years, £900 in payments to newspapers loyal to the government which were
willing to publish articles counteracting 'the evil influence of the
disloyal section of the press.'[248] Chamberlain replied that, although
many of the articles in the local press were 'extremely offensive', he felt
that, unless the disloyalty of the press increased considerably, it was
'neither necessary nor desirable for the Government to take any special
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notice of it.'[249] He also expressed considerable doubt as 'to the 
expediency of allowing civil servants to write for the press.' If 
permission was granted to a group of public officers friendly to the 
government, Chamberlain felt that it would be rather difficult to withhold 
it from others less disposed to the government, 'colonial Regulation No. 
79', ought not, he concluded, 'be relaxed unless very strong grounds can be 
given for doing so.'
The truth was that the time was not long in coming when London was to 
abandon this rule as well and to allow public servants to write articles in 
the press attacking the opposition.[250] But before it did, the government 
found it convenient, in 1901, to ban the holding in public of political 
meetings within the precincts of Valletta, Floriana, and the Three Cities 
on the ground that these form an integral part, because of their 
fortifications and armed services establishments, of the fortress.[251]
In 1901 the crisis could no longer be forestalled. In February of that
year the government brought before the Council a Public Revenue Improvement
Ordinance which would allow it to spend over £600,000 in public works, some
of which were necessary for the welfare of the population, such as
drainage, hospitals and so on, and others which some held were only for the
use of the military, such as wider and better roads. [252] As this
programme, however, involved the imposition of new indirect taxes, the
opposition was enabled to strike at the government in a way that surpassed
all expectations. Public meetings were held in the villages and outside the
gates of Valletta to protest against these taxes.[253] At these meetings
cries of "Malta belongs to the Maltese" were frequently raised[254] and
invective against the British military authorities was constantly
employed.[255] Chamberlain, Strickland and other public officers were
verbally attacked while the Mizzi press found no difficulty in siding with
the Boers against Britain.[256] The Bishop too joined in the fray, (the
clergy having already done so), refusing the Governor's advice to separate
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questions of religion from political issues during Church services.[257] 
Tension continued to rise and a police report observed that serious 
outrages against the Chief Secretary's own person were probable.[258] The 
Head of Printing also reported that the perpetration of 'rash acts against 
Responsible Officers'[259] were being spoken of, while the Crown Advocate 
felt that plans were in hand to assassinate Strickland and thought it fit
to advise the latter, who had gone to England for consultation, not to
return to Malta until things had become somewhat clearer.[260] The Governor
complained that in Valletta the entire population was hostile to the
government.[261]
London felt that this state of affairs could no longer be tolerated. 
In 1902 it was decided to move Strickland out of Malta and after several 
attempts secured for him the Governorship of the Leeward Islands.[262] 
Colonial Officials had reached the conclusion that nothing further could be 
gained by leaving Strickland in Malta.[263] He had been made the target of 
sane of the most savage attacks in the press and he was accused of schemes, 
such as the forced migration of Maltese to other countries, which had 
entirely no foundation but which an illiterate population was quick to 
believe. Two months after Strickland's departure, Chamberlain proceeded to 
carry out the threat he had made in December 1895 and the Constitution of 
1887 was first suspended and then revoked.[264] Rather than moving forward 
Malta, had regressed to the situation in which it was to be found in 1849.
The events of the last two decades of the nineteenth century
demonstrated that, in a micro-state or colony, political conflict tends to
have an adverse impact on the public service. As we saw above, not only
many of the proposed reforms were defeated but that, by and large, the only
acceptable policy was that which helped maintain the status quo. Support
for new policies, such as anglicization, depended entirely on the ability
of the government to reward its supporters. This was the policy pursued by
Strickland. To this extent, there was no principle involved and this
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explains why each side in the conflict viewed the public service as a 
mercenary army ready to march under the command of the highest bidder for 
its services. This, as we saw too, took its toll on discipline within the 
service and it was not unusual for Governor's to complain of their 
inability to impose their will on their subordinates. We shall see in the 
next Chapter that much the same pattern was to apply, with the difference, 
however, that civil servants were to seek to organize the forces better 
through the medium of trade unions.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CRISIS: 1903-1920
The last decades of the nineteenth century had been dominated, by and
large, by the issue of language. It did not disappear with the dawn of the
new century. By June 1903 it had resulted in the demise of representative
government and the return of Malta to the status of a Crown colony proper,
with a Legislative Council composed of an official majority and an elected
minority.[1] In fact the "language question" was to persist until 1940 when
Italy, entering the war on Germany's side, attacked Malta. But, in the
first decades of the twentieth century, it was the grave financial and
economic condition of the islands, rather than language, that was to be the
dominant issue of the time. Between 1906 and 1911 a series of successive
annual deficits, averaging about £16,600,[2] the cost of a number of
extraordinary works [3] and a sharp decline in government revenue,[4]
rapidly drove Malta towards bankruptcy. This crisis was to have a terrible
inpact on the Islands' rapidly expanding population and was, eventually,
made worse by the rapid rise in inflation which accompanied the Great War
of 1914-18. In 1919, as a result of the social distress prevailing in
Malta, serious rioting broke out in Valletta.[5]
For the Maltese civil service this economic crisis had three main
implications. First, as was the case in the past, responsibility for, or
mitigation of, the economic crisis was either placed on the shoulders of
senior administrators or sought in retrenchment of public service personnel
and expenditure. Political leaders, for example, blamed the unfavourable
economic condition of Malta on the existing system of bureaucratic
government. Remove the power of decision-making and public expenditure from
a group of irresponsible and unaccountable bureaucrats, they argued, vest
them in a number of elected, therefore accountable and responsible,
representatives of the people and, immediately, the causes of
maladministration and inefficiency, if not corruption, are removed.[6] For
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their part, Colonial officials in London held that the single most 
important reason for the crisis in Malta, was its vast, complex and costly 
administration. Thus, once again, London found itself grapping with the 
problem of retrenchment in Malta and as we shall see in this Chapter, by 
1911 another Royal Commission was being asked to examine 'the various 
departments of the public service'[7]] to see whether reducations could be 
effected.
A second outcome was the growth of working class militancy, especially 
in the harbour, the dockyards and the public service. Workers' 
organisations, mainly of the mutual benefit type, first appeared in Malta 
in the last decades of the nineteenth century, but after 1905, as the 
crisis bit deeper, many workers, notably in the dockyard and the public 
service, proceeded to establish unions and associations which were modelled 
on, and affiliated to, the British trade union movement. The setting up of 
a Whitley Council system in Malta was, as we shall see below, one of the 
aims of the Malta Civil Service Association, which was established in 
1919.[8] To some extent the riots of 1919 were evidence of this new 
militancy.
The final outcome of this crisis was the grant, in 1921, of a modified
form of responsible government to Malta. The decision to allow party
government in Malta was taken in 1919 partly in appreciation of the role
played by the Maltese in the 1914-18 war, partly in response to the riots
of 1919, but mainly because of the grave economic situation prevailing in
Malta.[9] It will be demonstrated below that, by this time, London had come
to accept that, in Malta, bureaucratic government was no longer feasible
and that, probably, no improvement in the finances of the Islands could be
expected unless some form of responsible government was introduced.[10] The
public service under responsible government will be one of the main themes
examined in the following Chapter. But, as we discuss in this Chapter the
other two developments, i.e. the role attributed to the civil service for
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the economic crisis in Malta and the rise of public service unions, we 
shall go a good part of the way in understanding some of the questions to 
which the introduction of this system of government was expected to give 
rise.
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT
In Malta economic "boom" has always been followed by "depression". The 
principal reason for this was that Malta's economy had for decades been a 
client economy, servicing the needs of the fortress. Hence, a sudden rise 
in imperial spending in Malta, occasioned either by the number of works 
connected with the fortress, or by the number of regiments and naval 
warships stationed in the Islands, usually gave rise to a situation of 
relative prosperity.[11] During this period prices of commodities and rents 
tended to rise as well but, as with every boom, wages tended to stay ahead 
of prices. However, once these works ceased or the British military and 
naval presence in Malta was reduced, crisis normally followed.[12] 
Unemployment tended to rise sharply and wages to drop dramatically, but it 
took time before prices and rents fell proportionally. Between 1898 and 
1906 history merely repeated itself but, with the difference, that this was 
to be the biggest boom that Malta was ever to experience in one hundred and 
sixty-four years of British rule. It was also to be followed, after 1905, 
with one of the most devastating depressions that the Maltese were ever to 
suffer.
The basis for the boom in turn of the century Malta could be found,
before 1898, in the implementation of the drainage scheme, the transition
from stone aqueducts to iron pipes for water distribution, the introduction
of a railway line betwen Valletta and Mdina, and the works connected with
the electrification of the island.[13] In 1901 further works for extending
the drainage works to the country districts, for the building of new
schools, waterworks, hospitals and roads, involving an estimated
expenditure of £380,500, (the government had intended to spend £600,000),
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were sanctioned by means of an Order-in-Council.[14] Shortly afterwards, 
the construction of a breakwater at the mouth of the Grand Harbour and a 
new drydock were also began. The Admiralty bore the full cost of the new 
dock and with the War Office contributed towards the cost of some of the 
other works, notably drainage, the breakwater, and roads, insofar as these 
works were deemed to affect 'Naval and Military interests'[15] As a result, 
naval and military spending in Malta, inclusive of that of military and 
naval personnel stationed in Malta, had reached, by 1904, an estimated £2 
million sterling annually.[16]
The enormous cost of many of these new works called for a sudden rise 
in taxation but, as unemployment dwindled rapidly, this inconvenience was 
apparently forgotten. Before his promotion abroad Strickland had claimed 
that, as the 'workman wants work',[17] these works would satisfy this want. 
Furthermore, he had argued that, in their own way, all these new works 
would contribute towards raising the quality of life of the average 
Maltese.[18] There was some truth to this assertion. Improving the sanitary 
condition of the towns and villages, providing homes with potable water and 
extending other facilities did contribute in a tangible manner towards this 
and, while these new schemes lasted, the working class enjoyed 
unprecedented prosperity. As the demand for labour rose, wages soared; 
imports of consumer goods expanded; and material expectations rose. Miles 
of new houses were constructed. Towns and villages expanded and traffic on 
the roads increased.[19] People also married younger and between 1901 and 
1911 the population had increased by a further 15%.[20] In 1904-5 
Government revenue reached an all time high of £467,335. The surplus 
balances of the government, at £160,000, were also the highest on 
record.[21] As the bulk of the revenue was obtained from custom duties and 
other forms of indirect taxation, both the increase in revenue and in 
surpluses reflected the existing real purchasing power enjoyed by the 
population.
The turnaround from "boom" to "depression" came about as suddenly as 
the former had done. By 1906 the works were finished. Unemployment rose 
sharply, wages crashed and panic set in. People rushed to emigrate.[22] The 
government's bill for the charities rose to £68,000 by 1909.[23] while its 
revenue plunged. In 1906 the government recorded a deficit of £14,330; in 
1907 of £17,592; in 1909 of £24,842, and in 1910 of £26,246. By 1911 the 
government reserve fund was practically exhausted and the local authorities 
had virtually nothing to fall back on. [24] The local government now found 
itself in grave difficulties. The elected members, who at the time were 
pursuing a policy of "astensionismo" by boycotting Council meetings, 
pointed out to the public that they had repeatedly warned against the 
dangers inherent in the measures which had been adopted by London and 
Malta. They had argued, when these works were first proposed, that Malta 
was too poor to bear either the cost or the new taxes which these projects 
involved. That undertaking them all at once would undermine and destabilize 
the economy and that, eventually, a crisis would ensue. The government, 
they had concluded, was spending its revenues without a care for the 
future.[25] Others had asked
'why the Imperial Government not pay this expense if the soldiers and 
sailors require wide roads, water and drainage?'[26]
In 1902, the government and the general public were warned against the 
growing euphoria which was growing apace with the new prosperity. Once the 
existing works were finished, they were told, crisis would follow. In the 
meantime, a 'few years of prosperity'[27] would accustom the average 
working man to a style of life which it would be impossible for him to 
sustain.
Thus, once again, the accusing finger was pointing to the government,
to the bureaucracy that squandered the taxes of the people, which had
ignored the advice of their elected representatives and which betrayed the
trust of the Maltese. Faced by these difficulties and these attacks, in
October 1906, the Governor appointed a sub-committee of the Executive
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Council
'to consider the question of establishing a permanent equilibrium between 
revenue and expenditure.'[281
The alternatives before this committee, however, were mainly two:
retrenchment or increased taxation, both of them unpopular with committee
members and the public. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the
bureaucracy had grown even more larger. Technological and social progress
had given rise to the Electricity and Water Works Department, the Health
Department and the Railway Department, the latter having been taken over by
the government from its private owners.[29] The "Malta (use of English
Language in Legal Proceedings) Order-in-Council" of 1899, which had
legalised the use of English in the Courts, had also resulted in more
clerks being employed with the government.[30] Consequently, the number of
public servants on the fixed pensionable establishment, had risen from
1,972 in 1894 to 2,597 in 1903[31] while, within the same nine-year period,
the number of clerks had jumped from 119 to 190.[32] The committee decided,
however, that adding to the growing army of the unemployed would give the
government no advantage. Not only would it make it more unpopular but it
would cause a further decline in its revenue. Persons with no money to
spend, given the indirect nature of taxation in Malta, paid hardly any
taxes. Instead, they became wholly dependent on government charity to see
them through the crisis. The government, therefore, suffered both ways: its
revenuue declined while its expenditure increased. Hence, when the
committee reported, in April 1907, it recommended the imposition of
increased taxation to the extent of £37,800 a year.[33]
This measure proved equally unpopular with the Maltese public and
worse, it failed to stem the decline in the government's revenue. A second
committee was, therefore, set up towards the end of 1908 but, this time, to
inquire into the working of government departments with the aim of
recommending retrenchment.[34] But this committee, while recommending a
number of reductions, it too failed to indicate how effective retrenchment
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in the public service could be achieved. It held, instead, that the crisis 
in Malta had nothing to do with the size of the public service or its 
activities but with developments over which the government could exercise 
no control, such as the loss of revenue arising from the withdrawal from 
Malta of nearly the whole of the Mediterranean naval squadron and of 
several military regiments of the line.[35] The Earl of Crewe, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, was not favourably irrpressed by the efforts of the 
government. He decided to intervene personally. His first act was to reform 
the local Customs Department, one of the principal revenue departments in 
the colony. In 1908 he sent to Malta Mr Robert MacCarthy, a UK Customs 
official, to carry the task.[36] McCarthy found that
'public money was squandered throughout the service on excessive staff and 
that efficiency as well as economy would result from the application of the 
pruning knife.'[37]
His recommendations, which were accepted by the Secretary of State, 
resulted, over the next two years, to the customs Department in savings of 
over £14,000. This led Crewe, in December 1909, to instruct the Governor to 
appoint a Finance Committee to consider the financial requirements of the 
government and to review the findings of the 1908 committee on 
retrenchment.
As London waited patiently for the report two issues, notably the few 
reductions effected in the clerical establishment and the position of the 
Lt Governor, engaged its atttention. Mr Cox, one of the officials 
responsible for Maltese affairs at the Colonial Office, observed, in May 
1910, that in the clerical establishment eleven clerkships had been 
abolished. However, he also observed that all the reductions had been 
confined to the lowest class of clerks.[38] He thought this to be rather 
unfair on the lower grades and feared that, if the Finance Committee did 
recommend further reductions, the same system would probably be adopted, 
'it seems to me', he minuted, that when wholesale reductions in 
establishment were made, these reductions
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'should properly be distributed proportionally among the various grades, as 
opportunities' [ 39 ]
arose. He held this to be of more relevance in the case of Malta where,
notwithstanding the division of the clerical service into classes,
'no distinction is made between the work of the various grades, and 
therefore no departmental reorganisation is rendered necessary.'
Lord Crewe agreed and the Governor in Malta was instructed to adhere, in
future, to the principle 'that the more highly paid clerkships should be
reduced pro rata with the junior class'.[40] Lord Crewe also intimated to
the Governor that he thought the existing salaries of civil servants too
high.
Sir Leslie Rundle, the Governor, rejected both of these instructions.
The 'numerical strength of each class',[41] he argued, had been last fixed
in 1903, 'after very careful consideration' and with the concurrence of
both the elected members and the Secretary of State for the time being.
Hence, any reduction in the number of clerks 'especially in the 1st Class,
would be regarded as a serious hardship by the members of the clerical
establishment.' What the Governor meant was that, in Malta, it was
unthinkable that a man of mature age with family and established social
responsibilities should be made redundant so that a younger man, perhaps
recently out of school or university and with no such responsibilities,
should be kept on. In practice, the numerical strength of each class had
been established in 1895 but, for one reason or another, but mainly
patronage and expansion, more clerks were added to the service with the
tacit approval of the elected members and the Colonial Office.[42] At times
this approval was formal, as in 1903, when the addition of ten new clerks
and the promotion of others were approved by Chamberlain on the ground that
they were necessary to give effect to his Order-in-Council sanctioning the
use of English in the Law Courts.[43] As to salaries, the Governor did not
think 'the clerical branch...extravagantly paid.'[44] He pointed out to
Lord Crewe, quite correctly, that although the cost of living had been on
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the rise for the last thirty years the maximum salary which a clerk in the 
highest class could hope to receive was that fixed 'by Sir Penrose Julyan 
as far back as 1879.'
Officials in London attributed Rundle's resistance to their 
instructions mainly to the influence of Sir Edward Merewether, the Lt 
Governor in Malta.[45] Merewether was appointed Lt Governor in 1902 in 
place of Sir Gerald Strickland who had been Chief Secretary of Malta since 
1890.[46] Chamberlain had hoped that the new appointee would be capable of 
exercising greater tact and reserve in his dealings with the opposition 
then Strickland had ever done. This, after all, had been the principal 
reason for moving the latter out of Malta.[47] The results did not do 
justice to these expectations. In 1910/ a polite plea from the leader of 
the elected members, (who in 1907 had abandoned their policy of 
"astensionismo" and returned to the Council Chamber), for the colonial 
Office to 'call to reason' the local bureaucracy, brought the matter to a 
head, 'sir E. Merewether', declared Cox, was incapable of a policy of 
tactful management 'and no good will be done until he is moved and a more 
suitable man...substituted for him'.[48] On this Governor Rundle agreed. 
Although an able and loyal officer, in Malta, Rundle wrote, Merewether 'was 
a square peg in a round hole'.[49] Rundle strongly favoured the abolition 
of the office of Lt Governor and its substitution by that of Chief 
Secretary, a view supported by the elected members.
In London the reaction was mixed. The suggestion accorded fully with 
the policy being pursued by the Colonial Office in other colonies at that 
very time.[50] But Malta was not like other colonies. 'Malta' minuted 
Edward Wingfield at the Colonial Office,
'is largely a military show; and whenever this is the case the civilian 
official element has trouble enough keeping its end up against the 
military'.[51]
He also thought the view of the elected members suspect since it was in
deference to the opinion of the elected bench in Malta, that the office had
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been created.[52] Thus, while he fully agreed that Merewether should be 
replaced at the first opportunity, he was not keen to see the office 
abolished. Consequently, it was agreed in London that Major Clauson, a 
retired army officer, but with proven ability in public administration, 
should be appointed in place of Merewether.[53]
In January 1911, more than a year after its appointment, the Finance
Committee finally presented its report.[54] It too failed to recommend any
significant economics in administration and, like its predecessors,
proposed the imposition of additional taxation to the extent of £43,000 a
year.[55] Colonial officials in London reacted sharply. One official warned
of the dangers of suddenly increasing existing duties 'very
considerably'.[56] He admitted, however, that the extra revenue needed to
'be raised as quickly as possible'. Wingfield agreed, although he expressed
annoyance that conditions in Malta continued to make it impossible to
abolish the grain tax. He suggested, therefore, the appointment of a Royal
Commission which 'if well constituted...might supply the driving power for
some useful reforms'[57] including retrenchment. Wingfield believed that
the idea would be favourably received, even in Malta, if the Commission's
'terms of reference included an enquiry into the numbers and efficiency of 
the present civil establishments as well as into the finances, the possible 
redistribution of taxation and the possibility of finding new sources of 
revenue.'
Viscount Harcourt, Crewe's successor as Secretary of State for the
Colonies, thought the idea of a Royal Commission a good one and informed
the Governor of his intention to appoint one.[58] He also made it clear
that he was 'not altogether satisfied' with the proposals made by the
Finance Committee to deal with the emergency, especially when one kept in
view 'the heavy burden of taxation on the poorer classes, and the lack of
employment.' Thus, while accepting that additional sources of revenue had
to 'be tapped without waiting for the appointment of a Royal Commission',
he stressed that any fresh taxation was to be regarded as provisional in
character, pending the results of the Royal Commission. In his reply the
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Governor claimed to welcome the appointment of a Royal Commission, but his 
despatch leaves no doubt that he, in fact, considered its appointment as 
nothing less than a formal and public censure of his government's inability 
to deal with the crisis. He pointedly retorted, that critics at the 
Colonial Office, shielded from local pressures, tended to lose sight of two 
important facts. First, that
'although the difficulties likely to be enountered in dealing with the 
affairs of a small place like Malta may appear on the surface to be of
small moment, they really are sometimes quite considerable in their
consequences.' [ 59]
And second, that while officials, meaning governors, 'appointed to exercise
authoritative functions' in Malta come out to the colony
'with the best intentions, they soon realize the fact that their efforts 
cannot be successful unless they adopt that sympathetic attitude...so 
helpful in dealing with a southern people'.
In other words, for the man on the spot, the real issue was not one of 
choosing what appeared to be the best or most sensible course of action, 
but of choosing that which had the best chance of success, given the
peculiar circumstances of the colony.
A three men Commission, composed of Francis Mowatt as Chairman,
Russell Rea, and MacKenzie Chalmers as members, arrived in Malta in
November 1911. Their instructions empowered them to look into the finances
and economy of the Islands, every aspect of the public service, and into
the existing judicial practices and procedures which, according to London,
prejudiced individual rights and caused loss of trade and custom to the
colony.[60] The Report of the Royal Commission on the Finances, Economic
Position and Judicial Procedure of Malta of 1911, as its report became
formally known, provides, to this day, the best account of the economic
implications for Malta arising from its strategic geographic location and
its centuries old role as a fortress, the Report states that,
'For centuries, the people of Malta have never been a self-supporting
community. Their own agriculture, industries and commerce have never 
supported them. They have always been able to rely on a large expenditure 
in the Island of revenues drawn from outside sources. This has by no means 
produced a pauperised and parasitic population, but it has diverted
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industry from production for internal consumption and external trade to 
work for the Government and the foreign governing class.'
This, the Commissioners noted, was true under the Order of St John but,
from the beginning of the British occupation too,
'the Government...has diverted more of the labour of the population to the 
service, direct or indirect, of the foreign government, which applied it to 
purposes entirely imperial and unconnected with the special interests of 
the colony.'[61]
Consequently, of this was that nearly the whole of the Maltese working
population had come to depend for its livelihood, directly or indirectly,
on the fortress. A sudden drop in imperial expenditure, as actually
happened in the first decade of the twentieth century, tended to 'reduce a
large section of the population to idleness and starvation'[62] because it
blotted 'out...a large measure of the employment of the people.'[63]
Nevertheless, the remedies that the Commissioners proposed were not by
any means new nor were they to have any significant impact. Indeed, Lord
Balogh and Professor Seers wrote, forty-four years later, that 'it is
astonishing, and ominously significant, how much of the Report of the 1912
Royal Commission applies today.'[64] Unemployment and the pressures of a
redundant population, the Commissioners suggested, could be relieved by
mass emigration.[65] Second, that the imperial Government should contribute
towards the maintenance of all public works which, directly or indirectly,
affected the health and comfort of the armed services. Third, that the
Imperial Government should, either discontinue charging Malta £5,000
annually as contribution for its defence, or pay a fair rent for all the
sites and buildings used by H.M.'s Forces in Malta for purposes other than
fortifications. Fourth, they recommended that the bread tax should be
reduced by one half, the lost revenue being made up from duties on other
items, such as imported tobacco, beer and sugar, and possibly, from an
imposition of a succession duty and a tax on houses. This, they believed,
would lead to a fairer distribution in the incidence of taxation than that
which existed at the time. Fifth, with respect to the law courts, Mowatt
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and his colleagues recommended, that judicial proceedings should be 
simplified, the number of courts, judges and staff gradually reduced, the 
scale of Court fees revised upwards and that the judicial establishments be 
made more self-supporting. As to language, the "bete noire" of Maltese 
politics, the Commissioners stated, in an unequivocal manner, their view 
that, in the inferior courts, the oral proceedings should be conducted in 
Maltese, and not in Italian, and that in the superior court a Maltese 
should be entitled, if he so wished, to have his case tried in his native 
Maltese.[66]
Finally, the Commissioners expressed the opinion that
'relief from financial difficulties must be sought in the abandonment of 
the present somewhat ambitious scale of administration and by curtailing 
expenditure to a point lower than has hitherto been considered consistent 
with the prosperity of the Islands.'[67]
This implied retrenchment of the sort which the local government had always
resisted, even at a time, as between 1906 and 1911, when it was obvious
that the colony was heading towards insolvency. But, the commissioners
found, that it was nearly impossible for them to conduct that full and
proper investigation into the various departments of the public service
which would enable them to point to areas where significant economies could
be made. 'For this purpose', Mowatt wrote Harcourt, 'a Royal Commission is
a very slow, very expensive, and, what is worse, a very inefficient
instrument.'[68] They noted, in their Report, that they had no opportunity
to verify the claims which had been made before them, i.e.,
'that there existed throughout the Civil Service "red-tapeism" and waste of 
time, that office hours were less than in commercial and manufacturing 
establishments, and that clerks of the higher classes were often enployed 
upon copying and other routine work'.[69]
Nor were they, from what they had seen and heard, 'sanguine that large
economies' could be effected in the clerical establishment or in existing
salaries. Indeed, the latter did not appear to them to be at all excessive.
Nonetheless, the Commissioners were convinced that 'efficiency, as well as
some economy' could be secured by 'a careful and systematic inquiry.' They
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therefore suggested, a proposal immediately accepted by the Secretary of 
State, the setting up of a separate Commission under the chairmanship of 
Major clauson, the new Lt Governor.[70] They further advised that, pending 
the outcome of this inquiry, no existing or future vacancy ought to be 
filled unless the Clauson Committee was satisfied, and the Governor had 
been informed accordingly, that it was absolutely necessary to do so.
The Royal Commissioners, however, had their own suggestions to make 
with regard to the civil service. First, they proposed that the clerical 
staff should no longer be divided into four classes but, as in Britain, 
into two, the First and Second Division,[71] thereby providing for a better 
separation of departmental work into the intellectual and the routine. 
Second, that
'the limits of age for admission should be higher and the examination more 
advanced for the upper class, while a rudimentary test would suffice for 
the lower.'
It is interesting to note that, personally, Sir Francis Mowatt, the 
chairman of the Royal Commission, was opposed to the notion of recruitment 
by examination. He was not only hostile to those who raised the issue but, 
at one stage of the proceedings, declared that he was glad that he had 
retired from the Home Civil Service before such a system was 
introduced.[72] Finally, the Commissioners suggested that a moderate 
remuneration would be adequate for the lower class while promotion to the 
upper class was to be rare and only in cases of exceptional merit.
As Laferla wrote, 'the Royal Commission was productive of some good'.
Malta's contribution of £5,000 a year in aid of the military service was
suspended and, for the first time, ordinary Maltese could have their case
in court tried in their native tongue, rather than Italian. But it was "ihe
Committee Appointed to Conduct an Investigation into the Expenditure of the
Government of Malta and the Organization of the Government Departments",
under the chairmanship of Clauson, (hereafter referred to as the Clauson
Committee), that really steered Malta towards a more stable financial
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position. It managed to do this because, unlike other committees before it,
it was prepared to risk unpopularity by indicating which offices could be
safely abolished and by pressing for huge cuts in public expenditure. It
was also able to exploit the stand, taken by the elected members of Council
before the Royal Commission, in favour of such measures. One after the
other they had come forward to condemn the extravagance of the government,
its inefficiency, and at times the organisation of the civil service
itself. Goffredo Mattei, for example, accused the government of living
beyond the means of the island and of lacking effective control over its
subordinates.[74] He blamed this on the fact that Heads of Departments were
also legislators, 'their presence as legislators', he claimed, 'removes
control over themselves'[75] and hence, over their subordinates.
'they naturally back each other out of sympathy and, being a majority - how 
can they be efficiently controlled?'
he had asked in 1910. He also attacked the extensive network of charitable
institutions belonging to the government. He believed that, with the
exception of the Hospitals, they should be handed over to private
organisations such as the Church. The people, he declared, were quite
willing to sustain these institutions themselves, 'Government interference'
serving merely to weaken 'the energy of the Maltese.'[76]
Although Mattei was not in syirpathy with the "Nazionalisti", the
former "anti-riformisti", his criticism was similar to that of other
representatives elected under their banner, 'i consider' said one of them,
'that we are poor...so that when I say that our country is poor I mean that
our government is also poor.'[77] He insisted that retrenchment was always
possible in 'a luxurious administration' such as that of Malta. Franceso
Azzopardi, leader of the party, was more forthright in his view. The crisis
in the Island, he told the Royal Commissioners, was entirely due to the
increase in the number of public offices and in the annual 'expenditure of
the administration',[78] both of which were out of proportion to the
exigencies of the population, 'a total reorganization of the [public]
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service', was required before economy could be achieved. Others, however, 
directed their attention to suggesting ways of making the civil service 
more efficient. Evaristo Castaldi, an elected representative of 
long-standing, decried the fact that in spite of every past report on the 
subject, promotion from one class to another had remained firmly based on 
seniority, whatever the merits of the individuals involved.[79] While he 
admitted that seniority ought not to be ignored, he stressed that 'the test 
must be that of efficiency, by examination' consisting of 'all those 
particular studies' such as finance, statistics and administrative law, 
which go to make a good head of department a capable legislator and member 
of the Executive Council. Caruana Gatto, himself a former public servant, 
propounded much the same view but pointed to the fact that, in the last 
decades, 'a constant complaint'[80] of all the examiners in civil service 
examinations was that the educational standard of candidates was lowering. 
He thought that the existing classification of clerks in four classes 
should be abandoned in favour of a two-class system.
The Clauson Committee, as we shall see below, was to integrate some of
these views within its own report, which was presented to the Governor in
January 1913. The committee considered that its primary task was 'to
indicate economies sufficiently great to enable the Government to be
carried on without an increase of taxation.'[81] The object in view, they
stated, could be achieved by on rigid economy and 'close and continuous
administrative control over finance and establishments.' On the one hand,
economy was possible, in their view, if expenditure was restricted to such
works as were urgently required; by economy in the repair and electric
lighting of streets and roads; by placing out to private contract the
scavenging and watering of streets; by amalgamating the Central Hospital
with the Poor House and by strictly limiting admission to both these
institutions to destitute persons who required long term medical care; by
the exercise of 'the greatest possible discrimination' in the dispensation
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of outdoor relief; and by the utilization, for the purpose of charity, of 
organisations and institutions run by private religious groups or 
individuals. Other economies, the Report stated, could be achieved by a 
reform of the pension system, i.e. by removing from the pensionable 
establishment all those remunerated by wages paid on a daily basis and 
others, such as doctors employed as police Physicians. They also 
recommended the abolition of no less than 19 clerkships and several other 
minor offices.
On the other hand, the Committee held that control over finances and
establishments could be achieved, if the machinery for the exercise of
effective control over expenditure was inproved, if the principles
governing public expenditure, as set out in the Colonial Regulations were
strictly adhered to, and if several subheads relating to expenditure were
removed from the schedule under the Governor's General Warrant and made the
subject of special control. This, the Committee argued, would ensure close
government control dver all departmental expenditure which was not of a
merely routine character.[82] It was noted in fact that, in the past,
excesses on these subheads had been too numerous. The committee also called
for a redefinition of the duties of the Receiver-General and the
Auditor-General pointing to the incomplete separation that existed between
these two offices. The duties of the former, the Committee insisted, should
be those defined by the Colonial Regulations, i.e. those of control and
supervision, even in the nature of a pre-audit, over public finance and
accounts. As in the Colonial Regulations too, his designation should be
that of Treasurer. As to the position of the Auditor-General, the Committee
felt that it was not right that this officer should hold a seat on any of
the existing Councils in Malta. It was his responsibility to ensure that
each individual department, and the government as a body, was conducting
its affairs according to the financial regulations and to call attention to
irregularities when they failed to do so. But he could not be expected to
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examine decisions in which he had previously participated and acquiesced in 
as a member of the Executive and Legislative Council. They strongly felt, 
therefore, that the time had come for 'placing the audit of the accounts of 
Malta under a system which is more in accordance with modern ideas and 
methods'[83] by appointing a staff Auditor from among, and under the 
supervision of, the newly organised Colonial Audit Department. This, the 
Committee held, would also allow for an independent audit to be carried out 
free from the pressures and internal politics of a small community.
These measures, however, the Committee reported, had to be 
complemented by the upgrading of the existing mechanisms for controlling 
expenditure within individual departments. The Committee stated that, 
within departments, 'the authorized methods of accounting and checking'[84] 
were closely followed and that 'the standard of conscientiousness in regard 
to money matters throughout the Malta civil service' was a very high one. 
However, the Committee found that 'financial ability and grasp of the 
principles of economical administration', as distinct from ordinary routine 
requirements, appeared to be rare. It recommended, therefore, the creation, 
within the principal spending departments (Public Works, charitable 
Institutions, Customs and Health Departments), of the office of Financial 
Assistant to the Head of Department. His duties were to include those of 
keeping himself fully informed of the details of current departmental 
expenditure,
'of calling attention to extravagant or unnecessary expense, and of 
indicating measures calculated to lead to economy and retrenchment.'[85]
The authority and personal responsibility of Heads of Departments for
affairs within their departments was, however, to remain uninpaired. But
Financial Assistants were to be regarded as having a certain measure of
direct responsibility to the Government and, 'in the event of an irregular
or extravagant transaction taking place' were, unless it could be shown
that they had made respresentations to their Heads on the matter, to be
regarded as jointly culpable with them.
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One obstacle in favour of this reform was, according to the clauson 
Committee, that those forming the First Class of the clerical establishment 
did not 'furnish suitable material'!86] for these, and other responsible, 
duties 'second only in importance' to those of Head of Department. The 
reasons which the Committee gave for this state of affairs were identical 
to those submitted by the elected members in their evidence before the 
Royal Commission of 1911, namely excessive regard to claims of seniority 
over those of merit and official qualification when giving promotions, and 
the 'unfortunately notorious' practice of employing First Class clerks on 
copying and other unimportant duties. As a result, the advancement of the 
more conpetent officials, often discharging arduous and responsible duties, 
was blocked. The fact of the matter was, that promotion, granted solely on 
the basis of seniority, was not in accordance with Colonial Regulations 
which laid down that, while the claims of candidates for promotion were to 
be considered in order of their seniority, selection was mainly to be 
decided on grounds of merit. The situation in the other three classes of 
the clerical establishment was equally unsatisfactory. Not only were 
promotions granted, except on rare occasions, on the basis of seniority, 
but these classes were so overcrowded, each having over fifty clerks, that 
prospects of promotion were extremely poor. Statistics showed that 'a young 
man of education and intelligence' had to wait a considerable number of 
years before attaining promotion to the class above his own. The Report 
concluded that,
'the facts constitute a serious condemnation of the existing organization 
of the Clerical Establishment...and, on grounds of increased departmental 
efficiency'!87]
proposed a new classification, the fourth in just over 30 years.
Under the proposed new classification (see below), the existing First
Class of clerks, consisting of 18 officers, was to be abolished and
replaced by a number of, (initially 15), special appointments. These
officers were expected to perform specific duties which were actually
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required in a particular department, such as those of Financial Assistants. 
The Committee stressed that these special appointments 'should be filled by 
officers who have given proof of special aptitude, either administrative, 
financial, or legal.'[88] As they anticipated that, at least six of those 
presently in the First Class were not fit to fill any of these special 
appointments, the Committee proposed that the latter should be filled by
selection from among clerks of the First and Second Class. First class 
clerks who failed the selection process were to be retired on a pension 
once their class was abolished. Of the remaining 155 clerks in the other 
three classes, i.e. 49 in the Second Class, 55 in the Third Class, and 51
in the Fourth Class, 113 were to be distributed among three new grades. 49
clerks in the First Grade, 20 in the Second and 44 in the Third. The 42
clerks (of the original 155) who remained from the existing Fourth class 
were then to become supernumerary clerks and the Committee proposed that 
those of them who passed a qualifying examination within the next three 
years, were to be eligible to fill vacancies in the new Third Grade. It was 
also proposed that, in future, admission to the clerical establishment 
should be to the Third Grade, after competitive examination. With respect 
to First Grade clerkships, the Committee was of the view that eventually 
these should be reserved to officers capable of performing the higher 
classes of work. Other competent officials were to attain the maximum 






3rd £60 £5 £100
2nd £110 £5 £180
1st £220 £10 £250
The Committee expressed itself satisfied that the adoption of these
recommendations would serve, not only to relieve the stagnation that
existed in the clerical grades, but to better the career prospects of
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deserving officers without, at the same time, involving larger expenditure 
over the next few years. London reacted with enthusiasm to the Report 
urging commitment in its adoption on the local government.[90] The proposal 
to appoint Financial Assistants and other officers to assist and at the 
same time to help check on the part of individual Heads, the inefficient 
use of financial resources by individual Heads, appeared to Colonial 
officials to be worthy of immediate implementation. It was felt that, for 
the first time, a scheme for controlling public expenditure was finally at 
hand. In Malta too, some applauded the 'recommended drastic economies in 
public expenditure'.[91] But generally speaking reductions in offices, as 
always, proved unpopular.
Many civil servants, writing to newspapers under assumed names,
objected to the cuts but their principal complaint was against the notion
of basing promotions mainly on merit without the criteria that constituted
merit being made explicit from the outset.[92] Others claimed that, while
in recommending merit the intentions of the Committee were honourable, they
feared that in a small community such as that of Malta merit would become
nothing less than a cover for nepotism.[93] Seniority, they argued, would
at least reward and punish the competent and the incompetent without
distinction. It was a view which, though not enjoying full support at the
Colonial Office, and against regulations, attracted some sympathy. In the
past Colonial officials had found it necessary to ask Governors to justify,
when recommending names of officers for promotion to responsible offices,
their rigid adherence to seniority when it appeared to them that the public
good would be better served by the promotion of other officers.[94] At
other times the feeling in London was that an opposite course should have
been adopted, and that it was the most senior officer who ought to have
been recommended for promotion.[95] But the result of these enquiries
tended to be the same on every occasion. Colonial officials were compelled
'to support the Governor's selection; trusting to his judgement'[96] since
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they knew preciously little about the individuals concerned. Governors were 
required to send home, every year, 'a confidential report on the 
qualifications of persons in the public service who are fitted for 
promotion',[97] but it is clear, when one keeps in mind the findings of the 
many reports we have discussed in this and other Chapters, that, in Malta, 
these confidential assessments were of little value. The conferment of 
promotion on the basis of seniority was attractive for most Governors. 
Seniority was politically safe. It may give rise to criticism. One or more 
of the elected members would rise to express their view that promotions 
ought to have been granted on the basis of merit. But it did not give rise 
to protests to London[98] or to accusations in the Council of favouritism, 
nor served as an excuse for violent attacks against the government in 
newspapers hostile to it.[99] Unlike merit, seniority was an easily 
definable and defendable criterion.
Financial difficulties and pressure from London forced the local
government to implement many of the reforms outlined in the Clauson
Committee Report. The result was, that on 3rd January 1914, Governor
Rundle, while inaugurating a new session of the Council of Government,
stated that 'the island had passed safely through the crisis which brought
it to the verge of insolvency.'[100] But the transfer of Clauson to Cyprus
in December 1914, the distractions of the War in Europe and its impact on
the cost of living in Malta, dealt the reform process a severe blow. Thus,
although most of the committee's proposals regarding the clerical service
were retained, one contemporary claimed that Clauson's
'successors ignored his schemes and revoked the measures that he had
already carried into effect.'[101] A rapid jump in the cost of living
eroded the real earnings of most employees of the public service and for
many the situation bordered on the desperate. Dockyard workers, teachers
and civil servants began to combine to press their claims on the
government. A new militancy, which had been altogether lacking among public
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servants until then, became daily more evident. A new era in the history of
the Maltese public service appeared to be on the brink.
THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC SERVICE UNIONS
In July 1914 the Great Powers of Europe exchanged rivalry for enimity
by going to war against each other. They were, by and large, the most
advanced industrial nations in the world and, within their borders, there
already existed large workers' organizations. In Malta, industry had become
synonymous with the naval dockyard, which was based in the creeks around
the Three Cities, and which employed thousands of skilled and unskilled
Maltese workers. It was here that the first combination of workers appeared
in 1885.[102] It was a benefit society set up by workers to help them in
time of illness, injury, or in case of death, their dependents. It survived
the unscrupulous attacks of the Nazionalisti and the censure of the
Catholic Church both of which accused it of fomenting class hatred.[103]
But the example set by this society was soon copied by other groups of
workers in the dockyard, at times with the help of British workers.[104]
But the first industrial strike, when it came in February 1900, occurred
among coal heavers in the harbour who, until then, were unorganized.[105]
The government intervened on the side of the workers and against the
steamship agents, enacting in Council an Ordinance regulating the wages of
port workers.[106] A strike by dockyard workers followed in November 1902
and although the union failed to gain concessions, 'contrary to what was
expected, there were no reprisals from the authorities.'[107] A second
strike was organized at the dockyard in 1917 and on this occasion the union
involved managed to secure a 50% increase in wages instead of the 10%
offered by the Admiralty.[108]
So far Maltese public servants had not demonstrated such unity of
purpose. In fact, no formal machinery existed through which public
servants, individually or collectively, could give vent to their
grievances. An analogous situation existed in Britain at the beginning of
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the 20th century but, by 1914, associations of public servants had become
commonplace.[109] Indeed, as a result of memorials and other actions, these
associations had, by 1909, induced the government to improve their pension
entitlement and other related matters through an Act of Parliament.[110] In
Britain, according to Macaulay, 'the dangers of the Home Front in
1914-18'[111] were met by the government with deferential appeals to the
people and by concessions to its employees. Thus, in 1916, the government
announced the setting up of a standing arbitration tribunal, under the
chairmanship of Whitley, Speaker of the House of Commons, to decide, during
the war, questions of wages arising between the government and its civil
employees.[112] In 1919 the recommendations of the Whitley Council, as it
became generally known, were approved by an Interdepartmental Committee
and, in the following year, a National Whitley Council, composed of
representatives of the government and its employees, was created to deal
with questions affecting the civil service as a whole.[113]
In Malta, the war gave rise to a difficult situation, mainly because
the Island needed to import the great bulk of its food requirement. As a
result prices rocketed to new heights. The price of bread rose threefold,
of sugar fourfold and of meat three and half times.[114] The government
intervened to the extent of granting large subsidies to the millers and by
creating boards for the purpose of controlling prices and to organise the
importation and distribution of food.[115] Similarly to what happpened
during the Crimean War, the conflict provided the Maltese working classes
with abundant opportunities for employment, both in Malta and in, or
around, the scattered battlefields.[116] But, also as in 1854-56, those
employed on a fixed wage, such as civil servants, suffered terribly. In May
1918 members of the clerical establishment lodged a protest with the
Governor with respect to their existing condition. Their aim, however, was
not to appeal 'for relief owing to the conditions occasioned by and in
consequence of the war',[117] but to secure long term reform. Hence, the
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target of their attack was the classification of the clerical establishment 
which had been carried into effect following the recommendations of the 
Clauson Committee. They argued that by fixing the number of clerks in the 
Second Grade at 20, the committee had defeated its own declared aim, i.e. 
that competent officials ought to attain the annual salary of £150, the 
maximum of the new Second Grade, after not more than fifteen years service. 
They requested, therefore, that, as soon as circumstances allowed, a 
commission would be appointed to revise the findings of the Clauson 
Committee.
The initial response of Long, Secretary of State for the Colonies, was 
to approve the grant of a rebate in the price of bread for members of the 
clerical establishments, whose salary was below £150 a year, and of war 
bonuses to nearly all categories of clerks.[118] This, however, was clearly 
not enough and, probably influenced by the success of the united stand 
taken by the dockyard workers, a meeting for all the clerks employed with 
the government was convened in September 1918 to decide on a plan of 
action. Those present at the meeting noted that, despite the dramatic rise 
in the cost of living, 'the rates of salaries of the clerical establishment 
remained stationary or suffered a set back.'[119] The effects of 
malnutrition, they claimed, were clearly visible on its members and their 
families and the capacity of the former for work was impaired. Many clerks 
had been conpelled to withdraw their children from school and to surrender 
their life insurance policies. They protested that their salaries should, 
at least, be sufficient to enable them to meet their primary needs but, at 
the same time, they expressed their confidence that the government would, 
on this occasion, 'succeed in finding the means of satisfying their just 
claim.' On the initiative of the conveners of the meeting, six young clerks 
who were to distinguish themselves in later years,[120] the views of those 
present were included in a Memorandum which was presented to the Governor 
by a deputation of clerks.[121]
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On this occasion this appeal elicited a spirited reaction from London. 
The clerks were informed that the Secretary of State refused to recognise 
that
'members of the Civil Service possess a vested interest forbidding the 
reduction of the number of higher grade appointments below the number which 
existed when any member entered the Service.'[122]
Such an assumption would, in his opinion, result in an effectual bar to
economy. He also made it clear that any permanent revision of the scales of
salary would have to be postponed until after the end of the war when the
economic position of Malta would have become clearer. In the meantime,
however, he promised that he will 'not refuse to consider the question of
granting further [War] bonuses,' if the Governor, 'at any time regarded
them as absolutely necessary'. Governor Methuen must have realised that the
Secretary's of State reply risked anatagonizing the entire clerical
establishment, for he delayed communicating the former's reply for almost a
month and until he had made his own proposition for an increase in the war
bonus of Second and Third Grade Clerks.[123]
In the past, the matter would have probably stopped there, only to be
pressed again on the arrival of a new Governor but, in November, a more
resolute and determined clerical establishment came back with a second
memorandum. In it they refuted the Secretary's of State assertion that they
had, at any time, presumed that the Clerical Establishment should not
'expand or shrink as circumstances may require.'[124] What they had
presumed was, that 'the Secretary of State will not be influenced only by
principles of economy...' It was, in their view, manifestly unjust 'to
attract the best men to the Service by a definite scheme which is set aside
after a number of years' and by which time it was 'impossible for the
individuals concerned to revert to the professions or other callings...' To
treat them as if they were casual labourers with no vested interests and
entitled to no special consideration, would serve only to defeat the aims
of the local government. As to the question of salaries, the clerks claimed
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that their difficulties had arisen from the adoption of the recommendations 
of the Clauson Committee, which had resulted in smaller annual increments. 
They argued, further, that an immediate revision of salaries, based on the 
existing Clauson scheme, would not resolve their problems and would fail to 
do 'full justice to the Clerical Establishment' as it would depart from 'a 
wrong basis'.[125] They requested, therefore, that, as a first step, a 
commission should be appointed to investigate their case and 'whether they 
had legitimate cause of complaint'. Hence, their appeal was not for relief 
from the conditions occasioned by the war, but for a
'revision of a sentence passed on a whole class of faithful servants 
without their having been given a chance of being heard in their own 
defence'.
The tone of the memorandum was indicative of the mood prevailing among 
members of the clerical establishment and of the many difficulties facing 
the government in 1918. Some of these difficulties were of an economic and 
financial nature. As early as January the Governor had informed the 
Secretary of State that the mass of the population had hardly anything to 
eat and if paraffin could not be obtained no means to cook the food.[126] 
Nor could the existing situation be allowed to continue 'without entailing 
starvation to the general population'.[127] Furthermore, the finances of 
the government had continued to show a deficit[128] while the poverty of 
the people precluded any increases in taxation.[129] Those agitating for 
political reform, often claimed, that Malta was 'groaning' under the weight 
of a military despotism and 'of the tyrannical bureaucracy of the offical 
members.'[130] Petitions for self-government became more frequent and 
insistent. In November 1918, this agitation took the worst possible turn 
for the government when Dr Filippo Sceberras, a lawyer said by the Governor 
to be 'a gentleman of moderate political views',[131] called on all 
constituted bodies to convene a representative assembly for the purpose of 
drawing up a new Constitution for Malta.[132]
Other difficulties which the government faced were, however, of its
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own making. In January 1919, in complete disregard of the precarious state 
of government finances, the Governor proposed to raise the salaries of 
Heads of Departments serving on the Councils, on the ground, that they 
should be paid more than those who were 'not amongst the confidential
advisers of the Governor[133] He also proposed to raise that of the 
Assistant Secretary to Government as the latter required to be an officer 
who could 'be relied upon to advise the Lt Governor on administrative and 
political questions...and who must be qualified' to act in his place. The 
whole matter induced in Colonial Officials a deep sense of exasperation. 
One official minuted that the salaries of these Heads were not
'proportionately more inadequate' than those of others in Malta and the 
case of the Governor was not 'a very strong one.'[134] Another complained 
that the Governor was 'under the influence of the Maltese Heads of 
Departments' who were all connected by marriage.[135] But the old argument 
that the Governor's wishes should be, as nearly as possible, always upheld 
in order that his authority may not be impaired, prevailed and the 
increases in salaries were approved.[136] It led one official in London to
conclude, however, that in Malta attenpts at economy were 'doomed to
defeat.'[137]
The reaction among the clerks in Malta was one of disbelief and anger. 
A memorandum from the clerks declared that,
'it is very significant that whilst the salary of the Clerical 
Establishment was being reduced on account of a depleted Treasury, the 
salaries of other public servants were improved.'[138]
Disgusted with their employer, several clerks were set to attend the
sessions of Dr Filippo Sceberras's "Assemblea Nazionale" but they were
prevented from doing so, at the last moment, by a government order which
compelled them to refrain.[139] One newspaper reported, however, that 'none
of them.. .withdrew his adhesion' to the principles eschewed by the
assembly, which meant, that these civil servants had expressed concurrence
with a resolution passed by the delegates that called for 'full political
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and administrative autonomy' in affairs of a 'local nature and
interest.'[140] But the matter was taken a step further in May 1919 when,
with political tension rising - there were some street demonstrations and 
some violent incidents[141] - the clerks formally launched the Malta Civil 
Service Association, the first of several associations within the public 
service.[142] The inaugural address by the association's first President 
left no room for doubt as to the aims and the mood of civil servants, 
'individual interests in any community', he told the General Meeting, could 
'best be served by combined effort and by unity of purpose.'[143] Two
questions, he said, called for immediate settlement: the improvement of
temporary war bonuses and the readjustment of salaries. He referred to 
their 'recent struggles for subsistence' and their low morale, but appealed 
to them not to be discouraged. 'CXir duty' he exhorted them, 'is to hold 
together and to work in earnest for a redress of our grievances, for a 
decent living, and for the happiness of our hones.' He also called on the 
government to provide, in partnership with the Association, 'a machinery of 
some sort', no doubt on the lines of the Whitley Councils in the UK, which 
would make it possible for members of the clerical establishment to 
ventilate their grievances and to express their views on all matters
affecting the civil service. Finally, the President announced the 
affiliation of their Association with the Society of Civil Servants and the 
Association of Staff Clerks, both of London, hinting at the moral and 
material advantages to be gained from this joining of 'hands 
with...brothers beyond the sea.' It was certainly a sign of the times that, 
while the clerks were holding their General Meeting, a group of teachers 
from the Valletta school were petitioning the government for an increase to 
their salaries.[144] Out of this nucleus of teachers, in November 1919, was 
born the Malta Union of Teachers which in its turn was affiliated to the 
NUT in the UK.[145]
Shortly after its General Meeting, the Civil Service Association wrote
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to the Lt Governor announcing its formation and asking for formal
recognition, while enclosing a copy of its rules, which had been adapted 
from those of the London societies,[146] and the President's inaugural 
address.[147] The view in London, was that as the policy then being pursued 
at home was to grant recognition to such associations, there was no
alternative but to 'recognize associations of civil servants in the 
colonies.'[148] This view was communicated to the Acting Governor in Malta 
in the middle of July 1919 but by then the crisis in the Island had already
reached its climax. On June 7th, 1919, in the wake of massive discharges
and the anticipation of more to come, from the armed services and the 
dockyard, violent riots broke out in Valletta.[149] The Maltese police, who 
nine months earlier had themselves staged a strike,[150] and the militia, 
were either unable or unwilling to act, and British soldiers were called 
out to help restore order. By the time the riots had been quelled six 
Maltese had been killed and dozens of others injured by the troops, facts 
symbolic enough that even today the "Sette Giugno" is revered as one of 
Malta's national holidays.[151] General Hunter-Blair, the Acting Governor, 
in reporting the incidents concluded that constitutional reform was now 
inevitable. He regretted that the impression would undoubtedly be, that 'we 
gave in to the riot'.[152] Nevertheless, he entertained no doubts as to the 
necessity of changing their stand. This view was shared by London. As early 
as March a Colonial Office clerk had minuted, that
'it seems clear...there will have to be some concession to the Maltese. We 
could hardly justify refusing them a degree of "autonomy" and "liberty" 
which we concede to for example Jamaica where the population is 
predominantly negro.'[153]
The stumbling block was, as always, the fortress. But L.S. Amery, the
Colonial Under-Secretary of State no longer held that the 'fortress
argument'[154] was an insuperable one and raised 'the possibility of taking
a bold plunge' in the direction of self-government. 'The camouflage system'
he concluded, referring to earlier "representative government"
constitutions, had 'served its turn possibly', but doubted if it could be
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continued.
In Malta, political leaders and the press, more than other groups in 
Maltese society, seemed to have sensed the drift of feeling among colonial 
officials, 'that His Majesty's Government was prepared to consider the 
question of granting Responsible Government.'[155] But, the mere notion 
that Britain might concede responsible government to Malta, sent shock 
waves through all levels of the civil service. Heads of Departments, the 
'tyrannical bureaucrats', as political leaders called them, did not relish 
the idea that one day, in the near future, they might have to exchange 
their status of rulers for that of servants to political masters whose 
struggle for self-government they had often opposed if not obstructed. As a 
consequence most of them, with the exception of the Lt Governor,[156] 
advised against any such concession. Some argued that responsible 
government was 'outside the realm of practical politics' and that the 
country was not 'mature for such a concession.'[157] Most advocated a 
return to the Constitution of 1887 in which 'administrative power was left 
in the hands of the Executive Council' while the elected members, by virtue 
of their majority on the Legislative Council, enjoyed the 'freedom', to 
oppose, but without responsibility.[158] In fact, Heads of Departments 
feared, that the inception of responsible government would result in loss 
of earnings - political leaders having consistently made the claim that 
they were excessively paid - and not impossibly, of office.
Clerks were as alarmed as their Heads at the prospect of responsible 
government in Malta. In May, at the inaugural meeting of their Association, 
the President had observed, that people outside the Civil Service, were 
'too apt to undervalue and disparage the services' they rendered.[159] It 
was often said, by a section of the press and
'by persons occupying responsible positions, that the Civil Servant is 
lavishly paid for his work, and invidious comparisons have often been drawn 
between the clerks of the Civil Service and the daily wage earners employed 
by private firms and by wholesale dealers.'
No doubt, the section of the press to which the President of the
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Association alluded was the pro-Italian press, now headed by Fortunato 
Mizzi's son Enrico who, in 1917, was found guilty of sedition by a military 
Court set up as part of the war emergency.[160] The Association's 
preference for the English language, the language adopted at the General 
Meeting, and for affiliation with civil service unions in Britain betrayed, 
for Enrico Mizzi and his supporters, a servile disposition to the 
authorities or, at worst, collaboration with the oppressor.[161] Under 
these circumstances it was reasonable for members of the clerical 
establishment to suspect that, under a Maltese ministry, their claims for a 
revision of salaries would be rejected. They, therefore, directed their 
energies to securing their objectives.
In August 1919, in a letter to Lord Plumer, the new Governor, they
reiterated through their Association their demand for a revision of
salaries and other conditions of the clerical establishment, and for the
institution of a National Whitley Council in Malta.[162] They soon followed
up this letter with a memorandum which restated all their grievances
including that regarding the classification of clerks by the Clauson
Committee which, they claimed, had marked them out in the eyes of 'the
better classes of the community as objects of public pity.'[163] At this
stage Colonial officials in London were not, at this stage, prepared to be
drawn into discussions regarding salaries. Nor were they ready to admit of
the necessity or desirability of setting up a Whitley Council in
Malta.[164] They confessed to being not quite sure themselves as to what
Whitley Councils involved!165] and there was general agreement in the
office that, 'until some experience has been gained of the working of such
Councils'[166] in England, it was premature to set up a corresponding
system in Malta. Furthermore, they felt that, 'before any steps could be
taken to set up such machinery for the Civil Service of any colony in
particular,' the question of general applicability of Whitley Councils to
colonies in general had to be considered. On this point the Secretary of
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State remained resolute, even in the face of an appeal, on behalf of their
local affiliates by the London Association of Staff Clerks.[167]
Despite this reluctance from London, the Maltese Association did gain
one of its objectives when, in September, Governor Plumer appointed a
Committee, composed of three officials and two elected members
'to consider and report upon the question of revising the salaries of the 
employees in the various Departments of the Civil Service.'[168]
The Committee presented its report in November 1919 but the two elected
members refused to endorse it.[169] The Report confirmed the general view
that the existing salaries of government employees were altogether
inadequate.[170] It proposed to remedy this state of affairs in two ways.
First, by increases on a percentage basis and in inverse proportion to the
amount of existing salaries. This was intended to benefit most those in the
lower ranks of the public service. Second, that in the case of the Clerical
Establishment, the percentage increases of salaries would be reckoned on
the salaries that would have been attained under the 1895 classification.
This meant, in practice, that for purposes of increases of salaries the
existing classification of the clerical establishment, i.e. the Clauson
classification, was to be ignored. This appeared to vindicate the claim of
the Civil Service Association that the Clauson scheme, while successful in
its drive to produce savings, was ultimately unjust as it altered the
conditions by which many clerks had been attracted to the service.[171] The
Governor supported the Report pointing to the 'real and genuine distress
among the lower ranks of the service' as his reason for doing so.[172]
One of the two elected members on the Committee, both of whom had
refused to sign the report, was Enrico Mizzi. According to the Governor,
both had conceded the necessity of raising the salaries of government
employees who earned £150 per annum or less. For those earning between £150
and £300 they thought that an increase equal to the existing war bonus was
sufficient. But they were not prepared to grant any increase to officers
earning over £300 a year. They were also of the view that the proposed
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increases should not be considered as permanent additions to salaries, but
more in the way of allowances and, therefore, subject to periodical
adjustment according to the increase or decrease in the cost of living and
the state of the revenue.[173] These views, it must be said, were
consistent with the stated position held over the years by elected members
that, under normal conditions the salaries of many public servants were not
merely adequate but excessive. But, as with everything else in Malta, there
was another side to the story. On November 20th, 1919, five days before the
Committee reported, the announcement was made simultaneoulsy in London and
in Malta, that it had been decided 'to entrust the people of Malta with
full responsible control of their purely local affairs.'[174] For this
reason the elected members, while having no desire to antagonize the entire
public service by opposing all increases of salaries, were not prepared to
add to the burdens of a government which they hoped to assume shortly. Even
so, most civil servants feared, that unless the recommendations of the
official side were implemented at once, they would, eventually, be
discarded under responsible government.[175]
The Colonial Office found itself caught in a difficult situation which
called for delicate handling. Colonial officials were fully aware of the
long history of antagonism that existed between the elected members and the
official side, but they did not wish to be seen to be taking sides. On the
one hand, there existed a desire to defend 'civil servants in Malta against
possible injustice at the hands of Maltese ministers.'[176] Following the
November announcement petitions in this sense flooded the Colonial Office
from various sources. Civil servants appealed for the inclusion, in the new
Constitution, of safeguards which guaranteed their existing salary and
pension rights.[177] British public service unions, with which local
associations were affiliated, in the meantime pressed for the
implementation of the salary increases proposed by the recent
committee.[178] The Governor too extended his support for these efforts. In
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one of his letters to the Secretary of State plumer demonstrated that, if 
some of the present elected members were to become ministers, they could 
not avoid, if they were to act consistently with their public declarations, 
but curtail these rights.[179] Others, such as sanitary officers, appealed 
to London to place them on the pensionable establishment, while the 
Governor urged the promotion of individual office holders on the ground 
that under responsible government their merits would very likely be ignored 
and others would be promoted in their place.[180] Because of their own 
experiences as public servants, Colonial officials could not remain 
insensitive to these appeals by or on behalf of another bunch of public 
officers. On the other hand, however, if they gave in to these appeals they 
risked incurring the disapprobation of Maltese politicians, especially as 
most of these measures would have had to be carried through Council by 
means of the odious official majority. This would lay the Secretary of 
State open to the charge, already being made by some,[181] that His 
Majesty's Government was not truly committed to giving them responsible 
government and was deliberately trying to undermine it by adding to the 
financial burdens of the Island.[182]
There was some sympathy for this view in London. One official minuted 
that, once in harness, the new ministers will
'come to the conclusion that the Civil Service established (nominally) 
under the authority of the Colonial Office is on too ambitious a scale for 
the resources of the Island and that retrenchment'[183]
in salaries, was absolutely necessary. He questioned whether the Colonial
Office was 'called upon to organize opposition to such a measure.' A
warning to this effect was sounded by the Director of Naval Intelligence in
Malta when he informed Amery, the Under-Secretary, that the proposed
revision of salaries had created considerable agitation.[184] He also
informed London that Heads of Departments perceived it to be vital to their
interests to obstruct, as much as it was in their power to do so, the
smooth transition to responsible government. In the circumstances the
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Secretary of State for the Colonies, while admitting that it was not 
possible to please both sides, decided on a middle course. He approved the 
increases in the salaries to members of the public service in line with the 
wishes of the official side but remanded every other demand for the 
consideration of the new government to be installed within a year or 
so.[185]
Throughout 1920, however, these matters were overshadowed by the 
discussions then going on over a new constitution for Malta. Once again how 
to reconcile British strategic interests in Malta with Maltese political 
aspirations was at the forefront of the debate. London no longer thought 
that this was impossible but nonetheless wanted its powers in Malta clearly 
defined. But, if anything, the dangers to responsible government appeared 
to be all internal. Would political leaders, inexperienced in party 
government, be able to handle the political pressures to which such a 
system normally gave rise while, at the same time, remaining faithful to 
both the spirit and the letter of the Constitution? How would political 
leaders, who had spent all of their political careers in a position of 
permanent opposition, react once entrusted with political power? But the 
issue which, in 1920, seemed to pose the greatest threat to responsible 
government, was that which centred around the future relationship between 
ministers and their permanent subordinates. Was it possible for the two 
sides to find a "modus vivendi"? The first two decades of the twentieth 
century had been particularly bitter. Heads of Departments had, in 1903, 
openly welcomed the demise of representative government. More threatening, 
at this late stage, were their efforts to block the process towards
responsible government. Now that they were to be stripped of political
power would they gracefully accept to play the role of the trusted adviser?
More to the point would the political office holder take them into his
confidence or would he prefer to appoint others to advise him? Would
responsible government lead to a reduction in the number to retrenchment?
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We shall seek to answer these question in the following Chapter where the 
impact of responsible government on the Malta Civil Service will be the 
principal theme.
It is sufficient to observe, at this stage, that the omens did not 
look particularly encouraging. For over ninety years Britain had tried, but 
failed, to effect reform or retrenchment in the Maltese public service. We 
have examined some of these attempts in this and earlier Chapters. 
Governors, Heads of Departments, local politicians and ordinary public 
servants all seemed to share some responsibility for these failures. What 
seems significant is, that these failures had come about despite the 
endless number of crises, Commissions, Committees, calls for economy in the 
administration and the general poverty of the Islands. The ability of 
public servants to play one side against the other, the government against 
the opposition, had in the past proved to be a contributing factor for this 
failure. But, as we saw above, in the 1900-1920 period civil servants 
appeared less sure of their position and apprehensive about their future, 
to the extent, that they felt the need to organize themselves in trade 
unions in order to defend their interests. Whatever the real cause, 
however, in 1921 Britain had apparently exhausted all but one of its 
options, i.e. responsible government. Colonial Office officials decided 
that it was time to risk it.
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RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND AFTER: 1921-1940
The announcement that Malta was finally to have self-government
'sparked off an explosion of popular enthusiasm in the streets and
squares'll] of Valletta while bands played and crowds cheered Lord Plumer,
the Governor. The feeling in both Malta and London was one of optimism,
that a new era in Anglo-Maltese relations was about to begin. It was Amery,
the Under-Secretary of State for the colonies, who finally convinced a
reluctant Britain to grant Malta a qualified form of responsible
government. Amery had written, following a visit to Malta, that
'we must give up thinking of Malta as a curious little old-world 
dependency, living on the outskirts of a British fortress and providing 
cheap labour for a British dockyard.'[2]
Instead, it was time that the British came to regard the Maltese, 'in a 
very direct and intimate sense', as their fellow citizens and fellow 
countrymen.
It proved to be, however, a misplaced optimism for, by 1930,
responsible government in Malta was clearly moribund, afflicted with
internal dissensions and external, real or imagined, threats to the
security of the fortress. In the first instance three of the political
parties which contested the 1921 elections, the first to be held under
self-government, represented all the old divisions which were present in
Maltese society, both in terms of personalities and policies, but
especially language. One party, II partito Democratico Nazionalista (PDN),
led by Enrico Mizzi, was staunchly pro-Italian and anti-English. Another,
L'Unione Politica Maltese (UPM), led by a cleric, Panzavecchia, was the
party of the church and though pro-Italian was moderate in its opposition
to English. The third party was the fervently pro-English Constitutional
Party, which was led by Sir Gerald Strickland, a former Chief Secretary of
Malta and former Governor of Queensland, Australia. There was a fourth
party, the Labour Party, which was under the leadership of Col William
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Savona, Sigismondo Savona's son.[3] This party was, in terms of language, 
pro-English but its stance, unlike that of the constitutionalists, was 
clearly more utilitarian than ideological. Labour leaders wanted English to 
be given greater importance than Italian in education, as they thought the 
former to be of more benefit to workers seeking employment. Over the next 
decade or so no quarter was to be conceded by these parties in their 
struggle to prevail over each other and by 1930 party political conflict 
had reached its climax. The Constitution was suspended and, in the 
following year a Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into the 
political affairs of Malta.[4] As it turned out, self-government not only 
failed to repay the early optimism displayed by all parties, but proved to 
be an anti-climax for, instead of propelling Malta towards dominion status, 
it served to revert the Island to the position of a Crown Colony.
Language, as we shall see, inevitably played its part in this
retrogression. The rise of Fascism in Italy, after 1925, and its leader's
frequent reference to Malta as constituting part of "Italia irredenta" and
his claim to the Mediterranean as Italy's "mare nostrum",[5] tended to make
Britain increasingly nervous about Italian influence in Malta. Even before
this time, however, an untrusting Britain had inserted, in the 1921
responsible government Constitution, provisions in favour of the English
language. Thus, according to the Constitution, English was to be the
official language of administration and nothing was to be allowed to
undermine its position. Enrico Mizzi, whose admiration for all things
Italian was undisputedly greater than that of his father, never reconciled
himself to these provisions and, in 1932, as Minister of Education, sought
to restore the Italian language to a parity in status with English. His
determination to carry on with his policy, despite warnings to the contrary
from London, resulted, in 1933, in the Constitution being once again
suspended.[6] The final blow was delivered by the Imperial Government in
1936 when legislation was passed formally annulling the Letters Patent of
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1921.[7] Malta reverted, once again, to a colonial administrative form of 
rule until 1947, when "self-government" was once more restored.
Whether the issue was party conflict or the language question, as in 
the past, the Maltese public service could not, and did not, emerge 
unscathed. In this Chapter we shall first examine the impact of responsible 
government on the civil service, and later, the changes that came with the 
resurgence of the language question and the withdrawal of the Constitution 
in the period 1933-1940. In this latter period internal conflicts were 
overtaken by external and more dangerous events. By 1935 Malta had drifted 
into an undeclared state of emergency. Mock air raids and practice 
blackouts became a part of life. The Italian language was pronounced 
"lingua non grata" and Italian influence in Malta was attacked with vigor 
and resolve. Public servants, known for their pro-Italian syrrpathies were 
dismissed from the public service and British officers were brought in to 
supervise the civil service. When war broke out others, including 
high-ranking officials, were arrested, interned and finally deported.
With respect to the first theme we have already seen in the previous
Chapter that, on the eve of responsible government, relations between the
bureaucracy and Maltese political leaders were particularly strained.
Self-government implied a transfer of authority, power and influence from
the bureaucracy to elected politicians, responsible to a legislature and an
electorate. It meant in the final analysis an exchange of roles. Wherever
this had taken place, or was about to happen, it was not entirely welcome
among civil servants. Writing of the transition to self-government in
India, Philip Mason observes that the period in question provided 'a
strange and unexpected test for the caste of Guardians', who up till then,
'had ruled this Platonic empire. They had come to a world in which they had 
been unquestioned masters... Now they breathed a harsher air.'[8]
Henceforth, 'they must give advice instead of orders, and they met constant
opposition, slander and abuse.'
In Malta too, the imminent transfer of power from the bureaucracy to
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ministers gave rise to fears and uncertainties among many public servants, 
some of which have already been discussed. Nonetheless, we shall see 
further on that, by and large, these fears were to prove greatly 
exaggerated. One reason for this, perhaps the most important, was that once 
party competition intensified, political parties shifted their main focus 
from the public service to their opponents in the political field. The 
interest that remained was generally concerned with appointments and 
promotions since parties in opposition feared the negative effect that 
political patronage, by the party in government, might have on their share 
of the vote at election time. Thus, gradually, interest in the public 
service was to become secondary. Even here, it must be said, the titanic 
clash between bureaucrats and ministers, the old and the new power brokers, 
which political conditions in Malta on the eve of responsible government 
might have been expected to produce under the new system, never 
materialized.
It was, however, not necessary that Malta should have self-government
for Maltese civil servants to breathe the harsher air or to experience
abuse. Indeed, as Amery had discovered for himself on a visit to the Island
in 1919, the abuse to which senior civil servants had been subjected to
over the years had completely broken their morale. He had gone out to Malta
to investigate its economic and financial situation but had come away
convinced that nothing short of (qualified) self-government would answer
the political problems of this Crown, cum fortress, colony. The stage had
been reached, in his view, when it was no longer advantageous to continue
to entrust the administration in the hands of a bureaucracy composed,
almost entirely, of Maltese. These local officials were, at least
nominally, under the control of the Secretary of State and ultimately
responsible to him alone. They were not, in any real sense, politically
responsible to the people over whom they governed. This was resented by
local politicians who, pressing for self-government, saw in these local
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bureaucrats a major obstacle to their political aspirations. Their
response, therefore, was to assail the bureaucracy by every means,
attacking its policies, its measures, its intentions and, not infrequently,
the personal character and integrity of its members, aiming finally to
paralyse the whole administration. The success of their strategy was
confirmed by Amery. 'The Government of Malta', he wrote,
'inspires no confidence either in the public or its own members. There 
might be something to be said for an autocratic government run entirely by 
keen active English officials in every department, reforming the Maltese in 
spite of themselves, and raising such taxes as seemed good to it. But the 
present administration is almost entirely in the hands of the Maltese. 
Without any disparagement of a body of efficient and honourable public 
servants, it is necessary to admit that, collectively, they have neither 
the means nor the temperament to cope with the reckless and irresponsible 
criticism to which they are subjected and are naturally reluctant to 
venture on any measure which may provide a fresh outcry. Bureaucratic 
government under such conditions inevitably tends to be timid and furtive 
and the most able and vigorous government can do little to infuse permanent 
life into the machine.'[9]
No Commissioner, Governor or visitor to Malta had, until then, so 
skillfully and concisely expressed, as Amery had done, the predicament in 
which the Maltese civil service had found itself by virtue of being almost 
entirely indigenous and by having to carry on the administration under 
conditions of near autocracy.
THE CIVIL SERVICE UNDER RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT
George Cornewall Lewis has observed that a self-governing colony was a
contradiction in terms.[10] This view was not shared by Lord Durham. In the
1840s, while inquiring into the political affairs of Canada, Durham had
concluded that it was possible to create a political administration which
would concede to the Canadians their demand for responsible government
while at the same time allowing Britain to continue to exercise its
imperial authority, albeit over a restricted sphere of Canadian affairs,
such as trade, foreign relations and crown lands.[11] This meant, in
practice, the contemporaneous existence, within and over the affairs of one
state, of two distinct authorities - the local and the imperial - each with
its own distinct and defined sphere and method of action. The dyarchical
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principle to which this view gave rise found practical expression, after
1918, in India and in the Malta Constitution of 1921, which was enacted by
Letters Patent 14 April 1921.[12]
The aim in Malta was to give to the Maltese as great a control over
their 'purely'[13] domestic affairs as was consistent with the interests of
the fortress and the colonial authorities.[14] This gave rise to a
constitution which Austin has described as 'certainly a complicated one'
and in which 'there had been no lack of ingenuity on the part of the
Imperial Government in its attempts to minimise'[15] its operation.
'Every device known to the Colonial Office had been introduced - a 
qualified franchise, an elected Assembly, a partly elected, partly 
appointed Senate, ministerial committees, a privy council, a local court of 
appeal, reserved powers for the Governor, and a careful division between 
Imperial and local matters: a splendid array of constitutional structures 
devised by legal officers and approved by the Maltese leaders themselves.'
Hence, in Malta as in India, dyarchy was intended to hand 'over the
steering-wheel' while retaining in colonial hands 'control over the
accelerator and the brake.'[16]
Under the 1921 Constitution, as Cremona rightly points out, control of
the Island was divided between two governments, the Maltese Inperial
Government and the Maltese Government.[17] The former was to be under the
direction of the Governor, but subject to instructions from London. He was
to be assisted by a Nominated council made up of the Lt Governor and the
Legal Adviser, (the latter yet to be appointed), as ex-officio members, and
a representative from each branch of the armed forces. This side of the
dyarchy was to deal with all matters, such as trade, immigration, defence,
foreign relations and telecommunications, which under the new Constitution
were "reserved" to the Imperial Government. The Maltese Government, the
other side of the dyarchy, was to be headed by an Executive Council or
responsible ministry (consisting of six ministries inclusive of that of
Head of Ministry), which was to be responsible to a popularly elected
Legislative Assembly (32 members) and a Senate (17 members) elected by
corporate bodies, such as the Church and the Unions, and by electors
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possessing certain special qualifications. Elections were to be held every 
three years. In cases of conflict between the local and imperial 
authorities the matters under dispute were to be referred to the Privy 
Council, consisting of the Executive Council and the Nominated council 
sitting in joint session, or to the Joint Committee of the Privy Council 
consisting of six members, three from each side.
English, as already observed, was to be the official language of 
administration but without prejudice to the use of Italian, the 'official 
language of legal record and of culture'. Debates in the legislature were 
to be conducted in these languages and Maltese. English and Italian were to 
be recognized as equal languages of culture in education, but from the 
higher classes of the elementary schools onwards. Enrico Mizzi, the 
pro-Italian clergy and the Chamber of Advocates were opposed to these 
articles in the Constitution and urged that knowledge of English and 
Italian should be made a qualification for membership in the legislature. 
They hoped in this way to effectively bar members of a nascent labour 
movement from standing as electoral candidates at the forthcoming 
elections.[18] Not surprisingly, therefore, the retention of Maltese was 
stressed by the Imperial Government Workers Union at the dockyard whose 
members were said, by naval intelligence, to be well-disposed towards 
Britain.
The Letters Patent also took care of some of the outstanding issues 
regarding the public service, public servants, as was demonstrated in the 
previous Chapter, expected the new government to cut salaries and to take, 
generally, a high-handed approach towards them. There were on the face of 
it strong grounds for such alarm. Sir Arturo Mercieca, the Crown Advocate 
since 1915, a staunch pro-Italian who, before his appointment, had stood 
and was elected as a candidate for the "Nazionalisti", recalled in his 
memoirs the attitude adopted by the elected members towards the official 
side on the Council. 'Emboldened' he writes,
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'as they were by the assurance of having soon all powers in their own 
hands, their pugnacity waxed the more fierce when dissension arose in the 
debates.'[19]
On one occasion the elected members not only indulged 'in unrestrained 
invective against government', but refused to withdraw some of their 
offensive accusations when asked to do so by the presiding officer. 
Mercieca also recalls another incident when 'the speeches of the elected 
members...degenerated, at times, into unjustified vulgarity.' This 
behaviour brought about a change of heart at the Colonial Office. London 
abandoned its earlier reticence to bind, insofar as existing public service 
salaries and conditions were concerned, the new government about to be 
elected under the 1921 Constitution. Thus, the new Letters Patent clearly 
stipulated that, while the power to appoint and remove public officers, 
after the coming into force of the Constitution, was to be vested in the 
Governor in Council, 'no public officer in the Island who shall have been 
appointed to his office before the date of the commencement'[20] of the 
Letters Patent,
'shall be removed from his office or have his emoluments reduced save in 
accordance with the laws, regulations or conditions subject to which he was 
appointed to such office.'
This applied to Judges too, although in their case they could be removed, 
by the Governor in Council, on grounds of proven misconduct or incapacity, 
after an address from the Senate and the Legislative Assembly. A Judge's 
salary, prescribed by law, was not however, to be diminished during his 
tenure of office.
The general elections under the new Constitution were held in early 
October 1921 with all four parties contesting. The only thing remarkable 
about them was the intense party passions and the violence which 
characterised them. When the votes were counted Mizzi's PND had won only 
four of the thirty-two seats, all from the Gozo constituency. The LP won 
seven, Strickland's CP seven and Panzavecchia's UPM, fourteen seats.[21]
The new government was inaugurated with great ceremony by the Prince
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of Wales on November 2, 1921. As Labour at first refused the UPM's offer of 
a coalition the latter were forced to go it alone as a minority government, 
with Joseph Howard, a local businessman, as Head of Ministry.[22] In 
accordance with the Constitution he appointed five of his colleagues as 
ministers, namely of Justice, Education, Public Works (including 
electricity, water works and public transport), Commerce and Agriculture, 
and Health, reserving for himself the Ministry of Finance. It was soon 
clear that the invective, misrepresentations and personal abuse that had 
characterised the first election contest were also to characterise the 
debates of both the Legislative Assembly and the Senate. The Lt Governor 
reported, at one stage, that
'no question was too trivial to serve as a pretext...to hurl at ministers 
irritating charges of incompetence, maladministration and deliberate 
dishonesty.'[23]
The public service tended to figure prominently during these attacks. There 
was the personal or career interests of party sympathisers to defend and 
political patronage to expose.
In a small community such as that of Malta the political sympathies of
individuals and of whole families are, if not perfectly known to others,
suspected. It was, therefore, not unusual for the names of public servants
either to crop up during political debates, or to form the subject of those
debates. A few examples would probably be sufficient to demonstrate this
point. There is the case of Mr Borg and Mr Cachia, two teachers who,
suffering from the same medical condition, had applied to their minister
for special permission to travel to England to undergo treatment there.[24]
The former's request was immediately acceded to, his personal physician's
medical certificate being accepted as sufficient evidence of his illness.
Not so in Mr Cachia's case, who was subjected to a medical board which
reported immediately after the vessel on which he was booked had sailed.
The matter, no doubt on Cachia's own urging, was brought up in the Chamber
during Question Time. It was alleged by the opposition that the different
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treatment meted out to Borg and Cachia was explained by the fact, that the
former was a "Panzavecchjan", i.e. a supporter of the party in government,
while the latter was a "Stricklandjan", and hence, politically opposed to
the Government. Of course, the minister denied the accusation but failed to
provide a satisfactory explanation for his actions.[25] On another
occasion, while a discussion on the administrative affairs of Gozo was
underway in the Chamber, the Head of Ministry, (the British had purposely
refused to allow the designation Prime Minister to be used[26]), denounced
the Assistant-Secretary to Government for Gozo as a die-hard supporter of
Strickland. [27] Some time later it was Strickland's turn to make
accusations, describing a particular civil servant as 'one of the hottest
supporters of the panzavecchian Party and one of the most rabid opponents
of what the Constitutional Party stands for.'[28] As political competition
increased, accusations of this kind about individual civil servants merely
became more frequent, flung across the floor of the Chamber by opposing
speakers and elaborated on in opposing newspapers. No doubt, the
information came from public servants who, either harboured some personal
grievance against their political heads, or wished to ingratiate themselves
with the opposition. Opposition parties tended to welcome information which
could be employed to harass or embarass ministers but, once in government,
they usually found themselves the object of similar tactics. To a large
degree these goings-on seem to lend support to Sutton's view that in very
small states 'anonymity is not possible and that pressure towards
partisanship are all too palable.'[29]
The Borg-Cachia case, because it occurred very early in the life of
the new legislature, served to generate debate about the political
activities of public servants generally. Some members of the legislature,
but notably those on the government side, had complained that public
servants seemed to dedicate more of their time and energies to partisan
political activities than to their duties. They claimed that, public
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servants who were truly devoted to their duties would so concentrate on 
them, that they would have less time for political activities.[30] But the 
feeling, generally, was, that it would be a mistake for the government to 
try either to discover the political inclinations of its servants or to 
unnecessarily restrict their freedom to indulge in such activities. One 
member, however, took the matter to its extreme. In the past, he claimed, 
the prohibition on political activities imposed on civil servants by the 
Colonial Regulations had been applied with great laxity and that under the 
new system of government these regulations had ceased to have any binding 
force.[31] He maintained, furthermore, that 'it ought to be the duty of 
Civil Servants to see that...with the changed conditions, they should cease 
to apply.' The views expressed in this debate bear witness not only to the 
influence, as electors, that civil servants enjoyed in the political 
process, but also to the fact that, in a polity where at least 75% of the 
population were illiterate, their exclusion as party activists would have 
severely limited the number of educated party organizers on whom political 
parties could depend.
Of greater concern to parties in opposition was the fear of political
patronage by their opponents in government. Political leaders on every side
were fully aware of the political advantages that patronage offered to a
government which was prepared to exploit to the full the opportunities that
came its way. In the past, political leaders had strenuously opposed the
local government's tendency to appoint elected members of Council to public
offices seeing, in this 'unwise and detestable policy',[32] an attempt by
the authorities 'to entice Elected Members to come to its support' by
holding out to them 'prospects of private advantage.' This, they had
argued, was intended to throw discredit on the elected side of the Council
as those coming forward at election time were often said to be actuated by
a desire to advance their own private interests rather than those of the
people. The government, however, had refused to bind itself on this issue,
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arguing that it must remain free to appoint from among individuals who, as
elected members, had given public proof of their fitness for public office.
It was entirely in the hands of the latter to accept or reject the offer of
public office.[33] The response of the leaders of the political factions
existing at the time was to require candidates, contesting under their
name, to make a public declaration that, if elected, they would not accept
public office.[34] But, in the end, few elected members felt inclined to
reject the government's offer of secure employment.[35]
It was, perhaps, this familiarity with the impact that political
patronage could have on the political fortunes of parties that partly
explains why, in 1920-21, no political party had publicly advocated the
introduction of a spoils system for public offices in Malta. Of course, the
1921 Constitution specifically prohibited the removal from office of any
public servant, but in the discussions that had taken place prior to the
promulgation of the Constitution, the very idea of a spoils system was not
even raised.[36] This was not true of Canada, for exanple, where political
parties for a time appeared to favour the system of spoils which was then
prevalent in the US.[37] In the case of Malta an examination of the views
expressed over the years by the elected members of Council, both in public
and before visiting Commissions, shows that their public position
throughout had been that only the best should be attracted to the service
and that this end could only be secured if recruitment and promotion were
based on merit.[38] Hence, to a large degree, their preference was for the
British system in which civil servants' tenure depended on "good behaviour"
rather than "at pleasure", or the stability of the government. For the
administration in Malta this had one significant advantage: it gave it a
stability and continuity which would otherwise not have been possible.
According to the 1921 Constitution, unless otherwise required, general
elections in Malta were to be held every three years.[39] This meant, in
practice, that under a spoils system frequent changes in government would
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have resulted in grave administrative disruption and discontinuity.
But political patronage can never be completely eliminated, especially 
in Malta where the people demanded paternal government. Party government 
was not expected to result in a reduction of the services provided by the 
government, but in an improvement in their quality, if not their extension. 
As it happened, the intense party struggle for power which took place after 
1921, resulted ultimately in every political party promising greater or 
wider government commitment in education, social services and 
employment. [40] Even in the period 1921-24 when, in view of the financial 
difficulties facing the Islands economy was the watchword of the 
government, some of the measures adopted by the latter involved appointing 
new officers. The "Eight Hours Act of 1922" involved, for example, the 
appointment of factory inspectors and, eventually, the creation of a 
Department of Labour.[41] The unemployment problem - more than 30% of the 
working population were unemployed - gave rise to a new Department of 
Emigration,[42] while the misnamed "Compulsory School Act of 1924" resulted 
in the appointment of new teachers.[43] Government efforts to bloster its 
revenue by the creation of a Lottery Department had similar consequences. 
The government also found that the workload in the departments made it
necessary to create a new class of clerks (designated auxilliary), and to
recruit clerical assistants, stenographers and clerk typists.[44] Thus, 
although the Governor had reported, in 1924, that ministers had 
'endeavoured', and 'to some extent succeeded', in effecting economies in 
the administrative services',[45] opportunities for political patronage 
were not lacking. In later years the pretext of economy was to be dropped 
completely. On the eve of the 1927 election the Governor reported that 
Government ministers, sensing defeat, had employed several hundred 
labourers with the public service.[46]
It must also be said that, in the period 1921-1936, neither the UPM,
nor the CP or the PN, all of which had been in government at one time or
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another, had done away with the channels for patronage which they had
inherited from the Imperial Government. Thus, for instance, they had
retained nomination as an essential pre-condition for candidates wishing to
compete for offices in the civil service.[47] Furthermore, when merit, as a
creteria for promotion, was not based on some objective test system such as
examinations, it gave rise to abuse, in May 1922, merely six months after
the establishment of self-government, a motion was brought before the
Legislative Assembly in which the government was accused of having
'committed abuses in reference to promotions, transfers, payment of 
salaries and management of the Civil Service.'[48]
The government, as might be expected, strenously denied the charges but its 
case, that all promotions had been based on merit, was shredded by a 
well-briefed opposition. It did, however, survive the vote, but thanks 
mainly, to the decision of some labour members who decided to abstain 
rather than assist in bringing down the government so early under the new 
Constitution. But, no matter which party was in government, distrust 
remained. This is clearly demonstrated by the frequent use made of Question 
Time, by members of the Legislature, to interrogate ministers on 
appointments, promotions and transfers in the public service.
The above discussion shows that civil service fears of party 
government had, in the end, proved to be grossly exaggerated. Most civil 
servants, it seems, had lost sight of the fact that, as under past 
Constitutions, they continued to form a significant proportion of the 
electorate and, therefore, no political party which was serious in its aim 
of forming the next government could afford to antagonize them as a 
body.[49] This was made particularly pressing by the fact that the 
electoral system adopted in Malta, in 1921, was that of proportional 
representation[50] which, even then, was known to favour the preferences of 
subgroups and minorities. Not surprisingly, therefore, election contests 
tended to be characterised by attempts, on the part of every political 
party, to secure for themselves the vote of public service members. At
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times these attempts amounted to nothing more than vague promises, notably 
of better conditions, but some specific promises were also made, such as 
the pledge to introduce a Widows and Orphans Scheme for the dependants of 
deceased public servants,[51] of a new Pension Act for civil servants 
themselves,[52] and to study the possibility of the setting up of Whitley 
Councils.[53] The first two measures were eventually implemented under 
different ministries, but the third was not introduced until 1950.[54] 
Maltese politicians were also aware that, because of their inexperiences 
they could not hope, if elected, to govern efficiently without the whole 
hearted support of the civil service. This, perhaps, explains why after the 
introduction of self-government the expected witch hunt against senior 
civil servants never materialised. Instead, some of them had their status 
raised as in the case of Bonavia who, until 1919, was an outspoken opponent 
of party government, but was later elevated to the office of Head of the 
Civil Service under Self-Government.[55] There were, indeed, clashes, but 
these concerned mostly incidents between individual ministers and 
individual public servants. There was, for example, the case of a water 
works eirployee who was fined two days wages by the minister for refusing to 
reconnect the water supply of a subscriber who was in arrears in his 
payments to the department.[56] Or the case of the policeman who was 
allegedly struck by a minister for failing to carry out an order to stop a 
demonstration against the government from taking place.[57] But such 
clashes cannot be put down to antagonism to the public service.
Of a more serious nature were those clashes between government and
opposition which in one way or another embroiled the public service.
Between 1921 and 1933 the police and the judiciary were the two sectors
which very often found themselves entangled in these quarrels. In 1924,
following their victory at the polls, PN ministers, on the pretext of
obtaining evidence of bribery, ordered the police to search the offices of
Strickland's Constitutional Party. The latter returned the courtesy in 1927
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when it had the homes of the outgoing Prime Minister, of the Secretary of 
the Nationalist Party and of his fiancee searched by the police, ostensibly 
for the purpose of recovering some missing government files.[58] The party 
in government also resorted to the police in order to harass its opponents 
or obstruct their political activities.[59] The local police force had 
never really been an efficient or effective body, but after the 1919 riots, 
efforts were made to strengthen it.[60] The inprovements made, however, 
were lost under party government as ministers strove to recruit persons on 
whose personal loyalty they could depend. These appointed saw their role,
therefore, not as public servants, but as ministerial henchmen.[61] 
Opponents of the government, in their turn, threatened these officers, 
making it clear to them that, once their party was in office, they would be 
dismissed. [62] It was because of this state of affairs that the Royal 
Commission of 1931, which was sent out to Malta to reappraise the working 
of responsible government there, recommended that, in future, unless 
matters improved, responsibilty for the police should be transferred to the 
Imperial side of the dyarchy.[63]
Party government also had serious repercussions for the local courts. 
As the Constitution of 1921 was a written legal instrument in its own
right, it was inevitable that disputes of a political and constitutional 
nature would end up in the courts for adjudication.[64] But the courts,
rather than helping to resolve conflicts, gave rise to others.[65] The 
belief took hold that Judges tended to be biased or partisan in their 
decisions.[66] The 1931 Commission stated that it could not say whether
'this accusation'[67] was 'validly founded, but [that] the accusation 
exists.' Indeed, some people held that because of judicial bias 'the state 
of the Law Courts was one of the chief causes of unrest and of the existing 
disputes.'[68] The Commission found that the belief in the partisanship of 
Judges was the cause of dissatisfaction with the judicial system in Malta. 
The Report stated that,
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'The real root of the matter lies in the continual innuendo that the Judges 
are appointed too often from the nominees of one political party and that 
the whole Bench is practically of one political colour and brings political 
bias into the law.'[69]
The political bias to which they referred was linguistic. The legal
profession in Malta was still predominantly, though not wholly, pro-Italian
language and staunch defenders of its use in Malta. Its leaders were Enrico
Mizzi and Sir Arturo Mercieca, the latter a former Crown Advocate who was
promoted to the office of Chief Justice after 1921. This, in itself, was
enough to make the pro-English Constitutional Party and the pro-Maltese
Labour Party suspicious of the courts, while one defeat after another at
the hands of the Court of Appeal, of which Mercieca was the President,
transformed in their minds suspicion into fact.[70] The most important of
these defeats came at a time when Strickland's Constitutionalists were in
government in alliance with the Labour Party. Their response was to
publicly attack the Judges concerned, to delay cases in which the
government had some interest, (but in which it feared defeat), by not
assigning Judges and by seeking to assign to the court of Appeal Judges
'considered to be favourable to it.'[71] As in the case of the police the
only solution envisaged by the Commission of 1931 was that control over
appointments to the Judiciary Should be transferred to the Imperial
government so that, in future, Ministers would not be able to secure Judges
'known for strong adherence to a political party.'[72]
Thus, once again, political conflict took its toll on the public
service, although on this occasion it was party conflict rather than
conflict between Malta and London, that was the cause. Nonetheless, as in
the past, those in government sought to employ the administrative machinery
under their control to defeat or thwart their opponent's schemes. Parties
in opposition, however, were not themselves above reproach and frequently
employed tactics which demonstrated an insincere commitment towards
responsible government and the spirit of the Constitution. This led one Lt
Governor to report in the 1920s, that in Malta governments were assailed by
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the opposition in a way which was 'without parallel in other Parliaments of
the Enpire'[73] and that intimidation was both a common and an effective
weapon in Maltese politics. The intensity of the conflict eventually
resulted in greater political polarization which soon spread to the public
service creating within it further division and fragmentation. This could
not be avoided. Unlike the civil service of India or West Africa, the
Maltese civil service was conposed almost entirely of local individuals.
Within such a small community as that of Malta, where personal and family
ties tend to be strong and where conflicts are made to centre around such
emotional issues as language, culture, and religion, neutrality becomes
almost next to impossible.[74] Hence, it may be said, that to a large
extent, the overall impact of responsible government on the Maltese public
service was a negative one.
BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNMENT RESTORED
In granting the Maltese their self-government constitution the
Secretary of State had remarked that it was up to the Maltese to make it
work.[75] Given the adversarial nature of Maltese politics this soon proved
to be a forlorn hope. By 1928, Government and opposition were engaged in a
series of running battles in which compromise formed no part of the
political agenda. But matters were made worse by a feud between Church and
State over clerical opposition to the government's financial estimates.[76]
The climax was reached on the eve of the 1930 general elections when the
Bishops of Malta issued a Pastoral Letter in which they declared it to be
'a grave sin' for any Catholic to vote for, or stand as a candidate for
Strickland's Constitutional Party or his allies the Labour Party, while
priests were instructed to withhold the administration of sacraments to
those 'obstinate' enough to disobey these instructions.[77]
As neither the Governor nor the Secretary of State could allow such
'interferences with the freedom of electors...to exercise . their political
judgement'[78] the elections were suspended. In June the Constitution
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itself was temporarily suspended and all power, once again, reverted to the 
Governor.[79] The latter took immediate advantage of the situation and 
appointed an English Commissioner of Police to assist the local
Commissioner, on the ground that disturbances were likely.[80] In practice, 
the Governor hoped to use the period of direct government to improve both 
the efficiency and the quality of the police force. In this he was 
successful for, by 1932, it was independently reported 'that the police 
appear to be far more efficient now than they were at the last proposed 
[1930] election...'[81] For their part, the permanent officials were quick 
to consolidate all authority over their departments in their own hands. 
This led Strickland to complain
'that the permanent officials were not consulting ministers and that as 
little correspondence as possible was being shown'[82]
to them, even though they had continued to hold their office in a
consultative capacity.[83]
In 1931, as already noted, the problems of Malta became the subject of 
a Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Askwith.[84] Also noted was 
the Commission's recommendation that, for the time being, the police force 
should continue to be under the control of ministers but that, if at any 
time, the Governor was not satisfied that it was being efficiently or 
impartially administered, then the latter was to be empowered to assume 
direct control over its affairs.[85] The Commission proposed too, that
authority over judicial appointments should no longer remain with local
ministers but ought to be transferred to the Imperial Government. Both 
these proposals were approved by London. Also approved was the 
recommendation that the 1921 Constitution, with some amendments, should be 
restored. The Maltese were to be given a second opportunity to 'justify 
their desire for self-government by showing that they are capable of 
it. '[86]
But the amendments which concerned the standing of Italian in Malta
were to wreck such hopes. In its Report, the Askwith Commission had
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recommended, as Mercieca sadly recalled,
'the removal of Italian as a teaching subject in the Government elementary 
schools, and as the official language of the Criminal courts,'[87]
and the insertion of Maltese in its place. Strong protests against these
proposals were made, in Malta, by the various professional bodies as well
as the Judges, but, given the growing strength of fascism in Italy, the
changes were approved by the Colonial Office.
New elections for both the Senate and the Legislative Assembly were 
held in June 1932. Political meetings were accompanied by disturbances 
while threats and violence were not lacking.[88] The "Partito 
Nazionalista", which had made revocation of the language provisions one of 
its electoral platforms, won a landslide victory. Immediately, Enrico Mizzi 
set about restoring the status of Italian which 'was again given the place 
of honour, as a subject for tests in the competitions for Government 
employment.'[89] Italian influence, including Fascist propaganda, was 
allowed to increase and several Italian schools were allowed to operate in 
the Island.[90] It was not the best time for such policies considering the 
strained relationship between Britain and Italy, and the complex 
international situation. As we have seen in previous Chapters, it was at 
times like these that the importance to Britain of the fortress rose 
tremendously. Everything not connected with strategic interests or, as was 
the case in Malta in 1933, which conflicted with those interests, had to be 
subordinated to them. But British warnings to local ministers to desist 
from their policy went unheeded.[91] The Governor, who was holidaying in 
England, hastily returned to his post, took full control of the police and, 
following an ultimatum - which was rejected - to the Maltese side of the 
dyarchy, he dismissed the government, dissolved the local Parliament, and 
suspended the Constitution.[92] Power, once again, reverted to the 
Governor.
The policies that Britain followed in Malta in the following years







inevitable, was highly likely. Indeed Malta became a veritable fortress, 
political meetings, public or otherwise, were banned and the press was 
placed under stringent controls, so much so that a spate of sedition cases 
were now brought before the Courts.[93] In 1934 the function of jurors in 
sedition trials was abolished and it was decreed that sittings were to be 
held "in camera" and the sentence of the Court was to be accompanied by 
motivations that had also to remain secret.[94] Judges, known for their 
pro-English sympathies, were also elevated to the judicial bench, a clear 
sign this, that the government had no confidence that the pro-Italian 
Judges on the Bench, which included the Chief Justice, would give adequate 
protection to what were considered legitimate British interests in 
Malta.[95] This lack of confidence may have been strengthened by the fact 
that, in their private lives, Judges frequently went out of their way to be 
seen participating in cultural activities which had the glorification of 
all things Italian as their aim.
By 1934 the decision to remove Italian from any of its remaining 
strongholds was taken and this time there was to be no compromise or going 
back. Hence, the use of Italian was completely abolished from the Courts 
and Maltese substituted for it.[96] Similarly, Italian was no longer to be 
the medium of instruction in the University with English and Maltese taking 
its place.[97] To ensure the success of its measure the government also 
stripped this body of any vestige of administrative autonomy it may have 
possessed.[98] In 1936 the "Istituto di Cultura Italiana", a Rome sponsored 
body, was closed down, as were the other Italian schools which had been 
established under the 1932-33 Partito Nazionalista administration.[99] In 
the course of time even street names received their due attention, being 
changed from Italian to Maltese.
Seen in its wider context British policy can be said to have been
two-edged. First, it sought to strengthen its authority over Malta in
defence of its wider strategic interests. Second, it strove to strengthen
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its rule by drawing on the local patriotism, not of the Italian-educated 
professions, but of the ordinary people, hence the elevation of Maltese, 
the language of the masses, to a status co-equal with that of English and 
over that of Italian. Hancock wrote that in the 1930s
'British rule was appealing to the stunted Maltese nationalism of the 
masses against the cultural programmes which had been championed by the old 
nationalist party'.[100]
It was a policy which aimed to cultivate the affections of ordinary Maltese 
by the 'blending of an ancestral and Imperial patriotism.'[101] The spirit 
of the new call found expression in the new government-produced text books, 
'books of Maltese history, told in the Maltese language', but 'with the 
Union Jack stamped on the cover.'[102] It was, to say the least, an unusual 
policy, aiming to encourage nationalist emotions which colonial governments 
normally sought to curb if not deny.[103] It was a policy which, in some 
ways, was similar to that adopted by Ball in the period 1800-1809, 
differing only in that, at the time, it was directed to physical needs not 
emotional niceties.[104] It was a policy first advocated by Savona and 
later by Strickland but which the colonial government had refrained from 
pressing fully in deference to the wishes of the professional classes.[105] 
It was, in brief, an unusual policy for an unusual colony in which the 
political (local) and the strategic (British) were inextricably 
interdependent. But as World War Two was to show, British policy after 1933 
was to reap its reward - an intense local patriotism which resisted both 
the Italian and Nazi German onslaught, and a closer relationship with 
Britain which directed and sustained that resistance.
Britain, however, went further. It not only tried to balance
strategic interests with the gut nationalism of the lower classes, but
embarked on a programme of action which was intended to make Crown Colony
rule popular, at least, among them. Following the 1919 riots, Governor
Plumer had proposed a strategy which he hoped would stimulate economic
development. It was to be a government led and financed strategy.[106]
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London had seen in it one of the alternative courses of action open to it. 
One colonial official declared it a strategy for 'killing Home Rule with 
kindness' for it amounted to giving the Maltese 'liberal doles' in 
recompense for the. political disabilities imposed on them by the 
fortress.[107] Rejected, in 1919, in favour of conceding Malta responsible 
government, it was now adopted to meet the new situation. In the period 
1934-39 the government inaugurated and carried through a remarkable 
programme of public welfare. Health centres, especially for mothers, were 
established while a study of the causes of undulant fever, (sometimes 
called Maltese Fever), was undertaken with success.[108] Hospitals were 
improved and hygiene and sanitation given greater priority. By 1938 the 
infant mortality rate and deaths from undulant fever were the lowest on 
record.[109] Agriculture was improved and fisheries given greater 
support.[110] A programme of road construction and school building, in 
addition to an extension of the dockyards were also undertaken.[Ill] 
Events, for a time, aided Britain in its efforts. We have seen at various 
stages of this study that the Maltese tended to prosper whenever the threat 
of armed conflict raised its head in the Mediterranean.[112] In the few 
years between the Anglo-Italian crisis over Abyssinia and the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1940, a period of incessant crisis, Malta thrived. British 
defence spending in Malta increased and unemployment was drastically 
reduced. According to Austin
'by 1939, the standard of living was higher than it had ever been: the
national income per head was higher than that of Greece and not much below 
that of Italy.'[113]
How did the public service fit in during this period? Crown Colony
Government meant bureaucratic government and, therefore, the Crown could
not govern without either the advice or active support of its permanent
officials on the spot. Even so, in 1933-40, Britain saw in the local Civil
Service merely a mechanism through which it could stamp its authority on
the island and for carrying through its various programmes. In fact, first
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the suspension and later the abrogation of responsible government, were
followed by the publication of official notices vesting administrative
authority over government departments in the hands of individual Heads of
Department, although final authority belonged to the Governor alone.[114]
Most public servants, though not all, were quite happy to see the demise of
self-government. Party government had proved a strain on them. Incessant
quarrels between government and opposition, as well as constant litigation
in the Courts, had brought the administration to a complete halt.[115] From
time to time individual public servants were made the object of pointed
personal attacks by opposition newspapers for merely carrying out the
orders of their political heads as, for example, for instructing labourers
to replace Italian street-names with ones in English or vice-versa,
depending on which party was in government.[116] Restoration of direct rule
did relieve them of such difficulties but, only partially, for newspaper
attacks, which in Malta were considered to be an efficacious method for
intimidating opponents, continued until 1940 when the outbreak of war
finally silenced them.[117] Observers have noted, that in the
circumstances, Maltese civil servants reacted positively and their
efficiency helped London no end in securing its economic and social
objectives in Malta.[118] Sir Harry Luke, the Lt Governor between 1930-38,
seemed to confirm this when, in one of his speeches before leaving Malta,
described the Maltese Civil Service as the best he had known.[119]
Despite these words, from the very beginning, it was clear that
Britain was not prepared to trust too much for the success of its policies
on local civil servants. British officers were brought in to assist the
Governor in implementing the new measures.[120] The courts, traditionally
held to be the seat of opposition to the English language and to the
Imperial Government generally, were the first to receive this
treatment.[121] Apart from placing, on the judicial bench, legal men who
were known for their sympathy, if not support, towards Britain,[122] it was
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also thought necessary, at one stage, to introduce a rule - which would 
have brought Malta in line with other Crown Colonies - whereby appointments 
to the judicial bench were no longer to be restricted to law graduates of 
the University of Malta. But this idea was abandoned.[123] Other British 
officials, however, were appointed to the civil service proper, a measure 
which raised some protests from the Malta Civil Service Association.[124] 
This Association had all but ceased to exist under responsible government. 
Party conflict dominated throughout, a state of affairs which continues 
today.[125] The point is, however, that as the Association was impotent to 
press its claims under responsible government it was hardly in a position 
to resist London.
Other developments, however, must have soon made it clear to those who 
might have thought that resistance was possible or that British resolve to 
push through the elimination of Italian could not be weakened. The first 
concerned the removal from office, with loss of pension, of advocate Carlo 
Mallia, professor of Commerical Law at the University, and of Vincenzo 
Bonello, Curator of Arts at the National Museum and teacher of the History 
of Art.[126] The reason given for their dismissal was vague, namely that 
they had carried on activities prejudicial to Imperial interests in 
Malta.[127] As these individuals were in very close contact with Italian 
consular officials in Malta, it is fair to assume that they were suspected 
of being informers.[128] They were in fact denied, despite their efforts, 
the formal enquiry which was prescribed by the Colonial Regulations, a 
novel step certainly in the case of Malta.[129]
A second development concerned candidates to the civil service.
Although over the years many changes had taken place in the examination
system through which new clerks were recruited, these changes were mainly
confined either to the weighting in marks allowed for the various subjects
examined, or as to which subjects were obligatory and which were optional.
In 1857, for example, when examinations were first introduced, Italian and
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English were both obligatory subjects and carried equal marks. Over the
years, however, Italian began to lose out to English. In the 1880s its
total mark was reduced to below that for English. In the 1930s it was made
an optional subject. The only change which had taken place and which was of
a somewhat different character was the introduction of nomination before
competition. In 1938, however, a new rule was introduced which laid down
'that candidates who pass part one of the examination were to be subjected 
to a personal interview. Those who fail the interview shall not proceed to 
part two.'[130]
This new rule was intended to ensure that those who were not considered 
loyal to Britain would not proceed to part two of the examination, the 
reason for their failure being so unmistakable that it would act as a 
deterrent to others hoping for a secure, if not always a rewarding, career.
The third and final development was to prove the most dramatic. In 
September 1939, following its latest aggression, this time against Poland, 
Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany. By early 1940 France was 
on the verge of defeat and British troops were everywhere on the retreat. 
German victory seemed assured and it was expected that Italy would enter 
the war as their ally. Whenever this was to occur an attack against Malta 
was certain to come. In expectation of this attack several Nazionalisti, 
including Enrico Mizzi and the entire journalistic staff of his newspaper, 
were arrested and interned.[131] The attack finally came on June 11, 1940.
The Governor now put into operation the instructions which had been 
communicated to him six days earlier. Several public servants, whose 
loyalty was suspected, were arrested and interned, the most prominent among 
these being Sir Arturo Mercieca, the Chief Justice. All those arrested, 
however, were granted the entire pension to which they were entitled.[132] 
An attempt to deprive them of it by members of the Constitutional Party was 
in fact resisted by the Lt Governor himself.[133] Eventually Mizzi, 
Mercieca and several of those arrested were deported to East Africa to wait 
out the end of the war.[134]
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None of these measures were met with popular opposition. On the 
contrary as war with Italy loomed larger the anti-Italian sentiment of the 
working classes became more manifest. In 1939 Britain had decided to 
re-introduce the elective element in the Council of Government and to 
replace the existing one consisting of the Governor and a number of 
nominated officials. The new Council was to consist of the Governor, 
eight-officials, two nominated members, and ten elected 
representatives.[135] The Governor had the power to veto any Bill or to 
impose any enactment rejected by the council. In the election that followed 
the Nazionalisti were defeated by the pro-British Constitutionalists.[136] 
This, in itself, was a significant departure from the past. But a further 
demonstration of anti-Italy feeling came in 1940 when, news that a bust of 
Fortunato Mizzi had been unveiled in Italy, an attack was made on the house 
in which the father of Maltese Italianata had, until his death in 1905, 
lived.[137] Italian, hence, was on the point of being rejected; the 
outbreak of war ensured that rejection.
British policy after 1933 was clear and unmistakable. It was to
prepare the fortress for the events of war with Italy. The civil service
was administered with a strict authoritarian regime. Nothing which could
deviate Britain from its purpose was allowed. There was no talk of pay
rises and no more than token protests at the appointment of a number of
British officers over the heads of the locals. Britain was more concerned
with ensuring the loyalty of the public service than with effecting changes
in it. Having said that, however, a reorganization of the Clerical Branch
was announced in 1935, although this description was somewhat of an
exaggeration.[138] In fact, this so-called reorganization had two principal
aims. First, to consolidate the various number of offices, such as those of
Auxiliary Clerks, Clerical Assistants, Shorthand-typists, Unclassified
Clerks, Typists and Temporary Hired Clerks, which had been created under
party government, into one Lower Division consisting of two equal groups of
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clerks, to be designated Auxiliary Clerks and Clerical Assistants. 
Auxiliary Clerks were to be eligible for promotion - the method was not 
specified - to a new Higher Division, which consisted of the existing 
holders of special posts, which had been created on the recommendation of 
the Clauson Committee in 1913, and of the First, Second and Third Class, 
which were also to be retained. The government's second aim was to publicly 
stress that henceforth 'ability to write and speak the English language 
correctly' and 'the ability to write Maltese'[139] were indispensable
conditions for entry into the civil service of Malta and that knowledge of 
Italian was of marginal importance. This policy was to remain unchanged 
until 1964 when Malta was granted indpendence.[140] But in the years
leading to World War Two the priority for London was to make the civil 
service work for Britain. It had long been recognized that, in the event of 
a siege, the defence of the fortress would be greatly endangered by the
presence of a hostile or indifferent population. Thus, while the task of
the armed services was to prepare for the military defence of the Island, 
the function of the civil service was to secure, for Britain, by "good" 
works, the hearts of the ordinary Maltese. The Maltese, as in the period 
1800 to 1814, had to be made to identify their own interests with those of 
Britain and its empire.[141]
CONCLUSION
The necessity to survive the siege of 1940-1943 served to bring the
two communities together. The defence of Malta and the resistance of the
Maltese in the face of terrible deprivations, rightly made the Island and
its people one of the legends of the war.[142] In 1942, at the height of
the siege, Britain conferred on 'the Island Fortress of Malta'[143] the
George Cross in recognition of the bravery of its inhabitants. In 1943, as
so often happens in history, the ironic occurred. On September 10 of that
year the Italian Navy was seen limping into Maltese waters to surrender
unconditionally.[144] In that same year the British Government gave an
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undertaking to restore self-government in Malta at the end of the war.[145] 
This promise was implemented in 1947, but once again, on the dyarchical 
model, although the number of items reserved under the so-called MacMichael 
Constitution were far more limited than in 1921.[146]
The first elections held under the new Constitution resulted in a 
landslide victory for the Labour Party. Language as an issue, despite the 
efforts made by Enrico Mizzi and others to revive it, was dead. Class 
politics was to be the new issue which was to divide Malta into two 
bitterly opposed political camps. Consequently, internal political crises 
have continued to be a feature of post war Maltese politics.[147] periodic 
breakdowns in Anglo-Maltese relations were not lacking either and continued 
even after independence. In 1958 Britain was, once again, forced to 
withdraw the Constitution it had granted in 1947 and to govern the Island 
directly, until responsible government was restored in 1962.[148] More 
often than not quarrels between London and Valletta centred around the 
fortress which continued to exert its influence. As the red lines on the 
globe, once denoting the extent of the British Empire, receded, the 
importance of Malta as a fortress declined. After the Suez fiasco of 1956, 
in an Island where the fortress was the economy, British defence cutbacks 
fuelled one crisis after another. As in the past the Maltese public service 
found itself entangled in every crisis and every conflict and, today stands 
divided as it never has been before. This view is succintly expressed in 
the Report of the Public Service Reform Commission - A New Public Service 
for Malta - which states that
'politicians, who are subjected to diverse pressures, have succumbed to the 
temptation to factor the Service into the strategies of power politics. 
Willingly or unwillingly, the public service came to be associated with the 
use of public resources for partisan or private gain. As a result, trust 
between the political authorities and public officers on the one hand, and 
between the Service and its customers on the other, has been seriously 
eroded. So, too, has the internal cohesion of the Service, when its 
leadership was either compromised or relegated to the sidelines, and when 
it was deprived of the authority to direct its affairs and renew 
itself.'[149]
But the history of the public service in the post-war period will have to
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be told in another study, perhaps, by others.
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This study has examined the historical development of the Maltese 
civil service within the period 1800-1940 in the context of its social, 
economic and political environment. It is the first full length study of 
this particular British colonial administration which has been surprisingly 
neglected by Maltese historians and other students of colonial history. 
Indeed, both as an institution in its own right and/or as an integral 
element in the political process of colonial administration, the Maltese 
public service, unlike others, has failed to attract the attention it 
deserves. In fact a recent international study, which purports to examine 
the impact of the British colonial experience on Malta, almost ignores this 
institution altogether.[1] While it might be readily acknowledged, judging 
from the above discussion and the vast literature which is extant, that the 
Maltese public service was not in the same league as the Indian Civil 
Service, or for that matter, that of Ceylon, it must also be admitted, as 
this study has amply demonstrated, that it pre-dated and had a more 
intriguing - if not altogether colourful - history than many others in the 
British Empire.
This neglect of the Maltese Civil Service becomes even less 
understandable, however, when one takes into consideration the fact that, 
for 140 out of 164 years of British rule in Malta, the civil government of 
this fortress was entrusted to this body. Furthermore, the Maltese public 
service enjoyed a creditable first in that it was the first public service 
in a British non-settlement colony to be almost fully indigenized by the 
middle of the nineteenth century. We have had occasion to see at various 
points in the narrative that, in Malta, this proved to be a point of some 
significance for the see-saw nature of its political and constitutional 
process. The Maltese civil service had also the distinction of being among 
the first in the British Empire to have its members recruited through a
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competitive examination system. Finally, while the governments of other 
colonies came to provide and administer schools, to provide and administer 
hospitals, and to create and run commercial concerns rather late in the 
nineteenth century,[2] that of Malta had always been intimately connected 
with such activities. These factors cannot be thrust aside or ignored for 
they raise questions which are significant for the understanding of Maltese 
public administration as it was and as it is today.
Another feature, which this study has forcefully emphasized, is that
this neglect is not due to a dearth of material. Notwithstanding, it must
also be admitted that the failure of the "practitioner", (who must have
passed the best years of his life serving in this institution), to make his
contribution to make it better known and understood, has created gaps which
cannot be easily filled. The reason or reasons for this are unknown and one
can only speculate about the possible scenarios that have led to this state
of affairs. One explanation could be that the practice of sons following
their fathers into the service was much more common than the mere survey of
official records can ever reveal and it may have been be the case that none
wished to create difficulties for the other. This concern would have been
further augmented if the incidence of inter-marriage among civil service
families was also relatively high. We did see, for example, in Chapter
Eleven, one Colonial Office official state that Maltese Heads of
Departments tended to be nearly all connected by marriage.[3] In an Island
the size of Malta, where the number of educated persons was rather small,
this might very well have been the case. Another scenario may be that
private papers or recollections in the form of diaries do exist, but that
their owners have, as yet, neither considered their publication nor making
them available for scholarly research. Perhaps the present research may
encourage them to do one or the other. Whatever the reasons, however, the
absence of such sources in published or unpublished form does determine a
little the style of this work, making the discussion particularly dependent
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on official records.
However, in this context, this study serves to give greater meaning, 
more depth and a wider perspective to studies of Maltese political history 
under British colonial rule. It also helps to fill a void in an otherwise 
rich literature on British colonial history. Finally, by laying strong 
foundations for more research and comparative study, it aims to inspire 
others to build upon it. This study, however, raises issues of its own and 
these require brief comment by way of conclusion.
As noted in the Introduction to this thesis, the predominant aim of 
this work was to trace the historical development of the Maltese public 
service during the period beginning with British rule, in Septentoer 1800, 
to the outbreak of war in the Mediterranean in 1940. It was argued, in some 
detail, that in every case, there is a context, an environment, or 
administrative politics - a term which we borrowed from Peter Self - which 
explains and gives meaning to this historical account. Public 
administrations, it was argued, do not exist or develop within a vacuum. In 
fact, three interrelated propositions reflecting the importance of the 
socio-economic and political environment were suggested at the outset of 
this research. The first concerned continuity, or the inpact of the pull of 
the past or of other factors, on organizational structures, features and 
functions which, despite the passage of time, remained relevant and 
functional. The second aimed to identify the factors which, more than 
others, inpinged on the Maltese public service, buttressing continuity or 
inducing change within Maltese public administration. Three factors were 
specially singled out: Malta's strategic location and fortress role; the 
Island's weak and dependent economy; and its geographic size. Finally, it 
was proposed that these factors, together, pressed on Maltese public 
servants a "dirigiste" role in the government and administrative affairs of 
the colony.
When explaining, in Chapter One, why continuity was adopted as a theme
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or proposition for this study, it was argued that, prior to its occupation 
by, and cession to Britain, Malta possessed a system of public 
administration and an administrative tradition (described in some detail in 
Chapter Two), that went back several centuries. It had, in other words, an 
administrative system that was well and truly established. It was further 
argued, on the basis of examples taken from studies of British and French 
public administrations that, despite their gravity, political upheavals do 
not always manage to undermine existing traditions and structures, at least 
not in the short term. Hence, it was shown that public administrative 
systems which enjoy deep historical roots cannot be set aside and replaced 
so easily. It was a point which, as observed in Chapter Two, the French in 
Malta had failed to appreciate so that their attempt to sweepingly remodel 
the local administration met with resistance, revolt and ultimately, 
defeat. But we also assumed that change would eventually take place which 
would alter the overall structure of Maltese public administration and, 
therefore, many of its traditions. Again two reasons were advanced. In the 
first instance it was assumed that, given the changed status of Malta from 
that of a quasi-sovereign state to that of a military and naval base, an 
outpost on the strategic route to India, the structures and tasks of the 
administration would gradually change to reflect the new status. Second, it 
was assumed that since, generally speaking, nineteenth century British and 
colonial notions of administration contrasted sharply with those of 
paternalism found in Malta, British doctrines and practices would, in time, 
prevail.
Initially, events seemed set to follow in the logic of these
assumptions but, as it turned out, it was a logic that was dictated by the
degree of British need of the strategic resource that possession of the
Maltese Islands provided. Hence, in the first decade or so of the
nineteenth century when, in the words of Ball (Chapter Three), it was
necessary to give the Maltese a vested interest in wanting to preserve
487
British rule in Malta,[4] the accent was on restoring the system of 
paternal government as it existed under the Order of St John. In fact, 
Britain had embarked at the time on a deliberate policy which aimed to 
impress upon the Maltese that their system of paternal administration was 
safe in its hands. Indeed, it went further and sought to demonstrate this 
practically by investing considerable sums of capital in its restoration. 
Moreover, in its proclamation of 1801, addressed to the Maltese, Britain 
publicly affirmed its resolve to continue with this form of 
administration[5].
However, between 1813 and 1824, i.e. during Maitland's administration 
(Chapter Four), when British possession of Malta was no longer under threat 
or in doubt, an important shift in policy occurred. From now on the accent 
was on as much change as circumstances would allow. Thus, fees were 
replaced by fixed salaries; the various Charitable establishments were 
placed under one central authority; and an Audit Department was 
established. These were, in themselves, important reforms having long-term 
implications, for they helped pave the way for a more settled and 
centralised departmental organization. Furthermore, in line with colonial 
administrations elsewhere, local office-holders were relegated to the 
lowest ranks of the public service and their offices filled by British 
officers, nearly all of them the product of the system of colonial 
patronage prevalent at the time. But the most important reform of the time 
was the suppression of the Universita' or grain monopoly which, however, 
resulted in the introduction of the controversial grain or bread tax. It 
marked too, the first (and also the last), departure from traditional 
Maltese patterns of paternalistic administration to which Britain, despite 
its earlier declarations and policies, was wholly opposed.
Up to this stage, therefore, the pattern fitted the sequence of the
assumptions, and on the strength of these reforms, it appeared that the
Island's system of administration and its public service were destined to
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suffer other modifications over the coming years. Indeed, other reforms 
were carried out, including the introduction of competitive examinations 
for offices on the clerical establishment (Chapter Seven), and the division 
of clerks into classes (chapter Ten). However, as we saw, although such 
initiatives were innovative, other factors tended to mitigate their impact.
What has emerged is the predominantly resilient character of Maltese 
public administration in the face of persistent efforts, especially after 
1827, by successive generations of colonial officials and their envoys, to 
remodel it. Continuity was to prevail over change. In fact, as we also saw, 
the issue which, decade after decade, rose to confront these officials and 
envoys, was how to break what they considered the stranglehold of its 
paternalistic traditions and structures of government which, they claimed, 
stifled individual enterprise and economic development. The local 
government, it was often stated, did far more for the population than it
ought to and that, consequently, the administration tended to be rather
large. This, combined with the fact that Malta was too poor to support, 
from within its own resources, the financial burdens that such an 
administration entailed, led to the conclusion that it was in the interest 
of the Maltese themselves that the existing system should be replaced by 
one based on more liberal values.
British efforts in this direction were not lacking, as the reports of
Commissions entrusted with this task, which we have examined, testify.
There was the Parliamentary Commission of 1830 (Chapter Five), the Royal
Commission of 1836-38 (Chapter Six), the Rowsell Mission and the Julyan
Mission (Chapter Nine) of 1877 and 1878 respectively, the Royal commission
of 1911-12 and the Clauson Committee of 1913 (both Chapter Eleven).
Nonetheless, despite these and other efforts and, at times, precise
instructions from London, the existing administrative edifice proved
exceedingly resilient. Not only departments and offices which the local
government was repeatedly instructed to suppress, such as the Monte di
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Pieta', the Police Physicians establishment, the Treasury, the Printing 
Office and others, continued to function as before or remained on their 
earlier footing, but the local administration continued to grow larger and 
more costly. In fact, we saw, as the discussion progressed, the government 
taking on greater responsibilities (see Diagram 13:1), such as the building 
and running of an Opera House (Chapter Eight), sanitation, (Chapter Ten), 
the Railway Service (Chapter Eleven), research into diseases common to 
Malta (Chapter Twelve), and the occasional foray into the grain market in 
times of scarcity. Consequently, nine decades of Colonial Office pressure 
to have the Island's system of public administration rationalised had 
produced scant results. Until 1921, the number of departments actually 
suppressed, could be counted on the fingers of one hand while the rest, 
sometimes under different names, (e.g. Administration of Public property to 
Land Revenue), continued to perform, albeit with some changes, the same 
functions which they had performed before 1798.
The sting in the tail, however, came in the period 1921-1940 which we
examined in Chapter Twelve. First, we witnessed there the failure of
elected Maltese politicians, despite their public statements when in
opposition, either to improve, or to rationalise the public service.
Instead, in their hands the administration became more or less a vehicle
for party interests. One reason for this was the stiff competition for
votes that existed which made political parties re-think their priorities.
Second, we saw that after the withdrawal of responsible government, in
1933, it was Britain's turn to rethink its priorities and it did so to an
extent that retrenchment in Malta was no longer seen either as desirable or
advantageous. What Britain aimed for now was a policy which, in the face of
a growing Italian threat, would, as in 1800-1812, rally the Maltese to its
side by giving them a valid cause for wishing to remain under British rule.
The appropriate policy at the time appeared to be more paternalism
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1800), the public service of those elements whan it considered to be 
attached to the 'cause of the enemy'.[6] Hence, it may be said that, 
because of the wider political context, by 1940 British policy towards the 
local public service and the administration generally, had come full 
circle. Thus, while in September 1800, for political reasons, Britain had 
deliberately restored the paternal system of government that had existed 
under the Order, in the period 1933-40, again for political reasons, it 
deliberately set out to extend it.
Having established continuity we must now explain why this continuity, 
this stubborn resistance to change, these reversions to earlier policies? 
The answer that this study has propounded is, that continuity arose because 
the kind of public service and administrative organization that Malta 
possessed, existed not so much out of choice, but mainly in response to a 
set of circumstances which remained dominant throughout the whole of the 
period under examination. These set of circumstances also gave rise to 
various vested interests, of individuals, of groups and of the colonial 
power itself which, in their turn, helped to reinforce continuity. These 
circumstances were, in the first instance, of a socio-economic nature and 
consisted of the small size of the Islands and their large civil 
population, dependence on external sources for food, and a lack of mineral 
or economic resources. Second, they were strategic and arose from the 
fortress role which the Islands came to have under the government of the 
Order of St John and that of Britain. The strategic resource was, in fact, 
the only important resource that Malta possessed and which, therefore, made 
Malta worth possessing.
Over the centuries the socio-economic characteristics of Malta had
given rise to several problems and difficulties, such as, competition for,
and pressure on, such scarce resources as land, food and water;
unemployment and generally very low wages for those in enployment; and the
everpresent danger of severe food shortages and, at times, famine. Before
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Malta was ceded to the Order these features were already in evidence and
had fashioned in the Islands a form of paternal administration which
included some semi-autonomous bodies (Chapter Two). The Maltese, conscious
of their general poverty and dependence, tended to regard the activities of
this administration as vital to their daily well-being and, in time of
crisis, to their very survival. The arrival of the Knights changed nothing
from these circumstances but, rather, added to the difficulties, for the
meagre resources of Malta had now to be shared with the newcomers. Malta,
it must be remembered, was the home of the Order not its colony and its
circumstances applied also to the Knights, their foreign regiments and
moorish slaves. This, for example, was not fully true of Britain for, in
peace time, its troops were provisioned through separate arrangements from
the population. The Order, therefore, recognised how vital, in time of
peace, some of the existing institutions, such as the grain monopoly, were
for the well-being of the population and, in time of siege, for its own
survival. Thus, it strengthened some of them, created new ones and, when
necessary, sustained others, to do this the Order invested in Malta some of
its European revenues. It also encouraged commerce, notably that of cotton,
education and the arts. One outcome of this policy was a large bureaucracy
which, through its numerous offices, provided enployment opportunities for
many Maltese. Another was the emergence of a small literate and
professional body from among the inhabitants. In the nineteenth century one
British official at the Colonial Office remarked that, among British Crown
Colonies, this feature was almost unique to Malta.[7] Consequently, during
this period, thanks to the extensive system of paternalism that the Order
sustained in Malta, the inhabitants came to enjoy a hitherto unknown period
of economic stability and freedom from want. The point here, and an
inportant one too, is that life in Malta was made tolerable because of
paternalism. The Order could not and did not change the socio-economic
characteristics of Malta. It merely mitigated their influence. Hence, we
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saw, that Maltese disenchantment with the government of the Order began to 
make itself evident when the latter, because of the loss of its European 
revenues, was no longer in a position to do this anymore.
There can be little doubt that Colonial officials in Downing Street, 
like the Knights, appreciated that the Maltese were poor and that their 
standard of living was remarkably low. Our detailed examination of Colonial 
Office Minutes has demonstrated this unequivocally. What most colonial 
officials rejected, although there were some important exceptions here 
too,[8] was the idea that paternalism in Malta was somehow crucial or vital 
for the welfare of the population. On the contrary, the general view was 
that the socio-economic circumstances of Malta were largely the result of 
paternalism rather than its cause. What was required, therefore, was not 
more paternalism which, as already noted, was considered to be an obstacle 
to development, but the dismantling of existing structures. Also required 
was an education that would encourage the Maltese to curb their prolific 
birth-rate and a disposition, among the redundant population, to settle in 
other, perhaps more distant, parts of the globe. It was such notions which 
had inspired the several British attempts, (to which reference was made 
earlier), to change the system of administration and to reduce offices in 
Malta.
Britain accepted, although it thought the Maltese position mistaken,
that the latter tended to view the matter differently and that they
attached a great deal of importance to their paternalistic institutions.
Almost every Civil Commissioner or Governor who had served in Malta had, at
one time or another, pressed this view on the Home authorities. From Ball
(1803-9) to Plumer (1919), they nearly all held that British control over,
and effective exploitation of, the strategic resource required a
commitment, or sacrifice, on the part of Britain, towards Maltese welfare.
In other words, they thought that it entailed a cost. Perhaps one of the
most poignant statements of this view was that made by Governor Grant in
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the 1860s (Chapter Nine) when he pleaded with the Secretary of State that, 
on grounds of 'good policy' Maltese sympathies towards the Mother Country 
should be 'specially fostered and maintained' and that the Maltese should 
be 'practically taught to look to Great Britain for all their benefits'.[9] 
There were, as we have seen others, some before and some later, who had 
pressed a similar point.[10] London was not oblivious to any of this for, 
as demonstrated a short while ago, whenever Britain was faced with an 
actual (as in 1800-1812), or impending (as after 1933), challenge to its 
possession of Malta, it did not hesitate to assume in Malta the role both 
of sponsor and promoter of paternal administration. In fact, British 
pursuit of its strategic - i.e. vested - interests, provides a partial 
explanation for continuity.
What emerges from this study, however, is that it was the British view 
that was flawed. In Malta, its socio-economic circumstances did make 
paternal administration necessary for the well-being of the inhabitants and 
more so under British rule than at any previous period in the history of 
the islands. The evidence was there to be grasped! It was, for example, 
evident if one looked at the outcome of policies which were intended to 
chip away at the existing paternalistic structures. There was the tragic 
events of the 1820s and 30s which occurred partly as a result of the 
decision, taken in London, to open up the grain market in Malta to 
competition and to allow the levying of a tax on its sale.[11] The 
resulting tragedy might have been worse were it not that, at the time, the 
local government was still able to keep a stock of grain for the use of the 
population in such situations and hence, to intervene in the market to 
influence the price. The effects of this decision were, to a considerable 
degree, to continue to be felt throughout the period examined (see Chapters 
Six, Seven, Eight and Eleven).
It was also evident in those acts of defiance, overt or indirect, by
Governors in respect of precise instructions from London to refrain from
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inplementing some measure or to suppress offices and departments. In this 
Chapter, though in a different context, we have already pointed to examples 
regarding the latter. With respect to the former, however, two examples 
would suffice. We had occasion to see, for example, in Chapter Five,
Hastings' and Ponsonby's defiance of both the Treasury and the Colonial 
Office in respect of the House of Industry for girls, the creation of the 
Board of Health and the granting of pensions to public servants or their
widows. In Chapter Ten, it was Borton's (and the elected members')
determined opposition to both Rowsell's and Julyan's reforms which best 
expressed this defiance.
There was evidence of it in the constant recourse to schemes of public
works in an effort to maintain people in employment; in the local
government's reluctance either to charge the market value for its extensive
property or to press its tenants, urban or rural, to pay the arrears on
their rent; in its readiness to allow destitute persons to take up
bed-space in the several hospitals that existed and in its unwillingness to
apply British principles and methods of charitable relief; and, finally, in
the creation of numerous useless offices in the public service to ease the
unemployment situation among the Island's educated young men; or, indeed,
in the government's reluctance to introduce new technologies, such as copy
presses, which might make officers redundant. It may be tempting to dismiss
these measures, as nearly every commission did, as nothing less than an
exercise in popularity hunting by the local administration. To an extent
they were. We saw, in Chapter Six, George Cornewall Lewis writing of the
'intense'[12] hatred that the Maltese harboured against the British for
depriving them of all the administrative offices. His solution, and that of
his colleague John Austin, as Commissioners, was to hand back those offices
to Maltese public servants stressing, among other things, the popularity
that Britain would gain from this measure.[13] Thus, popularity had its
political advantages. The fact was, however, that these measures were the
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response of an impotent administration seeking mainly, though not 
exclusively, to help make the otherwise bleak life of its subjects, barely 
tolerable.
Further proof to sustain this argument can be found in the 
administrations of those Governors who were known opponents of paternalism, 
such as Maitland and Le Marchant, and who had declared their intention to 
systematically curb it. Thomas Maitland (Chapter Four) begun his tenure 
openly declaring his intention to remodel the administration 'in toto' and 
away from its paternalistic structures. Nonetheless, we found him a few 
years later resisting Colonial Office instructions to suppress the 
government grain monopoly, on the ground, that such a measure might 
endanger the livelihood of the people and the tranquility of the colony; 
and creating government-sponsored cotton factories in Malta and Gozo in an 
effort to relieve some of the distress among the population. In 1858 
Gaspard le Marchant too embarked on his administration with a scathing 
attack on the public service and a promise to liberalise it (Chapter 
Eight). He too tried to make good his promise, as his decision to suppress 
the high-spending Public Works Department and to introduce a system of 
tendering demonstrated. However, as we saw, not only economic conditions in 
Malta thwarted the Governor's plans, but in the following years they were 
to force him to intervene in the grain market, to stave off famine among 
the population, and to defend his generally paternalistic administration 
from Colonial Office criticism. It may be said, therefore, that 
notwithstanding their earlier efforts, both Maitland and Le Marchant proved 
to be no less paternalistic in their administrations than other Governors.
The reasons for this are clearly brought out in the text. The social
and economic problems of Malta, i.e. unemployment, over-population, poverty
and external dependence for food were chronic problems and applied to
nearly every administration. It was in their degree of severity that they
differed. We saw in this study that, by the first decades of the nineteenth
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century, Malta had already lost those economic activities, mainly cotton
and shipping, and revenues which, for centuries had largely maintained the
population in errployment. Moreover, the search for alternative industries
had proved futile and, from around this time onwards, matters were
complicated by the fact that the population graph began to show a steep
rise which grew steadily steeper as the century wore on. Steam and the
opening of the Suez Canal eased the situation, but only marginally, and
mainly in the harbour areas. It was the fortress which in time became the
focus of the Maltese economy. In fact, prosperity and depression became, as
we also saw, inextricably linked with the level of British military and
naval spending in Malta, mainly because this expenditure tended to increase
during periods of international tension (as between 1890-1903) or war (as
during the Crimean War), and decrease once the emergency had passed or been
dealt with. This intricate link between Imperial spending in Malta and the
actual social condition of the Maltese at any given time., was emphatically
demonstrated by the Royal Commission of 1911-12 (Chapter Eleven). The
Commission had concluded that, given the socio-economic conditions of
Malta, without this expenditure or government aid the Maltese were 'almost
helpless to meet'[14] and respond to what Julyan had called, their constant
'painful struggle for existence'.[15] In the face of these circumstances a
move away from the existing paternalistic system of public administration
was outside the realm of practical politics. The livelihood of the
population depended in large measure on that administration and this
explains the near-violent reaction, in 1878 (see Chapter Nine), of the
labouring poor, to rumours that Rowsell had recommended its retrenchment;
and the riots of 1919 (Chapter Twelve), which occurred at a time when even
those in employment were suffering terribly from the effects of inflation.
The valid conclusion that the above leads to is that, in Malta, paternalism
was vital for the well being of the Maltese and that it was bound to remain
so unless, of course, the socio-economic and, to a lesser degree, the
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strategic circumstances of Malta were somehow changed. British rule had 
failed to do this. Hence, its failure to break the mould of the 
centuries-old system of administration. Hence the reason for continuity.
Continuity was also the result of vested interests. We have seen, a
short while ago, how Britain's own strategic needs had helped to reinforce
continuity. But there were others, notably public servants and persons with
an education, who saw in change, or its prospect, a threat to their
immediate interests. For the majority of civil servants, reform was
generally associated with retrenchment and the likelihood of loss of office
which, in the Maltese context, also meant long-term unemployment and loss
of status. This explains why public servants in Malta continued, over the
years, to obstruct Colonial Office attempts at reform. This was
understandable given that the Maltese public service was almost the only
source of stable employment for persons with an education. Persons of this
description out the service, especially members of the profession, saw
in retrenchment a dangerous narrowing of employment opportunities, either
for themselves or for their sons. We did, in fact, see examples (e.g.
Adrian Dingli in Chapter Seven and Arturo Mercieca in Chapter Eleven) of
professional persons abandoning promising private careers for the security
of public office; of how strong the demand and hew harsh the competition
was for offices in the public service; and of how large (Chapter Ten) the
number of professional persons employed with the government was and the
problems it eventually gave rise to. Hence, attenpts at retrenchment tended
to be also opposed by persons outside the service, an opposition which was
generally articulated by the elected members. In the 1880s Governor Borton
pleaded with London not to press with the reforms proposed by Julyan on the
ground that the former, and many civil servants, were opposed to them.[16]
The labouring poor, on whom the bulk of the burden of taxation mainly fell,
feared, as we saw a little earlier, that retrenchmeent would result in the
loss of some vital service or benefit. It was a situation which, as Rowsell
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wrote in 1877, gave rise to a keen 'struggle among the generality for the 
existence of their class, and for individual existence within that 
class'.[17] Hence, in Malta, the maintenance of one's social status 
involved one in a stiff competition with others for the satisfaction of 
one's daily needs.
British attitudes to public service size and to language, because they 
appeared to threaten the interests of nearly every group and class in Malta, 
served to coalesce resistance to these unpopular policies. However, the 
keen struggle for existence, the result of the socio-economic circumstances 
of Malta, also created deep-rooted mutual distrust between these groups, 
with the result, that Maltese society and its public service, became deeply 
divided and fragmented. The source of this distrust was the struggle for 
control, over the administration and its resources, between the 
administrative elite and the political elite which took the form of a 
struggle for representative or responsible government. The general 
impression conveyed by this study is that senior civil servants were 
opposed to any notion of meaningful political reform. They held their 
position and salaries threatened if control over the administration and the 
revenue came to be vested in the hands of elected members. Of course, as we 
saw in Chapters Seven and Ten, civil servants never expressed their 
opposition to political reform in terms of vested interests, but in 
socio-political terms, i.e. the ignorance of the population and the 
likelihood of it being manipulated by unscrupulous persons bent on 
extending their power. But we saw how real civil fears were when we 
examined, in Chapter Twelve, Britain's decision to grant the Maltese a form 
of self-government. Ironically we also saw there how exaggerated these 
fears proved to be.
In like manner the political elite too, held its interests to be at
risk as long as control over local affairs remained under the jurisdiction
of the local administration and the Colonial Office. The behaviour of some
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Governors, such as Le Marchant, the decision to alter the system of 
taxation (Chapter Nine) and to replace Italian with English as the official 
language, merely heightened these fears. Hence, their determined struggle, 
since 1800, to achieve their end. This, inevitably brought them into 
conflict with the administrative elite who were equally determined to 
obstruct political reform. Indigenization and smallness also tended to make 
this conflict more divisive and bitter. Indigenization removed the 
traditional pattern to be found in Crown Colonies and in India of a local 
elite seeking to oust and replace a foreign administrative elite with that 
of a local political elite seeking to wrest power from a local 
administrative elite. Hence, the conflict divided the population, the 
public service and even families.[18] Smallness complicated matters 
further, not only because of the ease with which the whole population could 
be mobilised, but also because defeat for one side or another involved loss 
of face with that population. Herbert, at the Colonial Office, had made 
this (Chapter Ten), quite clearly. Sutton has argued that whenever conflict 
occurs in small states it tends to be both personal in form and strident in 
tone.[19] We have seen this to be true in Malta, especially in the case of 
Dingli, of Savona and of Strickland. He has also argued that conflict tends 
to result in the avoidance of decision-making. This view was enphatically 
confirmed, in 1919, by Amery (Chapter Twelve) who reported that, in the 
circumstances of Malta, indigenization and smallness, had resulted in 
administrative paralysis.
The final issue which needs to be addressed is whether, given the
impact of the socio-economic and strategic circumstances of Malta and the
extensive system of paternalism to which they gave rise, the role of public
servants in Malta was "dirigiste" in character. It was demonstrated, in the
Introduction, that colonies which did not enjoy self-government were, in
nearly every sense, bureaucratically governed colonies. Indeed, we saw
there that, in these colonies, some civil servants tended to see themselves
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as nothing less than 'despots',[20] albeit, benevolent Ones. On the basis 
of this argument it was assumed that Maltese civil servants would also fit 
this description, but, more so in their case, because of the special 
circumstances of Malta. One cannot say from what has emerged from this 
study that this assumption is supported by the evidence.
A dirigiste civil service is one which controls and gives direction to 
the social, economic and political spheres of public life in a colony. That 
is one which, through its own decision-making processes arrives at, and 
seeks to implement identifiable policies. Whether these policies succeed, 
or prove to be the right policies, is not the issue. What is at issue is 
whether these policies originate from within the civil service or from some 
other source. Examples of such policies are hard to come by in the case of 
the Maltese public service, unless, of course, one includes under this 
category its staunch defence of the status quo. In fact, the nearest that 
the local service ever came to having a policy of sorts was in the 1820s 
(Chapter Five) when, in the face of one of the gravest crises of the 
ninteenth century, it sought to organize emigration to the West Indies and 
to encourage the setting up, in Malta, of certain industries. Emigration, 
in fact, remained a central concern of the administration throughout the 
period under review and, as we saw in Chapter Twelve, in the first decades 
of the twentieth century a Department of Emigration was established. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult, on the basis of one policy to categorize the 
Maltese civil service as dirigiste or political-managerial. The factors 
which contributed to civil service inertia have all been discussed 
immediately above and nothing further needs to be added.
Many of the insights that we have gained through this study of the
development of the Maltese public service in the period 1800-1940 would,
probably, have been lost had we not sought to examine that development in
the light of the administraive politics of Malta. This would also probably
apply in the case of studies, whenever they are undertaken, of the Maltese
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public service in the post-World War Two period. Although, as already noted 
at the very end of Chapter Twelve, sane of the predominant issues of this 
latter period were different (e.g. class rather than language politics), 
other issues, such as public service size or the implications for Malta of 
the fortress, remained equally predominant. Indeed, while on the surface 
much seems to have changed in Malta, much that is crucial and important has 
remained unaltered or unaffected by these apparent changes.
One apparent change is that, in Malta, affluence seems to have finally 
triumphed over poverty. Yet, the dependence of the people on the state is 
greater and the public service larger today than it has ever been at any 
time in the past. Indeed, the government today accounts for nearly 48% of 
all those gainfully occupied and, indirectly, for the incomes of a 
substantial proportion of workers employed in industries which supply 
services to the government. The reasons for this state of affairs are 
complex and cannot be dealt with adequately here. But they are mostly the 
result of a combination of the special socio-economic circumstances which 
we have examined in this study, and of the intense political party 
competition which has characterized Maltese politics since independence in 
1964.
The fortress, on the insistence of the Malta government, ended its 
operations in Malta in 1979. Although, as Map 13:1 demonstrates, it still 
commanded extensive importance in the life of the island at independence, 
cuts in British defence spending in the 1950s had already signalled its 
decline. After 1967 this decline became more accentuated. Local 
governments, faced with massive unemployment and potential unrest, were 
forced to take over some of the activities, such as the dockyards, 
relinquished by the British. Hence, as the number of those dependent on the 
fortress for their livelihood shrunk, the number of those dependent on the 
government expanded.
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international recession and political or military crisis in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. From around 1955 onwards successive 
Maltese governments have sought to diversify the economy from its exclusive 
dependence on the fortress. This policy gave rise to new corporations and 
departments, such as the Department of Economic Planning and the Malta 
Development corporation. In time mass tourism, light manufacturing 
industries and transhipment became the mainstays of the Maltese economy. 
But, because of the fact that Malta still requires to import the bulk of 
its dietary and raw material requirements, each of these activities have 
served to stress the dependent nature of the island's economy even further. 
This has made Malta's economy particularly open to the vicissitudes of the 
international economy. Thus, slump and depression, have continued to form 
an integral part of Maltese economic life. Governments of every shade have, 
increasingly, taken it upon themselves to try and mitigate the effects of 
outside economic forces on the domestic economy. One important measure has 
been the creation of the Bulk Buying Division - a sort of modern-day 
Universita' - which is responsible for the importation, in bulk, of 
essential items of food and a number of raw materials, including timber. 
Other government corporations enjoy monopoly control on the supply and 
distribution of energy products.[21] Finally, governments have invested and 
continue to hold, majority stakes in enterprises in every sector of the 
economy.
A third explanation is political and ideological. As in Britain, the
year 1947 saw in Malta the establishment of the modern welfare state, with
the introduction of compulsory schooling, old age and sickness benefits and
wider health provision. Given that, in Malta, the role of the state in
these areas had always been relatively high, it may be legitimate to argue
that postwar government policy had served, merely, to transform charity
into statutory provision. After 1964 the intense party struggle for power
led to the abandonment of means testing and the introduction of the
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practice of universality in the provision of family, health, education and 
other services. Indeed, the state in Malta today not only provides many of 
the welfare services found in the advanced industrial nations but also free 
private education for those who want it.
While such policies have inevitably resulted in a much larger 
bureaucracy the attempt to finance . these policies have rendered the 
bureaucracy even bigger. In fact, the post-war years have seen the creation 
of the Inland Revenue Department, to administer the income tax system 
established in 1948, and government takeover of all commercial banks and 
other profit-making services, such as telecommunications, which previously 
existed as private corporation.
It may be said, by way of conclusion, that, by and large, this study 
and the foregoing both seem to confirm Lowenthal's view that 'the smaller 
the state the larger its government looms in its economy and society'.[22] 
However, they do seem to question the IMF's hypothesis, certainly in the 
case of Malta, that it is those countries that have been most influenced by 
the British colonial system of government which tend 'to errploy larger 
numbers of government civil servants in administration than do other 
countrires'.[23] Whatever the cause, however, it seems certain that, in the 
future, unless there is a radical shift of policy, and circumstances, the 
Maltese public service is destined to grow further.
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APPENDIX A
GOVERNORS OF MALTA (1813-1940)
1813-1824 Lieut-General the Honourable Sir Thomas Maitland
1824-1826 General the Marquess of Hastings
1827-1836 Major-General the Honourable Sir Frederick Ponsonby
1836-1843 Lieut-General Sir Henry Bouverie
1843-1847 Lieut-General Sir Patrick Stuart
1847-1851 The Rt Honourable Richard More O'Ferrall
1851-1858 Major-General Sir William Reid
1858-1864 Lieut-General Sir John Gaspard Le Marchant
1864-1867 Lieut-General Sir Henry Storks
1867-1872 General Sir Patrick Grant
1872-1878 General Sir Charles van Straubenzee
1878-1884 General Sir Arthur Borton
1884-1888 General Sir J.A. Lintorn Simmons
1888-1890 Lieut-General Sir Henry Torrens
1890-1893 Lieut-General Sir Henry Smyth
1893-1899 General Sir Arthur Fremantle
1899-1903 Lieut-General Lord Grenfell
1903-1907 General Sir Mansfield Clarke
1907-1909 Lieut-General Sir Henry Grant
1909-1915 General Sir Leslie Rundle
1915-1919 Field-Marshal Lord Metheun
1919-1924 Field-Marshal Viscount Plumer
1924-1927 General Sir Walter Congreve
1927-1931 General Sir John du Cane
1931-1936 General Sir David Campbell
1936-1940 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter
1940-1942 Lieut-General Sir William Dobbie
APPENDIX B
SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR WAR AND THE COLONIES (1812-1852) 
1812 Earl Bathurst
1827 F.J. Robinson (Viscount Goderich)
1828 Sir George Murray 
1830 Viscount Goderich
1833 E.G. Stanley
1834 Thomas Spring Rice
1835 Charles Grant (Lord Glenelg)
1839 Lord John Russell
1841 Lord Stanley (Earl of Derby)
1835 William E. Gladstone 
1846 Earl Grey 
1852 Sir John S. Pakington 
1852 Duke of Newcastle
SECRETARIES OF STATE FDR THE COLONIES (1854-1940)
1854 June 10 Sir G. Grey, Bt
1855 February Sidney Herbert
1855 March Lord John Russell
1855 July 21 Sir William Molesworth
1855 November 17 Henry Labouchere
1858 February 26 Lord Stanley (Earl of Derby)
1858 May 31 Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton
1859 June 18 Duke of Newcastle
1864 April 4 Edward Cardwell (viscount Cardwell)
1866 July 6 Earl of Carnarvon
1867 March 8 Duke of Buckingham
1868 December 10 Earl Granville
1870 July 6 Earl of Kimberley
1874 February 21 Earl of Carnarvon
1878 February 4 Sir Michael E. Hicks Beach
1880 April 28 Earl of Kimberley
1882 December 16 Earl of Derby
1885 June 24 Colonel F.A. Stanley
1886 February 6 Earl Granville
1886 August 3 Edward Stanhope
1887 January 14 Sir Henry Holland (Baron Knutsford, Viscount Knutsford)
1892 August 17 Marquess of Ripon
1895 June 28 Joseph Chamberlain
1903 October 9 Alfred Lyttleton
1905 December 11 Earl of Elgin and Kincardine
1908 April 16 Earl of Crewe
1910 November 7 Lewis Harcourt (Viscount Harcourt)
1915 May 27 A. Bonar Law
1916 December 11 W.H. Long
1919 January 14 Viscount Milner
1921 February 14 Sir Winston Churchill
1922 October 25 Duke of Devonshire
1924 January 23 J.H. Thomas
1924 November 7 L.C. Amery
1929 June 8 Lord Passfield
1931 August 26 J.H. Thomas
1931 November 9 Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister
1935 June 7 Malcolm MacDonald
1935 November 27 J.H. Thomas
1936 May 29 W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore
1938 May 16 Malcolm MacDonald
1940 May 13 Lord Lloyd
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